Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : For decades, presidents of the United States have believed they could shape the world by interfering in other nations’ affairs—installing leaders of their choice, propping up allies who served their interests, and sidelining or imprisoning nationalist figures who threatened American designs. This pattern, repeated from Latin America to the Middle East, has been central to Washington’s projection of power. But under President Donald Trump, the limits of that model are becoming clear. Despite America’s military reach and financial muscle, there now stand two forces beyond Trump’s control: China, which has matured into an economic giant strong enough to resist U.S. leverage, and the American people themselves, who are openly challenging what they see as his king-like behavior. To this must be added a third failure closer to home—his inability to bring Congress into agreement, leaving the federal government paralyzed in a costly shutdown. Together, these three fronts expose the fragility of Trump’s leadership and the strain on America’s global standing.
For decades, Washington relied on leverage to bend others to its will. Yet China, over years of patient strategy, has taken its fate into its own hands. It has grown economically, financially, and industrially so strong that America can no longer dictate terms. Any attempt to coerce Beijing now risks countermeasures with devastating consequences for U.S. industry and commerce. The clearest example lies in rare earth minerals and magnets, critical to modern technology, where China holds near total dominance. Nearly 70% of global rare earth mining and over 85% of refining is controlled by Beijing, a chokehold over the materials that power smartphones, electric cars, wind turbines, and advanced weapons systems. When Beijing tightened its grip on exports, the United States was brought to its knees. Without these inputs, the American defense and tech industries risk collapse. Trump’s response has been to consider imposing another one-hundred percent tariff on Chinese goods—on top of the $361 billion in Chinese imports already tariffed since 2018—but Beijing has already diversified away from dependency on the American market. What once was a weapon of leverage for Washington is now a hollow threat.
China’s leverage extends far beyond minerals. It holds over $775 billion in U.S. Treasury securities, the largest foreign holder after Japan, and can disrupt the global currency balance by offloading them. It has built infrastructure and currency swap agreements across the Belt and Road Initiative, encompassing more than 150 countries and covering two-thirds of the world’s population, allowing trade in national currencies that bypass the dollar altogether. It possesses the capacity to redirect exports to other markets: in 2024, ASEAN overtook the U.S. as China’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade worth more than $950 billion, compared to just $575 billion with the United States. By contrast, U.S. options look weak. Threatening to halt sales of civilian aircraft parts may wound Boeing more than Beijing, since over 25% of Boeing’s orders in the last decade came from China, worth nearly $150 billion. Proclaiming America as the ultimate consumer market rings hollow when China has been cultivating alternative demand across Asia, Africa, and Europe. Trump’s bluster of tariffs and ultimatums may play well to his base, but it cannot mask the reality that the United States has lost the upper hand. Only negotiation, not confrontation, offers a way forward, but the White House seems unwilling to admit it.
If China represents Trump’s international failure, the American people have emerged as his domestic challenge. Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, or Syria, where U.S. power crushed resistance, Trump now faces opposition at home that cannot be bombed into silence or destabilized through covert tricks. Across states and cities, nearly two million Americans have taken to the streets, protesting what they describe as Trump’s king-like conduct. They oppose his deployment of federal immigration forces and even National Guard units into states under circumstances that many legal scholars argue violate the Constitution. The Guard is meant to be mobilized for extraordinary threats, typically from foreign enemies, not to police civilians in peacetime. To many, Trump’s orders resemble the occupation of foreign lands rather than the governance of a democracy. Protesters chant that they do not want a king; they want liberty, dignity, and democracy respected. So far, their defiance has been largely peaceful, but if Trump continues his path of executive overreach, anger could boil over into violence, with consequences that would plunge the nation into crisis.
Trump has dismissed these accusations with irritation, insisting he is no monarch but a servant working day and night to restore America’s dignity and power. Yet perception matters, and his tone has only fueled resistance. Unlike pliant foreign regimes, the American people are vocal, organized, and fully aware of their rights. They are not easily subdued. If Trump cannot win their trust, his authority will be weakened from within, regardless of what strength he projects abroad. For a president who promised to put America first, alienating America itself is a damning irony. Perhaps he should take inspiration from his so-called “favorite” Field Marshal Asim Munir of Pakistan—a man who has managed to bend under his thumb not only the National Assembly, Senate, Judiciary, and Government, but also an entire population of 250 million. If Trump truly yearns to rule unchecked, maybe a mentoring session with Munir could teach him the dark arts of silencing institutions and crushing dissent. It would be a masterclass in authoritarian success, but one that destroys democracy in the process.
On a third front, Trump has stumbled in the political heart of Washington: the relationship with Congress. It is now the twenty-second day of a government shutdown, with no bipartisan agreement in sight to reopen the federal apparatus. The impasse revolves around social spending, especially healthcare and Social Security benefits for seniors, retirees, and the disabled. Democrats insist these programs be preserved at their previous levels; Trump threatens to cut them unless his budget priorities are met. In retaliation, he has warned that Democratic initiatives and projects will be frozen entirely if they refuse to yield. This standoff has left more than 800,000 federal workers unpaid, public services crippled, and international confidence in U.S. governance shaken. The economic cost has been staggering: independent estimates suggest the shutdown has already drained nearly $3 billion per week from the U.S. economy, with projections of as much as $24 billion in losses if it lasts two months, shaving 0.2% off quarterly GDP growth. Small businesses relying on federal contracts are collapsing, loan approvals are frozen, and families living paycheck to paycheck are being forced into debt. The possibility that the shutdown could extend for months looms over the nation like a shadow, underlining not only a breakdown of negotiation but a collapse of leadership. The president, ultimately responsible for ensuring the functioning of government, has instead become the architect of its paralysis.
The damage reverberates abroad. Allies and rivals alike are watching, noting that America cannot manage its own house, let alone dictate terms to others. Each passing day without resolution chips away at U.S. credibility. For Trump, the stakes are immense. His ability to govern effectively is being judged not only by his opponents but by history itself. To fail simultaneously in managing China, his own people, and his own legislature would mark not just a troubled presidency but a broken model of leadership. Yet so far, he has responded with threats and defiance rather than compromise and wisdom.
The way forward is clear, though whether Trump will take it is uncertain. He must abandon the illusion of unilateral control and return to democratic norms. He must negotiate in good faith with Congress to restore government operations, even if it means conceding ground. He must respect the constitutional limits on deploying federal forces in states, reassuring the public that their freedoms are safe. And he must recognize that with China, confrontation is a dead end; dialogue is the only path that preserves America’s interests without triggering global economic disruption. Every war, whether military, trade, or political, ends at the negotiating table. Sooner is always better than later, for the longer conflict drags on, the greater the damage to all sides.
Trump has prided himself on being a deal-maker, but at this crossroads he has become a breaker of deals, a divider of people, and a trigger of crises. His legacy will not be judged by the force of his threats but by his capacity to resolve conflicts constructively. If he fails to change course, his presidency may be remembered not for making America great again, but for revealing just how fragile its greatness had become.

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : When a member of Congress asked who now holds the advantage between the United States and China, Kurt M. Campbell did not search for diplomatic shelter. He answered plainly—“China, China, China”—and added that America is in a more fragile position. That exchange distilled a wider realization in Washington: the contest is no longer about who has the cleverest idea, but about who can pair ideas with scale, speed, finance, and supply chains that actually deliver.
Across robotics, autonomous systems, shipbuilding, critical minerals, and the green-energy stack, China has assembled an industrial machine that converts plans into production with few seams. The United States still leads in many forms of research and in the highest tiers of AI hardware and software. Yet too often these strengths sit on islands that are hard to connect to the physical economy. China, by contrast, works from the factory outward. It absorbs a technology, replicates it at home, pushes costs down, and then ships it to the world. That pattern—learn, scale, export—now runs through much of its economy.
This is evident on factory floors. China has built the world’s largest base of industrial robots and the domestic suppliers to keep adding more of them, allowing factories to iterate quickly and standardize quality. It shows up in the air as well, where Chinese drones dominate civilian markets and where military variants have spread to buyers that find Western systems unaffordable or unavailable. Autonomy at scale is not just a technical feat; it is a logistics and training advantage that compounds year after year.
The imbalance is even clearer at sea. Chinese yards deliver commercial ships at a rate that American yards cannot currently approach. Those deliveries are not only commercial statistics. They translate into maritime resilience, sealift, and the capacity to replace hulls fast if a crisis damages them. Industrial power is not an abstraction; it is a queue of vessels sliding down the ways, month after month. America’s shipbuilding base, meanwhile, is thin, specialized, and expensive to expand, which leaves the country reliant on time it may not have.
Beneath these visible platforms lies a quieter source of leverage: rare earths and allied magnet materials. Modern electronics, precision weapons, wind turbines, and electric drivetrains all depend on them. China does not merely mine a large share of these inputs; it processes and refines them, and it manufactures the magnets that sit at the end of the chain. When Beijing tightened export restrictions, markets felt the tremor immediately. U.S. officials have pressed China to ease those curbs and have worked to rally partners to reduce concentration risk. That effort is prudent, but it also acknowledges the present reality—critical stages of the chain are outside American control.
It is here that the familiar American toolkit—tariffs, export controls, and the weaponization of data and finance—meets its limit. Measures of this kind can unsettle smaller or more fragile economies; they have done so repeatedly in the past. They are far less effective against a state with a continental-scale market, deep foreign-exchange reserves, a disciplined industrial policy, and broad capacity to substitute or reroute flows when pressured. China has spent years preparing for that pressure by localizing essential inputs, building parallel financial pipes, and hardening its digital and data regimes. A country that can supply so much of its own demand and anchor so many others’ supply is not easily forced to change course from the outside.
That is why the question posed in the hearing—will punitive tariffs work this time—lands differently today. Tariffs can raise Chinese costs at the American border, but they also raise costs for American producers who rely on Chinese inputs at every intermediate step. If the response from Beijing is to ratchet controls on minerals, chemicals, or magnet materials, the downstream impact is immediate: delays, higher bills, and quality slippage as firms scramble for substitutes. The economic effect accumulates in quieter ways as well. Investment decisions are deferred; projects are redesigned; factories operate below capacity. The result is slower growth and a steady erosion of credibility in the claim that America can out-produce its rival where it matters most.
Washington sees this bind and is examining ways to mine, process, and manufacture more of these inputs at home. That path is necessary, but it is not quick. Permitting, capex, skilled labor, environmental safeguards, local consent, and shared infrastructure mean any serious build-out takes well over a decade to mature. Even then, the unit costs will be markedly higher than those produced by an ecosystem in China that has already reached enormous scale. The arithmetic is straightforward: if domestic inputs are several times more expensive than imported ones, consumers pay more, manufacturers lose margin, or both. And if China chooses to restrict intermediate goods while America is still scaling its replacements, the squeeze is immediate. It is the classic choice between the devil and the deep sea.
None of this argues for resignation. It argues for realism. Treating China as an equal party in the global economy does not mean conceding strategic ground; it means recognizing that coercive instruments will not deliver quick or clean wins. A better first step is to lower the temperature of the tariff war by restoring duties toward earlier baselines and by limiting new restrictions to genuinely narrow security cases with clear, auditable justifications. That would not end competition. It would simply replace a spiral of retaliation with rules that both sides can plan around, which is the precondition for any serious industrial strategy at home.
De-escalation abroad must be matched by seriousness at home. The United States needs a long-horizon, bipartisan program that outlasts election cycles and that treats production as a national capability, not a slogan. That means modernizing ports and shipyards so output can compound rather than stall; accelerating permitting without waiving environmental standards; building regional hubs for magnets, specialty chemicals, and advanced components with public-private risk sharing; aligning procurement with delivery so firms are paid to produce, not to promise; and investing in workforce pipelines that can staff mines, mills, fabs, and yards. Recycling and re-use should be embedded from the start so domestic supply is not only larger but also more resilient when prices swing.
The same principle should guide the data front. The United States can and should protect sensitive datasets and core algorithms, but it should avoid broad regimes that punish neutral commercial activity or force partners to choose camps. A narrower, predictably enforced set of rules will better protect security without undermining competitiveness. Data is valuable because it flows; policy that freezes it indiscriminately tends to reduce American firms’ reach more than it constrains China’s.
Some will hear this and worry that stepping back from the tariff cliff signals weakness. The opposite is true. It signals confidence that America’s real advantage lies in the combination of research excellence, entrepreneurial depth, and an open capital market that can scale new industries when the ground rules are stable. Tariffs and blunt data controls may temporarily bruise a competitor, but they rarely build capacity at home. Capacity is built by patient investment, steady rules, and a clear list of priorities that does not change with each headline.
Campbell’s answer in the hearing was a snapshot of the present, not a verdict on the future. China’s strength today rests on a disciplined link between strategy and production. America’s path back runs through the same link. It will not be achieved by trying to bludgeon a rival that has already insulated itself from the tools that once worked on others. It will be achieved by lowering the noise, rebuilding the sinews of industry, and competing on the only terrain that decides enduring power: the ability to design, build, and deliver at scale. If the United States chooses that course, it will find that fragility is not fate. It is a diagnosis—and like any diagnosis, it is most useful when it prompts the right treatment.

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The United States is without question a great country. Its people are hardworking, intelligent, innovative, creative, and generous. From breakthroughs in medicine to technological revolutions in Silicon Valley, America has shaped the modern world in ways unmatched by any other nation. It remains a land where people from every nationality, race, and background are welcomed with open arms and provided with the opportunity to realize their dreams. Millions of immigrants, including myself, have experienced this spirit of hospitality and freedom, and this openness has helped make America a beacon of hope and aspiration for the entire world.
Yet today, the global balance of power is shifting rapidly, and the next two decades may define humanity’s political, economic, and technological future. At the heart of this transformation lies China, a country whose breathtaking rise over the last thirty years is unmatched in modern history and whose trajectory now threatens to challenge America’s position as the world’s leading power.
It is within this context that economists, think tanks, and policy experts around the world have debated when — and whether — China will overtake the United States as the dominant global power. The Council on Foreign Relations and Citigroup estimate that China could surpass the United States by 2035, driven by rapid technological advances, growing influence in international trade, and the vast economic ecosystem built around its Belt and Road Initiative. A report by the Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) places the crossing point around 2036 and predicts China may hold the top position for roughly two decades before the U.S. potentially regains its lead by 2057, underscoring that American decline is not inevitable if the right policies are adopted. Analysts at the RAND Corporation are more cautious, projecting that the tipping point may arrive only in the 2040s due to China’s aging population, rising debt, and slowing growth rates, but they warn that America’s relative decline accelerates if Washington fails to take decisive corrective measures. Meanwhile, The Guardian introduced the concept of “Peak China” in its 2025 economic report, suggesting that while China’s pace of expansion may eventually plateau, its technological leadership, military modernization, and deep integration with 154 countries give it an edge the United States cannot ignore. Despite differences in timelines, most credible institutions converge on one conclusion: the world is approaching a historic turning point where China could match or surpass American power, potentially redefining global leadership as early as the mid-2030s.
China’s leadership has spent decades investing heavily in its people, its industries, and its future. Millions of students were sent abroad with state support to acquire cutting-edge education and technical expertise, returning home to apply their skills to the country’s rapid technological advancement. Research centers and laboratories across the country are producing breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, electric vehicles, semiconductors, biotechnology, and space exploration. With consistent policy, centralized planning, and the ability to execute at extraordinary speed, China has achieved what no other country has attempted in modern times: it has built a knowledge-driven, innovation-focused economy at a scale the world has never seen before. Today, it competes directly with the United States in nearly every strategic sector, from energy to digital technology to defense.
This progress is matched by China’s deep global outreach through the Belt and Road Initiative, which now connects more than 154 nations through infrastructure, trade, and investment partnerships. By building ports, highways, railways, energy grids, and digital corridors across Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, China has positioned itself at the center of emerging economic systems and established influence across continents. In doing so, it offers developing countries access to resources and opportunities while simultaneously expanding its own markets and soft power. Unlike coercive alliances built on dependence, Beijing presents this as a model of shared prosperity — one where growth is mutual and partnerships create new possibilities for all. This resonates deeply with many nations, especially those historically marginalized in the global economic order.
In contrast, the United States stands at a crossroads. For decades, America has been the center of global power, but over time, its overreliance on financial dominance rather than industrial capability has weakened its foundations. Much of its manufacturing base has been outsourced to China, India, Taiwan, Vietnam, Bangladesh, and other nations, leaving the U.S. dependent on foreign supply chains for critical products, including advanced electronics, pharmaceuticals, and energy systems. America’s global influence has long relied on the dominance of the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency, allowing it to print trillions without economic backing and finance its consumption and global strategy. Yet this advantage is eroding rapidly as BRICS nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and other blocs create new frameworks for trade that bypass the dollar entirely. As countries increasingly settle energy, technology, and agricultural trades in local currencies or the Chinese yuan, Washington’s ability to shape the world economy through financial leverage diminishes year after year.
Political polarization compounds these challenges. While China moves forward with a unified vision, the United States struggles to reconcile deep divisions between Democrats and Republicans, preventing the creation of long-term strategies needed to sustain global leadership. Powerful lobbying networks and foreign influence groups, such as AIPAC, steer U.S. policy to serve external interests rather than the nation’s strategic priorities. Meanwhile, traditional allies in Europe and Canada, as well as partners in Latin America, are pursuing greater independence from Washington, no longer willing to follow policies they increasingly view as contrary to their own interests. For many across the globe, America is still admired for its innovation, opportunity, and generosity, but there is growing frustration with its history of military interventions and regime-change policies that have destabilized nations from Iraq to Syria, from Libya to Afghanistan. If the United States wants to sustain its role as a respected leader, it must abandon strategies rooted in coercion and start building partnerships grounded in trust, friendship, and mutual respect.
Yet the United States is not destined to fall behind. It still holds immense strengths — from its culture of innovation and world-class universities to its entrepreneurial spirit and unparalleled capacity to attract global talent. America’s scientific leadership, vibrant democracy, and openness to diversity remain unmatched assets. But sustaining these advantages requires decisive action and renewed purpose.
To match China’s pace and reclaim long-term competitiveness, the U.S. must invest heavily in rebuilding its domestic manufacturing base, revitalizing its infrastructure, and restoring leadership in research and development. It must reform its education system to empower a new generation of engineers, scientists, and innovators, and it must foster unity in policymaking, setting aside partisanship for strategic national goals. Most critically, America must shift from a foreign policy based on dominance to one built on equal partnerships, cooperation, and mutual growth.
China’s rise represents a once-in-a-century transformation of the global order, and whether the coming decades lead to confrontation or collaboration will depend on choices made today. If Beijing sustains its momentum and continues integrating 154 nations into its economic vision, it could emerge as the defining power of the 21st century. But China also presents itself as a nation seeking harmony, offering development opportunities rather than pursuing domination, knowing that shared prosperity fuels its own progress. Meanwhile, the United States has the ability to remain a global leader, but only if it adapts to a rapidly changing world, invests in its people, strengthens its alliances, and treats all nations with dignity, fairness, and respect.
The world stands at the threshold of a profound transformation. America’s greatness lies in its creativity, diversity, and openness, qualities that have long inspired humanity. If it can harness these strengths, end destructive foreign interventions, and focus on building lasting partnerships based on trust and care, it can chart a new path where leadership is not imposed but earned. This is the moment for the United States to rediscover its founding ideals and become not just a superpower but a partner to the world. If it fails to do so, China’s relentless rise will reshape the global balance irreversibly, and the 21st century may well belong to Beijing. But if America chooses wisely, there is room for both nations to thrive, for a multipolar world rooted in cooperation rather than conflict, and for humanity to achieve shared prosperity.