war
Probability of Victory in an Iran–U.S.–Israel War
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : As tensions escalate between Iran and the joint forces of the United States and Israel, the most pressing question dominating strategic circles is deceptively simple: Who would win? Yet modern warfare—especially among technologically advanced and regionally entrenched powers—is no longer a matter of tanks crossing borders or flags planted on captured capitals. Victory today is layered, conditional, and defined by political objectives rather than territorial conquest alone. To assess the probability of winning, one must first define what “winning” actually means.
If victory is defined as regime survival and preservation of fighting capability, Iran’s probability of success appears stronger than many assume. Historically, external air campaigns have struggled to topple deeply entrenched governments without significant ground intervention. Iran’s geography alone presents a formidable challenge. Its mountainous terrain, expansive landmass, and dispersed military infrastructure complicate any attempt at rapid decisive victory. Much of its missile arsenal is believed to be stored in underground facilities designed precisely to withstand aerial bombardment. Even sustained precision strikes may degrade capabilities, but eliminating them entirely is another matter.
Moreover, Iran’s doctrine is built around resilience and asymmetric endurance. Rather than matching Western air superiority aircraft for aircraft, Tehran relies on ballistic missiles, drones, cyber operations, and proxy networks across the region. This model does not aim to dominate the skies; it aims to outlast and impose cost. If the objective of Washington and Tel Aviv were to collapse the Iranian state or compel unconditional surrender, the probability of achieving that quickly would remain relatively low without a major ground campaign—an option that carries enormous political and military risk. In that scenario, Iran’s likelihood of “winning” through survival could reasonably be considered moderate to high.
However, if victory is defined differently—say, as the ability to significantly degrade Iran’s military capacity and limit its ability to launch sustained retaliation—the balance shifts. The United States maintains overwhelming air superiority, advanced stealth platforms, satellite surveillance, cyber dominance, and long-range precision strike capabilities. Israel brings decades of experience in targeted operations, missile defense innovation, and real-time battlefield intelligence integration. Together, they possess unmatched technological coordination.
In the early phases of a high-intensity conflict, joint U.S.–Israeli forces would likely dominate the airspace, suppress air defenses, and strike high-value targets including command centers, missile storage sites, naval facilities, and communications infrastructure. Iran’s conventional air force is comparatively limited, and its air defense systems, while upgraded over the years, would struggle against advanced stealth bombers and electronic warfare. Under this definition of victory—crippling Iran’s infrastructure and reducing its capacity for sustained attacks—the coalition’s probability of success would be moderate to high.
Yet degrading capability is not synonymous with eliminating threat. Missile forces are mobile. Drones are inexpensive and produced in significant quantities. Even if command structures suffer damage, decentralized networks can continue operations. Thus, while U.S.–Israel forces could inflict substantial destruction, the probability of completely stopping Iranian retaliation remains uncertain. The difference between “damaging” and “neutralizing” is strategically profound.
Another potential definition of victory is economic and psychological leverage. Iran’s geographic position near the Strait of Hormuz gives it influence over one of the world’s most critical energy corridors. Even partial disruption of maritime traffic would elevate global oil prices, strain supply chains, and create political pressure in energy-importing nations. While Iran itself would suffer economically from prolonged instability, it could still leverage regional disruption as a strategic equalizer. If the objective becomes forcing negotiations by generating economic shock, Iran’s probability of achieving leverage increases.
On the other hand, prolonged conflict risks devastating Iran’s own infrastructure. Energy facilities, ports, and industrial assets could become targets, further weakening its economy. The United States, with a diversified economy and global alliances, is better positioned to absorb long-term financial strain. Israel, though geographically smaller, maintains advanced civil defense systems and missile interception layers that mitigate, though do not eliminate, the impact of incoming threats. Thus, in a war of economic attrition, neither side emerges unscathed, but the coalition likely retains greater structural resilience.
Regime change remains the most ambitious—and least probable—outcome. History offers cautionary examples of external interventions that underestimated the complexity of internal political dynamics. Airpower alone rarely achieves political transformation. Ground occupation in a country the size of Iran would require vast troop deployments and sustained logistical commitment, with unpredictable consequences. Under this scenario, the probability of rapid decisive regime collapse appears low. Iran’s political system, though internally contested, has demonstrated endurance under decades of sanctions and pressure.
Therefore, when evaluating probability, the answer depends on which strategic objective is prioritized. If the goal is to survive and maintain core sovereignty, Iran’s odds are comparatively stronger. If the goal is to inflict extensive military degradation and assert technological superiority, the U.S.–Israel coalition holds the advantage. If the goal is total capitulation or permanent elimination of threat, probabilities on both sides decline sharply, as modern warfare between capable states rarely produces absolute outcomes.
There is also the factor of escalation management. A broader regional spread involving additional actors could alter calculations dramatically. The longer a conflict persists, the more unpredictable it becomes. Domestic political pressures in all three countries would shape decision-making. Public tolerance for casualties, economic hardship, and prolonged instability could either harden resolve or accelerate diplomatic engagement.
Ultimately, the most realistic outcome in such a confrontation may not be traditional victory at all, but a negotiated pause after significant destruction. In modern high-intensity conflicts, wars often end not because one side is annihilated, but because costs outweigh objectives. The probability that both sides declare partial success—while privately recognizing the limits of military solutions—may be higher than outright triumph for either camp.
In strategic terms, Iran is more likely to “win” by surviving, absorbing damage, and continuing to function as a sovereign actor. The United States and Israel are more likely to “win” by demonstrating overwhelming tactical superiority and degrading Iran’s operational capabilities. Neither outcome represents total dominance. Both involve trade-offs.
War among technologically advanced powers with asymmetric tools is less about decisive victory and more about shaping post-conflict narratives. Survival can be framed as victory. Deterrence can be framed as success. Destruction of infrastructure can be presented as strategic achievement. Yet beneath these narratives lies a sobering truth: in such conflicts, the probability of absolute victory for any side remains limited.
The real question, then, may not be who would win—but at what cost, and for how long.
war
How Iran War Is Grounding the World Economy
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The war in the Middle East has now moved far beyond the battlefield. What initially appeared as a regional military confrontation has evolved into a systemic global crisis—one that is tightening its grip not only on governments and markets, but on ordinary people struggling to sustain daily life. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, combined with targeted disruption of oil infrastructure, has triggered a cascading breakdown across energy supply chains, aviation networks, and tourism-dependent economies. The world is no longer merely watching a war; it is experiencing its economic consequences in real time.
At the center of this unfolding crisis lies the global jet fuel market—a sector often overlooked in geopolitical analysis, yet one that sustains the arteries of globalization. Prior to the conflict, global jet fuel demand had recovered strongly, reaching approximately 107 billion gallons annually in 2024, with projections climbing to nearly 7.2 million barrels per day by early 2026. This demand was supported by a finely balanced supply network spanning North America, Asia, and the Middle East. Today, that balance has been violently disrupted.
The Middle East, which typically contributes around 20% of global jet fuel supply, has seen a dramatic collapse in its effective output. War-related damage to refineries, combined with the strategic closure of the Strait of Hormuz, has removed an estimated 320,000 tons of jet fuel per day from global circulation. At the same time, approximately 3 million barrels per day of refining capacity across the الخليج region has either been shut down or rendered inoperable. This is not a marginal disruption—it is a structural shock to the global energy system.
Jet fuel prices have responded accordingly. Within weeks, prices surged from approximately $85–90 per barrel to well above $200, representing one of the sharpest increases in modern energy market history. For the aviation industry, where fuel accounts for up to one-third of operating costs, this is nothing short of catastrophic. Airlines are no longer operating in a demand-driven environment; they are navigating a survival crisis defined by cost pressures and supply scarcity.
The impact is most visible in Europe, where the aviation sector—and by extension, the tourism economy—is deeply exposed. Europe imports roughly 25–30% of its jet fuel from the Persian Gulf. With supply lines disrupted, airlines have begun aggressive capacity cuts. Major carriers have canceled thousands of flights ahead of the critical summer season. Lufthansa alone has reportedly removed tens of thousands of flights from its schedule, while other carriers are grounding aircraft, optimizing routes, and operating only essential services.
This contraction strikes at the heart of Europe’s economic model. Tourism is not a peripheral sector; it is a foundational pillar. The continent generates between $600 and $700 billion annually from tourism, supporting millions of jobs and contributing significantly to GDP in countries such as Spain, Italy, France, and Greece. This entire ecosystem depends on affordable, reliable air travel. Without it, hotels remain empty, restaurants lose customers, and entire regional economies begin to contract.
The crisis is not confined to Europe. In Asia-Pacific, where airlines depend heavily on Middle Eastern fuel flows, the situation is even more acute. Carriers have entered emergency operational modes, securing limited fuel supplies and preparing for prolonged disruption. Even in the United States—buffered by its status as a major producer—airlines face massive financial strain. Leading carriers have warned of billions of dollars in additional fuel costs, threatening profitability and forcing difficult operational decisions.
What makes this crisis particularly dangerous is its compounding nature. Aviation is not only about passenger mobility; it is a critical component of global trade. High-value goods, pharmaceuticals, and time-sensitive cargo depend on air freight. As flight capacity shrinks, supply chains tighten, prices rise, and inflationary pressures intensify. Indeed, energy analysts have already warned that this crisis could add nearly 0.8% to global inflation—an alarming figure in an already fragile economic environment.
Meanwhile, the maritime dimension of the conflict is adding further instability. The Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply normally passes, has become a contested zone. Tankers are being intercepted, diverted, and in some cases seized. Insurance costs have soared, discouraging shipping companies from entering the region. Even where fuel is available, the ability to transport it safely has become uncertain.
China’s position offers a temporary buffer but not immunity. With substantial strategic reserves and a diversified energy portfolio, including large-scale investments in renewable energy, China can withstand short-term shocks. However, as the world’s manufacturing hub, any prolonged disruption will inevitably impact its output. A slowdown in Chinese production would have global consequences, affecting supply chains and economic growth worldwide.
This brings into focus a critical strategic question: what is the underlying objective of this disruption? One interpretation—gaining increasing traction—is that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is not merely a byproduct of conflict, but a strategic lever. By constraining Middle Eastern supply, global demand is redirected toward alternative producers, most notably the United States. Over the past decade, the U.S. has transformed into a leading exporter of oil and liquefied natural gas. In a constrained market, its leverage increases significantly.
For Iran, the situation presents a profound strategic dilemma. Maintaining the closure of the Strait exerts pressure on adversaries but simultaneously inflicts economic pain on the wider world. Reopening the waterway, on the other hand, could reposition Iran as a stabilizing force while exposing the broader dynamics at play. It would restore global supply flows, ease economic pressures, and potentially shift international opinion.
From a strategic standpoint, reopening Hormuz could neutralize the leverage derived from disruption. It would deny the United States to exploit scarcity and would reestablish a degree of economic normalcy. More importantly, it would demonstrate that stability—not disruption—is the stronger strategic position in an interconnected global system.
The world today is facing more than an energy crisis. It is confronting the fragility of a system built on uninterrupted flows—of fuel, goods, people, and capital. When one critical node collapses, the effects ripple outward, disrupting industries and livelihoods across continents.
If the current trajectory continues, the consequences will be severe. Aviation networks may contract further, tourism economies could enter recession, and global trade may slow significantly. Inflationary pressures will rise, and economic uncertainty will deepen. What began as a regional conflict risks becoming a global economic turning point.
The solution lies not in escalation, but in recalibration. Restoring the free flow of energy through critical waterways, stabilizing supply chains, and reengaging in meaningful diplomacy are essential steps. The alternative is a prolonged period of economic disruption with far-reaching consequences.
The Strait of Hormuz is no longer just a geographic chokepoint. It has become the pivot on which the global economy now turns.
war
Aftermath of Iran-US War and A. J. Muste’s Quotes:
There is No Way to Peace, Peace is the Way
Akhtar Hussain Sandhu
Chicago (USA)

Iran-US War and Islamabad peace facilitation prompt me to recall the famous quotes of Abraham Johannes Muste, a US-based civil rights and anti-nuclear-weapons activist. To him, nothing can lead to peace, but peace, in fact, facilitates a positive change in relations therefore, not circumstances or ways, but ‘peace’ itself proves a nucleus of attention in the crisis-packed situation in a society or world. Social scientists usually count the factors and circumstances leading to peace in a conflict at the societal and international level, but A. J. Muste believes that ‘peace’ is the greatest force that attracts rival protagonists to create understanding and end conflict. A. J. Muste opposed World War I and the US-Vietnam War and also opposed nuclear weaponry. He worked zealously and nonviolently for labor rights and civil liberties in the United States. The US-Israel led war against Iran on 28 February 2026 caused a catastrophic results and the continuous bombing destroyed Iran’s civil infrastructure, and approximately 180 schoolgirls were killed in an aerial attack. It was condemned by the masses in the US and other countries. Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz as a war tactic, which created a global oil crisis, and all countries’ economies experienced an overnight major setback. The US President changed his initial war objectives and focused on the reopening of the Hormuz because multiple nations were bashing the US President for his unethical war mongering ambition, which caused the energy crisis. US President Donald Trump first decided to isolate the US from this dangerous drive and declared that the affected countries should send their troops to open this sea route for their vessels, but in April 2026, he issued a furious statement that if Iran did not open the Strait of Hormuz, it would be eliminated from the earth. It caused panic in the world because this message meant a nuclear attack on Iran. If it happened, any power could justify the use of nuclear weapons against the rival country, and the world could be an unsafe and hellish place. It could also convince every country, including Iran, to have nuclear weapons in future because having nuclear weaponry was to be left as the only option to survive against a rival nuclear power. However, Pakistan, China, Russia, Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, enjoying cordial relations with the US and Iran, ultimately brought a truce of two weeks, and both countries consented to dialogue in Islamabad on 10 April. Army Chief Gen. Asim Munir, PM Mian Shahbaz Sharif, and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar from Pakistan played a pivotal role in the ongoing parleys between the rival leaders. The ceasefire created an environment in which both camps claimed victory, and both seemed busy proving their military strength and muscles, but despite all, they are heading towards peace through dialogue. Threatening Statements by the US President even before a day before the negotiations is an evidence that the agreement (if it is concluded) would be presented as Iran’s surrender before the US might. A. J. Muste quotes that not circumstances, but ‘peace’ itself pushed the rival forces away from the battlefield. Once, a reporter questioned his presence as a protest in front of the White House: ” Can you change the White House? A. J. Muste replied. ‘I don’t do this to change the country. I do this so the country would not change me.’ The ruling elite always use the name of ‘state’ to change the people as it desires, but the state’s predilections change with the passage of time; therefore, to curb the citizens proves havoc for the social fabric. Dissatisfied masses can hardly produce a beneficial human resource that truly serves a nation. A. J. Must says that the problem after a war is that the victor shows the fight has brought a bright future, and war has paid the nation a lot. In their perception, the war was a new form of reform that would ensure prosperity and psychological pride for the people. Iran and the USA have both been claiming victories and asserting that the conflict has brought blessings. Both countries closed their eyes to the human sufferings and loss of innocent lives, wealth, economy, infrastructure, and hatred generated against each other. Peace proved its importance and motivated them to approach the neutral countries for a ceasefire, which means the war had crippled both the rivals to the extent that they were unable to talk even of ‘peace’, which shows the weakness and impotency of the so-called victors. A. J. Muste opines that no big power in the war accepts itself as an aggressor; instead, it is always the rival that is the aggressor.’ However, I think that every fighting country thinks of itself as a big force, therefore both become ‘big powers’ under their own justifications. Look at the arguments of the US and Iran that have been justifying their righteousness and aggression toward the rival according to their own national narratives. None of them is ready to accept any lapse on the side. Perhaps it happens amid internal and external threats to the political leadership, who twist events and arguments to secure their political position and national morale. This is another form of stress and aggression against peace, humanity, and righteousness. For example, many US military and other officials refused to attack Iran who must be consulted about their current thinking on their decision. A. J. Muste says that peace is impossible if people are only concerned with peace. A war is an outcome of different ways of life. If people desire to attack war, they have to attack that way of life.’ A. J. Muste here can be disagreed because way of life is always different, which does not mean to be in a battlefield all the time. I think he wants to say that if people dislike war, they should change their vision to one of living in societies with divergent ways of life. This quote reflects Muste’s desire that prosperity and civil liberties can change society, and by this, war maneuvering can be suffocated. AJ Must was a member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation in the US, which struggled against war hysteria and the violation of civil liberties and for labor rights. He delivered lectures in different universities on the nonviolent struggle for rights. He joined the Montgomery Bus Boycott, led by Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1955. A. J. Muste’s struggle is still admired by Americans and Europeans because he worked selflessly for humanity, peace, and the dignity of all races.
Writer is a US-based Historian & Colmunist
9 April 2026
war
PM Shehbaz, Starmer Hold Key Call on Regional Security UK Backs Pakistan’s Peace Initiatives and Ceasefire Efforts
Prime Minister’s Office
Media Wing
ISLAMABAD: 10 April 2026.
Prime Minister’s Telephone Call with Prime Minister Keir Starmer of the United Kingdom
Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif received a telephone call from Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, His Excellency Keir Starmer, this evening.
Prime Minister Starmer deeply appreciated Pakistan’s effective diplomatic efforts in facilitating the U.S.-Iran ceasefire, and the resumption of dialogue. He felicitated Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif on hosting the peace negotiations in Islamabad and offered his best wishes for the success of this endeavor.
Reaffirming Pakistan’s sincere commitment to regional peace and stability, Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif welcomed the joint statement issued by key European and international leaders, including Prime Minister Starmer, endorsing Pakistan’s peace initiatives.
Both leaders emphasized the importance of ensuring that the ceasefire remains in place and creates the necessary conditions for lasting peace and stability in the region.
The two leaders agreed to work together to lend fresh impetus to the longstanding friendly ties between Pakistan and the United Kingdom, across all spheres of mutual interest.
The Prime Minister reiterated his cordial invitation to Prime Minister Starmer to undertake an official visit to Pakistan.
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