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America’s Households Work; Corporate America Collects (Part-II)

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : For households, however, both principal and interest still have to be found each month. Principal repayment may build ownership, but it cannot simultaneously buy groceries or meet an emergency. The family lives through cash flow, not accounting classifications.
Then comes the subscription economy. EMARKETER forecast $46.4 billion in U.S. paid retail membership fees for 2025. Shopping clubs sell access to savings; software sells continued access to tools; streaming platforms sell entertainment; newspapers and magazines sell information; security businesses sell monitoring and reassurance.
Our research identified approximately $56.66 billion in separately reported worldwide subscription revenue across just seven companies for their annual periods labelled 2025: Adobe, Disney’s entertainment streaming business, SiriusXM, Dropbox, Peloton, The New York Times’ digital products and Duolingo. Spotify separately reported €15.35 billion in Premium revenue.
Netflix reported $45.18 billion in worldwide revenue, predominantly from memberships but also including advertising and other sources. Amazon’s $49.62 billion subscription-services category combined Prime and other digital subscriptions. Newspapers beyond the Times, magazines, tabloids, other apps and private platforms add further charges. OnlyFans illustrates another variation: approximately $7.2 billion in worldwide customer payments in fiscal 2024 generated about $1.41 billion in platform revenue, with payments encompassing more than subscription fees.
These figures cannot honestly be added into a single measure of American household extraction. They cover different countries, reporting periods and revenue definitions, and some overlap. Their significance lies in the breadth of the business model: an increasing range of activities carries a continuing payment obligation.
The consequences of this structure became personal when my family moved from Pakistan to Michigan. In Pakistan, I could educate my children, meet household expenses, pay my dues and still save for the future. In the United States, several members of my family work, savings accumulated over a lifetime continue to supplement our earnings, and the month still ends with little room to breathe. The American dollar is stronger. Our household’s financial security feels weaker.
Since moving to the United States in 2025, I have experienced how a higher-earning economy can leave a working household with less financial breathing room.
After a career in public service, my income in Pakistan provided purchasing power that its dollar equivalent—roughly $1,500 to $1,800 a month by my recollection—fails to convey. I could meet an education bill of approximately Rs100,000 for my two children, buy groceries, obtain medical care and maintain a reserve for unforeseen expenses. Over the years, I also built assets intended to protect my wife, my children and myself.
Today, my wife works two jobs. I work, and our 18-year-old daughter and 16-year-old son also work. Yet the combined effort of our household, supplemented by savings brought from Pakistan, has not produced the financial comfort we expected.
Groceries, by my estimate, account for only about 10 to 15 percent of our spending. Our son attends public school, while our daughter’s education is being financed through a loan. That loan postpones a burden; it does not make education free. The remaining income is absorbed by housing, utilities, transportation, insurance, debt payments, memberships and other recurring charges. We are working to keep the account current, while the future waits.
My experience cannot represent every Pakistani or American household. My professional standing and accumulated assets mattered in Pakistan; migration created new costs in America. Pakistan’s lower-paid workers face severe hardship, and affordable care is neither universally available nor consistently adequate. But those differences do not invalidate the question our experience raises: why does a family require so many earners merely to maintain an ordinary life in a wealthy country?
My experience in Pakistan was different. Many routine medical consultations, medicines and vehicle repairs could be paid from ordinary savings. Lower wages and operating costs help explain that difference; it cannot all be attributed to corporate conduct. Still, the practical consequence matters: an affordable repair lets a household solve a problem directly. An unaffordable repair can turn the same problem into a financing agreement, a protection contract or another claim on future income.
An optional streaming service is not equivalent to necessary medical treatment. Cancelling subscriptions can help a budget. But cancelling entertainment cannot repair an unaffordable housing market, make a car-dependent commute disappear or bring hospital prices within reach. Advice to economize becomes inadequate when it treats small discretionary charges as the main explanation for structural costs.
Donald Trump has recognized the political force of that pressure. In January 2026, his administration proposed a healthcare framework addressing drug prices, insurance accountability, middlemen and price transparency. Those proposals acknowledge that Americans face serious affordability problems. Announcing them, however, is different from delivering household relief.
The test of Trump’s economic leadership must be the money and security left with families after essential bills are paid. Corporate growth and rising asset values cannot substitute for that test. If several members of a household must work while long-accumulated savings are consumed simply to remain current, declarations of prosperity do not describe that household’s reality.
Discipline must begin where costs are largest: healthcare pricing, housing supply and financing, transportation, insurance and expensive consumer debt. Competition rules should confront abusive market power. Medical prices should be understandable before treatment where feasible. Insurance should provide clear coverage and fair claims handling. Repair markets should offer affordable alternatives. Subscription cancellation should be as straightforward as enrolment. Public transport should make employment possible without multiplying vehicle costs.
These reforms would preserve useful services while challenging prices and practices that leave families dependent and financially exposed. The objective should be a household capable of saving, choosing and planning.
I did not bring a lifetime of savings to America merely to watch it disappear between payment deadlines. I came with the hope that work would improve our security and give our children a stronger future.
A prosperous country should allow that hope to survive the monthly bills. When parents work, teenagers work and savings still shrink, the measure of success must extend beyond the balance sheets of the companies collecting the payments. The American promise must be judged by what remains in the household—and what that household can still hope to become.

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America’s Households Work; Corporate America Collects (Part-1)

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Across America, millions of households are working to exhaustion while banks, insurers, lenders and corporate platforms collect their share before the family can put anything aside. The mortgage falls due. The car payment follows. Insurance premiums, utility bills, credit-card interest, protection plans and subscriptions arrive in succession. By the time the household has paid for the right to remain housed, mobile, connected and protected, little may remain for savings, a child’s education or a secure retirement. Work continues; financial freedom retreats.
At the other end of these payment chains, wealth accumulates on a scale almost impossible for an ordinary wage earner to imagine. The contrast is stark: families calculate which bill can wait, while the fortunes at the top expand by billions. America has become extraordinarily successful at creating immense private fortunes. Its greater failure is allowing so many people who sustain that prosperity to live with persistent financial insecurity.
Forbes’ March 2026 ranking placed 15 of the world’s 20 richest people in the United States. Its September assessment valued America’s 400 wealthiest people at a combined $8 trillion, up from $6.6 trillion a year earlier. The richest 20 Americans alone held approximately $4 trillion. Those estimates measure assets, not cash taken directly from households, but they reveal the extraordinary concentration of economic power at the summit.
Meanwhile, the Census Bureau counted 34.5 million Americans below the official poverty line in 2025, or 10.2 percent of the population. Its broader Supplemental Poverty Measure, which accounts for taxes, benefits and expenses including medical and work costs, put poverty at 13.1 percent. Financial insecurity extends beyond these thresholds. A household can earn too much to be classified as poor and still have too little left after essential bills to withstand illness, unemployment or a major repair.
That is the dividing line this article examines: the difference between earning an income and retaining enough of it to build a life. The Federal Reserve found that 91 percent of adults were concerned about prices in 2025. Only 63 percent said they could cover a $400 emergency entirely with cash or its equivalent, and 26 percent reported skipping medical care because of cost. A wealthy national economy can coexist with deeply insecure household budgets.
The pressure is cumulative. Housing ties income to rent or a long mortgage. Employment may require a car, which brings financing, insurance, fuel and repairs. High medical prices make protection indispensable, yet insurance itself requires premiums and may leave further out-of-pocket bills. Credit covers the shortfall and creates another interest charge. Subscriptions and service contracts then add smaller claims on what remains. Each institution sees its own transaction; the family must survive their combined demand.
The question is how much income a household can retain after buying the necessities of participation in American life. When essential services become increasingly expensive and access depends on continuing payments, corporate revenue can rise while the people supplying that revenue lose their capacity to save.
Housing is the first claim on income. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, median monthly owner costs for households with a mortgage reached $2,035 in 2024, including selected costs such as insurance, taxes and utilities. Median gross rent was $1,487. These are national figures; individual households can face much higher bills. Before a family purchases food or saves for a child, shelter has already taken a substantial share of its earnings.
Transportation creates another chain of obligations. Where we live and work in Michigan, available public transport does not adequately connect our family’s different workplaces and schedules. Four people travelling in different directions can create pressure for several vehicles. Each brings some combination of a purchase payment, fuel, registration, repairs and insurance. Transportation becomes part of the cost of holding a job.
Michigan requires no-fault insurance for vehicles driven legally. A lender may also require additional protection for a financed car. Homeowners insurance is generally a mortgage condition, while life insurance, extended warranties and shopping memberships are ordinarily optional. These distinctions matter. Nevertheless, the household experiences the cumulative bill, regardless of whether each component originates in legislation, a lending contract or a personal decision.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics offers a revealing national comparison. In 2024, housing accounted for 33.4 percent of average consumer expenditure and transportation another 17 percent. Together, they absorbed just over half of spending. Food accounted for 12.9 percent. Our experience of groceries being a relatively small part of the pressure is therefore entirely plausible: the larger burdens often arrive before the shopping begins.
Healthcare makes that pressure more formidable. KFF found that average annual premiums for employer-sponsored family health coverage reached $26,993 in 2025. Workers contributed $6,850 on average, with employers paying the balance. The entire premium does not come directly out of the worker’s paycheck, but the employer’s contribution remains part of the cost of employing that worker.
Even after coverage is purchased, deductibles, copayments and uncovered services may remain. Dental and vision benefits are frequently arranged separately. A family can therefore pay repeatedly for protection and still face a significant bill when it actually needs treatment.
Insurance provides real protection against losses that savings alone may not cover. A year without a claim does not mean the protection had no value. The deeper problem is that when treatment, repairs or replacement become prohibitively expensive, households become increasingly dependent on intermediaries to afford the underlying service. Lowering the price of care would strengthen both insured families and those struggling to obtain coverage.
The scale of the American financial machinery is enormous. The NAIC’s report covering 2024 recorded 6,228 domestic insurance companies and approximately $3.65 trillion in premiums and deposits. That figure includes commercial business, annuities and deposit-type funds; it is neither household spending alone nor industry profit. Yet it demonstrates how much economic activity passes through institutions selling financial protection.
Protection is then sold in additional layers. Industry estimates put U.S. home-warranty providers at 78 businesses and $4.3 billion in revenue in 2024. Auto extended-warranty providers numbered approximately 287 in 2024, with their market estimated at $22 billion in 2025. Appliance, electronics and phone protection plans extend the model further. Their prices may appear modest beside a mortgage, but each is another recurring commitment competing with savings.
Credit supplies relief today by reserving part of tomorrow’s earnings. At the end of 2025, 4,336 FDIC-insured banks and savings institutions and 4,287 federally insured credit unions operated in the United States. Their combined reported net income was approximately $314.4 billion. Their activities include business lending and other services, so this cannot be presented as profit extracted exclusively from households. But it establishes the scale of the institutions through which families finance major purchases and manage shortfalls.
Mortgages require the same accounting discipline. The latest official dataset covered 4,782 institutions reporting 2025 mortgage activity. The Mortgage Bankers Association’s October 2026 forecast put that year’s single-family mortgage originations at approximately $2.1 trillion. The principal advanced is not lenders’ revenue. Interest, fees, servicing and loan-sale income are the relevant earnings streams. United Wholesale Mortgage, for example, originated $163.4 billion in loans in 2025 and reported $3.16 billion in revenue.

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The Story of Two Elections

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Two elections, separated by one week, could reshape the future of the Middle East. Israel votes on October 27; Americans elect Congress on November 3. Behind both contests stands the same question: has the war against Iran made ordinary people safer, or has it made their lives more expensive and their future more uncertain? For Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, the battlefield is becoming an electoral liability.
These are different elections with interconnected consequences. Netanyahu is fighting to retain the premiership; Trump is fighting to preserve Republican control of Congress. An Israeli defeat could dislodge one architect of confrontation. An American congressional reversal could constrain the other. Neither outcome guarantees peace, but together they could alter the political machinery sustaining this conflict. Iran, the country Washington and Israel sought to weaken, could consequently become a central factor in weakening their leaders’ domestic authority.
The military buildup makes that possibility urgent. Euronews reported on October 16 that the USS George Washington and USS George H.W. Bush were operating in the Arabian Sea, with the USS Theodore Roosevelt heading toward the region. Approximately 9,000 additional sailors and Marines were being dispatched, potentially bringing regional naval personnel above 20,000. DefenseScoop also reported an autonomous surface vessel deploying with Roosevelt’s strike group. The preparations give Washington the means to turn threats into action.
Trump’s promise of no attack before the midterms offers little reassurance while American strike capacity continues to grow. On October 8, he publicly tied his pledge to November 3. His record of reversals gives reason to question whether this is electoral caution, negotiating pressure or tactical ambiguity intended to keep Iran off guard. Tehran therefore has reason to judge Washington’s military preparations more seriously than its president’s assurances.
CNN subsequently reported contingency plans potentially involving the Massive Ordnance Air Blast bomb. Read alongside the naval deployments, such planning gives Trump’s declaration a disturbing significance: the pause could provide time to position forces while encouraging an adversary to lower its guard. A sudden strike before the election could then be defended as deliberate deception. The political calendar shapes the danger; it does not reliably determine when that danger might materialize.
For Americans, the connection between foreign policy and household hardship is becoming difficult to ignore. Trump campaigned on restoring affordability. The BBC account places his approval near 37 percent and describes gasoline reaching approximately four dollars following disruption to Middle Eastern energy supplies. War reaches voters through fuel pumps, transport charges and household budgets. Presidential declarations of strength offer little comfort when families experience that strength as another expense they cannot avoid.
Republican vulnerability is acute in the House of Representatives. All 435 seats face election, and the governing majority is narrow. The Senate presents Democrats with a harder challenge: Republicans hold 53 seats, against 47 Democrats and aligned independents. Democrats therefore need a net gain of four for an outright majority. A national mood hostile to Trump creates opportunities, but individual candidates, turnout and state loyalties will decide whether discontent becomes congressional power.
History reinforces Republican vulnerability. The president’s party lost House seats in 20 of the 23 midterms from 1934 through 2022. Trump lost 41 in 2018, although Republicans gained Senate seats. Presidential unpopularity can punish the governing party without producing identical verdicts in both chambers.
Why would a Democratic victory matter to Iran? Congress controls appropriations and can attach restrictions to funding, investigate military decisions and challenge the legal basis for hostilities. A hostile House could make financing an extended campaign considerably more difficult. Democratic control of both chambers would strengthen that pressure. The essential question would become whether legislators actually use these powers, rather than merely expressing dissatisfaction while approving the resources that keep military operations moving.
Yet an electoral defeat would not immediately immobilize Trump. The new Congress takes office on January 3, 2027, leaving an interval after November’s vote. Trump could therefore confront a future Democratic majority with military decisions already taken. Congressional checks would remain significant, but their timing matters: an election that promises restraint could be followed by escalation before that restraint becomes effective.
In Israel, Netanyahu confronts a different version of the same reckoning. A leader who has built his authority around security must answer whether successive wars have delivered it. Households also judge the cumulative burden of expensive essentials and prolonged mobilization. These pressures do not require an economy in collapse to become politically powerful. Families can hear reassuring national statistics and still conclude that their own lives have become harder, less predictable and less secure.
The electoral arithmetic offers Netanyahu little comfort, although it leaves room for survival. An October 15 Times of Israel report put Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar party at 26 seats and Likud at 20. Its poll projected 54 seats for the Jewish opposition bloc and 49 for Netanyahu’s camp, both below the conventional 61-seat majority in the 120-seat Knesset. Other surveys differ. The broad warning is uncertainty: dissatisfaction with Netanyahu has yet to produce an assured alternative government.
That uncertainty is central to his survival. Israel’s Basic Law provides for an outgoing government to continue until a successor is constituted. Netanyahu could therefore fail to secure a fresh majority yet remain prime minister during coalition negotiations or another electoral cycle. Political deadlock can prolong incumbency. An opposition that wins more seats but cannot assemble a government may discover that an adverse verdict against Netanyahu is insufficient to remove him.
His legal exposure adds another dimension. Netanyahu faces domestic corruption proceedings and an International Criminal Court arrest warrant issued in November 2024 concerning alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. A warrant is not a conviction. Nor does losing office automatically produce arrest. Nevertheless, a weakened Netanyahu could face greater diplomatic isolation. Reduced American protection might make international cooperation with the Court politically easier, although enforcement depends on states, legal obligations and where he travels.
Still, voters have an opportunity to interrupt the assumption that military dominance entitles leaders to unlimited political patience. Americans and Israelis will vote for different institutions, but both can demand an accounting of promises, costs and results. Neither electorate controls the region; both can influence governments whose decisions reach far beyond their borders.
This is the story of two elections whose consequences will travel well beyond two countries. Iran may emerge as the issue that helped weaken the leaders who pursued war against it. The hopeful outcome is restraint, accountability and renewed diplomacy. The darker outcome is escalation pursued before restraints take effect. These ballots could open a door to peace. The world must hope their answer arrives before another devastating round of war.

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America: Where Corporate Elites Govern and the People Pay

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : “Produce a drone without China.” With that challenge, Simon Dixon—former investment banker, BnkToTheFuture co-founder, author of Bank to the Future, and host of Simon Dixon Hard Talk—questions the foundations of American power. Dixon, whose biography describes postgraduate economics training, advanced these ideas on Julian Dorey’s podcast. His argument connects military dependence, banking incentives, corporate influence, and digital manipulation. Sovereignty must be measured by who controls the factories, minerals, processing facilities, and components beneath the arsenal. When those foundations lie elsewhere, declarations of supremacy become vulnerable to decisions beyond Washington’s control.
China’s position gives this warning substance. The International Energy Agency reports that China supplied 91 percent of refined magnet rare earths and 94 percent of sintered permanent magnets in 2024. These supply chains support critical civilian and defense technologies. The 2022 interruption of F-35 deliveries over a Chinese-origin alloy illustrated how dependence penetrates subcontracting networks. Rebuilding processing, technical skills, electricity infrastructure, and competitive manufacturing requires years. Financial dominance cannot instantly manufacture industrial independence.
Dixon describes talk of world war as psychological theater concealing these constraints. Existing weapons provide immediate power; replacement capacity determines endurance. A confrontation disrupting critical supplies could impose severe production bottlenecks precisely when demand accelerates. Citizens therefore need an honest accounting of industrial resilience, rather than threats detached from manufacturing capacity. The strategic question is whether America can sustain the conflict its political rhetoric appears prepared to invite.
The second concept concerns public borrowing becoming private revenue. Governments finance military commitments, contractors receive payments, and investors anticipate orders. Taxpayers carry obligations that outlast campaigns. Continued conflict can strengthen demand for weapons, logistics, surveillance, maintenance, and reconstruction while weakening the society financing them. What citizens experience as national sacrifice can become recurring business for commercial beneficiaries. The public balance sheet records debt and devastation; suppliers record contracts and opportunities.
Afghanistan gives this divergence devastating clarity. Brown University’s Costs of War project estimated $2.313 trillion for the Afghanistan and Pakistan war in its 2021 accounting, excluding future interest and lifetime veterans’ care. After twenty years, the Taliban returned to power. Dixon interprets this outcome as evidence that expenditure served powerful interests regardless of the mission’s failure. Who prospered while the stated purpose collapsed? A system rewarding continued contracting more reliably than durable peace can sustain its beneficiaries through repeated strategic disasters.
The banking example carries the argument into history. In March 1939, after Germany occupied Prague, Czech gold held through the Bank for International Settlements at the Bank of England was transferred to a Reichsbank account under instructions issued through coercion. The BIS acknowledges that the order should never have been executed and records wartime German payments involving looted gold. While populations suffered invasion and dispossession, financial procedures preserved institutional continuity, converting stolen national wealth into transactions.
The critique of capitalism follows from this separation between responsibility and reward. The East India companies demonstrated how private commercial power could exercise governing functions. The modern charge is that powerful firms demand market freedom during expansion and public protection during collapse. The 2008 banking rescue became a defining symbol: households faced foreclosure while institutions received emergency support. Socialized losses and privately retained gains turn risk-taking into privilege when beneficiaries influence the rules governing their rescue.
Corporate encroachment now reaches beyond lobbying into governing itself. The Pentagon’s September 2026 announcement that Elon Musk, Palmer Luckey, and Newt Gingrich would help lead Project Meridian, studying future warfare, makes this boundary consequential. Musk’s and Luckey’s companies have substantial defense interests. When prospective suppliers help define future military requirements, commercial ambition enters the machinery of public decision-making. Expertise does not remove the need for independent scrutiny and enforceable safeguards.
Donald Trump brings this convergence directly into the presidency. His family’s expanding defense investments place relatives of the commander-in-chief within businesses positioned to benefit from wartime demand. Senators Elizabeth Warren and Richard Blumenthal questioned safeguards surrounding his sons’ investment in drone manufacturer Powerus; Associated Press reporting described its efforts to sell interceptors to Gulf countries facing Iranian attacks. The pattern invites a disturbing conclusion: the presidency shapes the conditions of war while family-linked enterprises pursue the commercial opportunities those conditions create.
The war’s continuation sharpens that conclusion. On April 25, Trump canceled a negotiating trip involving his representatives, citing excessive travel and an inadequate proposed document. Viewed alongside the family’s defense investments, interrupted diplomacy and continued military demand suggest a system in which prolonged insecurity can serve private financial interests. This is an inference from the convergence of decisions, incentives, and beneficiaries. For ordinary Americans, delay means continuing costs; for businesses selling protection, it sustains a market. The power to pursue peace becomes entangled with interests capable of profiting while peace remains elusive.
Jared Kushner embodies the fusion of private finance and public diplomacy. Trump’s son-in-law has participated in sensitive negotiations while his firm, Affinity Partners, manages money from Gulf investors. In April 2026, House Judiciary Committee ranking Democrat Jamie Raskin opened an inquiry into this dual role, citing approximately $6.16 billion in managed assets and overwhelmingly foreign funding. Here, corporate power participates directly in governing: the businessman retains commercial relationships while acting for the state. The resulting inference is that national diplomacy risks being shaped by the same financial networks whose interests the negotiator serves commercially.
Corporate prominence at presidential gatherings reinforces the broader imbalance. Citizens petition from outside; wealthy executives enjoy proximity to decision-makers. Influence operates through familiarity, dependence, and agenda-setting, especially when the same firms control communications, investment, and essential services. Across capitalist economies, the danger is a gradual transfer of practical governing authority to private interests while constitutional offices retain their formal titles. Corporate access becomes most corrosive when it escapes disclosure, competition, and democratic oversight.
Big data carries this influence into everyday judgment. Reactions, searches, purchases, and pauses reveal preferences and vulnerabilities. Dixon’s “boxes” describe audiences classified by belief and supplied material likely to hold attention. PNAS research found political out-group language strongly predicted sharing and angry reactions. Hostility therefore has commercial value. His “social credit” metaphor captures the fear that accumulated behavioral profiles can become instruments of influence. Citizens help feed systems capable of shaping their subsequent choices.
These concepts converge on one imbalance: soldiers seek security, citizens seek prosperity, and elected representatives promise accountability, while powerful intermediaries can benefit from debt, dependence, conflict, and division. Aligned incentives and concentrated ownership can serve a narrow class without one secret command center.
America’s escape requires breaking corporate capture, enforcing conflict rules, restraining monopoly, rebuilding productive capacity, and protecting public deliberation. National strength must be judged by people’s independence and well-being, rather than wealth accumulated through managing their insecurity.

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