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Strategic Siege: Is Pakistan Being Surrounded

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Geopolitics has never been governed by sentiment. Not religion, not shared history, not cultural brotherhood—only interests. The unfolding realignments across South Asia and the Middle East illustrate this truth with striking clarity. Alliances are shifting, rivalries are recalibrating, and Pakistan finds itself increasingly positioned at the intersection of competing strategic designs.
The roots of today’s complexity stretch back to 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Pakistan became the frontline state in a U.S.-backed campaign to counter Moscow. Billions of dollars in American and Saudi assistance flowed through intelligence networks to arm and train Afghan fighters. The mobilization of religious ideology was not incidental—it was strategic. Fighters from across the Muslim world converged in Afghanistan. By 1989, the Soviet withdrawal marked a Cold War victory for Washington and its partners.
But militant infrastructures rarely dissolve once their immediate utility ends. The Taliban emerged in the 1990s from the ashes of war, establishing control over Kabul in 1996. Pakistan was among the few nations to recognize their regime. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, however, the same Taliban became the primary target of American military intervention. The subsequent 20-year war cost over $2 trillion and claimed more than 170,000 lives before the U.S. withdrawal in August 2021.
The Taliban’s return to power reshaped the region yet again. Instead of ushering in stability for Pakistan, however, cross-border militancy intensified. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), operating from Afghan soil, escalated attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Islamabad responded with cross-border airstrikes against militant sanctuaries. While tactically decisive, these actions strained relations with Kabul and risked civilian backlash.
Instead, Pakistan with its deep intelligence roots in Afghanistan, had the option to adopt the same tactics which Afghanistan is using by infiltrating Pakistani Taliban in Pakistan and killing innocent people mostly by detonating human bombs in Mosque. This could have been a more discrete way to weed out the menace of TTP. History suggests that purely kinetic responses can produce unintended strategic consequences. Airstrikes may eliminate immediate threats, but they can also deepen mistrust and create diplomatic openings for rival powers.
In geopolitics, tactical victories can sometimes yield strategic setbacks. By intensifying overt military pressure, Islamabad may have inadvertently accelerated Kabul’s search for diversified partnerships.
That diversification is perhaps the most striking development. The Taliban government, ideologically committed to Islamic governance, has increasingly explored diplomatic and economic engagement beyond traditional Islamic partners. India reopened diplomatic channels in Kabul and expanded humanitarian assistance. Israel has pledged billions of dollars of aid to Kabul in alignment with India. This is a profound geopolitical entanglement: an Islamic Emirate seeking expanded engagement with a Hindu-majority India and a Jewish-majority Israel, even as tensions simmer with neighboring Muslim Pakistan.
This underscores a fundamental principle of realpolitik: states pursue survival and leverage, not theological alignment. Religious brotherhood and shared culture matter, but only when they coincide with national interest calculations. Facing economic collapse, frozen reserves, and diplomatic isolation, Kabul seeks diversification. India offers infrastructure and access. Israel offers technological cooperation and strategic outreach. Ideology yields to necessity.
For Pakistan, however, the optics intensify concerns of encirclement. On its eastern border, India remains a strategic competitor, particularly over Kashmir. On its western frontier now stands an Afghanistan willing to engage Islamabad’s rivals. To the southwest lies Iran, itself navigating tense relations with the United States. This evolving geometry fuels perceptions of a tightening strategic ring.
An additional dimension complicates matters further: Bagram Airbase. During the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, Bagram served as the largest American military installation in the country, with dual runways capable of handling heavy aircraft and advanced surveillance platforms. Its geographic location—approximately 500 kilometers from China’s Xinjiang region—made it strategically significant.
U.S. President Donald Trump publicly criticized the abandonment of Bagram in 2021, arguing that retaining the base would have preserved American leverage, particularly in the context of intensifying U.S.-China rivalry. Bagram’s proximity to Central Asia, Iran, and western China positions it as more than a counterterrorism platform—it is a potential springboard in great-power competition.
While direct American military reentry into Afghanistan appears unlikely in the near term, evolving regional alignments could create indirect pathways of influence. The strengthening of India’s presence in Kabul, combined with Israel’s strategic engagement in broader Asian geopolitics, introduces analytical possibilities. Washington maintains deep defense partnerships with both New Delhi and Tel Aviv. If Afghanistan continues diversifying toward these actors, space may gradually reopen for U.S. strategic leverage—without formal troop deployments.
Interestingly, geopolitics often unfolds through indirect channels. For Washington, containing China remains a central strategic priority. For India, Afghanistan offers westward strategic depth. For Israel, expanded regional engagement broadens diplomatic influence. For Kabul, diversified partnerships reduce isolation. For Pakistan, however, these convergences heighten strategic anxiety.
For Israel, extending its engagement with Kabul through India would provide a strategic foothold in South Asia and enhance its capacity to deter Pakistan from aligning with Turkey and Saudi Arabia in any configuration perceived as intimidating to Israel. Such cooperation could be viewed as a counterweight to a potential alignment involving Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and nuclear-armed Pakistan, which some analysts argue might aim to exert strategic pressure or encirclement against Israel.
Simultaneously, the Persian Gulf remains heavily militarized. The U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain deploys advanced naval assets, while Iran has invested in ballistic missiles, drones, and anti-ship systems designed to offset conventional asymmetry. China, importing substantial Gulf energy supplies, and Russia, expanding ties with Tehran, both observe carefully.
Any escalation between Washington and Tehran would reverberate in Pakistan. The country already hosts approximately 1.3 million registered Afghan refugees. A major Iran conflict could trigger further displacement, compounding economic strain amid IMF-backed reforms and domestic political polarization.
Internally, Pakistan faces political turbulence, including debates surrounding the incarceration of former Prime Minister Imran Khan and federal-provincial tensions. External pressure combined with internal division magnifies vulnerability.
Yet one broader truth emerges from this complex web: strategic encirclement is not solely a product of adversarial design. It can also arise from miscalculation, overreliance on hard power, and insufficient diplomatic agility. States that rely exclusively on military tools risk narrowing their strategic options.
This is a defining moment. Great-power rivalry, regional insecurity, and ideological contradictions intersect at fragile fault lines. Afghanistan’s outreach beyond traditional religious alignments demonstrates the primacy of interest over identity. Bagram symbolizes the enduring shadow of great-power competition. India and Israel’s evolving engagement in Kabul reflects the fluidity of modern alliances.
But history offers a sobering lesson. From the Soviet-Afghan war to the U.S. intervention, military campaigns have reshaped borders without resolving deeper grievances. Stability requires not merely deterrence but diplomacy.
Encirclement strategies may promise leverage. Hybrid doctrines may promise precision. Yet sustainable security demands cooperation grounded in mutual recognition of vulnerabilities.
Geopolitics may be ruthless in its calculations, but peace remains the only enduring strategic victory.

Pakistan News

Rare Earths: Pakistan’s Economic Part 2

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : A mine has a finite life; the capabilities built around it can serve generations. Part One examined Pakistan’s mineral opportunity and the international partnerships that could help develop it. The next task is to connect extraction with a national industrial programme: Pakistani engineers operating sophisticated facilities, Pakistani enterprises supplying them, and Pakistani factories exporting increasingly valuable components and finished products.
This connection should become a central condition of mineral cooperation with China, Canada, the United States, Australia, European countries or any international consortium. Each major agreement should contribute to an industrial development plan, with responsibilities assigned to mining companies, manufacturers, infrastructure providers and public institutions. Measurable commitments can align commercial returns with Pakistan’s ambition to build a diversified economy.
The programme begins with infrastructure. Mines and processing plants require dependable electricity, water management, roads, rail connections and efficient ports. Industrial development also needs broadband, laboratories, workshops, warehouses and customs facilities. Planning these investments together would allow surrounding communities and businesses to share the benefits. A railway should connect productive regions; a power network should support factories and homes alongside mineral operations.
Industrial zones linked to mineral corridors could bring processors, component manufacturers and service businesses into connected locations. Their success would depend on reliable utilities, clear land rights, predictable regulation and access to customers. Common testing facilities, wastewater treatment and logistics services could reduce costs for smaller enterprises. Development should be measured through operating businesses, exports and employment.
Processing provides the first industrial bridge. Copper can support conductors, cables, transformers and electrical equipment. Suitable rare-earth feedstock can support separation, purified oxides, metals, alloys and magnet production. Commercial studies should identify which stages Pakistan can establish competitively and what partners, technology and scale they require. Investment agreements can then specify facilities, commissioning milestones and Pakistani participation.
Magnet manufacturing can connect these activities with motors, pumps, industrial automation, wind-energy equipment and automobile components. Engineering capability in these fields can gradually support more advanced production. Firms supplying one component reliably can qualify for larger contracts and more demanding markets. This progression gives mineral development a route into manufacturing through products that businesses can sell.
The wider ambition should include laptops, smartwatches, smartphones and other electronic devices. Partnerships with established manufacturers could develop components, precision parts, assembly and product testing, progressing toward design and engineering. Production for international brands, including devices such as iPhones, would require authorised commercial arrangements and qualification within their supply networks. Pakistan should negotiate pathways through which firms and workers can meet those standards.
Minerals supply one part of these products. Competitive electronics production also requires semiconductors, batteries, displays, software, precision equipment and dependable suppliers. Pakistan’s industrial programme should connect these requirements through joint ventures, licensing and research partnerships. A strategy would identify selected products, secure customers and build the complementary capabilities needed to manufacture them.
Automobiles offer another route through motors, wiring, sensors, power electronics and specialised components. Shipbuilding and frigate programmes could draw upon stronger capabilities in electrical systems, propulsion components and precision fabrication. Aerospace, satellite and space-launch ambitions would benefit from advances in materials, electronics, control systems and engineering. Participation should progress through civilian and other permitted partnerships, with the necessary certifications and technology approvals.
Pakistani people must occupy the centre of this transformation. Universities should expand relevant programmes in geology, mining, metallurgy, chemical engineering, materials science, electronics and industrial automation. Colleges and vocational institutions should prepare electricians, mechanics, welders, machinists and laboratory technicians. New institutions should be established where regional demand requires them, while existing institutions receive equipment, qualified teachers and industry partnerships.
Scholarships should give students from producing districts a direct route into these professions. Paid apprenticeships and supervised practical training should connect education with employment. Joint ventures should establish time-bound plans for Pakistani engineers and managers to assume greater operational responsibility. Success would be demonstrated by competence in running, maintaining, troubleshooting and improving complex facilities.
Research partnerships should leave permanent capacity within Pakistan. Shared laboratories, pilot plants, geological databases and negotiated access to technical knowledge can help institutions solve industrial problems. Agreements should define intellectual-property rights, licensing and opportunities for Pakistani innovation. Research funding should support processing efficiency, recycling, water conservation and new materials, allowing knowledge generated by collaboration to create further enterprises.
Business and financial infrastructure must develop alongside technical capacity. Local suppliers need working capital, equipment finance, insurance and timely payment. Exporters need trade finance, certification and efficient customs. Transparent procurement can help Pakistani companies enter supply networks, while long-term customer agreements improve investment confidence. Public financial support should carry clear limits, disclosed obligations and performance conditions.
Mineral revenues can finance this wider productive base. A transparent framework should provide predictable allocations for producing communities, investment in education and infrastructure, and savings against commodity downturns. Expenditure should follow verified receipts and public audits. Supporting manufacturing and local enterprise would broaden the sources of income available when particular mines approach the end of their lives.
Environmental management protects that future. Water use, tailings, emissions and eventual rehabilitation need funded obligations and independent monitoring. Communities should participate in decisions affecting their land and livelihoods, with lawful compensation and accessible remedies. Recycling metals and magnets can create additional businesses while retaining valuable material within the economy.
The foundation is accountable government. Credible elections, independent courts, empowered provinces and effective local authorities can give citizens a voice in the use of their wealth. Parliament should scrutinise major agreements, while independent regulators oversee environmental and commercial obligations. The armed forces should fulfil their constitutional security responsibilities, with economic policy directed by elected civilian institutions.
Pakistan’s economic promise will be fulfilled through the factories, skills, research and enterprises its mineral partnerships help create. Negotiating this connection is a national responsibility. With capable governance and sustained cooperation, Pakistan can export finished products, develop its own technology and build prosperity that outlives the deposits from which the transformation began.

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Rare Earths: Pakistan’s Economic Part 1

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Rare earths offer Pakistan an opportunity to change its economic destiny. Their greatest promise lies in connecting the country’s geological wealth with the industries shaping modern life: electric vehicles, electronics, clean energy, advanced machinery and aerospace. Growing international interest can bring the capital, technology and markets needed for this transformation. Pakistan’s task is to build partnerships that turn mineral deposits into lasting productive capacity, skilled employment and public prosperity.
America’s chargé d’affaires in Pakistan, Natalie A. Baker, has described cooperation extending from geological assessment and extraction to workforce training, schools and transport infrastructure. Her reference to mineral potential reaching seven trillion dollars sits within published estimates of $6 trillion to $8 trillion. The opportunity she outlined provides a basis for agreements that connect mining investment with local development and a wider industrial economy.
Energy Update, citing the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of Pakistan, reports mineral-bearing areas extending across approximately 600,000 square kilometres, with 92 known minerals, including 52 commercially exploited. SFA (Oxford) estimates recoverable rare-earth oxide potential at 100,000 to 500,000 tonnes. These estimates offer a starting point for systematic exploration, deposit assessment and investment planning.
My own association with this opportunity reaches back four decades. In 1986, while working as a news producer, I accompanied a visiting Chinese state minister during a tour connected with mineral deposits in Balochistan. The delegation’s interest reflected an early appreciation of the region’s potential. Subsequent Chinese involvement at Saindak established an important chapter in Pakistan’s mineral development, providing experience upon which broader partnerships can build.
Reko Diq demonstrates the scale of Pakistan’s documented copper-gold opportunity. Barrick’s year-end 2025 disclosures identify 7.3 million tonnes of contained copper and 13 million ounces of gold attributable to its 50 percent interest. Project-wide quantities implied by these rounded figures are approximately 14.6 million tonnes of copper and 26 million ounces of gold. Federal Pakistani enterprises and Balochistan each hold 25 percent of the venture.
Using illustrative prices of $10,000 per tonne of copper and $3,000 per ounce of gold, those quantities represent approximately $224 billion in gross contained-metal value. Commercial returns will emerge over decades through production, sales and expenditure. Pakistan’s benefits will include agreed royalties, taxes, dividends, employment and domestic procurement. The volume of activity retained within the country will determine how widely these benefits spread.
Rare earths create a related avenue for industrial development. Geological research identifies promising formations at Sillai Patti, Koga, Loe Shilman, Warsak and Jambil in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Studies document light rare-earth enrichment involving cerium, lanthanum, neodymium, praseodymium and samarium. SFA also identifies prospects around Skardu and Chilas, Chagai and the Makran coast, together with potential secondary recovery from Thar coal fly ash.
Research on Sillai Patti cites earlier sampled-material averages of approximately 314 parts per million of neodymium, 915 of cerium and 519 of lanthanum. A hyperspectral investigation identified portions of samples reaching approximately 1,000 parts per million of neodymium. Representative drilling, mineralogical analysis and processing trials can translate this scientific knowledge into project-specific quantities, recovery rates and commercial values.
Neodymium and praseodymium are important inputs for powerful neodymium-iron-boron magnets. Samarium supports samarium-cobalt magnets used where temperature stability matters. Certain high-performance magnets also incorporate dysprosium or terbium. Developing these products involves concentration, separation, purification, metal production, alloying and precision manufacturing. Each stage offers a possible link between Pakistan’s resource base and a more technically capable economy.
American engagement already has a practical foundation. In September 2025, Pakistan announced a US Strategic Metals partnership with the Frontier Works Organization, envisaging approximately $500 million in initial investment and eventual development of a polymetallic refinery. USSM subsequently reported receiving antimony, copper concentrate and rare-earth material containing neodymium and praseodymium. The U.S. Export-Import Bank also lists $1.25 billion in authorised financing for Reko Diq.
Potential technical partners extend across the industrial chain. MP Materials operates in rare-earth processing and magnet manufacturing, Energy Fuels has demonstrated separated neodymium-praseodymium oxide production, and Arnold Magnetic Technologies manufactures advanced magnets. Their capabilities suggest possible commercial matches as Pakistani projects become investment-ready. Chinese, Canadian, Australian and European expertise can likewise contribute through competitive, transparent arrangements.
The economic scale is substantial. Barrick’s 2025 feasibility plan envisaged Phase 1 ramping up to 240,000 tonnes of copper and 297,000 ounces of gold annually. At the illustrative prices above, this represents about $3.29 billion in annual gross metal value. Its planned expanded operation’s specified ten-year average would represent approximately $6.16 billion annually on the same basis. Net national gains will depend on costs, financing and domestic value addition.
Barrick’s April 2026 update provided for slower development and a review through mid-2027. This makes phased planning valuable: exploration, infrastructure, skills and industrial investment should advance through clearly financed stages. SFA’s proposed rare-earth roadmap similarly progresses from initial exports toward processing and larger-scale mining. Timelines should guide coordination, with implementation measured through completed facilities and commercially qualified output.
Pakistan’s strengths are its mineral base and growing international attention. Its development needs include geological data, processing capacity, dependable utilities and specialised skills. Opportunities encompass exports, technology transfer and manufacturing; threats include security disruption, price fluctuations and environmental pressures. This SWOT assessment points toward coordinated investment, strong institutions and community participation.
The next step is to place industrial development at the centre of mineral policy. Agreements should connect extraction with infrastructure, Pakistani expertise and downstream production. That is the bridge from geological promise to economic transformation—and the question taken forward in Part Two: how Pakistan can use today’s mineral opportunity to build industries that continue creating wealth long after individual deposits are exhausted.

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Political Hoopla in Pakistan

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The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) government’s non-cooperation with the federal government’s policies and its opposition to military operations against terrorists led to the imposition of Governor’s Rule on 12 October 2026. Political hoopla has been a defining feature of Pakistan’s political history. The PTI’s dissenting and, moreover, defiant politics led its leadership and activists towards violence. However, the subsequent situation, in which security agencies reportedly identified deep links between KP-PTI leaders and the Taliban and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), convinced the federal government to impose Governor’s Rule. There are allegations that the KP government had a covert understanding with Afghanistan regarding cooperation. Although no one has presented evidence of such an understanding, the PTI’s non-cooperation with Pakistan Army operations, its silence on the deaths of law enforcement personnel, and its apathetic attitude towards equipping the KP police with the required modern weapons and other equipment reflect the provincial government’s detachment from federal policies. These factors have also reinforced the claims made by state institutions. Pakistan is a democratic country, but undemocratic policies and attitudes have devastated the dream of establishing a welfare state. The federal government has spent huge amounts of public money on maintaining a luxurious lifestyle for those in power, while the public has continued to endure severe hardships. Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir has expressed his desire to make Pakistan a hard state in which the rule of law empowers the state. However, this aspiration has yet to be realized because politicians remain reluctant to enforce the rule of law. The rule of law begins with genuine democracy, which is possible only through an empowered local government system. Yet, such a system is largely absent across Pakistan. It does not suit politicians and the civil bureaucracy because it transfers resources and decision-making powers to local governments for development work. Neither politicians nor the civil bureaucracy appears willing to share these resources and powers. Federal and provincial governments may formulate democratic policies, but their undemocratic attitudes towards implementation prevent those policies from producing the desired results. Governments are dominated by elite families that enjoy protection from accountability for illegal and corrupt activities. Such practices include shielding individuals from criminal proceedings, protecting the occupation of government land and plots, and benefiting from corruption, commissions from contractors, NGOs, fraudulent TA/DA claims, and bogus medical bills. This pathetic situation neither restores peace in society nor produces honest and competent leadership. Such a pathetic situation neither restores peace in society nor produces honest and competent leadership. After imposing Governor’s rule in KPK, what is to be done with the PTI followers and leaders? I opine that discarding the traditional policy of dividing the political party into factions is more harmful than declaring one party as a traitor and anti-Pakistan. It would have been better to create a parallel PTI faction instead of the Istehkam-i-Pakistan Party, etc. because the PTI workers must have been provided political shelter somewhere, but right now the establishment has left them in the doldrums, which can be more dangerous. This is what we warned about: it would be very easy for terrorist or violent groups to form governments in the proposed new provinces with small areas. Nobody can prevent violent groups such as TLP, TTP, BLA, etc. from clinching governments in the new provinces with small areas. Now, the federal government owes the entire responsibility to root out terrorism from KPK and to ensure the prosperity of the people. People expect positive results from this political strategy. To sum, if we genuinely want to transform Pakistan into a welfare state in which the rule of law is firmly enforced and crime and punishment are proportionate and consistently applied, ‘we’ must redefine the role of institutions. Who are ‘We’ is yet to be disclosed, although the Constitution ought to be the ‘we.’ Everyone, from politicians to those who exercise a strong grip on the system, must demonstrate the will to put Pakistan on the path to becoming a democratic country. The existing political system cannot transform Pakistan into a welfare state as long as elite capture (Gutterafia) continues to prevail and the powerful remain above the law.

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