Pakistan News
Pakistan and the Yemen Trap
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Any indication by the Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations that Pakistan is actively assisting Saudi Arabia against Yemen’s Houthis would represent a major departure from prudent diplomacy. This would not be an ordinary extension of defence cooperation between two longstanding allies. It could place Pakistan inside a conflict connected with Iran, Israel, the United States, the Gulf states and the future control of one of the world’s most sensitive maritime corridors.
The Houthis, formally known as Ansar Allah, are no longer merely a Yemeni insurgent movement. They control much of northern Yemen, including the capital, Sana’a, and possess missiles, drones and maritime-strike capabilities. By attacking commercial vessels and confronting Israel, they have projected themselves into the wider Middle Eastern conflict. Their actions may be disputed strategically, but across much of the Muslim world they portray their campaign as support for Palestinians and resistance to Israel’s war in Gaza.
Bab el-Mandeb is central to this equation. This narrow strait connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and, through the Suez Canal, links Asian trade with Europe. Any force capable of threatening vessels, ports or islands surrounding this corridor can disrupt shipping, raise insurance costs, increase oil prices and force commercial vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. The Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are therefore two strategic pressure points capable of influencing the global economy.
Pakistan must distinguish, however, between protecting commercial navigation and entering Yemen’s civil war on behalf of one party. Intelligence sharing, naval protection of Pakistani shipping and participation in internationally defined anti-piracy operations are different from identifying Houthi positions, supporting Saudi or Yemeni government forces, conducting strikes, or helping one side capture strategically important territory. The first category may serve a legitimate defensive purpose. The second would make Pakistan a party to the conflict.
That distinction is particularly important because the Houthis are closely aligned with Iran. Tehran may not control every Houthi decision, but it has provided the movement with political support, military technology and strategic assistance. Direct Pakistani involvement against the Houthis would consequently be interpreted in Tehran as Pakistan joining an anti-Iran regional alignment. This could damage a difficult but indispensable relationship between two neighbouring Muslim states sharing a border of more than 900 kilometres.
Pakistan’s strategic plate is already overflowing. Its confrontation with India has not disappeared; it has only been restrained by an uncertain truce and the fear of escalation between two nuclear-armed states. Any new incident could revive that conflict with extraordinary speed. Pakistan is also engaged in an increasingly dangerous struggle with militants operating from Afghanistan, while relations with the Afghan Taliban remain deeply strained. Terrorist attacks continue to take the lives of civilians and security personnel inside Pakistan.
Opening a third front—directly or indirectly—in Yemen would disperse Pakistan’s military attention, intelligence capabilities and diplomatic resources. A country confronting threats on its eastern and western borders cannot responsibly volunteer for another conflict thousands of kilometres away, particularly one involving missiles, drones, maritime warfare, proxy organisations and competing global powers.
There is also an unavoidable Palestinian dimension. Whatever Pakistan’s assessment of Houthi politics or methods, the movement has publicly connected its Red Sea operations with Israel’s actions in Gaza. If Pakistani assistance weakens the Houthis’ capacity to confront Israel, many Pakistanis will interpret Islamabad’s involvement as indirectly helping Israel rather than merely assisting Saudi Arabia. Whether that interpretation is strategically complete would matter less than its political effect inside Pakistan.
Religious parties, opposition forces, student organisations and civil-society groups could mobilise against the government. Demonstrations might portray the civilian and military leadership as exchanging Palestinian solidarity for Saudi financial support. At a time when Pakistan is already politically polarised, economically burdened and institutionally divided, such a perception could produce protests, agitation and prolonged internal instability. A foreign deployment undertaken in the name of national security could ultimately weaken security at home.
Israel and the United States would also view an expanded Pakistani role through their own strategic calculations. They may welcome operations that reduce Houthi attacks on shipping, but they would remain suspicious of the deployment of a major Muslim military force with nuclear capability and extensive combat experience. A Pakistani force introduced today against the Houthis could theoretically be redirected tomorrow under changed political circumstances. Israel would therefore evaluate Pakistan not merely as a temporary partner of Saudi Arabia but as a potentially independent military actor entering its immediate strategic environment.
Conversely, if Pakistan limited itself to Saudi defence but refused actions benefiting Israel, Washington and Tel Aviv could still consider Islamabad unreliable. Pakistan could thus acquire the liabilities of intervention without securing the complete trust of either side. In a region where alliances shift quickly, tactical cooperation does not necessarily produce lasting strategic protection.
The relevant calculation is not how many billions of dollars Saudi Arabia may deposit or invest. It is whether that assistance compensates Pakistan for possible casualties, retaliatory terrorism, damaged relations with Iran, increased defence expenditure, domestic turmoil and exposure to a prolonged regional war. Measured against these risks, even substantial economic support could become an extremely expensive bargain.
Yemen itself offers a warning. Years of Saudi-led military operations failed to eliminate the Houthis. Despite superior aircraft, weaponry and financial resources, the coalition could not impose a decisive settlement. The Houthis emerged more experienced, better armed and politically entrenched. Pakistan must therefore ask what its involvement could accomplish that years of regional military intervention did not.
There may nevertheless be a legitimate Pakistani role. Islamabad can defend Saudi territory against external attack under clearly defined bilateral arrangements. It can help train Saudi forces, support mine-clearing, protect Pakistani shipping and participate in diplomatic efforts for a Yemeni settlement. It can also use its relations with Saudi Arabia, Iran and other Muslim countries to encourage de-escalation. But Pakistani personnel should not conduct offensive operations inside Yemen or become instruments in a wider campaign against Iran and its regional partners.
Before any deployment, the government must inform Parliament about its objectives, geographical limits, duration, command structure and rules of engagement. It must clarify whether Pakistani forces are defending Saudi territory, protecting international shipping or operating against the Houthis inside Yemen. Strategic ambiguity may temporarily protect officials from criticism, but it leaves the country vulnerable to mission expansion without democratic consent.
Pakistan’s relationship with Saudi Arabia is important, but it cannot override Pakistan’s own national interest. The country needs economic recovery, internal stability, secure borders and balanced relations with neighbouring Iran. It does not need another battlefield.
The wisest policy is therefore one of defensive cooperation without offensive entanglement: protect Saudi Arabia from attacks on its territory, safeguard lawful maritime commerce, support negotiations and refuse participation in Yemen’s internal war. Pakistan can stand with Saudi Arabia without becoming an enemy of Yemen, Iran or those who believe they are resisting Israel. That balance may be difficult, but it is far less dangerous than stepping into a regional furnace from which Pakistan may find no easy exit.
Pakistan News
Rare Earths: Pakistan’s Economic Part 2
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : A mine has a finite life; the capabilities built around it can serve generations. Part One examined Pakistan’s mineral opportunity and the international partnerships that could help develop it. The next task is to connect extraction with a national industrial programme: Pakistani engineers operating sophisticated facilities, Pakistani enterprises supplying them, and Pakistani factories exporting increasingly valuable components and finished products.
This connection should become a central condition of mineral cooperation with China, Canada, the United States, Australia, European countries or any international consortium. Each major agreement should contribute to an industrial development plan, with responsibilities assigned to mining companies, manufacturers, infrastructure providers and public institutions. Measurable commitments can align commercial returns with Pakistan’s ambition to build a diversified economy.
The programme begins with infrastructure. Mines and processing plants require dependable electricity, water management, roads, rail connections and efficient ports. Industrial development also needs broadband, laboratories, workshops, warehouses and customs facilities. Planning these investments together would allow surrounding communities and businesses to share the benefits. A railway should connect productive regions; a power network should support factories and homes alongside mineral operations.
Industrial zones linked to mineral corridors could bring processors, component manufacturers and service businesses into connected locations. Their success would depend on reliable utilities, clear land rights, predictable regulation and access to customers. Common testing facilities, wastewater treatment and logistics services could reduce costs for smaller enterprises. Development should be measured through operating businesses, exports and employment.
Processing provides the first industrial bridge. Copper can support conductors, cables, transformers and electrical equipment. Suitable rare-earth feedstock can support separation, purified oxides, metals, alloys and magnet production. Commercial studies should identify which stages Pakistan can establish competitively and what partners, technology and scale they require. Investment agreements can then specify facilities, commissioning milestones and Pakistani participation.
Magnet manufacturing can connect these activities with motors, pumps, industrial automation, wind-energy equipment and automobile components. Engineering capability in these fields can gradually support more advanced production. Firms supplying one component reliably can qualify for larger contracts and more demanding markets. This progression gives mineral development a route into manufacturing through products that businesses can sell.
The wider ambition should include laptops, smartwatches, smartphones and other electronic devices. Partnerships with established manufacturers could develop components, precision parts, assembly and product testing, progressing toward design and engineering. Production for international brands, including devices such as iPhones, would require authorised commercial arrangements and qualification within their supply networks. Pakistan should negotiate pathways through which firms and workers can meet those standards.
Minerals supply one part of these products. Competitive electronics production also requires semiconductors, batteries, displays, software, precision equipment and dependable suppliers. Pakistan’s industrial programme should connect these requirements through joint ventures, licensing and research partnerships. A strategy would identify selected products, secure customers and build the complementary capabilities needed to manufacture them.
Automobiles offer another route through motors, wiring, sensors, power electronics and specialised components. Shipbuilding and frigate programmes could draw upon stronger capabilities in electrical systems, propulsion components and precision fabrication. Aerospace, satellite and space-launch ambitions would benefit from advances in materials, electronics, control systems and engineering. Participation should progress through civilian and other permitted partnerships, with the necessary certifications and technology approvals.
Pakistani people must occupy the centre of this transformation. Universities should expand relevant programmes in geology, mining, metallurgy, chemical engineering, materials science, electronics and industrial automation. Colleges and vocational institutions should prepare electricians, mechanics, welders, machinists and laboratory technicians. New institutions should be established where regional demand requires them, while existing institutions receive equipment, qualified teachers and industry partnerships.
Scholarships should give students from producing districts a direct route into these professions. Paid apprenticeships and supervised practical training should connect education with employment. Joint ventures should establish time-bound plans for Pakistani engineers and managers to assume greater operational responsibility. Success would be demonstrated by competence in running, maintaining, troubleshooting and improving complex facilities.
Research partnerships should leave permanent capacity within Pakistan. Shared laboratories, pilot plants, geological databases and negotiated access to technical knowledge can help institutions solve industrial problems. Agreements should define intellectual-property rights, licensing and opportunities for Pakistani innovation. Research funding should support processing efficiency, recycling, water conservation and new materials, allowing knowledge generated by collaboration to create further enterprises.
Business and financial infrastructure must develop alongside technical capacity. Local suppliers need working capital, equipment finance, insurance and timely payment. Exporters need trade finance, certification and efficient customs. Transparent procurement can help Pakistani companies enter supply networks, while long-term customer agreements improve investment confidence. Public financial support should carry clear limits, disclosed obligations and performance conditions.
Mineral revenues can finance this wider productive base. A transparent framework should provide predictable allocations for producing communities, investment in education and infrastructure, and savings against commodity downturns. Expenditure should follow verified receipts and public audits. Supporting manufacturing and local enterprise would broaden the sources of income available when particular mines approach the end of their lives.
Environmental management protects that future. Water use, tailings, emissions and eventual rehabilitation need funded obligations and independent monitoring. Communities should participate in decisions affecting their land and livelihoods, with lawful compensation and accessible remedies. Recycling metals and magnets can create additional businesses while retaining valuable material within the economy.
The foundation is accountable government. Credible elections, independent courts, empowered provinces and effective local authorities can give citizens a voice in the use of their wealth. Parliament should scrutinise major agreements, while independent regulators oversee environmental and commercial obligations. The armed forces should fulfil their constitutional security responsibilities, with economic policy directed by elected civilian institutions.
Pakistan’s economic promise will be fulfilled through the factories, skills, research and enterprises its mineral partnerships help create. Negotiating this connection is a national responsibility. With capable governance and sustained cooperation, Pakistan can export finished products, develop its own technology and build prosperity that outlives the deposits from which the transformation began.
Pakistan News
Rare Earths: Pakistan’s Economic Part 1
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Rare earths offer Pakistan an opportunity to change its economic destiny. Their greatest promise lies in connecting the country’s geological wealth with the industries shaping modern life: electric vehicles, electronics, clean energy, advanced machinery and aerospace. Growing international interest can bring the capital, technology and markets needed for this transformation. Pakistan’s task is to build partnerships that turn mineral deposits into lasting productive capacity, skilled employment and public prosperity.
America’s chargé d’affaires in Pakistan, Natalie A. Baker, has described cooperation extending from geological assessment and extraction to workforce training, schools and transport infrastructure. Her reference to mineral potential reaching seven trillion dollars sits within published estimates of $6 trillion to $8 trillion. The opportunity she outlined provides a basis for agreements that connect mining investment with local development and a wider industrial economy.
Energy Update, citing the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of Pakistan, reports mineral-bearing areas extending across approximately 600,000 square kilometres, with 92 known minerals, including 52 commercially exploited. SFA (Oxford) estimates recoverable rare-earth oxide potential at 100,000 to 500,000 tonnes. These estimates offer a starting point for systematic exploration, deposit assessment and investment planning.
My own association with this opportunity reaches back four decades. In 1986, while working as a news producer, I accompanied a visiting Chinese state minister during a tour connected with mineral deposits in Balochistan. The delegation’s interest reflected an early appreciation of the region’s potential. Subsequent Chinese involvement at Saindak established an important chapter in Pakistan’s mineral development, providing experience upon which broader partnerships can build.
Reko Diq demonstrates the scale of Pakistan’s documented copper-gold opportunity. Barrick’s year-end 2025 disclosures identify 7.3 million tonnes of contained copper and 13 million ounces of gold attributable to its 50 percent interest. Project-wide quantities implied by these rounded figures are approximately 14.6 million tonnes of copper and 26 million ounces of gold. Federal Pakistani enterprises and Balochistan each hold 25 percent of the venture.
Using illustrative prices of $10,000 per tonne of copper and $3,000 per ounce of gold, those quantities represent approximately $224 billion in gross contained-metal value. Commercial returns will emerge over decades through production, sales and expenditure. Pakistan’s benefits will include agreed royalties, taxes, dividends, employment and domestic procurement. The volume of activity retained within the country will determine how widely these benefits spread.
Rare earths create a related avenue for industrial development. Geological research identifies promising formations at Sillai Patti, Koga, Loe Shilman, Warsak and Jambil in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Studies document light rare-earth enrichment involving cerium, lanthanum, neodymium, praseodymium and samarium. SFA also identifies prospects around Skardu and Chilas, Chagai and the Makran coast, together with potential secondary recovery from Thar coal fly ash.
Research on Sillai Patti cites earlier sampled-material averages of approximately 314 parts per million of neodymium, 915 of cerium and 519 of lanthanum. A hyperspectral investigation identified portions of samples reaching approximately 1,000 parts per million of neodymium. Representative drilling, mineralogical analysis and processing trials can translate this scientific knowledge into project-specific quantities, recovery rates and commercial values.
Neodymium and praseodymium are important inputs for powerful neodymium-iron-boron magnets. Samarium supports samarium-cobalt magnets used where temperature stability matters. Certain high-performance magnets also incorporate dysprosium or terbium. Developing these products involves concentration, separation, purification, metal production, alloying and precision manufacturing. Each stage offers a possible link between Pakistan’s resource base and a more technically capable economy.
American engagement already has a practical foundation. In September 2025, Pakistan announced a US Strategic Metals partnership with the Frontier Works Organization, envisaging approximately $500 million in initial investment and eventual development of a polymetallic refinery. USSM subsequently reported receiving antimony, copper concentrate and rare-earth material containing neodymium and praseodymium. The U.S. Export-Import Bank also lists $1.25 billion in authorised financing for Reko Diq.
Potential technical partners extend across the industrial chain. MP Materials operates in rare-earth processing and magnet manufacturing, Energy Fuels has demonstrated separated neodymium-praseodymium oxide production, and Arnold Magnetic Technologies manufactures advanced magnets. Their capabilities suggest possible commercial matches as Pakistani projects become investment-ready. Chinese, Canadian, Australian and European expertise can likewise contribute through competitive, transparent arrangements.
The economic scale is substantial. Barrick’s 2025 feasibility plan envisaged Phase 1 ramping up to 240,000 tonnes of copper and 297,000 ounces of gold annually. At the illustrative prices above, this represents about $3.29 billion in annual gross metal value. Its planned expanded operation’s specified ten-year average would represent approximately $6.16 billion annually on the same basis. Net national gains will depend on costs, financing and domestic value addition.
Barrick’s April 2026 update provided for slower development and a review through mid-2027. This makes phased planning valuable: exploration, infrastructure, skills and industrial investment should advance through clearly financed stages. SFA’s proposed rare-earth roadmap similarly progresses from initial exports toward processing and larger-scale mining. Timelines should guide coordination, with implementation measured through completed facilities and commercially qualified output.
Pakistan’s strengths are its mineral base and growing international attention. Its development needs include geological data, processing capacity, dependable utilities and specialised skills. Opportunities encompass exports, technology transfer and manufacturing; threats include security disruption, price fluctuations and environmental pressures. This SWOT assessment points toward coordinated investment, strong institutions and community participation.
The next step is to place industrial development at the centre of mineral policy. Agreements should connect extraction with infrastructure, Pakistani expertise and downstream production. That is the bridge from geological promise to economic transformation—and the question taken forward in Part Two: how Pakistan can use today’s mineral opportunity to build industries that continue creating wealth long after individual deposits are exhausted.
Pakistan News
Political Hoopla in Pakistan

The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) government’s non-cooperation with the federal government’s policies and its opposition to military operations against terrorists led to the imposition of Governor’s Rule on 12 October 2026. Political hoopla has been a defining feature of Pakistan’s political history. The PTI’s dissenting and, moreover, defiant politics led its leadership and activists towards violence. However, the subsequent situation, in which security agencies reportedly identified deep links between KP-PTI leaders and the Taliban and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), convinced the federal government to impose Governor’s Rule. There are allegations that the KP government had a covert understanding with Afghanistan regarding cooperation. Although no one has presented evidence of such an understanding, the PTI’s non-cooperation with Pakistan Army operations, its silence on the deaths of law enforcement personnel, and its apathetic attitude towards equipping the KP police with the required modern weapons and other equipment reflect the provincial government’s detachment from federal policies. These factors have also reinforced the claims made by state institutions. Pakistan is a democratic country, but undemocratic policies and attitudes have devastated the dream of establishing a welfare state. The federal government has spent huge amounts of public money on maintaining a luxurious lifestyle for those in power, while the public has continued to endure severe hardships. Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir has expressed his desire to make Pakistan a hard state in which the rule of law empowers the state. However, this aspiration has yet to be realized because politicians remain reluctant to enforce the rule of law. The rule of law begins with genuine democracy, which is possible only through an empowered local government system. Yet, such a system is largely absent across Pakistan. It does not suit politicians and the civil bureaucracy because it transfers resources and decision-making powers to local governments for development work. Neither politicians nor the civil bureaucracy appears willing to share these resources and powers. Federal and provincial governments may formulate democratic policies, but their undemocratic attitudes towards implementation prevent those policies from producing the desired results. Governments are dominated by elite families that enjoy protection from accountability for illegal and corrupt activities. Such practices include shielding individuals from criminal proceedings, protecting the occupation of government land and plots, and benefiting from corruption, commissions from contractors, NGOs, fraudulent TA/DA claims, and bogus medical bills. This pathetic situation neither restores peace in society nor produces honest and competent leadership. Such a pathetic situation neither restores peace in society nor produces honest and competent leadership. After imposing Governor’s rule in KPK, what is to be done with the PTI followers and leaders? I opine that discarding the traditional policy of dividing the political party into factions is more harmful than declaring one party as a traitor and anti-Pakistan. It would have been better to create a parallel PTI faction instead of the Istehkam-i-Pakistan Party, etc. because the PTI workers must have been provided political shelter somewhere, but right now the establishment has left them in the doldrums, which can be more dangerous. This is what we warned about: it would be very easy for terrorist or violent groups to form governments in the proposed new provinces with small areas. Nobody can prevent violent groups such as TLP, TTP, BLA, etc. from clinching governments in the new provinces with small areas. Now, the federal government owes the entire responsibility to root out terrorism from KPK and to ensure the prosperity of the people. People expect positive results from this political strategy. To sum, if we genuinely want to transform Pakistan into a welfare state in which the rule of law is firmly enforced and crime and punishment are proportionate and consistently applied, ‘we’ must redefine the role of institutions. Who are ‘We’ is yet to be disclosed, although the Constitution ought to be the ‘we.’ Everyone, from politicians to those who exercise a strong grip on the system, must demonstrate the will to put Pakistan on the path to becoming a democratic country. The existing political system cannot transform Pakistan into a welfare state as long as elite capture (Gutterafia) continues to prevail and the powerful remain above the law.
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