Pakistan News
One chief to rule all military services
The proposed 27th Constitutional Amendment, which would overhaul Article 243 and recast Pakistan’s military command hierarchy, is the most ambitious restructuring effort in decades and perhaps the most contentious as it collides with entrenched institutional cultures and the fragile equilibrium between civilian and military power.
Its implementation may prove far more difficult than its drafters imagine. The plan collides with entrenched institutional cultures, long-standing inter-service rivalries, and the delicate balance between civilian oversight and military autonomy that has, at least in theory, defined Pakistan’s power structure since 1973.
At the heart of the bill lies the deceptively simple premise of modernising defence coordination by creating a Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) and abolishing the office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC).
But in practice, the reform would elevate the army chief to a constitutionally enshrined position of supremacy — combining operational command with overarching control of all services.
Article 243 overhaul marks a leap towards military centralisation and consolidation of uniformed supremacy
For over four decades, the CJCSC has served as the symbolic head of the armed services, designed to ensure coordination among the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
In practice, the role remained largely ceremonial, with the army — for over two and a half decades — reluctant to rotate it to other branches.
The proposed amendment would dissolve the post entirely on Nov 27, 2025, coinciding with the retirement of the current CJCSC, Gen Sahir Shamshad Mirza, and make the chief of army staff concurrently the Chief of Defence Forces — placing all three services under his authority.
Former human rights minister and defence academic Dr Shireen Mazari highlights an ambiguity left unaddressed in the bill.
“With the end of the CJCSC position, would the joint chiefs of staff committee also be dissolved?” she asks.
If so, which forum would replace it for coordination among the three services though the CJCSC’s ineffectiveness is well known.
The supporters of the legislation argue that the change will streamline decision-making and enhance unified command.
However, critics see it as institutional capture. “By placing an army officer as the Chief of Defence Forces with authority over the Air Force and Navy, the proposed system invites institutional imbalance and potential disaster,” warns retired Lt Gen Asif Yasin Malik, a former defence secretary.
“This amendment appears tailored to benefit a specific individual rather than to strengthen the defence structure,” he adds.
The criticism cuts to the core of the country’s military culture — the deep-seated rivalries among the Army, Air Force, and Navy, each guarding its operational turf and doctrine.
The Air Force and Navy have long resisted attempts to subordinate their autonomy under land-centric command.
Harmonising these distinct traditions — air power’s rapid, decentralised decision cycles versus the army’s hierarchical chain of command — has historically been the Achilles’ heel of every “joint” reform effort.
A critical question under the new system is who would control transfers, postings, and promotions in the Air Force and Navy.
Would the two service chiefs readily cede that authority? Dr Mazari cautions that if promotions in the Air Force and Navy were to be decided by an army-origin CDF, it “could lead to festering resentments and affect morale in the long run”.
She raises another hypothetical scenario: “What if there is a Marshal of the Air Force or Admiral of the Fleet while the COAS is a four-star general — will they then be under a four-star army officer if the latter is the CDF?” she asks. “Too much has been left to ad hoc and arbitrary decisions.”
Equally consequential is the proposal to create a Commander of the National Strategic Command, a position overseeing the country’s nuclear forces.
Under the amendment, the commander would be appointed by the prime minister on the army chief’s recommendation and must be chosen from within the army.
That subtle shift moves control of the country’s most sensitive assets away from the collegial National Command Authority (NCA), designed to ensure civilian oversight and inter-service balance, toward a single service.
Dr Mazari warns the change could have grave operational implications.
“Effectively, all nuclear weapons and delivery systems will be under the army’s control, including second-strike missiles which normally fall under naval command,” she says.
“This could lead to command-and-control problems and time delays, especially in a war-like situation.”
Her concerns recall a rare moment of institutional dissent — the 2019 National Security Committee meeting after the Balakot strikes — when, according to retired Lt Gen Malik, the then-army chief Gen Qamar Bajwa advised restraint but was reportedly overruled by the air chief and the CJCSC.
“Under the proposed arrangement, would such dissent, and the powerful response it ensured, even be possible?” he asks pointedly.
Perhaps the most controversial innovation lies in the clauses granting life-long constitutional protection to officers elevated to five-star ranks — field marshal, marshal of the air force, or admiral of the fleet.
These officers would “retain rank, privileges and remain in uniform for life”, removable only through impeachment under Article 47 and protected by immunities “similar to those enjoyed by the president” under Article 248, applied mutatis mutandis.
The language is designed to legalise the extraordinary promotion of Gen Asim Munir to field marshal following the India-Pakistan confrontation in May this year.
What looks ceremonial on paper, however, amounts to a permanent legal armour around an unelected officeholder — “a parallel authority insulated from the very rule of law it is sworn to defend”, as one constitutional lawyer puts it, asking not to be named.
Such provisions blur the line between honour and power.
“Even in the United States, the chairman of the joint chiefs does not wield absolute powers,” notes Lt Gen Malik.
“Creating lifetime immunities for military officers upends the very idea of civilian supremacy”. The supporters of the amendment, including government ministers, argue the changes merely formalise existing practices.
Yet the bill remains ambiguous about the tenure of the service chiefs.
Minister of State for Law and Justice Barrister Aqeel Malik told reporters that there was “no need for a fresh notification” on the army chief’s tenure, since existing legal provisions already establish a five-year term under the Army Act as amended by the 26th Constitutional Amendment.
But such reassurances overlook a deeper concern, which is that the proposed amendment will move the defence management from statute to constitutional entrenchment, making future civilian corrections exponentially harder.
Military affairs expert Muhammad Faisal, a doctoral researcher in Sydney, sees the bill as “the first phase” of a broader restructuring.
“There could be more updates coming with changes in the Army Act and NCA Acts to reflect new proposals,” he says.
“This could also lead to the restructuring of strategic forces, currently administered by three services separately, into a unified single command.”
That trajectory — toward centralisation rather than coordination — captures the tension at the heart of Pakistan’s military politics. Every attempt at “jointness” risks hardening into hierarchy because institutional habits and prestige are resistant to reform.
The stakes are profound. The country’s Constitution has endured repeated experiments in balancing military power and civilian authority.
A Chief of Defence Forces position can be created, as many democracies have done, through statutory reform subject to parliamentary review.
But embedding such a role in the Constitution transforms it from an administrative necessity into a permanent political reality, one that cannot easily be undone.
Ultimately, the question is not whether Pakistan needs a modernised defence structure. However, it definitely needs to be updated.
The question is whether modernisation must come at the cost of institutional equilibrium. History offers a cautionary note that once military power is constitutionalised, it rarely yields ground voluntarily.
Article 243 was meant to preserve civilian command over the armed forces. The 27th Amendment risks rewriting it into a charter of military supremacy.
Published in Dawn, November 9th, 2025
Header image: Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal General Asim Munir addressing the passing out parade of the Pakistan Military Academy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Kakul on April 29. — ISPR
Pakistan News
Pakistan and the Trillion-Dollar Peace Dividend
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : At a moment when the world stood dangerously close to a wider regional inferno, Pakistan has emerged not merely as a bystander, but as one of the few states able to talk to all sides and keep diplomacy alive. As of April 15, 2026, there is still no final U.S.-Iran agreement, and no official ceasefire extension has been publicly confirmed. But Washington says fresh talks may happen in Pakistan within days, President Trump is signaling optimism, Pakistan’s military chief has been in Tehran, and regional diplomacy is now visibly revolving around Pakistani mediation. That alone marks a dramatic shift in Pakistan’s standing in the current geopolitical crisis.
The facts matter. The first 21-hour round of talks in Islamabad ended without a deal, with Vice President JD Vance saying Iran had not accepted core U.S. demands, especially on the nuclear issue. Yet Pakistan did not walk away after that setback. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif publicly said Pakistan’s “full effort” remained focused on ending the conflict, while Field Marshal Asim Munir traveled to Tehran in an attempt to narrow differences before the ceasefire expires. That is the real significance of Pakistan’s role: not that it solved the war in one stroke, but that it kept open the only serious diplomatic corridor after formal negotiations collapsed.
This matters because the war’s costs are no longer theoretical. The conflict that began on February 28 has already killed more than 5,000 people across the region. The repair costs to damaged energy infrastructure alone may reach as high as $58 billion. The Strait of Hormuz, through which about one-fifth of global oil and LNG normally passes, remains the central choke point in the conflict. Even after the April 8 ceasefire, traffic through Hormuz had at one stage fallen to less than 10% of normal, while ships and crews remained trapped and insurers, traders and governments braced for a prolonged shock.
That is why Pakistan’s diplomatic intervention should be understood not only in moral or political terms, but in financial ones. No government or international institution has yet issued an official dollar figure for what Pakistan has “saved.” Still, scenario-based calculations grounded in World Bank, IMF and Reuters reporting suggest that if Pakistan’s mediation helps convert the fragile ceasefire into a durable settlement, the avoided losses could plausibly run from the high hundreds of billions into the low trillions. This is not propaganda; it is what the macroeconomic numbers imply.
Start with global growth. The IMF cut its 2026 global growth forecast to 3.1% because of the war and warned that, in a severe scenario, growth could fall to 2.0%. The World Bank separately warned that even in a best case the war could shave 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points off global growth, and as much as 1 point in a prolonged conflict. WTTC data showing global travel and tourism alone contributed $11.7 trillion in 2025, equal to 10.3% of global GDP, implying a world economy of roughly $113.6 trillion. On that basis, preventing a 0.3–0.4 point hit means protecting roughly $341 billion to $454 billion of global output. Preventing a 1-point hit protects about $1.14 trillion. Preventing the IMF’s 1.1-point slide from 3.1% to 2.0% implies roughly $1.25 trillion in avoided output loss.
And that is only the macro layer. Add the already-estimated $58 billion energy repair bill, the IMF’s warning that more than a dozen countries may need $20 billion to $50 billion in support, the World Bank’s preparedness to mobilize $80 billion to $100 billion for war-hit economies, and the UNDP estimate that just $6 billion in emergency support could keep 32 million people from falling into poverty due to the war-driven energy shock. Even before counting military fuel, munitions, deployment costs, higher insurance, rerouted shipping, lost industrial output and inflation spillovers, the visible tally of avoided or containable damage quickly rises into the hundreds of billions.
Markets themselves are already pricing the value of diplomacy. Gulf stock markets rising on renewed hopes of U.S.-Iran talks, while Wall Street pushed to record highs as investors bet the worst might be avoided. Brent crude, though still elevated, has pulled back from the panic zone above $100 and hovered around $95 on April 15 as traders responded to the possibility of renewed negotiations. Eleven finance ministers meeting around the IMF-World Bank spring meetings called for full implementation of the ceasefire, warning that even if the shooting stops, the economic aftershocks on inflation, growth and debt will linger. That is the clearest evidence that diplomacy is not a symbolic exercise; it is already functioning as a stabilizing economic asset.
Pakistan’s importance in this crisis is therefore not accidental. It has managed to present itself as credible to Washington, acceptable to Tehran, relevant to Gulf capitals and increasingly necessary to wider regional diplomacy that now also involves Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. President Erdogan has openly referenced Pakistan’s mediator role, while the White House has acknowledged Pakistan as the likely venue for the next round. In a fractured region where many actors are aligned too heavily with one bloc or another, Pakistan’s value lies in being politically connected, militarily serious, diplomatically flexible and geographically impossible to ignore.
Still, the argument must remain grounded. Pakistan has not yet “saved the world” in any final sense, because the war is not formally over, the Hormuz issue is unresolved, Lebanon remains volatile, and the hardest questions — nuclear verification, sanctions, shipping access and war damages — are still on the table. The IAEA chief has warned that any real settlement will require detailed inspections, and Reuters says U.S. economic pressure on Iran is still intensifying even while diplomacy continues. So the credit Pakistan deserves today is not for a completed peace, but for preventing diplomatic collapse and preserving the one path that could still save the region from a second explosion.
If the second round succeeds, Pakistan’s diplomatic dividend will be immense. It will not simply have hosted talks; it will have helped prevent a wider energy shock, a deeper inflation spiral, further destruction across Iran and the region, and perhaps a global recession. In scenario terms, that would place Pakistan’s peace dividend somewhere between roughly $341 billion and $1.25 trillion in avoided world output loss, before adding infrastructure, humanitarian and fiscal savings. For a country long described as fragile, indebted and peripheral, that would be a stunning reversal. Pakistan may still be economically constrained, but in this crisis it has demonstrated something rarer than wealth: strategic usefulness. And in the modern world order, the country that can stop a war may matter more than the country that can afford one.
Pakistan News
Pakistan’s Peace Window Reopens
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : After a tense pause in talks between Iran and the United States held in Islamabad on April 11, and to the relief of the entire world, diplomacy has not died; it has simply entered a more difficult and consequential phase, with Pakistan once again emerging as the venue where war-weary rivals may still search for an exit.
The collapse of the first round of direct U.S.-Iran talks in Pakistan did not end diplomacy. It exposed how far apart the two sides still are, but it also showed that both Washington and Tehran believe the crisis is too dangerous to leave to military logic alone. On April 14, President Donald Trump said a second round of talks in Pakistan could happen “over the next two days,” while U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres called it “highly probable” that negotiations would restart. Pakistan’s finance minister, Muhammad Aurangzeb, also said the country’s leadership was “not giving up” and would keep pursuing dialogue.
That is the real story of the moment. The first session in Islamabad may have ended without a deal, but it was not a diplomatic failure in the larger sense. Vice President JD Vance himself struck a more optimistic tone on April 14, saying negotiators had made “a ton of progress,” that Iranian negotiators appeared to want a deal, and that he felt “very good” about where things stood. That is a very different message from a final rupture. It suggests the breakdown was procedural and substantive, not terminal. The gap remains wide, especially over enrichment, inspections, and access, but the process is alive.
Pakistan’s importance has therefore grown rather than diminished. It hosted the first direct U.S.-Iran discussion in nearly half a century, won public praise from Guterres, and is now being openly discussed again as the venue for the next round. In diplomacy, trust is measured less by ceremony than by repetition. If two adversaries return to the same table in the same country after a failed first round, that country has already scored a quiet but significant success. Pakistan’s role is no longer symbolic; it is becoming operational.
The reason the world cares so intensely is obvious. The war has already imposed a severe economic shock. Reuters reported that Wall Street rallied sharply on April 14 because investors interpreted talk of renewed negotiations as a sign that the worst-case scenario might still be avoided. The S&P 500 rose 1.17%, the Nasdaq jumped 1.95%, and Brent crude fell 4.6% to $94.79 while WTI dropped nearly 8% to $91.20. Markets were not celebrating peace; they were pricing in the possibility that diplomacy might prevent a wider catastrophe.
The IMF’s warning makes the stakes even clearer. It cut its 2026 growth forecast for the Middle East and North Africa to 1.1%, with Iran’s economy projected to contract 6.1%, and warned that the conflict is already inflicting broad damage through disrupted shipping, damaged infrastructure, and energy insecurity. In other words, this is no longer a regional war with merely regional costs. It has become a global economic threat touching inflation, shipping, fertilizer, fuel, and food systems far beyond the battlefield.
That is why the Strait of Hormuz remains central to everything. About one-fifth of the world’s oil trade normally passes through that corridor, and both the war and the subsequent U.S. blockade of Iranian ports have turned it into the most sensitive chokepoint in the global economy. Reuters reported that Britain and France are now preparing a 40-country diplomatic effort focused on restoring freedom of navigation, while refusing to simply fold themselves into the American approach. That alone tells us how far the crisis has widened: even close U.S. allies are now building parallel frameworks to contain the fallout.
Washington’s own posture reflects strain. Publicly, U.S. officials remain firm. Vance has repeated that Iran cannot be allowed to retain a path to nuclear weapons capability, and reports from CBS and the Washington Post indicate that Washington pushed a demand for a long suspension of uranium enrichment, alongside wider restrictions. But firmness is not the same as appetite for endless war. The very fact that the White House is signaling renewed talks so quickly after the first round shows that military pressure alone has not delivered closure. It has created leverage, but not resolution.
Iran, for its part, is also signaling that it has not shut the door. Tehran continues to insist on its rights under international law and rejects maximalist U.S. demands, but its willingness to return to talks in Pakistan indicates that it still sees diplomacy as useful, especially if the alternative is a prolonged economic siege and continued strategic pressure. Guterres’ remarks, Pakistan’s continued engagement, and Trump’s own public comments all point in the same direction: neither side believes this crisis can be settled quickly through coercion alone.
Parallel diplomacy is also unfolding on another front, though with far less certainty. Israel and Lebanon held their first direct talks in decades in Washington on April 14, under U.S. auspices and with Secretary of State Marco Rubio participating. The talks produced agreement to continue discussions, but they also immediately revealed their core weakness: Hezbollah rejects the track, and rocket fire resumed even as diplomacy was being launched. That does not make the talks meaningless, but it does mean they cannot by themselves end the violence unless they eventually alter the military and political calculations of the armed actors on the ground.
So the regional picture is mixed. On one side, there is cautious diplomatic movement: Pakistan trying to bring Washington and Tehran back together, Europe preparing a post-crisis Hormuz framework, and Washington opening a rare direct Israel-Lebanon channel. On the other side, there is still active fighting, deep mistrust, maritime disruption, and a massive humanitarian toll. AP reported that more than 2,100 people have been killed in Lebanon and more than a million displaced, while the broader war has killed thousands in Iran and continued to wound U.S. forces. These realities make optimism necessary, but premature triumphalism dangerous.
What Pakistan can claim, however, is substantial. It has shown itself capable of hosting high-risk diplomacy with professionalism and enough credibility that both parties are prepared to consider returning. For a country often described internationally through the language of instability, this is a valuable reversal of narrative. Pakistan is being seen not as a bystander to chaos, but as a facilitator of de-escalation. That does not guarantee success, but it does restore diplomatic relevance.
The next 48 hours matter because they will test whether the first Islamabad round was merely an opening probe or the foundation of a real process. If talks resume, markets will likely read that as the strongest signal yet that a broader settlement remains possible. If they do not, the war economy, maritime insecurity, and political fragmentation now spreading from Tehran to Washington to Europe will deepen. For now, the most important fact is simple: the door is still open, and Pakistan is still holding it.
Pakistan News
Pakistan High Commission Partners with Gerrys for UK Consular Services New Facilitation Centres to Enhance Access for Overseas Pakistanis
Press Release
During a solemn ceremony held today, the High Commission for Pakistan signed a landmark agreement with Gerrys Visa Services Ltd., designating the latter as the sole authorized partner for establishing a network of Facilitation Centres to provide Consular Services across the United Kingdom. The initiative has been undertaken in line with the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and aims to enhance the accessibility and efficiency of consular services for the Pakistani community throughout the country.
The initiative marks a major step forward in the High Commission’s commitment to serving the two million strong Pakistani diaspora in the UK. Under the agreement, Gerrys Visas Services Ltd. will operate the only authorized service centres nationwide, enabling overseas Pakistanis to access a wide range of consular services, including the processing of visas, passports, NADRA related documents, and attestation services.
Speaking on the occasion, the High Commissioner for Pakistan, Dr. Muhammad Faisal, stated, “this partnership is about putting overseas Pakistanis first. By decentralizing these essential services through authorized partners like Gerrys, we are eliminating the burden of long distance travel and making consular access faster, safer, and more convenient.”
At the same time, a key objective of the agreement is to combat the growing menace of unauthorized and fraudulent visa and NADRA facilitation centres operating across the UK, which have been charging exorbitant fees and perpetrating scams that harm vulnerable applicants. The new framework will also help prevent data pilferage by ensuring that personal information is no longer provided to unapproved entities.
Mr. Afzal Wali Muhammad, Chairman of Gerrys Visa Services Ltd., expressed that the company is honoured to be entrusted as the single authorised partner for this transformative project. He pledged to ensure world-class, transparent, and secure services for the Pakistani community across the UK.
The first Gerrys Visa Services Ltd. Facilitation Centre will be inaugurated in May 2026, with a phased expansion planned to establish a comprehensive presence across all major regions of the United Kingdom. Further details regarding locations, services, and appointment procedures will be announced in the coming weeks.
London
13th April, 2026
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