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How Pakistan Became Israel’s Primary Target (PART-I)

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The geopolitical sands of Southwest Asia have shifted dramatically in recent months. In a stunning reversal of roles, Pakistan—once viewed as a struggling state battling internal insurgencies and economic instability—has emerged as a pivotal power broker on the world stage. Through its successful mediation between the United States and Iran and its efforts to avert a global economic crisis, Islamabad has positioned itself as a formidable voice in international diplomacy. This diplomatic ascendancy, however, has come at a considerable cost. By challenging the established order and offering a counterbalance to Israeli power in the region, Pakistan has inadvertently painted a target on its own back. The result is a new and dangerous proxy war being fought on Pakistani soil, leveraging the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Balochistan Liberation Army as tools to bleed the nation from within.
The calculus of power in the Middle East has been fundamentally upended. As the only nuclear-armed Muslim state with a growing arsenal, Pakistan is increasingly viewed by regional actors as a necessary counterweight to Israel’s unbridled military might and expansionist ambitions. The narrative in Islamabad and across many Middle Eastern capitals is that Israel, guided by a maximalist ideology and backed by its own nuclear capabilities, seeks to redraw the map of the region.
The perceived Greater Israel project, aiming to control territory from the Nile to the Euphrates, necessitates the destruction or fracture of all regional power structures. Under this worldview, Israel’s strategy is to create chaos, foster fractured governments, and use nuclear blackmail to cow its adversaries.
In this context, Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella is seen as the ultimate deterrent against Israeli aggression. By providing a potential shield for nations like Turkey, Egypt, and Iran, Pakistan has become a primary obstacle to Israel’s regional ambitions. This is the crux of the new animosity. Israel has recognized that it cannot neutralize Iran, Turkey, or other regional rivals without first neutralizing the threat from Pakistan.
The diplomatic achievements of Pakistan—including its instrumental role in stopping the wars in Lebanon and Gaza—have made it a major thorn in the eye of Israel. What Pakistan achieved diplomatically is perhaps greater in value and impact than what Iran achieved through its military confrontations with the United States and Israel.
This remarkable ascent has transformed Pakistan from a peripheral player into a central actor in the Middle Eastern power equation, and with that transformation has come the inevitable attention of adversaries who view its rise as a direct threat to their interests.
To counter this emerging threat, Israel is purportedly pivoting to a strategy of asymmetric warfare, exploiting Pakistan’s internal vulnerabilities through a classic playbook: find, fund, and arm proxy actors to destabilize a state from within, avoiding a direct and costly conventional confrontation.
The first prong of this strategy involves the TTP. Pakistan has long differentiated between the good Taliban in Afghanistan and the bad Taliban at home, but this distinction has become dangerously moot. The Afghan Taliban, now in power in Kabul, has provided safe havens, training camps, and logistical support to the TTP, allowing them to operate with near impunity across the porous border.
Now Israel in collaboration with India and elements within the Afghan government, is providing arms, ammunition, financial incentives, and operational guidance to the TTP. This financing and advanced training are intended to motivate TTP operatives to intensify their attacks on Pakistan’s military and civilian power centers, creating a constant state of insecurity that weakens the state from within.
The second, equally dangerous prong involves the separatist movements in Balochistan. The Balochistan Liberation Army and other ethnic insurgent groups are waging a war for independence, and while these movements have deep-rooted local grievances, they have become receptive to external manipulation.
The exiled Baloch leaders have expressed a willingness to align with Israel, viewing it as a potential guarantor of their independence. This creates a perverse alliance of convenience. India’s Research and Analysis Wing has a well-documented history of fomenting unrest in Balochistan to destabilize Pakistan, with the arrest of Indian naval officer Kulbhushan Jadhav in 2016 serving as a key example.
Now, Israel is reportedly deepening this cooperation, offering advanced intelligence, satellite reconnaissance, and perhaps even technological assistance to these separatist groups. In return, the BLA and its affiliates are promising to act as Israel and India’s stooges in a post-conflict scenario, leveraging whatever remains of a fractured Pakistan. The goal is to cripple the Pakistani state, potentially allowing external actors to seize control of the strategic Gwadar port and neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear assets.
Beyond the proxy war, there is an immediate and visceral threat that Pakistan must contend with: Israel’s technological prowess in targeted assassinations. Israel has a documented history of using sophisticated, often commercially available technology to track and eliminate high-value targets across the globe.
This includes the use of advanced surveillance software, remote-controlled weaponry, and even cyber-enabled sabotage of critical infrastructure. Pakistan, with its community of nuclear scientists, military strategists, and political leaders, is vulnerable to such tactics.
The threat is not merely hypothetical. Pakistan must ensure that the technology used by Israel for assassinating marked rivals and people of high political, scientific, and military value cannot be successfully deployed within its borders.
This demands a comprehensive overhaul of Pakistan’s internal security protocols, including strict monitoring of digital communications, protection of supply chains from cyber-tampering, and rigorous vetting of personnel with access to sensitive information. Failure to address this vulnerability could result in the loss of the nation’s most valuable minds and a catastrophic blow to its strategic capabilities.
Passive defense, however, is no longer sufficient. The current situation demands a proactive and offensive strategy. Pakistan cannot simply wait for an attack to occur; it must act to deter it. The core recommendation emerging from strategic analysts is the creation of a counter-spy network in Israel.
This is not merely an intelligence-gathering operation; it is a strategic necessity that would provide Islamabad with two critical advantages. First, a counter-network would provide Islamabad with powerful leverage, as knowing that Pakistan possesses the capability to respond in kind within Israeli territory would raise the stakes for any Israeli-initiated action in Pakistan.
Second, the doctrine of proportional response is central to this strategy. If Israel engages in sabotage, assassination, or support for proxy militancy within Pakistan, Islamabad must be prepared to reply in the same coin, delivering a proportional, measured, and effective response inside Israel itself. The goal is not escalation, but the creation of a credible deterrent that ensures the cost of aggression is too high to be borne.
This is where the expertise of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence becomes paramount. The ISI has decades of experience in covert operations, counterinsurgency, and intelligence gathering in Afghanistan and against Indian targets.
These accumulated skills must now be refocused on the Israeli threat. Pakistan has shown its diplomatic capability to de-escalate major international conflicts; now it must demonstrate its resolve to defend its sovereignty and nuclear assets against covert infiltration and sabotage.
The agency must evaluate the situation from all angles and place security mechanisms that are not only defensive but also offensive in nature. Pakistan should use all the deceptive and intelligence-gathering methods that Israel has employed to weaken countries within their own borders and apply them in Israel itself, creating a countervailing power that ensures proportional and responsible retaliation for any aggression. If this is not done now, it will be too late, and Pakistan will have to face the consequences of inaction. To be continued…….

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Pakistan Prime Minister attend Leaders’ Summit of COP-31 in Antalya, Türkiye

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Antalya (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY):- Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif will visit Antalya, Republic of Türkiye, from 10–12 November 2026 to participate in the Leaders’ Summit of the 31st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
 
Prime Minister will address the Leaders’ Summit on 11 November 2026, during which he will urge the global community to take concrete actions to address the threat posed by climate change to the planet. He will highlight Pakistan’s steps towards rapid solarization and expansion of its renewable energy capacity, as part of its transition towards a cleaner and more resilient economy, along with its efforts to strengthen disaster preparedness and early-warning systems.

In addition, he will also call for predictable, adequate and accessible climate finance for developing countries to strengthen their resilience and pursue sustainable development.

The Prime Minister will also attend a High-Level Roundtable convened by the Presidency of the COP-31 on the sidelines of the Leaders’ Summit, and hold bilateral meetings with the Turkish leadership as well as several other world leaders.

Prime Minister’s participation in the COP-31 Leaders’ Summit is an expression of Pakistan’s strong support for the climate agenda, and will provide Pakistan with an opportunity to reaffirm its commitment towards working closely with the international community to address the climate crisis.

COP 31 starting Yesterday, Minister Climate Change of Pakistan Mr. Tasadaq Malik attended the opening ceremony in Antalya, Türkiye.

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Tehran’s Diplomatic Bombshell

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The arrival in Tehran of the defence minister of Saudi Arabia, the army chief of Pakistan and the intelligence chief ofTürkiye may prove more consequential than another round of American or Israeli military threats. Three powerfulMuslim countries, bound by the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, sat across the table from Iran while Washington and Israel contemplated renewed military operations. The question is not merely what these leaders discussed, but what they may have quietly agreed to do—or refuse to do—when the next missiles begin flying.
The delegation was extraordinary in its composition. Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Pakistan’s FieldMarshal Asim Munir and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin represented countries possessing enormous financial, military, diplomatic and strategic influence. Their collective appearance conveyed that Iran’s security could no longer be treated exclusively as a confrontation between Tehran, Washington and Tel Aviv. Regional powers were asserting their own interests in determining whether another devastating war would engulf their neighbourhood.
The war with Iran has transformed American military installations across the Gulf from instruments of deterrence into potential targets of retaliation. Reports and assessments of American military repositioning toward Israel, Jordan and other locations reflect this wider vulnerability. For Washington, geographic access remains a military advantage; for Gulf governments, that same access increasingly carries the possibility of devastating retaliation.
Saudi Arabia consequently faces an exceptionally difficult choice. American air defence systems, intelligence cooperation, maintenance arrangements and advanced weapons remain important to its security. Yet the presence ofAmerican forces can expose Saudi oil installations, airports, industrial infrastructure and civilian populations to Iranian orHouthi attacks. The attacks around Ras Tanura have demonstrated how rapidly regional warfare can threaten energy supplies and global economic stability. Riyadh must therefore calculate whether American protection is reducing its vulnerability or contributing to it.
Here lies the first possible hidden significance of the Tehran meeting. Iran may have sought assurances that Saudi Arabia,Pakistan and Türkiye would neither participate in renewed American-Israeli attacks nor facilitate them through military installations, airspace, intelligence or logistical support. No publicly disclosed agreement establishes that such promises were made. Nevertheless, the subject would be entirely consistent with Iran’s longstanding concern about foreign military infrastructure being used against it.
The second possibility points in the opposite direction. The Makkah Pact countries may have arrived not simply as sympathetic neighbours, but as a collective deterrent. Their defence agreement treats an attack against one member as a matter of common security. The presence of nuclear-armed Pakistan, NATO member Türkiye and economically powerful Saudi Arabia could therefore convey a warning that further Iranian or Houthi attacks against Saudi territory risk widening the conflict. Collective defence, however, does not automatically establish a commitment to join an American war.
This dual character makes the delegation particularly significant. It could simultaneously reassure Iran against foreign aggression and warn Tehran against attacking Saudi Arabia. Such diplomacy is not necessarily contradictory. It reflects an attempt to establish reciprocal restraint: regional states would avoid becoming launching platforms for attacks on Iran,while Iran would avoid retaliating against countries that remained outside the fighting. Whether such an understanding was actually reached remains undisclosed.
The third possibility concerns Qatar’s parallel diplomatic initiative. Unlike the three Makkah Pact countries, Qatar has maintained an intermediary role between Washington and Tehran. Its proposed seven-day confidence-building framework sought to bridge disagreements over nuclear activities, sanctions, maritime access and the wider conflict. Reports also indicate support for mediation from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. Thus, the Tehran consultations could represent complementary diplomatic tracks rather than competing initiatives.
Iran’s response to the Qatari proposal was nevertheless uncompromising. Tehran objected to demands for nuclear concessions before meaningful economic relief, insisting that the American blockade of Iranian ports and restrictions on oil exports must be addressed first. Washington, conversely, wanted nuclear commitments from the beginning. The dispute was therefore not merely over the contents of a peace agreement, but over which party would surrender its leverage before receiving guarantees.
The most consequential outcome of the Tehran meeting may lie not in what was publicly announced, but in what was deliberately withheld. A day-long consultation involving the defence minister of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s army chief, Türkiye’s intelligence chief and Iran’s highest political and security authorities could hardly have been confined to the four lines of the joint communiqué. Such meetings necessarily involve extensive deliberations on the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats arising from an ongoing war, including American military bases, Iranian retaliation, Saudi security, the Strait of Hormuz, economic sanctions and the consequences of another American-Israeli offensive.
Drawing upon my experience attending high-level meetings as Press Secretary and media adviser to the President of Pakistan, I know that public statements rarely disclose the full substance of sensitive diplomatic and security consultations.
The positive assessments expressed by the Iranian leadership and the visiting delegations strongly suggest that the participants found sufficient common ground to explore practical understandings and a coordinated pathway for responding to future developments.
Such understandings may include assurances of non-participation in renewed attacks against Iran, restrictions on the use of regional military facilities, reciprocal restraint toward Gulf countries and mechanisms for further consultations should Washington and Israel resume hostilities.
Kuwait and the other Gulf countries will therefore become important indicators. Their decisions concerning American bases, airspace, logistical support and diplomatic engagement could reveal whether the Tehran initiative develops into a broader regional non-aggression arrangement. The Houthis’ conduct will be equally revealing. A sustained reduction in attacks on Saudi infrastructure could indicate that Tehran and Riyadh have found a mechanism to separate Gulf security from the wider American-Israeli confrontation, although Houthi decision-making cannot simply be equated with Iranian instructions.
The timing adds urgency. Reports indicate concern about renewed American and Israeli military action around the November 3 American midterm elections. Whether such an offensive actually occurs remains uncertain. But if it does, the military effectiveness of the campaign will depend partly on regional access, intelligence, logistics and the willingness of neighbouring governments to absorb the consequences of Iranian retaliation.
Ultimately, Tehran may have achieved something strategically important without obtaining a single publicly declared concession: it has compelled influential regional governments to discuss security with Iran rather than merely discuss Iran with Washington. That is a meaningful diplomatic shift, even if its durability remains untested.
The real verdict on the Tehran meeting will not emerge from its carefully worded communiqué. It will emerge whenWashington next demands military access, when Israel considers another strike, and when Iran decides where its missiles will—or will not—fall. If regional governments refuse to become instruments of another war, the Makkah Pact may be remembered not as an alliance formed to confront Iran, but as the beginning of a Middle East determined to prevent outside powers from deciding its fate.

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Pakistan’s Moment Beyond the Battlefield

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : While Pakistan wrestles with political confrontation at home, its diplomacy is opening doors abroad. From the Badr memorandum signed in Doha to the earlier Mecca defence agreement, and from Riyadh’s security consultations to mediation with Tehran and Washington, Pakistan is acquiring a place at tables where regional security is being negotiated. The opportunity is considerable. The challenge is to turn international recognition into domestic stability, industrial strength and prosperity.
The Badr Memorandum of Understanding, signed on October 21 by Qatar, Türkiye, Pakistan and Indonesia, marks the latest advance. Its central purpose is defence industrial cooperation: joint production, technical training, research, development and stronger manufacturing capabilities. It offers a means of building the technological and industrial capacity that makes security sustainable.
Its promise lies in combining complementary strengths. Türkiye brings an expanding defence industry and experience in developing and integrating complex systems. Pakistan contributes military experience, technical manpower and established production facilities. Indonesia offers manufacturing capacity, a substantial domestic market and an important Southeast Asian base. Qatar brings investment potential and demand. Together, these assets could support projects beyond the reach of countries working separately.
The resulting opportunity extends beyond buying and selling weapons. Shared design, component manufacturing, software development, testing, maintenance and training could create enduring industrial relationships. A country that helps manufacture a system develops skills and supplier networks that an ordinary purchase may never deliver. The real prize is the ability to understand, sustain and improve equipment throughout its working life.
But signatures cannot run factories. Badr needs an efficient institution to translate ambition into projects, with agreed financing, clear responsibilities and deadlines. Partners must settle technology access, intellectual property, export permissions and the division of production before these become disputes. Each project should have accountable leadership and measurable milestones. Good faith must be matched by management capable of delivering on time.
For Pakistan, Türkiye is a particularly valuable partner. Their existing naval cooperation demonstrates how procurement can support domestic construction and technical learning. Turkish progress in drones, electronics, armoured platforms and naval systems offers further possibilities. Pakistan should seek arrangements that allow its engineers and manufacturers to become development partners, accumulating knowledge with every successive project.
This industrial initiative follows the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan in August, which established a powerful principle: an armed attack against one would be regarded as an attack against all. Its resemblance to NATO’s collective defence commitment explains the attraction of calling it a “mini-NATO”. For Pakistan, it represents recognition that its military capacity and strategic position have value well beyond South Asia.
Yet solidarity becomes complicated when it must move from declarations to decisions. These countries share Islamic bonds, but their relationships, interests and vulnerabilities differ. A confrontation involving Saudi Arabia and Iran, or attacks from Yemen, would confront Pakistan with difficult choices. Religious, social and historical connections cross the very boundaries that security arrangements seek to defend. An effective pact must therefore combine credible deterrence with political judgment and clearly understood responsibilities.
Nor does Mecca constitute a comprehensive Muslim alliance addressing every shared concern. The Palestinian question and Israel’s military actions remain central to public sentiment across the Muslim world, while the agreement’s immediate operation is shaped by its members’ security needs. Its worth will depend on whether it protects its participants while helping contain regional conflict. Pakistan’s strongest contribution would be to make collective security reinforce reconciliation rather than deepen divisions.
Pakistan also brings a distinction no other Muslim country possesses: nuclear weapons capability. Alongside this stands an experienced army, a capable air force and a smaller navy responsible for demanding maritime duties. The May 2025 confrontation with India, which Pakistan regards as a major defensive success, reinforced the importance of readiness and technological competence. India’s acknowledgment of initial aircraft losses underlined the seriousness of that contest.
Military standing, however, achieves its greatest value when it supports diplomacy. Field Marshal Asim Munir’s October 20 visit to Tehran formed part of Pakistan’s continuing effort to help bring the United States and Iran towards an accommodation. Such engagement requires persistence because the parties approach negotiations through deep distrust, competing security demands and domestic political pressures.
Pakistan is attempting a difficult balancing act: sustaining communication with Washington and President Donald Trump, preserving access to Iran’s leadership, and maintaining Saudi confidence. Its usefulness rests on remaining a credible channel across these relationships. Every conversation that clarifies intentions, reduces miscalculation or identifies a possible compromise adds value, even when a final settlement remains elusive.
This is where Pakistan’s defence partnerships and diplomatic role must reinforce each other. Friendship with Saudi Arabia should strengthen its ability to explain Saudi concerns to Tehran. Relations with Iran should help it communicate Iranian concerns elsewhere. Close ties with Türkiye and Qatar add further channels. Pakistan can gain lasting influence by helping countries find an exit from confrontation that preserves security and dignity.
That achievement would be more persuasive if accompanied by reconciliation at home. Continuing confrontation around Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and the imprisonment of former prime minister Imran Khan consumes political energy the country urgently needs for reconstruction. Pakistan should ensure fair and transparent judicial proceedings, end politically motivated restrictions and pursue his release through lawful means. He should have the opportunity to participate in normal democratic politics.
The way forward also requires free, fair and impartial elections, credible institutions and acceptance that political opponents belong within the constitutional system. Protest must remain peaceful, and the state must protect lawful political participation. A country seeking to mediate between bitter international adversaries should apply the same patience and confidence to resolving its own political disputes.
Peace along Pakistan’s borders is equally necessary. Terrorism must be confronted firmly, but lasting security also requires sustained diplomacy with Afghanistan. Islamabad and Kabul need practical arrangements to prevent armed groups from exploiting territory, manage border disputes and preserve legitimate trade. With Iran, cooperation should protect a peaceful frontier. With India, Pakistan should continue seeking dialogue and measures that reduce the risk of another military escalation.
Economic recovery must give these efforts a material foundation. Pakistan’s mineral resources can contribute far more if extraction is connected to processing and domestic manufacturing. Copper, gold and other commercially viable deposits should support infrastructure, technical education and industries that add value at home. Mineral wealth becomes national wealth when it creates productive skills, competitive businesses and lasting employment.
Badr could help cultivate some of the engineering, electronics and materials expertise relevant to that broader transformation. Pakistan should connect its diplomatic partnerships with universities, industrial estates, reliable energy and local suppliers. Exporting raw materials alone would leave much of the value elsewhere; building industries around them would allow Pakistanis to retain a larger share.
Pakistan has earned an opening. Its task now is to make external confidence durable through internal consent, peaceful borders and productive industry. The country’s finest strategic achievement would be a Pakistan whose citizens experience the gains its diplomats announce: greater security, meaningful work and a future worth investing in.

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