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One chief to rule all military services

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The proposed 27th Constitutional Amendment, which would overhaul Article 243 and recast Pakistan’s military command hierarchy, is the most ambitious restructuring effort in decades and perhaps the most contentious as it collides with entrenched institutional cultures and the fragile equilibrium between civilian and military power.

Its implementation may prove far more difficult than its drafters imagine. The plan collides with entrenched institutional cultures, long-standing inter-service rivalries, and the delicate balance between civilian oversight and military autonomy that has, at least in theory, defined Pakistan’s power structure since 1973.

At the heart of the bill lies the deceptively simple premise of modernising defence coordination by creating a Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) and abolishing the office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC).

But in practice, the reform would elevate the army chief to a constitutionally enshrined position of supremacy — combining operational command with overarching control of all services.

Article 243 overhaul marks a leap towards military centralisation and consolidation of uniformed supremacy

For over four decades, the CJCSC has served as the symbolic head of the armed services, designed to ensure coordination among the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

In practice, the role remained largely ceremonial, with the army — for over two and a half decades — reluctant to rotate it to other branches.

The proposed amendment would dissolve the post entirely on Nov 27, 2025, coinciding with the retirement of the current CJCSC, Gen Sahir Shamshad Mirza, and make the chief of army staff concurrently the Chief of Defence Forces — placing all three services under his authority.

Former human rights minister and defence academic Dr Shireen Mazari highlights an ambiguity left unaddressed in the bill.

“With the end of the CJCSC position, would the joint chiefs of staff committee also be dissolved?” she asks.

If so, which forum would replace it for coordination among the three services though the CJCSC’s ineffectiveness is well known.

The supporters of the legislation argue that the change will streamline decision-making and enhance unified command.

However, critics see it as institutional capture. “By placing an army officer as the Chief of Defence Forces with authority over the Air Force and Navy, the proposed system invites institutional imbalance and potential disaster,” warns retired Lt Gen Asif Yasin Malik, a former defence secretary.

“This amendment appears tailored to benefit a specific individual rather than to strengthen the defence structure,” he adds.

The criticism cuts to the core of the country’s military culture — the deep-seated rivalries among the Army, Air Force, and Navy, each guarding its operational turf and doctrine.

The Air Force and Navy have long resisted attempts to subordinate their autonomy under land-centric command.

Harmonising these distinct traditions — air power’s rapid, decentralised decision cycles versus the army’s hierarchical chain of command — has historically been the Achilles’ heel of every “joint” reform effort.

A critical question under the new system is who would control transfers, postings, and promotions in the Air Force and Navy.

Would the two service chiefs readily cede that authority? Dr Mazari cautions that if promotions in the Air Force and Navy were to be decided by an army-origin CDF, it “could lead to festering resentments and affect morale in the long run”.

She raises another hypothetical scenario: “What if there is a Marshal of the Air Force or Admiral of the Fleet while the COAS is a four-star general — will they then be under a four-star army officer if the latter is the CDF?” she asks. “Too much has been left to ad hoc and arbitrary decisions.”

Equally consequential is the proposal to create a Commander of the National Strategic Command, a position overseeing the country’s nuclear forces.

Under the amendment, the commander would be appointed by the prime minister on the army chief’s recommendation and must be chosen from within the army.

That subtle shift moves control of the country’s most sensitive assets away from the collegial National Command Authority (NCA), designed to ensure civilian oversight and inter-service balance, toward a single service.

Dr Mazari warns the change could have grave operational implications.

“Effectively, all nuclear weapons and delivery systems will be under the army’s control, including second-strike missiles which normally fall under naval command,” she says.

“This could lead to command-and-control problems and time delays, especially in a war-like situation.”

Her concerns recall a rare moment of institutional dissent — the 2019 National Security Committee meeting after the Balakot strikes — when, according to retired Lt Gen Malik, the then-army chief Gen Qamar Bajwa advised restraint but was reportedly overruled by the air chief and the CJCSC.

“Under the proposed arrangement, would such dissent, and the powerful response it ensured, even be possible?” he asks pointedly.

Perhaps the most controversial innovation lies in the clauses granting life-long constitutional protection to officers elevated to five-star ranks — field marshal, marshal of the air force, or admiral of the fleet.

These officers would “retain rank, privileges and remain in uniform for life”, removable only through impeachment under Article 47 and protected by immunities “similar to those enjoyed by the president” under Article 248, applied mutatis mutandis.

The language is designed to legalise the extraordinary promotion of Gen Asim Munir to field marshal following the India-Pakistan confrontation in May this year.

What looks ceremonial on paper, however, amounts to a permanent legal armour around an unelected officeholder — “a parallel authority insulated from the very rule of law it is sworn to defend”, as one constitutional lawyer puts it, asking not to be named.

Such provisions blur the line between honour and power.

“Even in the United States, the chairman of the joint chiefs does not wield absolute powers,” notes Lt Gen Malik.

“Creating lifetime immunities for military officers upends the very idea of civilian supremacy”. The supporters of the amendment, including government ministers, argue the changes merely formalise existing practices.

Yet the bill remains ambiguous about the tenure of the service chiefs.

Minister of State for Law and Justice Barrister Aqeel Malik told reporters that there was “no need for a fresh notification” on the army chief’s tenure, since existing legal provisions already establish a five-year term under the Army Act as amended by the 26th Constitutional Amendment.

But such reassurances overlook a deeper concern, which is that the proposed amendment will move the defence management from statute to constitutional entrenchment, making future civilian corrections exponentially harder.

Military affairs expert Muhammad Faisal, a doctoral researcher in Sydney, sees the bill as “the first phase” of a broader restructuring.

“There could be more updates coming with changes in the Army Act and NCA Acts to reflect new proposals,” he says.

“This could also lead to the restructuring of strategic forces, currently administered by three services separately, into a unified single command.”

That trajectory — toward centralisation rather than coordination — captures the tension at the heart of Pakistan’s military politics. Every attempt at “jointness” risks hardening into hierarchy because institutional habits and prestige are resistant to reform.

The stakes are profound. The country’s Constitution has endured repeated experiments in balancing military power and civilian authority.

A Chief of Defence Forces position can be created, as many democracies have done, through statutory reform subject to parliamentary review.

But embedding such a role in the Cons­titution transforms it from an administrative necessity into a permanent political reality, one that cannot easily be undone.

Ultimately, the question is not whether Pakistan needs a modernised defence structure. However, it definitely needs to be updated.

The question is whether modernisation must come at the cost of institutional equilibrium. History offers a cautionary note that once military power is constitutionalised, it rarely yields ground voluntarily.

Article 243 was meant to preserve civilian command over the armed forces. The 27th Amendment risks rewriting it into a charter of military supremacy.

Published in Dawn, November 9th, 2025

Header image: Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal General Asim Munir addressing the passing out parade of the Pakistan Military Academy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Kakul on April 29. — ISPR

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CM Murad asks authorities to boost polio vaccination across Sindh

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KARACHI: Sindh Chief Minister Syed Murad Ali Shah on Wednesday reviewed the progress against poliovirus, noting that Sindh had reduced its polio burden from 23 cases in 2024 and nine in 2025 to just one case so far in 2026. However, environmental surveillance showed that the virus is still present in a few high-risk areas.

Chairing a meeting of the Provincial Task Force (PTF) on Polio Eradication, the CM reaffirmed the government’s commitment to eliminating the disease and directed authorities to intensify vaccination, surveillance and community engagement efforts ahead of the September 21-27 Sub-National Immunisation Days (SNIDs) campaign.

“The progress achieved by Sindh is encouraging and reflects the hard work of our health workers, district administrations and partner organisations, but our mission will only be completed when every child is protected, and the virus is eliminated from every district,” said Murad Ali Shah.

“No child should remain unvaccinated due to negligence, weak supervision or lack of follow-up.”

Reviews preparations for week-long campaign beginning on 21st

The meeting, held at CM House, was attended by Health Minister Dr Azra Fazal Pechuho, chief secretary Asif Hyder Shah, Mayor of Karachi Murtaza Wahab, IG Police Sindh Javed Alam Odho, commissioner of Karachi Hassan Naqvi, provincial secretaries, provincial coordinator of Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) Shaharyar Gul, Sindh government partners, and deputy commissioners. From other districts, commissioners, DIGs, deputy commissioners and SSPs participated via video link.

Briefing the meeting, Health Minister Dr Azra Fazal Pechuho said Pakistan’s wild poliovirus (WPV1) cases have declined sharply from 74 in 2024 to 31 in 2025 and only three so far in 2026. Sindh has recorded a single case this year, reported from Sujawal on February 10, compared to nine cases last year and 23 in 2024.

In-charge of EOC Shaharyar Gul informed the chief minister that environmental surveillance data shows a significant reduction in virus circulation across the province. The number of positive environmental surveillance sites has fallen from a peak of 29 in March 2025 to only five in August 2026. Outside Karachi, all 14 surveillance sites are currently negative, while six of Karachi’s 15 sites remain positive, indicating that transmission is increasingly confined to limited pockets of the city.

The meeting participants were told that the absence of confirmed polio cases in Karachi during the 2025 high-transmission season, despite some positive environmental samples, reflects stronger population immunity achieved through routine immunisation and repeated vaccination campaigns.

Chief secretary Asif Hyder Shah said that sustained immunisation efforts have helped prevent clinical cases even where environmental surveillance continues to detect virus circulation.

Expressing satisfaction over the declining trend, the chief minister directed all commissioners, deputy commissioners and district health authorities to adopt a zero-tolerance approach towards missed children, refusals and operational gaps.

Reviewing surveillance findings, he ordered intensified vaccination and monitoring efforts in Karachi and other identified high-risk areas, full implementation of the Karachi Action Plan 2.0, stronger coordination among district administrations and health authorities, closer monitoring of migrant and mobile populations and improved routine immunisation coverage in underserved communities.

EOC coordinator Shaharyar Gul reported that nearly three million oral polio vaccine (OPV) doses and 2.89 million booster doses were administered in Karachi, while campaigns in other divisions delivered approximately 2.7 million OPV doses and 2.58 million booster doses. Expanded-age vaccination strategies helped reach older children through schools and community-based interventions.

The chief minister appreciated the efforts of frontline workers, teachers, community mobilisers and health staff working in remote and hard-to-reach areas, describing them as the backbone of the eradication programme.

The task force was informed that after the July 2026 SNIDs campaign, a special 10-day follow-up drive was launched to vaccinate children who had initially been missed. Of 146,149 missed children, more than 23,500 were subsequently vaccinated through targeted efforts focused on refusals and unavailable children.

Mr Shah directed district administrations to further reduce refusal rates through stronger community engagement and public awareness campaigns, emphasising that building trust with parents remains critical to the success of the programme.

The meeting reviewed preparations for the September 21-27 SNIDs campaign, during which nearly 10 million children under five will be vaccinated across Sindh. The campaign will cover 23 full districts and selected union councils in seven partial districts, with more than 80,000 frontline workers participating.

Officials said over 26,000 police personnel have been assigned security duties. The chief minister reiterated the provincial government’s financial support for the campaign and noted that incentives for frontline workers had been increased by 28 per cent.

He directed all districts to complete remaining preparedness measures, including vaccine supply, logistics, workforce deployment and supervision arrangements, before the campaign begins.

The chief minister also reviewed campaign quality indicators and was informed that Sindh has continued to maintain strong performance standards while pursuing key reforms in routine immunisation, surveillance, staffing and community engagement.

Published in Dawn, September 17th, 2026

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Dealers await answers as fuel subsidy rollout begins

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• Petroleum dealers lament lack of clarity on payment mechanism, timeline
• PM wants facilitation desks to help people trying to buy subsidised fuel
• Ogra attributes hike to elevated crude prices despite decline in int’l rates

ISLAMABAD: Even as members of the public who have signed up for the PM’s Fuel Relief Scheme queued up at fuel pumps late on Wednesday night, petroleum dealers were still not clear about the mechanism whereby they would be compensated.

The concern was voiced by the Pakistan Petroleum Dealers Association (PPDA) during a presser in Karachi, where its chairman Malik Khuda Bakhsh said that no fuel pump could afford to bear a loss of Rs100 per litre without clarity on how they will be compensated.

He claimed that between the petroleum ministry, Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (Ogra) and even the finance ministry, no one had been able to answer their questions.

“Officials from Ogra and oil marketing companies say that the petroleum ministry will possibly pay the subsidy amount, whereas ministry officials maintain that payments will be made by the finance ministry, while finance ministry officials assure us that the State Bank will release the funds in a day or two,“ Mr Bakhsh added.

A day earlier, the National Steering Com­mittee on Fuel Subsidy — chaired by Deputy PM Ishaq Dar — had ordered that payments to fuel stations under the PM’s scheme be processed within 24 hours through the State Bank of Pakistan.

However, Mr Bakhsh said the federal government had assured dealers that they would be taken into confidence before the launch of the fuel relief package, but lamented that no such consultation took place.

”The government has to understand that if payments are not reimbursed in time, many dealers will stop participating in [the scheme], as many previous promises were also not fulfilled by the government,” he added.

PPDA Vice Chairman Tariq Hassan said that around 14,000 dealers across the country have been trying desperately to contact the government over the past three days, adding that whenever Islamabad wants to enforce something, it stops communication.

Another vice chairman, Anwar Kamal, said that if the scheme was to be successful, the government must negotiate with dealers, adding that dealers could not afford to have billions tied up for a long period under this scheme.

Mr Bakhsh later told Dawn they had been invited to a virtual meeting with the relevant federal secretary on Thursday morning.

He added that Ogra officials had also reached out to brief him, but he had asked for that information in writing, so he could relay that to the members of his association.

Facilitation desks

Earlier, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif ordered authorities to set up facilitation desks comprising administration officials, volunteers and petrol pump staff to assist citizens in easily obtaining fuel subsidy under the special relief scheme, which was rolled out across the country at Wednesday midnight, following the launch of the pilot phase in Islamabad.

Presiding over a meeting to review progress on the scheme, PM Shehbaz directed that personnel deployed at the facilitation desks should guide eligible citizens and provide them with all possible assistance in registration and other necessary procedures.

The prime minister also asked the relevant authorities to remain proactive in creating public awareness about the scheme, which will benefit people from all four provinces, Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.

The meeting was informed that the scheme had been designed in a simple and easy-to-understand manner for the public. Only four pieces of information were required for registration: the applicant’s CNIC number, vehicle number plate, province of registration and vehicle registration date.

According to an official, the number of successful registrations was gradually rising, while provincial governments were extending “full cooperation” for nationwide implementation of the scheme.

Oil prices

Meanwhile, notifying fresh POL rates on Wednesday night, Ogra attributed the steep hikes to elevated international crude oil and petroleum product prices.

The price of high-speed diesel was increased by Rs5.62 per litre to Rs421.45, while petrol became costlier by Rs6.88 per litre, taking its new price to Rs391.22 per litre.

Brent crude futures fell $2.92, or 2.7 per cent, to settle at $105.83 a barrel. US West Texas Intermediate futures fell $3.40, or 3.2pc, to close at $102.43, Reuters reported.

Saudi Arabia is offering more loadings of crude oil to Asian refiners via ship-to-ship transfers off Oman’s Sohar port, people familiar with the matter said, blunting some of the hit to global supply from attacks on the country’s East-West pipeline to the Red Sea.

Oil prices had gained more than $3 in the previous session after shipping industry sources said crude loadings at Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea export hub of Yanbu had been suspended and Riyadh had cancelled some cargo deliveries to European customers.

The suspension followed strikes on the East-West pipeline, which feeds the Saudi port of Yanbu. It became the main Saudi outlet for oil exports after Iran began blockading the Strait of Hormuz after US and Israeli attacks on the country.

Published in Dawn, September 17th, 2026

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Islamabad, Beijing activate joint border commission

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ISLAMABAD: Pakistan and China on Wednesday operationalised a long pending joint mechanism for managing their common border, with Islamabad des­cribing the move as a significant milestone in bilateral relations and a step toward closer coordination on border management, trade and cross-border connectivity.

“The inaugural meeting of the Commission was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Islamabad,” the Foreign Office said in a statement.

The meeting was co-led by Li Ya, deputy director general of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs at China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Bilal Mahmood Chaudhary, director general for China at Pakistan’s Foreign Office.

The FO described the ope­r­ationalisation of the Pakis­tan-China Boundary Joint Com­m­ission as a “significant milestone for Pak­istan-China relations”, saying it would set “the stage for enh­anced cooperation in border management, joint border surveys, trade flows and people to people connectivity.”

The commission has its origins in the 2013 Agre­ement on the Boundary Mana­gement System signed during the visit of then Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to Islamabad. Article 45 of the agreement provides for establishment of the joint commission to oversee implementation of the border management arrangements.

The mechanism would provide an institutional framework for dealing with practical issues along the border, including maintenance and inspection of the boundary, joint surveys, boundary marker issues, management of cross-border facilities and handling of incidents involving the border.

Its activation also gives the two countries a mechanism for regular coordination on a border that is important for movement between Pakistan and China, including thr­ough the Khunjerab crossing, and for trade and connectivity linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

The new commission is distinct from the Joint Boundary Demarcation Commission that was established under the Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of March 2, 1963. The earlier commission had a specific and essentially one time mandate to conduct surveys, establish boundary markers, prepare detailed maps and set out the alignment of the boundary.

Its work ended after the signing of the protocol and maps completing the demarcation process. The 1963 agreement was signed in Beijing by then-Pakistani foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Chinese counterpart Chen Yi.

It also provided that, following a settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the relevant sovereign authority would reopen negotiations with China on the boundary.

The 2013 agreement, by contrast, established a continuing system for managing the already demarcated boundary, including provisions for dealing with boundary markers and cross-border infrastructure. The agreement says that if a marker cannot be restored at its original location, the joint commission can determine another suitable location, provided the boundary line itself is not altered.

India, which disputes the validity of the 1963 agreement and regards the territory covered by it as part of Occupied Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, rejected the new mechanism.

“We have seen reports in this regard. Our position on this matter is clear and consistent. There is no boundary between Pakistan and China. We reject the so-called Joint Commission, which is without any legal basis,” Ind­ian Foreign Ministry spokesman Randhir Jaiswal said.

For Pakistan and China, however, the commission provides a new institutional arrangement for managing their border relationship and dealing with practical issues that have emerged since the 2013 agreement, while leaving the broader territorial positions of the parties unchanged.

Published in Dawn, September 17th, 2026

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