Connect with us

Pakistan News

Can Pakistan be a Hard State?

Published

on

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : In a recent public statement, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff vowed to turn the country into a “hard state.” While this declaration may resonate with the desire for national strength and order, it reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of what the term truly means in a political context. Turning Pakistan into a hard state requires far more than military power or suppression; it demands strong, independent institutions, a rule-based system, and unwavering adherence to democratic norms. Ironically, the steps taken by the establishment, particularly after the February 2024 elections, have pushed Pakistan further into the category of a soft state—fragile, inconsistent, and vulnerable to internal and external pressures.
A hard state is defined not by the might of its army or the fear it can instill but by the integrity and functionality of its institutions. It enforces the law consistently and fairly, possesses a judiciary that functions independently, and maintains internal security without undermining civil liberties. In such a state, the bureaucracy works efficiently, policies are enforced without political compromise, and national sovereignty is upheld with dignity. Countries often cited as hard states, such as China and Israel, have built systems of governance that, while autocratic or semi-democratic, still ensure institutional resilience and policy continuity. They are capable of making and implementing difficult decisions without succumbing to domestic chaos or foreign influence.
In stark contrast, soft states suffer from policy U-turns, weak law enforcement, politicized institutions, and frequent subservience to foreign interests. Laws are selectively applied, corruption is widespread, and national direction is unclear. Unfortunately, this description fits today’s Pakistan far more accurately than the aspirational “hard state” image being promoted by the military leadership. The events following the February 2024 elections have laid bare the extent of institutional decay and political manipulation in the country.
The manipulation began with the democratic process itself. The party that received the popular mandate, commanding a clear majority, was sidelined. Instead, a party that won only eighteen seats was elevated to form the government, while leaders of the majority party were jailed, silenced, or excluded from the political process. Parliament was reduced to a rubber stamp, mechanically passing pre-drafted legislation provided by military-backed forces. No real debate, no democratic process, and no respect for public opinion—all hallmarks of a system that has drifted far from democratic norms. In such a scenario, the very foundation of a hard state—public legitimacy—was shattered.
Next came the judiciary, another pillar of state strength that was swiftly undermined. Constitutional amendments passed in the wake of the election stripped the Supreme Court of its inherent powers, effectively making it subservient to the executive. The procedures for the appointment, promotion, and transfer of judges were modified, placing the judiciary under the influence of the legislature and the bureaucracy—both now acting under the military’s shadow. This erosion of judicial independence has rendered the legal system toothless, unable to check the excesses of power or safeguard the rights of citizens. In a true hard state, the judiciary serves as the guardian of justice; in Pakistan, it has been forced into submission.
Civilian governance, too, has been hollowed out. All major decisions—political, economic, and administrative—are now taken by the military or its proxies. Elected representatives are either bypassed or given ceremonial roles, while real power is exercised behind closed doors. Ministries have been reduced to implementing orders rather than crafting policies. This imbalance not only breeds inefficiency but also eliminates accountability, making it impossible for the government to respond to the public’s needs or correct its own course. A hard state, by contrast, requires effective civilian governance supported—not supplanted—by the military.
Perhaps the most chilling consequence of this shift has been the crackdown on media and freedom of speech. Independent journalism has been silenced through censorship, harassment, and exile. Journalists are persecuted, news channels are gagged, and many outspoken voices have been forced to flee and continue their work from abroad. Even social media, the last refuge for open discourse, has been increasingly restricted. A state that fears open dialogue is not strong—it is insecure. A hard state allows criticism because it believes in its own legitimacy. Pakistan’s current trajectory suggests a state trying to mask its weaknesses through control and coercion.
These internal failures are compounded by growing unrest in various regions of the country. Instead of addressing the root causes of discontent—poverty, political marginalization, lack of infrastructure—the state has responded with overwhelming force. This has only deepened alienation, fueling separatist sentiments and insurgencies. Borders have become more perforated, and citizens increasingly feel like strangers in their own land. When force is used to fix problems caused by force in the first place, the cycle of instability only deepens. This is not the path to a hard state but a descent into chaos under the illusion of control.
The military’s assertion that it will transform Pakistan into a hard state rings hollow against this backdrop. What it has actually built is a weak and soft state, deprived of democratic legitimacy, judicial independence, and civil freedoms. Without the very institutions that define a hard state, the promise to create one becomes either a façade or a warning of further repression.
Even if we were to take inspiration from hard states like China or Israel, we must recognize that their models are rooted in unique political ideologies and historical conditions. China’s success is tied to its centralized, one-party system and decades of economic reforms. Israel’s strength stems from its national security doctrine and compulsory civic participation. Pakistan, by contrast, is a democracy—flawed, yet still defined by its Constitution and public mandate. Attempting to replicate authoritarian models without replicating the structural foundations that support them is not only unrealistic but also dangerous.
What Pakistan truly needs is a return to democratic norms. The most successful models in South Asia and beyond—India, the United States, and European countries—demonstrate that long-term stability and prosperity come through democratic resilience, not authoritarian shortcuts. India, despite its flaws, has maintained democratic continuity for decades and is now among the world’s fastest-growing economies. Its 7% annual growth over the past two decades and emergence as a potential global economic power is a testament to the strength of democratic systems supported by independent institutions.
Pakistan, on the other hand, has experimented with martial law and military-led governance multiple times in its history, and each time, it has emerged weaker. Institutions were eroded, democratic norms were bypassed, and the country was left grappling with deeper economic and political crises. The current approach is no different. If anything, it is a repetition of a failed script—one that never produced a hard state, only harder times for the people.
Before invoking the language of strength, the military and political elite must first understand its true essence. A hard state is not built by force—it is built by trust. Trust in democratic processes, in judicial independence, in freedom of expression, and in the will of the people. Without these elements, any promise of national strength is merely rhetorical. If Pakistan is to emerge as a strong and respected nation, it must restore its institutions, respect its democratic values, and empower its people—not suppress them.

Pakistan News

Pakistan’s Yemen Dilemma

Published

on

By

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Pakistan’s military commitment to Saudi Arabia raises a question that cannot be answered simply by identifying where its soldiers are stationed. Modern warfare allows forces to attack through aircraft, missiles, drones and targeting support without sending infantry across a border. The decisive issue is whether Pakistani personnel and capabilities will participate in hostilities against Yemen’s Houthis—and what consequences could follow.
Scott Ritter, renowned American podcaster, military and geopolitical analyst captures the central danger: Saudi Arabia could obtain through collective defence the Pakistani involvement in Yemen that Islamabad previously resisted. An initially limited commitment could expand through casualties, retaliation and demands for reinforcement, leaving Pakistan responsible for a war whose objectives it does not control.
CNN reported on October 7 that Pakistani troops were already stationed in Saudi Arabia. In the interview, Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, director general of Inter-Services Public Relations, declined to disclose their numbers or capabilities. Asked about operations across the Yemeni border, he invoked military confidentiality, explaining that participating countries do not publicly disclose how and where they will employ their forces. His response offered no categorical exclusion of ground operations or offensive action inside Yemen, even as he described Pakistani involvement as defensive.
That distinction matters. Operational secrecy may protect military personnel, but it also leaves the public without clear answers about the mission’s boundaries. The description “defensive” cannot establish those boundaries by itself. Governments routinely invoke defence to justify attacks beyond their territory; the relevant questions concern what forces actually do, whom they target and under whose authority.
Pakistani forces operating from Saudi territory could potentially support or conduct attacks inside Yemen without deploying infantry there. Air operations and targeting assistance could carry substantial consequences. If Pakistani personnel participate in attacks against Houthi positions, Ansarullah could regard Pakistan as belligerent. Tehran could interpret the same activity as participation in a campaign against Iranian regional interests.
The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye on August 7, 2026, reportedly treats an attack against one member as an attack against all three. Its deterrent promise is substantial, but so is the danger of importing one member’s confrontation into the security calculations of the others.
An October 5 statement published by Türkiye’s Foreign Ministry committed the partners to implement collective defence arrangements and rapidly deploy agreed military forces and capabilities to Saudi Arabia, subject to national legislation. Türkiye therefore shares the deployment commitment. However, the evidence reviewed does not establish a Turkish ground combat commitment against the Houthis or an equal distribution of operational risks.
For Islamabad, the unanswered questions are fundamental. Who authorizes Pakistani involvement in cross-border attacks? Can Pakistan refuse a particular operation? Who finances a prolonged deployment, and what conditions permit withdrawal? Confidential operational details need not be published to explain the political mandate governing the use of force.
Pakistan brings potential strengths to the alliance: experienced personnel, established military institutions and longstanding cooperation with Riyadh. Saudi infrastructure and financing could support a substantial deployment. Islamabad’s relationships with both Riyadh and Tehran might also create diplomatic opportunities, provided military involvement does not undermine its credibility as an intermediary.
Yet those strengths do not resolve the weaknesses of an extended campaign. Destroying particular weapons or positions is different from ending an adversary’s ability and determination to fight. Dispersed forces, local networks and adaptation can frustrate superior firepower. Tactical gains could therefore coexist with an expanding mission and an elusive political settlement.
Ritter’s warning is strongest when understood in these terms. Predicting inevitable Pakistani defeat is less useful than asking what victory would require. Protecting defined facilities offers measurable objectives. Permanently eliminating the Houthi threat could entail commitments far beyond what Pakistan initially intended—and costs that additional military capability cannot necessarily overcome.
Saudi financial assistance complicates Islamabad’s freedom of choice. The State Bank of Pakistan confirmed that a $3 billion Saudi deposit maturing in December 2025 was extended for another year. Such support gives Pakistan a substantial interest in maintaining Saudi confidence.
Saudi’s financial influence does not require an explicit threat. A government facing external financing pressures may find it difficult to reject security requests from an important creditor. The danger is that short-term economic reassurance encourages military obligations carrying much greater long-term costs.
Iran introduces a further risk. Pakistani attacks against an Iranian-supported movement could damage relations with a neighbouring country and generate security pressures closer to home. The Houthis also possess their own Yemeni objectives, and attacking them is not automatically equivalent to attacking Iran. Political escalation, however, can advance through perceptions and retaliation before governments agree on legal distinctions.
International law offers no reliable assurance that this confrontation would remain contained. Legal obligations persist, but their enforcement is uneven, and states may invoke self-defence while pursuing military objectives beyond their borders. Pakistan therefore cannot assume that legal distinctions between defending Saudi territory and attacking Houthi positions would restrain retaliation. If Tehran perceives Pakistani operations as threatening its interests, the danger would turn on strategic calculations, perceived threats and the risk of escalation—not simply on competing interpretations of the UN Charter. Shared religion and geographical proximity would offer no dependable protection against that outcome.
Pakistan’s domestic divisions make a widening conflict especially consequential. The supporters of imprisoned former prime minister Imran Khan began marching from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa toward Islamabad on October 4, demanding his release, hospital treatment and family access. An overseas campaign would impose additional demands on resources and political legitimacy amid an already polarized environment.
Parliament’s April 2015 resolution remains relevant. It supported neutrality in Yemen alongside solidarity against threats to Saudi territorial integrity and the holy sites, while urging diplomacy through the United Nations and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. That distinction deserves renewed parliamentary examination before military commitments overtake political debate.
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye should pursue an emergency OIC initiative linked to UN diplomacy, involving Iran and meaningful Yemeni participation. Reciprocal de-escalation, civilian protection and humanitarian access should take priority. Their collective influence should also sustain action for Palestinian rights rather than dissipate through another prolonged regional confrontation.
The Makkah Pact’s credibility will depend on whether it improves security. Secrecy about military methods cannot replace clarity about political objectives. Before Pakistan’s commitment deepens, its leaders must explain what they are defending, how far that obligation extends and how they intend to prevent it from becoming an open-ended war.

Continue Reading

Pakistan News

Pakistan Reaffirms Commitment to Multilateralism, Peace and International Cooperation at the Executive Board of UNESCO

Published

on

By

Paris ( Imran Y. CHOUDHRY):- Advisor to the Prime Minister of Pakistan and Representative of Pakistan to UNESCO, Syed Tauqeer Hussain Shah, delivered Pakistan’s national statement at the 225th Session of the UNESCO Executive Board in Paris, France, reaffirming its steadfast commitment to multilateralism, international cooperation and the promotion of peace through dialogue and mutual understanding.

In his statement,

  • Underscored Pakistan’s firm support for multilateral institutions, South-South cooperation and collaborative efforts to address global challenges, particularly those confronting developing countries;
  • Highlighted the urgent need to protect human life, educational institutions and cultural heritage amid conflicts and crisis, especially in Gaza;

-Called for an international action plan to confront the challenge of out-of-school children;

  • Stressed the importance of equitable access to scientific knowledge, international scientific collaboration and reducing technological inequalities;

-Underlined the need to combat racism, misogyny, Islamophobia, disinformation and hate speech, while encouraging responsible and ethical governance of artificial intelligence and emerging technologies; and

  • Expressed support for institutional reform of UNESCO to enhance its effectiveness and impact worldwide.

Continue Reading

Pakistan News

Quetta’s Daughter, Pakistan’s Pride

Published

on

By

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : While browsing today’s international news, one story stopped me and filled my heart with both pride and anguish: Jalila Haider, a Hazara woman born, raised and educated in my hometown, Quetta, has won the 2026 Right Livelihood Award, announced today, September 30. Presented by the Stockholm-based Right Livelihood Award Foundation, the distinction is widely known as the “Alternative Nobel Prize,”.
This year, just four recipients—two women and two women-led organizations—were selected from 200 nominations across 72 countries. Haider was recognized for challenging ethnic persecution, state repression and discrimination against women through her legal work and activism.
For recipients, such recognition brings international visibility to their struggles and strengthens their ability to rally support; for Pakistan, Haider’s achievement highlights the courage and humanity of citizens defending its most vulnerable communities.
Amid reports of conflict and suffering, here was a Pakistani woman honored for standing beside people whom violence and indifference had pushed into the shadows. The news brought pride, but also anguish over the injustices that made her work necessary—and memories of a city whose humanity I once knew intimately.
Quetta, nestled like a bowl among towering hills, was beautiful for more than its landscape and refreshing weather. During my years of education, from 1970 to 1984, its greatest attraction was the fellowship between its communities. In the Quetta I remember, differences of ethnicity, language and religious tradition did not prevent friendship. We studied, played and visited one another, sharing a city that felt like home to us all.
I watched Hazara families advance through education, commerce, public service and sport. Their businesses grew, their young people distinguished themselves, and their contribution became woven into Quetta’s everyday life. Their achievements enriched the city. Remembering that shared life makes the subsequent persecution especially painful: people who helped build our hometown were increasingly denied the freedom to live safely within it.
I witnessed that atmosphere deteriorate as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 drew our region into confrontation between Moscow and Washington. In my observation, foreign ideological rivalries, money and weapons deepened divisions among people who had lived together. I saw resentment grow around Hazara and Punjabi advancement in commerce and public employment. These memories carry the pain we shared as neighbours: the gradual destruction of trust, followed by violence against familiar families.
The consequences were merciless. Hazaras were attacked in markets, on roads and while travelling to worship. Human Rights Watch recorded that two major bombings in Quetta in January and February 2013 killed at least 180 Hazaras. Such figures describe the scale, but cannot convey the anguish within each household. Every victim left relationships, responsibilities and hopes that no compensation or official condolence could restore.
For me, this tragedy has a familiar face: Abrar Hussain, the celebrated Hazara boxer who trained us during our school and college years. He brought distinction to Pakistan in international competition. When I later served in Quetta as deputy income tax commissioner, I knew him in his sports administration role. In June 2011, he was murdered in the city he had served. A man who strengthened Pakistan’s reputation abroad could not be protected at home.
Fear drove families away from their neighbourhoods, livelihoods and memories. Some sought safety elsewhere in Pakistan; others rebuilt their lives overseas, including in Australia. Those who remained faced restricted movement and shrinking opportunities. The loss extended beyond households. Quetta itself was diminished whenever a family left because it could no longer trust that its children would return safely from school, work or the market.
This was the environment in which Jalila Haider chose to stand her ground. Born in 1984, she lost her father when she was twelve. Her mother raised six children and supported her determination to study law. In 2010, she earned her degree from University Law College, Quetta, becoming the first woman lawyer from Pakistan’s Hazara community. Behind that achievement stood a mother’s resolve and a daughter’s refusal to surrender.
Her legal practice, established in 2011, became a refuge for people whose cases others considered dangerous or unrewarding. According to her award biography, her firm has handled more than 7,000 cases and helped restore freedom of movement to more than 600 political activists and human rights defenders. She has represented women seeking divorce, custody and inheritance rights, alongside refugees, transgender people and those facing wrongful accusations.
The dangers were personal. She survived the 2016 bombing that devastated Balochistan’s legal community. She has endured detention, online harassment and death threats. Nevertheless, she continued appearing for people whose vulnerability often made them easy to abandon. In a setting where professional advancement can reward silence, her willingness to accept difficult cases gave frightened families someone prepared to listen and act.
In 2018, she carried that determination into a seven-day hunger strike against the targeted killing of Hazaras. She demanded direct engagement from the army chief, refusing to accept assurances from officials unable to deliver security. The protest brought negotiations between the military leadership and Hazara women. The award foundation credits it with contributing to a sustained decline in attacks, although the community’s insecurity and displacement remained unresolved.
Her work also recognises that justice requires the means to survive. Through We the Humans, founded in 2015, she has helped more than 400 widows of terrorism victims gain financial independence. Rug weaving, childcare, education and literacy support connect income with dignity. A widow able to support her children acquires something beyond financial relief: greater freedom to make decisions about her family’s future.
As a founding member of the Women’s Democratic Front, Haider also helped pioneer Balochistan’s first Women’s March. Her advocacy reaches women facing forced marriage and honour violence, crossing the boundaries of her own community. That breadth matters. Having experienced persecution, she has refused to make another person’s ethnicity or identity a condition for receiving help.
Pakistan owes women like her more than ceremonial praise. They need protection, functioning courts and institutions that respond before desperation forces a hunger strike. Their work reveals both the courage within our society and the distance between constitutional promises and everyday experience. Supporting them would allow more families to recover the ordinary security that violence has stolen.
Pakistan is too often viewed through an unfavourable lens in the international media, with few stories allowing its humanity and courage to shine. Finding Jalila Haider’s recognition among the day’s top ten world news stories filled my heart with pride, even as it revived the agony of everything our Hazara community has endured.
May this honour bring her greater dignity, respect and protection, and inspire many more Jalila Haiders across Pakistan and the world to join the struggle for justice and freedom. May their courage restore hope to those pushed into the shadows and challenge the label of “illegal” imposed on human beings through no fault of their own, but by systems, borders and laws that fail to recognise their humanity.

Continue Reading

Trending