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Israel’s Bases in Iran and Iraq and Threat to Pakistan

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The June war between Israel and Iran revealed a frightening new reality of modern warfare: nations are no longer defeated only by armies crossing borders or fighter jets bombing cities. Increasingly, wars are prepared from within. The real battlefield now lies inside societies, intelligence networks, covert safe houses, cyber systems, recruited insiders, and hidden operational bases quietly established years before conflict begins.
What shocked military analysts during the June conflict was not merely the intensity of Israeli airpower, but the astonishing precision with which Iran’s top military commanders, nuclear scientists, IRGC leadership, missile batteries, and strategic facilities were targeted. According to multiple international investigations published by The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Times of Israel, many of these attacks were enabled through covert Israeli operational networks functioning deep inside Iran itself.
Reports suggest that Mossad had spent years cultivating Iranian dissidents, smugglers, contractors, and covert assets near strategic locations such as Tehran, Natanz, Isfahan, and other sensitive military and nuclear sites. Through these embedded networks, Israeli intelligence reportedly obtained precise coordinates, movement patterns, communication details, and even internal meeting schedules of senior Iranian officials.
The result was devastating. Nuclear scientists were assassinated with pinpoint precision. Missile launchers were neutralized before activation. Air-defense systems were disabled from within. Underground command centers were reportedly identified and struck with astonishing accuracy. Even senior Iranian military gatherings were allegedly tracked through cyber deception operations and internal informants.
Iran later admitted the scale of internal infiltration by launching mass arrests across the country. Thousands were detained on accusations of espionage, treason, and collaboration with foreign intelligence services. Iranian authorities claimed that many individuals had shared coordinates of military sites and strategic locations with Israeli operatives. Tehran’s response reflected a painful realization: much of the war had already been prepared inside Iran long before the first missile was fired. But the most alarming development emerged later.
International media reports revealed that Israel had allegedly established covert operational bases inside Iraq as well. According to these reports, hidden facilities in Iraq’s western desert were used for reconnaissance, logistics, emergency pilot support, intelligence gathering, and preparation for attacks deep inside Iran. Some reports suggested these installations dated back to 2024 and were operational during both the 2025 and 2026 conflicts.
The implications are enormous. If covert Israeli infrastructure could function inside countries openly hostile to Israel, then no regional state can assume immunity from similar penetration.
This is where the danger becomes particularly serious for Pakistan.
Pakistan today faces a highly sensitive strategic environment. The growing convergence between India, Israeli strategic interests, and evolving Taliban-controlled dynamics inside Afghanistan creates a deeply concerning security equation for Islamabad. Afghanistan’s geography alone makes it an ideal staging ground for intelligence operations targeting both Pakistan and Iran. Its porous borders, fragmented governance structures, smuggling networks, militant corridors, refugee movements, and weak centralized intelligence oversight create an operational environment where covert infrastructure can potentially be established with relative ease.
Israel’s operational doctrine, as demonstrated in Iran and Iraq, appears increasingly dependent on first creating hidden operational ecosystems inside or near adversarial states before open conflict begins. Such ecosystems may start as small reconnaissance cells, logistics hubs, communications nodes, safe houses, drone launch sites, cyber relay stations, or intelligence listening posts. Over time, they mature into fully operational covert bases capable of supporting sabotage, surveillance, targeted assassinations, and precision military operations.
This is precisely why Pakistan must now view Afghanistan not merely through the lens of terrorism or border security, but through the broader framework of strategic intelligence warfare.
The danger is compounded by the existing instability in regions like Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Long-running insurgencies, political polarization, smuggling routes, militant financing channels, ethnic grievances, and cross-border trafficking networks create fertile ground for foreign intelligence agencies seeking recruitment opportunities or covert operational access. Such environments are vulnerable to exploitation by any sophisticated intelligence service capable of leveraging local actors, financial desperation, ideological divisions, or anti-state sentiments.
If covert Israeli networks could allegedly penetrate the heavily monitored security structure of Iran, then Pakistan cannot afford complacency.
The warning is clear and urgent: Pakistan and Iran must immediately strengthen their counterintelligence cooperation regarding Afghanistan. Both countries need to activate deep intelligence monitoring systems capable of detecting even rudimentary efforts to establish covert operational infrastructure near their borders. Intelligence operations can no longer remain reactive. They must become aggressively preemptive.This requires several immediate strategic measures.
First, Pakistan and Iran must significantly expand intelligence penetration inside Afghanistan itself. Monitoring militant networks alone is no longer sufficient. Greater focus must now be placed on suspicious logistics activities, foreign funding channels, unexplained infrastructure projects, covert aviation activity, encrypted communications networks, and unusual movements near sensitive border regions.
Second, Pakistan’s intelligence agencies must intensify scrutiny over recruitment pipelines operating through financial networks, NGOs, smuggling channels, technology firms, cross-border trade routes, and ideological organizations. Modern intelligence warfare rarely begins with soldiers; it begins with local facilitators.
Third, sensitive military, nuclear, communication, and leadership infrastructure inside Pakistan must undergo a complete security reassessment. The Iranian experience demonstrated that covert targeting becomes possible only after years of surveillance, infiltration, and mapping. Preventing such penetration requires constant internal vetting, cyber monitoring, communication discipline, and aggressive counterespionage measures.
Fourth, strategic coordination between Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and other regional states must expand beyond diplomacy into active intelligence-sharing frameworks focused specifically on covert foreign operational networks.
The reality of modern warfare is brutal. By the time airstrikes begin, the enemy may already have spent years building the battlefield from inside your territory.
This is why the June war should not merely be studied as a military confrontation between Israel and Iran. It should be understood as a case study in how intelligence penetration, covert bases, recruited insiders, cyber deception, and hidden logistics networks can cripple even powerful states from within.
For Pakistan, the lesson is existential. The greatest threat may not come from visible armies massing at the border, but from invisible networks silently embedding themselves within vulnerable spaces long before conflict erupts. Afghanistan’s instability, combined with emerging India-Israel strategic alignment, creates precisely the type of environment where such covert infrastructure could potentially take root.
Time, therefore, is not on the side of complacency. Pakistan, Iran, and other regional powers must act now — before covert operational ecosystems mature into irreversible strategic threats. Once such networks become deeply entrenched, the cost of dismantling them becomes extraordinarily high, and the damage they can inflict may already be beyond repair.

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Why a new Pakistan-China border pact has irked India

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For decades, India has refused to recognise a Pakistan-China boundary in a disputed part of the Himalayas that Delhi claims as its own.

But last week, Pakistan and China formalised a boundary in a remote part of the mountainous region, drawing a sharp response from Delhi.

The two countries signed the Pakistan-China Boundary Joint Commission, an agreement which Pakistan described as a “significant milestone” that would deepen cooperation on border management, trade and connectivity between India’s regional rivals.

Delhi rejected the move as having no legal basis, saying it did not recognise any Pakistan-China boundary located in territory it claims as Indian.

The announcement comes at a particularly sensitive moment.

India and China are seeking to stabilise their relationship after years of military tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the disputed line separating their forces along much of their Himalayan frontier. At the same time, Beijing and Islamabad are deepening cooperation along a neighbouring stretch of the frontier that India also claims.

“There is no boundary between Pakistan and China. We reject the so-called Joint Commission, which is without any legal basis,” Indian foreign ministry spokesman Randhir Jaiswal said.

Corbis via Getty Images Shaksgam River and Karakoram Mountains
The commission concerns the Pakistan-China frontier, including the Shaksgam Valley

The commission concerns the Pakistan-China frontier, including the Shaksgam Valley, a roughly 5,180 sq km tract that Pakistan ceded to China in 1963 but which India claims as part of its territory in Ladakh.

India says the territory was part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and was illegally occupied by Pakistan before being ceded to China. The Indian government has never recognised the agreement and considers it illegal and invalid.

This history explains the particular sensitivity of Wednesday’s announcement.

“Pakistan has no locus standi to enter into arrangements concerning Indian territory under its illegal and forcible occupation,” the Indian foreign ministry said.

Pakistan says Jammu and Kashmir remains a disputed territory, and argues that India therefore has no standing to challenge its 1963 boundary agreement with China. It regards the agreement as valid.

Jabin T Jacob, professor at the Department of International Relations and Governance Studies at Delhi’s Shiv Nadar University, said the new development represented the revival of an old mechanism rather than an entirely new arrangement.

“A joint boundary commission is provided for in the 1963 Sino-Pak Agreement, the only issue at hand is the timing of its operationalisation,” he told the BBC.

He said there could be several reasons for the timing, including China’s broader effort to demarcate its boundaries and a desire to institutionalise exchanges and movement along a frontier at a time when Pakistan’s other borders have experienced conflict and instability.

Getty Images An Indian army convoy drives towards Leh, on a highway bordering China, on June 19, 2020 in Gagangir, India.
An Indian army convoy driving towards Leh on a highway bordering China

Jacob said India should be “worried” by the development. More importantly, he said, the move appeared to disregard a provision in the 1963 treaty itself.

Article 6 of the agreement provided for its renegotiation once the Kashmir dispute was settled with whichever country ultimately controlled the territory, Jacob said.

For India, Jacob said, the problem is compounded by the international information environment.

“China’s relative dominance of the international media and information landscape – [with] CGTN, CRI, presence on social media – relative to India allows it to put forward its narrative and maps globally while India is limited to fulminations that other world capitals are likely to ignore,” he said.

AFP via Getty Images Indian Army vehicles drive on a road near Chang La high mountain pass in northern India's Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir state near the border with China on June 17, 2020. - India and China held top level talks on June 17 to "cool down the situation", Beijing said, after a violent border brawl that left at least 20 Indian soldiers dead. (Photo by STR / AFP) (Photo by STR/AFP via Getty Images)
Indian Army vehicles drive on a road near a mountain pass in India’s Ladakh region

That concern is distinct from the practical management of the frontier itself. Pakistan and China already have extensive infrastructure and connectivity links across the region, including the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Karakoram Highway.

Husain Haqqani, former Pakistani ambassador to the US and now a senior fellow at Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy and Hudson Institute, said the new commission was both practical and political.

“It is a combination of both,” Haqqani told the BBC. “It is a mechanism to enhance border and boundary cooperation, prevent illegal crossings and protect the strategic infrastructure tied to CPEC.”

He said it also served as a signal to India that Beijing continued to view Kashmir through the Pakistani prism.

“China has never accepted India’s position on Kashmir and China views Gilgit-Baltistan from the Pakistani, not Indian prism,” Haqqani said, referring to the region in Pakistan-administered Kashmir that borders China and which India claims as part of its territory.

Haqqani said Islamabad’s position had evolved in response to developments in Indian-administered Kashmir.

“Pakistan still maintains that the final status of Jammu and Kashmir is yet to be decided,” he said. “But since India has made internal changes – for example, the abrogation of Article 370 – in its part of Kashmir, Pakistan sees no issue with simply institutionalising what has been de facto with China since 1963.”

Anadolu Agency/Getty Images A ship carrying containers are seen during the opening of a trade project in Gwadar port, west of Karachi on November 13, 2016.
The Gwadar port, west of Karachi, is a key part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

For Beijing, the arrangement also fits into a broader pattern of using its relationships with neighbouring states to manage and signal its position towards India.

Haqqani said reassurance to Pakistan on Kashmir was of both strategic and geopolitical value to Beijing.

“On the strategic front it further deepens ties with Pakistan and on the geo-strategic front it reinforces for India its fear of a two-front threat from China and Pakistan, which pleases Pakistan and benefits China.”

The timing of the statement, say experts, is also significant.

“China always plans its decisions months, if not years, in advance so the decision to operationalise a joint boundary commission must have been made some time back,” says Haqqani.

“The release of this information was timed for after President Xi Jinping’s recent Brics summit trip to send Pakistan a message of reassurance in the strategic partnership, and India a reminder that multilateral engagement does not translate into any change in China’s vision for South Asia.”

But Jacob cautioned against interpreting every aspect of the development as a direct military move against India.

“There aren’t any immediate or apparent implications for the LAC as of now,” he said.

That suggests that the significance of last week’s announcement may lie less in an immediate change to the disputed Himalayan frontier than in the gradual institutionalisation of arrangements that India has consistently rejected.

India’s position, Jaiswal said, remained “clear and consistent”: any attempt to legitimise what Delhi considers Pakistan’s illegal occupation of Indian territory is unacceptable and has no bearing on India’s sovereignty.

But Haqqani believes the dispute goes beyond the legalities of borders.

“The key disagreement between India and China about the border and boundary is geo-strategic, not cartographic,” he said. “So there is a limit to what border negotiations and border management mechanisms can achieve.”

Pakistan, he added, remained “China’s secondary deterrent against India” – and Beijing’s engagement with Islamabad would continue to send that message to Delhi.

Taken From BBC News

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cqe9e4vjx1e5o

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CM Murad asks authorities to boost polio vaccination across Sindh

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KARACHI: Sindh Chief Minister Syed Murad Ali Shah on Wednesday reviewed the progress against poliovirus, noting that Sindh had reduced its polio burden from 23 cases in 2024 and nine in 2025 to just one case so far in 2026. However, environmental surveillance showed that the virus is still present in a few high-risk areas.

Chairing a meeting of the Provincial Task Force (PTF) on Polio Eradication, the CM reaffirmed the government’s commitment to eliminating the disease and directed authorities to intensify vaccination, surveillance and community engagement efforts ahead of the September 21-27 Sub-National Immunisation Days (SNIDs) campaign.

“The progress achieved by Sindh is encouraging and reflects the hard work of our health workers, district administrations and partner organisations, but our mission will only be completed when every child is protected, and the virus is eliminated from every district,” said Murad Ali Shah.

“No child should remain unvaccinated due to negligence, weak supervision or lack of follow-up.”

Reviews preparations for week-long campaign beginning on 21st

The meeting, held at CM House, was attended by Health Minister Dr Azra Fazal Pechuho, chief secretary Asif Hyder Shah, Mayor of Karachi Murtaza Wahab, IG Police Sindh Javed Alam Odho, commissioner of Karachi Hassan Naqvi, provincial secretaries, provincial coordinator of Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) Shaharyar Gul, Sindh government partners, and deputy commissioners. From other districts, commissioners, DIGs, deputy commissioners and SSPs participated via video link.

Briefing the meeting, Health Minister Dr Azra Fazal Pechuho said Pakistan’s wild poliovirus (WPV1) cases have declined sharply from 74 in 2024 to 31 in 2025 and only three so far in 2026. Sindh has recorded a single case this year, reported from Sujawal on February 10, compared to nine cases last year and 23 in 2024.

In-charge of EOC Shaharyar Gul informed the chief minister that environmental surveillance data shows a significant reduction in virus circulation across the province. The number of positive environmental surveillance sites has fallen from a peak of 29 in March 2025 to only five in August 2026. Outside Karachi, all 14 surveillance sites are currently negative, while six of Karachi’s 15 sites remain positive, indicating that transmission is increasingly confined to limited pockets of the city.

The meeting participants were told that the absence of confirmed polio cases in Karachi during the 2025 high-transmission season, despite some positive environmental samples, reflects stronger population immunity achieved through routine immunisation and repeated vaccination campaigns.

Chief secretary Asif Hyder Shah said that sustained immunisation efforts have helped prevent clinical cases even where environmental surveillance continues to detect virus circulation.

Expressing satisfaction over the declining trend, the chief minister directed all commissioners, deputy commissioners and district health authorities to adopt a zero-tolerance approach towards missed children, refusals and operational gaps.

Reviewing surveillance findings, he ordered intensified vaccination and monitoring efforts in Karachi and other identified high-risk areas, full implementation of the Karachi Action Plan 2.0, stronger coordination among district administrations and health authorities, closer monitoring of migrant and mobile populations and improved routine immunisation coverage in underserved communities.

EOC coordinator Shaharyar Gul reported that nearly three million oral polio vaccine (OPV) doses and 2.89 million booster doses were administered in Karachi, while campaigns in other divisions delivered approximately 2.7 million OPV doses and 2.58 million booster doses. Expanded-age vaccination strategies helped reach older children through schools and community-based interventions.

The chief minister appreciated the efforts of frontline workers, teachers, community mobilisers and health staff working in remote and hard-to-reach areas, describing them as the backbone of the eradication programme.

The task force was informed that after the July 2026 SNIDs campaign, a special 10-day follow-up drive was launched to vaccinate children who had initially been missed. Of 146,149 missed children, more than 23,500 were subsequently vaccinated through targeted efforts focused on refusals and unavailable children.

Mr Shah directed district administrations to further reduce refusal rates through stronger community engagement and public awareness campaigns, emphasising that building trust with parents remains critical to the success of the programme.

The meeting reviewed preparations for the September 21-27 SNIDs campaign, during which nearly 10 million children under five will be vaccinated across Sindh. The campaign will cover 23 full districts and selected union councils in seven partial districts, with more than 80,000 frontline workers participating.

Officials said over 26,000 police personnel have been assigned security duties. The chief minister reiterated the provincial government’s financial support for the campaign and noted that incentives for frontline workers had been increased by 28 per cent.

He directed all districts to complete remaining preparedness measures, including vaccine supply, logistics, workforce deployment and supervision arrangements, before the campaign begins.

The chief minister also reviewed campaign quality indicators and was informed that Sindh has continued to maintain strong performance standards while pursuing key reforms in routine immunisation, surveillance, staffing and community engagement.

Published in Dawn, September 17th, 2026

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Dealers await answers as fuel subsidy rollout begins

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• Petroleum dealers lament lack of clarity on payment mechanism, timeline
• PM wants facilitation desks to help people trying to buy subsidised fuel
• Ogra attributes hike to elevated crude prices despite decline in int’l rates

ISLAMABAD: Even as members of the public who have signed up for the PM’s Fuel Relief Scheme queued up at fuel pumps late on Wednesday night, petroleum dealers were still not clear about the mechanism whereby they would be compensated.

The concern was voiced by the Pakistan Petroleum Dealers Association (PPDA) during a presser in Karachi, where its chairman Malik Khuda Bakhsh said that no fuel pump could afford to bear a loss of Rs100 per litre without clarity on how they will be compensated.

He claimed that between the petroleum ministry, Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (Ogra) and even the finance ministry, no one had been able to answer their questions.

“Officials from Ogra and oil marketing companies say that the petroleum ministry will possibly pay the subsidy amount, whereas ministry officials maintain that payments will be made by the finance ministry, while finance ministry officials assure us that the State Bank will release the funds in a day or two,“ Mr Bakhsh added.

A day earlier, the National Steering Com­mittee on Fuel Subsidy — chaired by Deputy PM Ishaq Dar — had ordered that payments to fuel stations under the PM’s scheme be processed within 24 hours through the State Bank of Pakistan.

However, Mr Bakhsh said the federal government had assured dealers that they would be taken into confidence before the launch of the fuel relief package, but lamented that no such consultation took place.

”The government has to understand that if payments are not reimbursed in time, many dealers will stop participating in [the scheme], as many previous promises were also not fulfilled by the government,” he added.

PPDA Vice Chairman Tariq Hassan said that around 14,000 dealers across the country have been trying desperately to contact the government over the past three days, adding that whenever Islamabad wants to enforce something, it stops communication.

Another vice chairman, Anwar Kamal, said that if the scheme was to be successful, the government must negotiate with dealers, adding that dealers could not afford to have billions tied up for a long period under this scheme.

Mr Bakhsh later told Dawn they had been invited to a virtual meeting with the relevant federal secretary on Thursday morning.

He added that Ogra officials had also reached out to brief him, but he had asked for that information in writing, so he could relay that to the members of his association.

Facilitation desks

Earlier, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif ordered authorities to set up facilitation desks comprising administration officials, volunteers and petrol pump staff to assist citizens in easily obtaining fuel subsidy under the special relief scheme, which was rolled out across the country at Wednesday midnight, following the launch of the pilot phase in Islamabad.

Presiding over a meeting to review progress on the scheme, PM Shehbaz directed that personnel deployed at the facilitation desks should guide eligible citizens and provide them with all possible assistance in registration and other necessary procedures.

The prime minister also asked the relevant authorities to remain proactive in creating public awareness about the scheme, which will benefit people from all four provinces, Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.

The meeting was informed that the scheme had been designed in a simple and easy-to-understand manner for the public. Only four pieces of information were required for registration: the applicant’s CNIC number, vehicle number plate, province of registration and vehicle registration date.

According to an official, the number of successful registrations was gradually rising, while provincial governments were extending “full cooperation” for nationwide implementation of the scheme.

Oil prices

Meanwhile, notifying fresh POL rates on Wednesday night, Ogra attributed the steep hikes to elevated international crude oil and petroleum product prices.

The price of high-speed diesel was increased by Rs5.62 per litre to Rs421.45, while petrol became costlier by Rs6.88 per litre, taking its new price to Rs391.22 per litre.

Brent crude futures fell $2.92, or 2.7 per cent, to settle at $105.83 a barrel. US West Texas Intermediate futures fell $3.40, or 3.2pc, to close at $102.43, Reuters reported.

Saudi Arabia is offering more loadings of crude oil to Asian refiners via ship-to-ship transfers off Oman’s Sohar port, people familiar with the matter said, blunting some of the hit to global supply from attacks on the country’s East-West pipeline to the Red Sea.

Oil prices had gained more than $3 in the previous session after shipping industry sources said crude loadings at Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea export hub of Yanbu had been suspended and Riyadh had cancelled some cargo deliveries to European customers.

The suspension followed strikes on the East-West pipeline, which feeds the Saudi port of Yanbu. It became the main Saudi outlet for oil exports after Iran began blockading the Strait of Hormuz after US and Israeli attacks on the country.

Published in Dawn, September 17th, 2026

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