Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The contrasting trajectories of China and the United States reveal a fundamental lesson of national development: civilian infrastructure creates lasting wealth, while prolonged warfare consumes it. For decades, China concentrated overwhelmingly on economic development, industrial capacity, education, research, infrastructure and technological self-reliance. The United States, despite possessing greater wealth and formidable innovative capacity, repeatedly diverted enormous resources toward overseas wars, military deployments and the maintenance of global strategic dominance. The consequences are now visible in their respective economic priorities and physical landscapes.
China has avoided a major, sustained kinetic war for nearly five decades. During the same period, the United States fought or intervened militarily in Vietnam, Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, Iraq, Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Yemen and, most recently, Iran, while maintaining hundreds of military installations across the world.
This difference in strategic emphasis produced an enormous opportunity gap. Estimates based on Congressional Research Service figures and Brown University’s Costs of War project suggest that the direct and broader fiscal costs of American wars since World War I may approach $18 trillion in 2026 dollars. The total includes direct military operations, post-9/11 homeland-security expenditures, war-related increases in Pentagon spending, interest on borrowed funds and present and future obligations toward veterans. Even this amount does not fully capture the economic consequences of higher energy prices, disrupted trade, inflation, lost productivity or the lifetime costs of caring for wounded personnel.
Half of that estimated burden—$9 trillion—would almost equal the entire amount that the American Society of Civil Engineers says is required between 2024 and 2033 to bring the country’s major infrastructure categories into good condition.
The organization estimates that America faces a $3.7 trillion infrastructure financing gap over that period. Had only half of the historical war expenditure been invested efficiently at home, the United States could have closed that gap, repaired its roads and bridges, modernized public transportation, expanded healthcare facilities and still retained trillions for housing, education and scientific research.
More than 41,000 American bridges are presently classified as being in poor condition, while approximately one-third require some form of repair or replacement. Roads face an estimated funding gap of nearly $684 billion. Transit agencies confront a repair and modernization backlog exceeding $140 billion. Water systems continue to lose treated water through aging pipes, communities still struggle with lead contamination, and electricity networks remain vulnerable to extreme weather, cyberattacks and rising demand. These are not signs of a country lacking resources. They are signs of a country that has allocated its resources elsewhere.
China made a different choice. It constructed the world’s largest high-speed railway network, extending approximately 48,000 kilometres, together with a vast expressway, port, airport, electricity and telecommunications systems. It developed globally competitive industries in electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, nuclear power, shipbuilding, telecommunications and high-speed rail. It invested heavily in universities, laboratories, space exploration, satellite systems and advanced manufacturing. Its infrastructure became the foundation upon which industry, trade and productivity could expand.
China’s economic growth at the extraordinary 8–10% translating to rapid expansion transformed the country from a largely agrarian economy into the world’s leading manufacturing power. By contrast, the mature American economy normally grows between 1% and 3%. This slower growth is not caused exclusively by military expenditure, but recurrent wars, growing debt and the diversion of public investment have undoubtedly imposed significant opportunity costs.
China has now extended its development approach abroad through the Belt and Road Initiative. Across approximately 140 participating countries, Chinese companies and financial institutions have supported ports, roads, railways, power plants, pipelines, telecommunications networks and industrial zones. Cumulative Chinese BRI investment and construction engagement reached an estimated $1.4 trillion through 2025. China is therefore converting national capacity into commercial access, supply chains, political influence and long-term economic partnerships.
The American model remains different. Washington generally supplies loans, guarantees, grants, insurance and technical assistance, leaving partner governments and private companies to construct and operate projects. Although the United States supports important ventures such as the Lobito Corridor in Africa, its state-supported overseas infrastructure programme remains much smaller than China’s. America’s most visible global presence continues to be military, whereas China’s is increasingly associated with ports, railways, energy projects and trade.
At home, the consequences of American priorities are becoming harder to ignore. Millions remain inadequately insured or exposed to medical bills capable of destroying household savings. Higher education can leave students burdened with debt for decades. Homeownership is increasingly beyond the reach of ordinary working families. Public transportation remains inadequate in many metropolitan areas, forcing households to maintain expensive vehicles. Families facing high housing, insurance, food, healthcare and education costs often live from paycheck to paycheck despite working full-time.
Against this background, the proposed increase in American defence resources from roughly $1 trillion in FY2026 to $1.5 trillion in FY2027 demands serious examination. The increase is approximately $441 billion, while proposed reductions in nondefence discretionary programmes amount to only about $73 billion. Consequently, civilian cuts would offset less than one-fifth of the military increase. The remaining amount would require additional revenue, further reductions or new borrowing.
War costs are not necessarily included within the regular defence budget. When a new conflict begins, the Pentagon can seek emergency supplemental appropriations. For the Iran war, the administration submitted a package of $87.6 billion, including approximately $67.1 billion for military operations and weapons replenishment. Such emergency financing, when not matched by taxation or expenditure reductions, enlarges the deficit and ultimately adds to the national debt. The public consequently pays twice: first for the military operation and later through interest on the money borrowed to finance it.
Military capability remains necessary. China itself continues modernizing its armed forces, nuclear deterrent, navy, missile systems, cyber capabilities and space assets. No major power can ignore national defence. The real issue is proportion, purpose and strategic discipline. Defence should protect national development; it should not consume the resources required to sustain it. A military that weakens the society and economy behind it ultimately undermines its own foundation.
The Iran war may therefore offer Washington an opportunity for strategic reconsideration. America’s greatest long-term strength will not be measured only by aircraft carriers, overseas bases or missile inventories. It will be measured by the condition of its bridges, affordability of its homes, accessibility of healthcare, quality of its schools, reliability of public transportation and leadership in science and technology.
China’s rise demonstrates that patient investment in productive capacity can generate influence more durable than military intervention. If the United States wishes to preserve its position, it must restore balance between power projected abroad and prosperity created at home. The choice is not between defence and development. It is between a defence policy that protects national prosperity and one that gradually consumes it.

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : For nearly half a century following the Second World War, the Soviet Union stood as the United States’ principal strategic adversary. The Cold War divided the international system into two competing ideological, political and military blocs. Washington championed liberal democracy and market capitalism, while Moscow promoted centralized communist governance. Their rivalry extended far beyond military confrontation; it encompassed economics, science, technology, diplomacy, intelligence, space exploration and global influence.
The Soviet Union possessed virtually every attribute of a superpower. It maintained one of the world’s largest industrial bases, commanded an immense conventional military, developed strategic nuclear parity with the United States and became the first nation to launch both an artificial satellite (Sputnik) and a human (Yuri Gagarin) into space. Through the Warsaw Pact and extensive political relationships across Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America, Moscow projected global influence that challenged American leadership for decades.
However, sustaining competition with the United States imposed enormous economic burdens. Central planning increasingly failed to generate innovation and productivity. Industrial inefficiency, declining economic growth, fiscal strain from the arms race, and political rigidity gradually weakened the Soviet system. The decade-long Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979–1989) further strained national resources and damaged international prestige. While Afghanistan contributed to Soviet exhaustion, historians generally agree that the collapse of the USSR resulted from multiple structural causes rather than any single conflict.
In December 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved into fifteen independent republics. Russia inherited the Soviet Union’s permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, most of its nuclear arsenal and much of its military-industrial infrastructure. Yet it did not inherit the Soviet Union’s comprehensive economic power.
Today, Russia remains one of the world’s foremost military powers. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia ranked as the world’s third-largest military spender in 2025, allocating approximately US$190 billion, equivalent to 7.5 percent of GDP, while the United States remained first at US$954 billion and China second at US$336 billion. Together, these three countries accounted for more than half of global military expenditure.
Russia also retains one of the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals. Alongside the United States, it possesses the overwhelming majority of global nuclear warheads, ensuring that Moscow remains a decisive military and strategic actor in international security.
Nevertheless, military strength alone no longer defines comprehensive global leadership. Unlike the Soviet Union, contemporary Russia does not compete with the United States across the full spectrum of national power. Russia’s economy, while resilient under difficult geopolitical circumstances, remains relatively modest in global terms. According to the World Bank, Russia’s nominal GDP in 2025 stood at approximately US$2.56 trillion, compared with an American economy exceeding US$32 trillion and a Chinese economy exceeding US$20 trillion.
Russia continues to be an important exporter of oil, natural gas, wheat, fertilizers, metals and military equipment. These sectors provide strategic influence and significant export revenues. However, Russia is not a dominant global supplier of consumer electronics, advanced semiconductors, electric vehicles, telecommunications equipment, commercial aircraft, digital platforms, pharmaceutical products or large-scale civilian infrastructure systems.
This distinction is crucial. Russia can threaten the United States through military deterrence, nuclear capabilities, cyber operations and geopolitical disruption. It remains capable of altering regional security dynamics and challenging NATO in Europe. Yet Russia does not possess the broad-based industrial, technological and commercial ecosystem necessary to reshape the global economy.
China does. Over the past four decades, China has transformed itself from a relatively poor developing nation into one of the world’s largest economic powers. Unlike the Soviet Union, whose influence depended heavily on military and ideological competition, China’s rise has been driven primarily by industrialization, manufacturing, infrastructure development, international trade, education, technological innovation and long-term economic planning.
The scale of China’s transformation is unprecedented in modern economic history. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China remains the world’s second-largest economy in nominal GDP and the largest economy when measured by purchasing power parity (PPP), reflecting the enormous scale of its domestic productive capacity. The IMF projects China’s economy to continue expanding in 2026 despite global economic headwinds.
Unlike Russia, China has embedded itself deeply within global production networks. Its factories manufacture everything from smartphones and consumer electronics to high-speed trains, renewable-energy equipment, industrial machinery and advanced electric vehicles. Chinese companies participate in supply chains that reach virtually every continent.
Trade has become one of China’s greatest strategic assets. The World Trade Organization’s latest trade data continue to rank China among the world’s largest trading nations, with merchandise imports exceeding US$2.47 trillion in 2024 alone and exports remaining among the highest globally. China has become the principal trading partner for dozens of countries across Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East.
This economic integration fundamentally distinguishes China from the Soviet Union. The USSR largely operated outside the capitalist global economy. China, by contrast, operates at its very center. Businesses, governments and consumers around the world rely on Chinese manufacturing, logistics, industrial inputs and consumer products. Even countries that maintain strategic disagreements with Beijing often remain economically interconnected with China through trade and investment.
This level of economic integration gives China forms of influence that military power alone cannot achieve. It is therefore increasingly evident why successive American administrations—Republican and Democratic alike—have identified China, rather than Russia, as the United States’ principal long-term strategic competitor. Russia remains a formidable military power. China is a comprehensive national power. That distinction defines the strategic landscape of the twenty-first century.
(Part II will examine how China’s manufacturing strength, Belt and Road Initiative, technological innovation, renewable-energy leadership and control of critical supply chains have transformed it into America’s foremost comprehensive strategic challenger.)

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Why China—Not Russia—Has Become America’s Principal Strategic Challenger. America’s Response and the Defining Strategic Competition of the Twenty-First Century
Recognizing China’s rapid rise, successive American administrations—Republican and Democratic alike—have fundamentally reoriented U.S. national security strategy. Although they have differed in tactics, they have shared the same underlying conclusion: China is the only nation with the economic, technological, industrial and military capacity to challenge American leadership across the full spectrum of national power.
This bipartisan assessment has been reflected in official U.S. strategy documents, defence planning and economic policy. The U.S. Department of Defense consistently describes the People’s Republic of China as America’s “pacing challenge,” meaning it is the only competitor capable of reshaping the international order while simultaneously modernizing its military, expanding technological capabilities and increasing global influence.
The Department’s 2025 Pacific Deterrence Initiative requested nearly US$10 billion to strengthen American military posture, missile defence, logistics, infrastructure and alliances throughout the Indo-Pacific region, reflecting Washington’s strategic focus on maintaining regional balance. The Pentagon’s annual reports also emphasize China’s rapid military modernization, including advances in naval power, missile systems, cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence and space technologies.
Military competition, however, represents only one dimension of the broader strategic rivalry.Unlike the Cold War, today’s competition extends deeply into economics, trade, finance, technology and industrial supply chains.
Beginning in 2018, the United States introduced sweeping tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese imports under Section 301 of the Trade Act. These measures sought to address concerns relating to intellectual property, industrial subsidies, technology transfer and broader trade imbalances.
The tariffs continued under subsequent administrations, although implementation evolved through negotiations, exemptions and targeted modifications. According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), these policies encouraged some diversification of supply chains and supported certain domestic industries. Imports shifted toward countries such as Vietnam, Mexico and India in selected sectors.
However, the broader objective of substantially reducing China’s industrial and technological competitiveness has proven considerably more difficult. China remains the world’s largest manufacturing nation, one of the world’s largest exporters and a dominant supplier of countless industrial inputs. Global supply chains have adjusted, but they have not fundamentally displaced China’s central role in world manufacturing.
The experience demonstrates an important reality. Tariffs can alter trade patterns. They cannot rapidly replicate decades of accumulated industrial ecosystems, engineering expertise, supplier networks, logistics infrastructure and manufacturing scale.
Consequently, both Washington and Beijing have discovered that complete economic separation—or “decoupling”—is extraordinarily difficult. Instead, policymakers increasingly speak of “de-risking” supply chains rather than eliminating economic engagement altogether.
The United States has complemented tariffs with export controls, investment screening and industrial policy. Washington has introduced restrictions on advanced semiconductor equipment, high-performance computing technologies and certain artificial intelligence applications, seeking to slow China’s access to cutting-edge technologies with potential military applications.
At the same time, the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act have directed hundreds of billions of dollars toward semiconductor manufacturing, clean-energy technologies and advanced industrial production within the United States.
These initiatives acknowledge that long-term strategic competition will be determined not simply by military spending but by leadership in innovation, manufacturing and advanced technologies.
China has responded by accelerating domestic research, expanding semiconductor investment, increasing support for indigenous innovation and strengthening supply chains for critical industries. The result is a technological competition unprecedented in modern history.
One of the defining characteristics of the current rivalry is that the two largest economies remain deeply interconnected. The United States and China continue to conduct hundreds of billions of dollars in annual trade.
American companies manufacture in China. Chinese firms invest internationally. Universities, researchers and multinational corporations continue to cooperate in many scientific fields despite increasing strategic competition.
This reality distinguishes today’s geopolitical environment from the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union maintained relatively limited economic interaction.
The United States and China compete while simultaneously remaining major trading partners. This creates mutual dependence as well as mutual vulnerability. American industries depend upon Chinese manufacturing capacity for numerous products and intermediate components.
Chinese growth continues to benefit from access to global markets, advanced technologies and international finance. Neither side can impose unlimited economic costs upon the other without also affecting itself. The rivalry is therefore characterized not by complete isolation but by strategic interdependence.
Ultimately, the strategic competition between the United States and China extends beyond individual policies such as tariffs or export controls.
It concerns what political scientists often describe as comprehensive national power—the combined strength derived from economic performance, industrial capacity, scientific innovation, technological leadership, military capability, financial influence, diplomacy, education, infrastructure and national institutions.
Measured through this broader lens, China has emerged as the only country capable of challenging the United States simultaneously across multiple dimensions.
Russia remains an indispensable military power. Its nuclear deterrent, advanced missile systems, cyber capabilities and geopolitical influence ensure that it will continue to shape international security. However, Russia does not possess China’s manufacturing ecosystem, technological breadth, global trade integration or industrial scale. It is therefore primarily a military challenger rather than a comprehensive systemic competitor.
China is different. Its industrial base underpins global supply chains. Its research institutions produce world-class scientific output. Its companies increasingly compete in telecommunications, renewable energy, electric vehicles, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and advanced manufacturing.
Its Belt and Road Initiative has expanded infrastructure connectivity across large parts of the developing world. Its growing financial and diplomatic engagement increasingly shapes international institutions and development priorities. No previous American rival combined these diverse forms of power to the same extent.
The outcome of this strategic competition remains uncertain. The United States retains formidable advantages. It possesses the world’s largest nominal economy, the dominant international reserve currency, unmatched capital markets, leading universities, exceptional entrepreneurial culture, powerful alliances and the most capable global military.
China possesses different but equally significant strengths. It leads the world in manufacturing scale, infrastructure construction, renewable-energy deployment, electric-vehicle production, battery manufacturing and numerous critical supply chains. It has become one of the largest investors in research and development and continues to expand its technological capabilities.
Neither country enjoys decisive superiority across every domain. Rather than a contest likely to produce a single overwhelming victor, the twenty-first century is more likely to witness prolonged competition between two exceptionally capable powers.
Success will depend less upon military confrontation than upon sustained innovation, economic resilience, educational excellence, technological leadership, institutional effectiveness and international partnerships.
The decisive question is therefore not whether one country can simply stop the rise of the other. It is which nation can more effectively mobilize its resources, talent, institutions and alliances while adapting to a rapidly changing global economy. History demonstrates that great-power competition evolves with changing sources of national strength.
During the Cold War, military capability and ideological confrontation defined the rivalry between Washington and Moscow. Today, the competition has expanded into manufacturing, technology, artificial intelligence, infrastructure, renewable energy, finance, critical minerals, trade and global supply chains. Russia remains one of the world’s foremost military powers and an indispensable actor in international security.
China, however, has become something fundamentally different. It has built the world’s largest manufacturing economy, emerged as one of the world’s leading trading nations, invested heavily in science and technology, developed extensive global infrastructure partnerships through the Belt and Road Initiative and established strategic influence across numerous industries essential to the twenty-first-century economy.
Unlike the Soviet Union, China operates not outside the global economy but at its very centre. That distinction explains why American policymakers increasingly regard Beijing—not Moscow—as the United States’ principal long-term strategic challenger.
The defining contest of this century will not be decided solely by military strength. It will be determined by innovation, productivity, industrial capability, technological leadership, resilient institutions and the ability to shape the rules, standards and economic architecture of an increasingly interconnected world.