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Strategic Siege: Is Pakistan Being Surrounded

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Geopolitics has never been governed by sentiment. Not religion, not shared history, not cultural brotherhood—only interests. The unfolding realignments across South Asia and the Middle East illustrate this truth with striking clarity. Alliances are shifting, rivalries are recalibrating, and Pakistan finds itself increasingly positioned at the intersection of competing strategic designs.
The roots of today’s complexity stretch back to 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Pakistan became the frontline state in a U.S.-backed campaign to counter Moscow. Billions of dollars in American and Saudi assistance flowed through intelligence networks to arm and train Afghan fighters. The mobilization of religious ideology was not incidental—it was strategic. Fighters from across the Muslim world converged in Afghanistan. By 1989, the Soviet withdrawal marked a Cold War victory for Washington and its partners.
But militant infrastructures rarely dissolve once their immediate utility ends. The Taliban emerged in the 1990s from the ashes of war, establishing control over Kabul in 1996. Pakistan was among the few nations to recognize their regime. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, however, the same Taliban became the primary target of American military intervention. The subsequent 20-year war cost over $2 trillion and claimed more than 170,000 lives before the U.S. withdrawal in August 2021.
The Taliban’s return to power reshaped the region yet again. Instead of ushering in stability for Pakistan, however, cross-border militancy intensified. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), operating from Afghan soil, escalated attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Islamabad responded with cross-border airstrikes against militant sanctuaries. While tactically decisive, these actions strained relations with Kabul and risked civilian backlash.
Instead, Pakistan with its deep intelligence roots in Afghanistan, had the option to adopt the same tactics which Afghanistan is using by infiltrating Pakistani Taliban in Pakistan and killing innocent people mostly by detonating human bombs in Mosque. This could have been a more discrete way to weed out the menace of TTP. History suggests that purely kinetic responses can produce unintended strategic consequences. Airstrikes may eliminate immediate threats, but they can also deepen mistrust and create diplomatic openings for rival powers.
In geopolitics, tactical victories can sometimes yield strategic setbacks. By intensifying overt military pressure, Islamabad may have inadvertently accelerated Kabul’s search for diversified partnerships.
That diversification is perhaps the most striking development. The Taliban government, ideologically committed to Islamic governance, has increasingly explored diplomatic and economic engagement beyond traditional Islamic partners. India reopened diplomatic channels in Kabul and expanded humanitarian assistance. Israel has pledged billions of dollars of aid to Kabul in alignment with India. This is a profound geopolitical entanglement: an Islamic Emirate seeking expanded engagement with a Hindu-majority India and a Jewish-majority Israel, even as tensions simmer with neighboring Muslim Pakistan.
This underscores a fundamental principle of realpolitik: states pursue survival and leverage, not theological alignment. Religious brotherhood and shared culture matter, but only when they coincide with national interest calculations. Facing economic collapse, frozen reserves, and diplomatic isolation, Kabul seeks diversification. India offers infrastructure and access. Israel offers technological cooperation and strategic outreach. Ideology yields to necessity.
For Pakistan, however, the optics intensify concerns of encirclement. On its eastern border, India remains a strategic competitor, particularly over Kashmir. On its western frontier now stands an Afghanistan willing to engage Islamabad’s rivals. To the southwest lies Iran, itself navigating tense relations with the United States. This evolving geometry fuels perceptions of a tightening strategic ring.
An additional dimension complicates matters further: Bagram Airbase. During the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, Bagram served as the largest American military installation in the country, with dual runways capable of handling heavy aircraft and advanced surveillance platforms. Its geographic location—approximately 500 kilometers from China’s Xinjiang region—made it strategically significant.
U.S. President Donald Trump publicly criticized the abandonment of Bagram in 2021, arguing that retaining the base would have preserved American leverage, particularly in the context of intensifying U.S.-China rivalry. Bagram’s proximity to Central Asia, Iran, and western China positions it as more than a counterterrorism platform—it is a potential springboard in great-power competition.
While direct American military reentry into Afghanistan appears unlikely in the near term, evolving regional alignments could create indirect pathways of influence. The strengthening of India’s presence in Kabul, combined with Israel’s strategic engagement in broader Asian geopolitics, introduces analytical possibilities. Washington maintains deep defense partnerships with both New Delhi and Tel Aviv. If Afghanistan continues diversifying toward these actors, space may gradually reopen for U.S. strategic leverage—without formal troop deployments.
Interestingly, geopolitics often unfolds through indirect channels. For Washington, containing China remains a central strategic priority. For India, Afghanistan offers westward strategic depth. For Israel, expanded regional engagement broadens diplomatic influence. For Kabul, diversified partnerships reduce isolation. For Pakistan, however, these convergences heighten strategic anxiety.
For Israel, extending its engagement with Kabul through India would provide a strategic foothold in South Asia and enhance its capacity to deter Pakistan from aligning with Turkey and Saudi Arabia in any configuration perceived as intimidating to Israel. Such cooperation could be viewed as a counterweight to a potential alignment involving Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and nuclear-armed Pakistan, which some analysts argue might aim to exert strategic pressure or encirclement against Israel.
Simultaneously, the Persian Gulf remains heavily militarized. The U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain deploys advanced naval assets, while Iran has invested in ballistic missiles, drones, and anti-ship systems designed to offset conventional asymmetry. China, importing substantial Gulf energy supplies, and Russia, expanding ties with Tehran, both observe carefully.
Any escalation between Washington and Tehran would reverberate in Pakistan. The country already hosts approximately 1.3 million registered Afghan refugees. A major Iran conflict could trigger further displacement, compounding economic strain amid IMF-backed reforms and domestic political polarization.
Internally, Pakistan faces political turbulence, including debates surrounding the incarceration of former Prime Minister Imran Khan and federal-provincial tensions. External pressure combined with internal division magnifies vulnerability.
Yet one broader truth emerges from this complex web: strategic encirclement is not solely a product of adversarial design. It can also arise from miscalculation, overreliance on hard power, and insufficient diplomatic agility. States that rely exclusively on military tools risk narrowing their strategic options.
This is a defining moment. Great-power rivalry, regional insecurity, and ideological contradictions intersect at fragile fault lines. Afghanistan’s outreach beyond traditional religious alignments demonstrates the primacy of interest over identity. Bagram symbolizes the enduring shadow of great-power competition. India and Israel’s evolving engagement in Kabul reflects the fluidity of modern alliances.
But history offers a sobering lesson. From the Soviet-Afghan war to the U.S. intervention, military campaigns have reshaped borders without resolving deeper grievances. Stability requires not merely deterrence but diplomacy.
Encirclement strategies may promise leverage. Hybrid doctrines may promise precision. Yet sustainable security demands cooperation grounded in mutual recognition of vulnerabilities.
Geopolitics may be ruthless in its calculations, but peace remains the only enduring strategic victory.

Pakistan News

Pakistan Prime Minister attend Leaders’ Summit of COP-31 in Antalya, Türkiye

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Antalya (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY):- Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif will visit Antalya, Republic of Türkiye, from 10–12 November 2026 to participate in the Leaders’ Summit of the 31st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
 
Prime Minister will address the Leaders’ Summit on 11 November 2026, during which he will urge the global community to take concrete actions to address the threat posed by climate change to the planet. He will highlight Pakistan’s steps towards rapid solarization and expansion of its renewable energy capacity, as part of its transition towards a cleaner and more resilient economy, along with its efforts to strengthen disaster preparedness and early-warning systems.

In addition, he will also call for predictable, adequate and accessible climate finance for developing countries to strengthen their resilience and pursue sustainable development.

The Prime Minister will also attend a High-Level Roundtable convened by the Presidency of the COP-31 on the sidelines of the Leaders’ Summit, and hold bilateral meetings with the Turkish leadership as well as several other world leaders.

Prime Minister’s participation in the COP-31 Leaders’ Summit is an expression of Pakistan’s strong support for the climate agenda, and will provide Pakistan with an opportunity to reaffirm its commitment towards working closely with the international community to address the climate crisis.

COP 31 starting Yesterday, Minister Climate Change of Pakistan Mr. Tasadaq Malik attended the opening ceremony in Antalya, Türkiye.

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Tehran’s Diplomatic Bombshell

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The arrival in Tehran of the defence minister of Saudi Arabia, the army chief of Pakistan and the intelligence chief ofTürkiye may prove more consequential than another round of American or Israeli military threats. Three powerfulMuslim countries, bound by the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, sat across the table from Iran while Washington and Israel contemplated renewed military operations. The question is not merely what these leaders discussed, but what they may have quietly agreed to do—or refuse to do—when the next missiles begin flying.
The delegation was extraordinary in its composition. Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Pakistan’s FieldMarshal Asim Munir and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin represented countries possessing enormous financial, military, diplomatic and strategic influence. Their collective appearance conveyed that Iran’s security could no longer be treated exclusively as a confrontation between Tehran, Washington and Tel Aviv. Regional powers were asserting their own interests in determining whether another devastating war would engulf their neighbourhood.
The war with Iran has transformed American military installations across the Gulf from instruments of deterrence into potential targets of retaliation. Reports and assessments of American military repositioning toward Israel, Jordan and other locations reflect this wider vulnerability. For Washington, geographic access remains a military advantage; for Gulf governments, that same access increasingly carries the possibility of devastating retaliation.
Saudi Arabia consequently faces an exceptionally difficult choice. American air defence systems, intelligence cooperation, maintenance arrangements and advanced weapons remain important to its security. Yet the presence ofAmerican forces can expose Saudi oil installations, airports, industrial infrastructure and civilian populations to Iranian orHouthi attacks. The attacks around Ras Tanura have demonstrated how rapidly regional warfare can threaten energy supplies and global economic stability. Riyadh must therefore calculate whether American protection is reducing its vulnerability or contributing to it.
Here lies the first possible hidden significance of the Tehran meeting. Iran may have sought assurances that Saudi Arabia,Pakistan and Türkiye would neither participate in renewed American-Israeli attacks nor facilitate them through military installations, airspace, intelligence or logistical support. No publicly disclosed agreement establishes that such promises were made. Nevertheless, the subject would be entirely consistent with Iran’s longstanding concern about foreign military infrastructure being used against it.
The second possibility points in the opposite direction. The Makkah Pact countries may have arrived not simply as sympathetic neighbours, but as a collective deterrent. Their defence agreement treats an attack against one member as a matter of common security. The presence of nuclear-armed Pakistan, NATO member Türkiye and economically powerful Saudi Arabia could therefore convey a warning that further Iranian or Houthi attacks against Saudi territory risk widening the conflict. Collective defence, however, does not automatically establish a commitment to join an American war.
This dual character makes the delegation particularly significant. It could simultaneously reassure Iran against foreign aggression and warn Tehran against attacking Saudi Arabia. Such diplomacy is not necessarily contradictory. It reflects an attempt to establish reciprocal restraint: regional states would avoid becoming launching platforms for attacks on Iran,while Iran would avoid retaliating against countries that remained outside the fighting. Whether such an understanding was actually reached remains undisclosed.
The third possibility concerns Qatar’s parallel diplomatic initiative. Unlike the three Makkah Pact countries, Qatar has maintained an intermediary role between Washington and Tehran. Its proposed seven-day confidence-building framework sought to bridge disagreements over nuclear activities, sanctions, maritime access and the wider conflict. Reports also indicate support for mediation from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. Thus, the Tehran consultations could represent complementary diplomatic tracks rather than competing initiatives.
Iran’s response to the Qatari proposal was nevertheless uncompromising. Tehran objected to demands for nuclear concessions before meaningful economic relief, insisting that the American blockade of Iranian ports and restrictions on oil exports must be addressed first. Washington, conversely, wanted nuclear commitments from the beginning. The dispute was therefore not merely over the contents of a peace agreement, but over which party would surrender its leverage before receiving guarantees.
The most consequential outcome of the Tehran meeting may lie not in what was publicly announced, but in what was deliberately withheld. A day-long consultation involving the defence minister of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s army chief, Türkiye’s intelligence chief and Iran’s highest political and security authorities could hardly have been confined to the four lines of the joint communiqué. Such meetings necessarily involve extensive deliberations on the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats arising from an ongoing war, including American military bases, Iranian retaliation, Saudi security, the Strait of Hormuz, economic sanctions and the consequences of another American-Israeli offensive.
Drawing upon my experience attending high-level meetings as Press Secretary and media adviser to the President of Pakistan, I know that public statements rarely disclose the full substance of sensitive diplomatic and security consultations.
The positive assessments expressed by the Iranian leadership and the visiting delegations strongly suggest that the participants found sufficient common ground to explore practical understandings and a coordinated pathway for responding to future developments.
Such understandings may include assurances of non-participation in renewed attacks against Iran, restrictions on the use of regional military facilities, reciprocal restraint toward Gulf countries and mechanisms for further consultations should Washington and Israel resume hostilities.
Kuwait and the other Gulf countries will therefore become important indicators. Their decisions concerning American bases, airspace, logistical support and diplomatic engagement could reveal whether the Tehran initiative develops into a broader regional non-aggression arrangement. The Houthis’ conduct will be equally revealing. A sustained reduction in attacks on Saudi infrastructure could indicate that Tehran and Riyadh have found a mechanism to separate Gulf security from the wider American-Israeli confrontation, although Houthi decision-making cannot simply be equated with Iranian instructions.
The timing adds urgency. Reports indicate concern about renewed American and Israeli military action around the November 3 American midterm elections. Whether such an offensive actually occurs remains uncertain. But if it does, the military effectiveness of the campaign will depend partly on regional access, intelligence, logistics and the willingness of neighbouring governments to absorb the consequences of Iranian retaliation.
Ultimately, Tehran may have achieved something strategically important without obtaining a single publicly declared concession: it has compelled influential regional governments to discuss security with Iran rather than merely discuss Iran with Washington. That is a meaningful diplomatic shift, even if its durability remains untested.
The real verdict on the Tehran meeting will not emerge from its carefully worded communiqué. It will emerge whenWashington next demands military access, when Israel considers another strike, and when Iran decides where its missiles will—or will not—fall. If regional governments refuse to become instruments of another war, the Makkah Pact may be remembered not as an alliance formed to confront Iran, but as the beginning of a Middle East determined to prevent outside powers from deciding its fate.

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Pakistan’s Moment Beyond the Battlefield

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : While Pakistan wrestles with political confrontation at home, its diplomacy is opening doors abroad. From the Badr memorandum signed in Doha to the earlier Mecca defence agreement, and from Riyadh’s security consultations to mediation with Tehran and Washington, Pakistan is acquiring a place at tables where regional security is being negotiated. The opportunity is considerable. The challenge is to turn international recognition into domestic stability, industrial strength and prosperity.
The Badr Memorandum of Understanding, signed on October 21 by Qatar, Türkiye, Pakistan and Indonesia, marks the latest advance. Its central purpose is defence industrial cooperation: joint production, technical training, research, development and stronger manufacturing capabilities. It offers a means of building the technological and industrial capacity that makes security sustainable.
Its promise lies in combining complementary strengths. Türkiye brings an expanding defence industry and experience in developing and integrating complex systems. Pakistan contributes military experience, technical manpower and established production facilities. Indonesia offers manufacturing capacity, a substantial domestic market and an important Southeast Asian base. Qatar brings investment potential and demand. Together, these assets could support projects beyond the reach of countries working separately.
The resulting opportunity extends beyond buying and selling weapons. Shared design, component manufacturing, software development, testing, maintenance and training could create enduring industrial relationships. A country that helps manufacture a system develops skills and supplier networks that an ordinary purchase may never deliver. The real prize is the ability to understand, sustain and improve equipment throughout its working life.
But signatures cannot run factories. Badr needs an efficient institution to translate ambition into projects, with agreed financing, clear responsibilities and deadlines. Partners must settle technology access, intellectual property, export permissions and the division of production before these become disputes. Each project should have accountable leadership and measurable milestones. Good faith must be matched by management capable of delivering on time.
For Pakistan, Türkiye is a particularly valuable partner. Their existing naval cooperation demonstrates how procurement can support domestic construction and technical learning. Turkish progress in drones, electronics, armoured platforms and naval systems offers further possibilities. Pakistan should seek arrangements that allow its engineers and manufacturers to become development partners, accumulating knowledge with every successive project.
This industrial initiative follows the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan in August, which established a powerful principle: an armed attack against one would be regarded as an attack against all. Its resemblance to NATO’s collective defence commitment explains the attraction of calling it a “mini-NATO”. For Pakistan, it represents recognition that its military capacity and strategic position have value well beyond South Asia.
Yet solidarity becomes complicated when it must move from declarations to decisions. These countries share Islamic bonds, but their relationships, interests and vulnerabilities differ. A confrontation involving Saudi Arabia and Iran, or attacks from Yemen, would confront Pakistan with difficult choices. Religious, social and historical connections cross the very boundaries that security arrangements seek to defend. An effective pact must therefore combine credible deterrence with political judgment and clearly understood responsibilities.
Nor does Mecca constitute a comprehensive Muslim alliance addressing every shared concern. The Palestinian question and Israel’s military actions remain central to public sentiment across the Muslim world, while the agreement’s immediate operation is shaped by its members’ security needs. Its worth will depend on whether it protects its participants while helping contain regional conflict. Pakistan’s strongest contribution would be to make collective security reinforce reconciliation rather than deepen divisions.
Pakistan also brings a distinction no other Muslim country possesses: nuclear weapons capability. Alongside this stands an experienced army, a capable air force and a smaller navy responsible for demanding maritime duties. The May 2025 confrontation with India, which Pakistan regards as a major defensive success, reinforced the importance of readiness and technological competence. India’s acknowledgment of initial aircraft losses underlined the seriousness of that contest.
Military standing, however, achieves its greatest value when it supports diplomacy. Field Marshal Asim Munir’s October 20 visit to Tehran formed part of Pakistan’s continuing effort to help bring the United States and Iran towards an accommodation. Such engagement requires persistence because the parties approach negotiations through deep distrust, competing security demands and domestic political pressures.
Pakistan is attempting a difficult balancing act: sustaining communication with Washington and President Donald Trump, preserving access to Iran’s leadership, and maintaining Saudi confidence. Its usefulness rests on remaining a credible channel across these relationships. Every conversation that clarifies intentions, reduces miscalculation or identifies a possible compromise adds value, even when a final settlement remains elusive.
This is where Pakistan’s defence partnerships and diplomatic role must reinforce each other. Friendship with Saudi Arabia should strengthen its ability to explain Saudi concerns to Tehran. Relations with Iran should help it communicate Iranian concerns elsewhere. Close ties with Türkiye and Qatar add further channels. Pakistan can gain lasting influence by helping countries find an exit from confrontation that preserves security and dignity.
That achievement would be more persuasive if accompanied by reconciliation at home. Continuing confrontation around Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and the imprisonment of former prime minister Imran Khan consumes political energy the country urgently needs for reconstruction. Pakistan should ensure fair and transparent judicial proceedings, end politically motivated restrictions and pursue his release through lawful means. He should have the opportunity to participate in normal democratic politics.
The way forward also requires free, fair and impartial elections, credible institutions and acceptance that political opponents belong within the constitutional system. Protest must remain peaceful, and the state must protect lawful political participation. A country seeking to mediate between bitter international adversaries should apply the same patience and confidence to resolving its own political disputes.
Peace along Pakistan’s borders is equally necessary. Terrorism must be confronted firmly, but lasting security also requires sustained diplomacy with Afghanistan. Islamabad and Kabul need practical arrangements to prevent armed groups from exploiting territory, manage border disputes and preserve legitimate trade. With Iran, cooperation should protect a peaceful frontier. With India, Pakistan should continue seeking dialogue and measures that reduce the risk of another military escalation.
Economic recovery must give these efforts a material foundation. Pakistan’s mineral resources can contribute far more if extraction is connected to processing and domestic manufacturing. Copper, gold and other commercially viable deposits should support infrastructure, technical education and industries that add value at home. Mineral wealth becomes national wealth when it creates productive skills, competitive businesses and lasting employment.
Badr could help cultivate some of the engineering, electronics and materials expertise relevant to that broader transformation. Pakistan should connect its diplomatic partnerships with universities, industrial estates, reliable energy and local suppliers. Exporting raw materials alone would leave much of the value elsewhere; building industries around them would allow Pakistanis to retain a larger share.
Pakistan has earned an opening. Its task now is to make external confidence durable through internal consent, peaceful borders and productive industry. The country’s finest strategic achievement would be a Pakistan whose citizens experience the gains its diplomats announce: greater security, meaningful work and a future worth investing in.

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