Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : President Xi Jinping’s development vision extends beyond China’s national transformation to a broader framework of international connectivity, cooperation and shared prosperity. This vision took institutional shape in 2013 with the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), one of the largest international development and economic-cooperation programmes of the modern era.
In Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative seeks to address one of the greatest impediments confronting developing countries: inadequate infrastructure. Weak transportation networks, unreliable energy supplies, high logistics costs and limited digital connectivity have historically constrained investment, trade and industrialization across Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America. By improving physical, commercial, financial and digital connectivity, the BRI aims to help participating countries expand trade, attract investment, create employment and accelerate modernization.
The financial scale of the initiative demonstrates the breadth of President Xi’s vision. The cumulative Chinese engagement in BRI countries between 2013 and 2025 reached approximately $1.399 trillion. This consisted of around $837 billion in construction contracts and $561 billion in non-financial investments.
The year 2025 alone recorded approximately $213.5 billion in Chinese BRI engagement, including $128.4 billion in construction contracts and $85.2 billion in investments. Energy-related engagement reached about $93.9 billion, while metals and mining accounted for approximately $32.6 billion and technology and manufacturing reached nearly $28.7 billion.
The BRI now encompasses 150 participating countries and has expanded into the Digital Silk Road, Green Silk Road and Health Silk Road, together with cooperation in renewable energy, science, innovation, education and sustainable development.
For Pakistan, President Xi’s global vision found its most consequential expression in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), widely regarded as a flagship project of the BRI. CPEC is also one of the six principal economic corridors envisioned under the initiative. Although commonly described as a network linking Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang region with Gwadar on Pakistan’s Arabian Sea coast, it is considerably broader. It covers transportation, energy, Gwadar Port, industrial cooperation, Special Economic Zones, agriculture, mining, digital connectivity, science, education, healthcare and socioeconomic development.
CPEC was initially announced in 2015 with projects worth approximately $46 billion, while its projected portfolio was subsequently reported to have expanded to around $62 billion. According to Pakistan’s official CPEC Secretariat, approximately 43 projects worth about $25 billion have been completed, while nearly 9,000 megawatts of electricity-generation capacity have been added under the corridor.
Major connectivity projects included the Havelian–Thakot section of the Karakoram Highway, the Multan–Sukkur Motorway, the Lahore Orange Line Metro Train and the cross-border optical-fibre cable connecting Khunjerab with Rawalpindi. These projects improved national connectivity, reduced travel times, facilitated freight movement and strengthened Pakistan’s communications infrastructure.
Energy projects became the financial and operational backbone of CPEC’s first phase. Major plants at Sahiwal, Port Qasim and Hub, together with Thar coal, Karot hydropower, Suki Kinari hydropower and several wind and solar facilities, added substantial generation capacity to Pakistan’s electricity system. According to the 2025 global BRI engagement assessment, Pakistan has received more than $41.5 billion in cumulative Chinese energy-sector engagement since 2013, the highest recorded for any BRI country under that dataset.
CPEC financing, however, is not uniform. Its portfolio includes government-to-government concessional and commercial loans, grants, construction contracts, equity investment and independent power projects financed through combinations of sponsor equity and borrowing from Chinese financial institutions. Therefore, it would be misleading to describe the entire $62 billion portfolio either as Chinese direct investment or as sovereign debt owed by Pakistan. Each project must be evaluated according to its own financing structure, repayment obligations, guarantees and expected economic returns.
Gwadar occupies a central position in CPEC’s long-term vision. The Eastbay Expressway has improved the port’s connection with Pakistan’s highway network, while the New Gwadar International Airport is intended to strengthen regional access. The Gwadar Free Zone and Smart Port City Master Plan provide foundations for future commercial, industrial and urban development.
Gwadar could eventually provide western China with a shorter potential route to the Arabian Sea and reduce dependence on longer maritime routes passing through the Strait of Malacca. However, this strategic possibility should not be mistaken for a fully operational alternative at present. It requires efficient port utilization, modern logistics, upgraded road and rail links, viable energy-transit infrastructure and sustained commercial demand.
Social projects—including the Pak-China Friendship Hospital, the Technical and Vocational Institute, desalination and drinking-water schemes, schools, fisheries assistance and community-development programmes—demonstrate that CPEC is gradually moving beyond physical infrastructure. Its ultimate test will be whether development produces visible employment, skills and business opportunities for the people of Gwadar and Balochistan.
CPEC 2.0 must therefore concentrate on industrialization and productive investment. Infrastructure creates opportunities, but factories create wealth. Special Economic Zones at Rashakai, Allama Iqbal Industrial City, Dhabeji and Bostan are intended to attract manufacturing, promote technology transfer, create employment and integrate Pakistan into regional and global supply chains. Their success will depend upon reliable energy, policy continuity, simplified regulations, skilled labour and an export-oriented strategy.
Pakistan must encourage Chinese companies to establish manufacturing facilities and joint ventures rather than limiting cooperation to construction and imports. Greater local sourcing, technology transfer and participation by Pakistani small and medium-sized enterprises would distribute CPEC’s benefits more widely.
Agriculture presents another promising frontier. Modern irrigation, improved seeds, mechanization, livestock development, food processing and cold-chain logistics could raise productivity, reduce post-harvest losses and increase rural incomes. Digital cooperation in artificial intelligence, cloud computing, e-commerce, smart cities and information technology could similarly help Pakistan’s young population participate in the knowledge economy.
CPEC must consequently be treated not as an end in itself but as a platform for national transformation. This principle is consistent with the people-centred development philosophy presented in President Xi’s Up and Out of Poverty: governments can create opportunities and improve infrastructure, but communities must build productive capacity and become active participants in development.
China’s experience offers Pakistan several enduring lessons: policy continuity, disciplined implementation, capable institutions, accountability, investment in education and research, merit-based governance and sustained action against corruption. Above all, development must remain people-centred so that economic growth improves ordinary lives rather than enriching only a narrow section of society.
As Pakistan and China celebrate 75 years of diplomatic relations, established on 21 May 1951, their partnership remains one of the most enduring relationships in contemporary international affairs. It has survived wars, geopolitical realignments and leadership transitions because it rests upon mutual trust, sovereign equality and support for each other’s core interests.
CPEC-2.0 is aimed at extending beyond conventional infrastructure into renewable energy, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, climate resilience, advanced manufacturing, mineral processing, healthcare, higher education and scientific research. This would transform the relationship from one centred primarily on connectivity into a partnership driven by knowledge, innovation and productive capacity.
For Pakistan, the most meaningful tribute to 75 years of friendship would go beyond commemorative ceremonies and official declarations. It would be a national commitment to policy continuity, institutional reform, human-capital development and disciplined implementation. By combining China’s cooperation with Pakistan’s own resolve, CPEC can transform its estimated $62 billion vision into a sustainable pathway towards industrial strength, regional connectivity and shared prosperity.

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : President Donald Trump’s May 2026 visit to Beijing was expected to reset global geopolitics, calm financial markets, pressure China on Iran, secure trade breakthroughs, and perhaps establish a new strategic understanding between the world’s two largest powers. Instead, the visit exposed something far more consequential: a visible shift in global leverage from Washington to Beijing. What was projected as a high-stakes diplomatic triumph increasingly appeared to many observers as a journey of strategic desperation, where the United States arrived seeking concessions while China calmly projected patience, confidence, and restraint.
The visit came at perhaps the worst possible moment for Washington. The United States entered Beijing politically exhausted, militarily stretched, economically pressured, and diplomatically weakened after months of confrontation surrounding Iran, the Strait of Hormuz crisis, sanctions battles, and growing instability in global energy markets. China understood this reality fully. Beijing knew that America’s military-industrial supremacy, once considered untouchable, had suffered reputational damage after Iran managed to withstand the combined pressure of the United States and Israel without surrendering its strategic posture. The longer the war dragged on, the more global markets, oil routes, and supply chains trembled.
Trump arrived in Beijing hoping to secure Chinese cooperation on several critical fronts. Washington wanted China to pressure Iran into reopening the Strait of Hormuz completely and stabilizing energy shipments. The United States also sought Chinese compliance with sanctions and shipping restrictions targeting vessels accused of supporting Iran. Another major American objective was to reduce Chinese economic engagement with Venezuela, whose oil exports had increasingly escaped U.S. pressure mechanisms. Simultaneously, Washington expected movement on agricultural purchases, aircraft deals, tariff relief, and broader trade normalization.
Yet despite all the ceremonial grandeur, lunches, tours, dinners, and carefully choreographed hospitality, China committed to virtually nothing concrete on the core geopolitical disputes.
The most sensitive issue of all remained Taiwan. Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly warned Trump in direct terms that mishandling Taiwan could push both countries toward confrontation or even open conflict. Trump, unusually cautious throughout the visit, avoided public comments about Taiwan while in Beijing. Only after boarding Air Force One did he hint that he may reconsider arms sales to Taipei after hearing Xi’s objections.
That hesitation alone sent shockwaves through strategic circles. Taiwan represents the center of China’s national reunification doctrine under the “One China” policy. Beijing views Taiwan not as a separate sovereign state, but as a breakaway province destined eventually to return to the mainland—much like Hong Kong returned after decades of British control. China’s leadership believes time is now increasingly on its side. Hong Kong’s reintegration demonstrated Beijing’s long-term strategic patience, and Chinese policymakers appear convinced that Taiwan’s eventual absorption into the broader Chinese system is historically inevitable.
Trump’s reluctance to firmly reaffirm military backing for Taiwan revealed how complicated the balance of power has become. America once projected overwhelming confidence in East Asia. Today, Washington appears increasingly cautious about opening another major confrontation 9,500 miles away while already struggling to manage crises in the Middle East.
Equally important was China’s silence on the Iran war. Trump publicly claimed that Xi agreed a nuclear-armed Iran would be dangerous and even offered help in ending the conflict. Yet Beijing itself avoided confirming any such alignment. China maintained its carefully balanced diplomatic position, emphasizing only that all parties’ concerns should be considered.
That distinction mattered enormously. China has no interest in openly endorsing an American-led strategy that weakened one of Beijing’s critical energy and geopolitical partners. Iran remains central to China’s Belt and Road ambitions, regional connectivity plans, and long-term energy security. Beijing also deeply resented American efforts to interfere with Chinese shipping, oil imports, and maritime operations linked to Iran. The Chinese leadership clearly signaled that while it favors stability, it will not become an enforcement arm of U.S. pressure campaigns.
Meanwhile, the economic dimension of the trip produced more headlines than substance. Trump spoke enthusiastically about potential aircraft purchases, suggesting China could buy between 200 and eventually 750 Boeing planes. There were also discussions involving General Electric engines, agricultural products, investment boards, and reciprocal tariff reductions.
But the markets were not impressed. Global investors had expected major breakthroughs—perhaps a concrete trade accord, sanctions relief, maritime understandings, or joint statements stabilizing geopolitical tensions. Instead, what emerged was vague language, future possibilities, and broad diplomatic formulations without enforceable commitments.
Financial markets reacted negatively because traders recognized the gap between optics and outcomes. The world economy today is deeply fragile. Oil prices remain volatile. Shipping insurance costs are elevated. Supply chains are unstable. Fertilizer markets, aviation industries, and industrial production continue facing enormous uncertainty tied to Middle Eastern instability. Investors were hoping for decisive clarity. What they received instead was strategic ambiguity.
The contrast in diplomatic posture between Trump and Xi was also striking. Trump showered Xi with praise throughout the visit, repeatedly describing him as a “great leader,” a “friend,” and someone with whom America could build a “fantastic future.” Xi, by contrast, remained disciplined and restrained. He offered polite gestures, symbolic hospitality, and carefully measured compliments, but avoided emotional reciprocity.
This imbalance itself became symbolic. To many analysts, it reflected a reversal of psychological positioning between the two powers. America appeared eager for accommodation; China appeared comfortable waiting. Trump openly admired Xi and praised China’s hospitality, while Beijing calmly held its ground on virtually every critical issue—from Taiwan to Iran, sanctions, shipping, and strategic competition.
Even more significantly, China now understands America’s vulnerabilities far better than before. Beijing witnessed how quickly American stockpiles of precision-guided weapons were consumed during the Iran conflict. It saw how difficult and expensive prolonged modern warfare had become. It also saw that despite enormous military expenditures, Washington failed to decisively bend Iran to its will or secure uncontested dominance over the Strait of Hormuz.
This realization changes strategic calculations permanently. For decades, American power rested not only on military capability but on the perception of overwhelming inevitability. That aura has weakened. China now increasingly believes that economic resilience, technological advancement, industrial capacity, and strategic patience can gradually outlast American pressure.
The tariff war itself reinforced this conclusion. Washington expected tariffs to severely damage China’s economy. Instead, many American farmers suffered as China reduced agricultural imports and diversified suppliers. Soybean producers, meat exporters, and farming communities across the United States felt the consequences sharply. Beijing endured the tariffs while maintaining industrial production and export competitiveness.
By the end of the visit, Trump appeared to be requesting renewed Chinese purchases more than dictating terms. The broader geopolitical message of the Beijing summit was therefore unmistakable: the global order is shifting from unipolar dominance toward strategic multipolarity, with China increasingly acting not as a challenger seeking acceptance, but as a confident superpower shaping the rules of engagement.
The visit achieved little in concrete terms. There was no major Taiwan understanding, no Iran breakthrough, no Hormuz settlement, no sanctions resolution, and no transformational trade agreement. Yet paradoxically, the trip may still prove historic—not because of what was signed, but because of what it revealed.
It revealed an America struggling to preserve leverage it once took for granted, and a China increasingly convinced that history is moving in its direction.

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : President Donald Trump’s May 2026 visit to Beijing was expected to reset global geopolitics, calm financial markets, pressure China on Iran, secure trade breakthroughs, and perhaps establish a new strategic understanding between the world’s two largest powers. Instead, the visit exposed something far more consequential: a visible shift in global leverage from Washington to Beijing. What was projected as a high-stakes diplomatic triumph increasingly appeared to many observers as a journey of strategic desperation, where the United States arrived seeking concessions while China calmly projected patience, confidence, and restraint.
The visit came at perhaps the worst possible moment for Washington. The United States entered Beijing politically exhausted, militarily stretched, economically pressured, and diplomatically weakened after months of confrontation surrounding Iran, the Strait of Hormuz crisis, sanctions battles, and growing instability in global energy markets. China understood this reality fully. Beijing knew that America’s military-industrial supremacy, once considered untouchable, had suffered reputational damage after Iran managed to withstand the combined pressure of the United States and Israel without surrendering its strategic posture. The longer the war dragged on, the more global markets, oil routes, and supply chains trembled.
Trump arrived in Beijing hoping to secure Chinese cooperation on several critical fronts. Washington wanted China to pressure Iran into reopening the Strait of Hormuz completely and stabilizing energy shipments. The United States also sought Chinese compliance with sanctions and shipping restrictions targeting vessels accused of supporting Iran. Another major American objective was to reduce Chinese economic engagement with Venezuela, whose oil exports had increasingly escaped U.S. pressure mechanisms. Simultaneously, Washington expected movement on agricultural purchases, aircraft deals, tariff relief, and broader trade normalization.
Yet despite all the ceremonial grandeur, lunches, tours, dinners, and carefully choreographed hospitality, China committed to virtually nothing concrete on the core geopolitical disputes.
The most sensitive issue of all remained Taiwan. Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly warned Trump in direct terms that mishandling Taiwan could push both countries toward confrontation or even open conflict. Trump, unusually cautious throughout the visit, avoided public comments about Taiwan while in Beijing. Only after boarding Air Force One did he hint that he may reconsider arms sales to Taipei after hearing Xi’s objections.
That hesitation alone sent shockwaves through strategic circles. Taiwan represents the center of China’s national reunification doctrine under the “One China” policy. Beijing views Taiwan not as a separate sovereign state, but as a breakaway province destined eventually to return to the mainland—much like Hong Kong returned after decades of British control. China’s leadership believes time is now increasingly on its side. Hong Kong’s reintegration demonstrated Beijing’s long-term strategic patience, and Chinese policymakers appear convinced that Taiwan’s eventual absorption into the broader Chinese system is historically inevitable.
Trump’s reluctance to firmly reaffirm military backing for Taiwan revealed how complicated the balance of power has become. America once projected overwhelming confidence in East Asia. Today, Washington appears increasingly cautious about opening another major confrontation 9,500 miles away while already struggling to manage crises in the Middle East.
Equally important was China’s silence on the Iran war. Trump publicly claimed that Xi agreed a nuclear-armed Iran would be dangerous and even offered help in ending the conflict. Yet Beijing itself avoided confirming any such alignment. China maintained its carefully balanced diplomatic position, emphasizing only that all parties’ concerns should be considered.
That distinction mattered enormously. China has no interest in openly endorsing an American-led strategy that weakened one of Beijing’s critical energy and geopolitical partners. Iran remains central to China’s Belt and Road ambitions, regional connectivity plans, and long-term energy security. Beijing also deeply resented American efforts to interfere with Chinese shipping, oil imports, and maritime operations linked to Iran. The Chinese leadership clearly signaled that while it favors stability, it will not become an enforcement arm of U.S. pressure campaigns.
Meanwhile, the economic dimension of the trip produced more headlines than substance. Trump spoke enthusiastically about potential aircraft purchases, suggesting China could buy between 200 and eventually 750 Boeing planes. There were also discussions involving General Electric engines, agricultural products, investment boards, and reciprocal tariff reductions.
But the markets were not impressed. Global investors had expected major breakthroughs—perhaps a concrete trade accord, sanctions relief, maritime understandings, or joint statements stabilizing geopolitical tensions. Instead, what emerged was vague language, future possibilities, and broad diplomatic formulations without enforceable commitments.
Financial markets reacted negatively because traders recognized the gap between optics and outcomes. The world economy today is deeply fragile. Oil prices remain volatile. Shipping insurance costs are elevated. Supply chains are unstable. Fertilizer markets, aviation industries, and industrial production continue facing enormous uncertainty tied to Middle Eastern instability. Investors were hoping for decisive clarity. What they received instead was strategic ambiguity.
The contrast in diplomatic posture between Trump and Xi was also striking. Trump showered Xi with praise throughout the visit, repeatedly describing him as a “great leader,” a “friend,” and someone with whom America could build a “fantastic future.” Xi, by contrast, remained disciplined and restrained. He offered polite gestures, symbolic hospitality, and carefully measured compliments, but avoided emotional reciprocity.
This imbalance itself became symbolic. To many analysts, it reflected a reversal of psychological positioning between the two powers. America appeared eager for accommodation; China appeared comfortable waiting. Trump openly admired Xi and praised China’s hospitality, while Beijing calmly held its ground on virtually every critical issue—from Taiwan to Iran, sanctions, shipping, and strategic competition.
Even more significantly, China now understands America’s vulnerabilities far better than before. Beijing witnessed how quickly American stockpiles of precision-guided weapons were consumed during the Iran conflict. It saw how difficult and expensive prolonged modern warfare had become. It also saw that despite enormous military expenditures, Washington failed to decisively bend Iran to its will or secure uncontested dominance over the Strait of Hormuz.
This realization changes strategic calculations permanently. For decades, American power rested not only on military capability but on the perception of overwhelming inevitability. That aura has weakened. China now increasingly believes that economic resilience, technological advancement, industrial capacity, and strategic patience can gradually outlast American pressure.
The tariff war itself reinforced this conclusion. Washington expected tariffs to severely damage China’s economy. Instead, many American farmers suffered as China reduced agricultural imports and diversified suppliers. Soybean producers, meat exporters, and farming communities across the United States felt the consequences sharply. Beijing endured the tariffs while maintaining industrial production and export competitiveness.
By the end of the visit, Trump appeared to be requesting renewed Chinese purchases more than dictating terms. The broader geopolitical message of the Beijing summit was therefore unmistakable: the global order is shifting from unipolar dominance toward strategic multipolarity, with China increasingly acting not as a challenger seeking acceptance, but as a confident superpower shaping the rules of engagement.
The visit achieved little in concrete terms. There was no major Taiwan understanding, no Iran breakthrough, no Hormuz settlement, no sanctions resolution, and no transformational trade agreement. Yet paradoxically, the trip may still prove historic—not because of what was signed, but because of what it revealed.
It revealed an America struggling to preserve leverage it once took for granted, and a China increasingly convinced that history is moving in its direction.