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Budget 2025-26: Austerity budget offers ‘crumbs’ for relief

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• Next year’s revenue target set at Rs14.13tr
• Provinces’ contribution helps Centre outperform fiscal target, record lowest budget deficit in a decade
• Subsidy allocations have been reduced by 14pc
• Reduced debt servicing drives expenditure containment of nearly Rs2.26tr
• Generous tax relief, incentives for construction sector
• Fuel levy, electricity surcharges to rise next year
• Tough crackdown planned on non-filers, tax evaders
• Development spending squeezed to cut deficit

ISLAMABAD: Maintaining an aggressive stance on fiscal consolidation, as required by the Int­ernational Monetary Fund (IMF), Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb on Tuesday still managed to offer some notional relief to the salaried class in the federal budget for fiscal year 2025-26, along with incentives for the real estate and construction sectors, in an effort to revive the struggling industrial sector and stimulate economic growth.

At the same time, however, the government announced it was imposing a ‘carbon levy’ of Rs2.5 per litre on petrol, diesel and furnace oil in the upcoming fiscal year, to be doubled the following year. It also introduced a 5 per cent tax on large pensions, an 18pc tax on imported solar panels, and an increase in the debt servicing surcharge on electricity to finance not only interest payments, but also principal debt. Additionally, it announced the gradual elimination of tax exemptions for the tribal areas beginning this year.

Ambitious targets

Despite a record tax shortfall of Rs1.07 trillion recorded for the current fiscal year, the finance minister set next year’s revenue target at Rs14.13tr — an 18.7pc increase from this year’s revised estimate of Rs11.9tr, against the original budget target of Rs12.97tr. This would include approximately Rs840 billion in additional revenue measures, on top of a Rs1.39tr automatic tax increase supported by projected inflation of 7.5pc and economic growth of 4.2pc and expenditure containment of nearly Rs2.26tr (equivalent to 2pc of GDP), driven primarily by reduced debt servicing costs, and also at the expense of development and public welfare initiatives.

Not only the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), but the provincial governments, too, were unable to meet their commitment of maintaining a Rs1.22tr surplus for the current year. Still, they provided vital support to the federal government with a surplus of Rs1.01tr.

This contribution enabled the federal government to outperform its fiscal target and record a budget deficit of just 5.6pc of GDP (Rs6.44tr) — the lowest in a decade since FY2015-16 — compared to a higher projected deficit of 5.9pc (Rs7.28tr). This notable fiscal tightening was achieved through punishing additional taxation measures amounting to Rs2.2tr (1.8pc of GDP) alongside a reduction in expenditure as interest rates declined from a historic peak of 22pc.

Accordingly, the FY2025–26 budget sets an ambitious target to reduce the budget deficit to 3.9pc of GDP (Rs5.04tr), contingent upon a cash surplus of Rs1.46tr from the provinces. As a result, the primary budget surplus is projected to rise to 2.4pc of GDP, or Rs3.17tr, for the next year — up from this year’s 2.2pc of GDP (Rs2.5tr).

Relief for select groups

The government found sufficient fiscal space to offer some relief to the salaried class, who have been burdened by high tax rates, declining real incomes, and severe inflation over the past two years.

The finance minister proposed a reduction in income tax by half, to 2.5pc, on annual income between Rs600,000 and Rs1.2 million. It is pertinent to mention that there was a discrepancy in the income tax rate for the lowest taxable bracket announced by the finance minister and the tax rate mentioned in the finance bill, which was even lower at 1pc.

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Clarity is awaited on this matter. Similarly, the annual tax on a salary of Rs1.2m was proposed to be reduced to Rs6,000, down from the current Rs30,000. Mr Aurangzeb added that the income tax rate for those earning up to Rs2.2m per annum would be cut to 11pc, down from the current 15pc. Similarly, the tax rate has been reduced to 23pc from 25pc for salaried income between Rs2.2m and Rs3.2m. In addition, the finance minister acknowledged that oppressive tax rates were driving highly skilled professionals to migrate, contributing to a “brain drain”. As a corrective measure, he announced a 1pc reduction in the surcharge on annual incomes exceeding Rs10m.

Apart from this, a 10pc increase in salaries and 7pc rise in pensions was announced for government employees. The salaries of armed forces personnel would also be increased by 25pc, including a special relief allowance in recognition of their recent heroic performance in response to Indian aggression, the finance minister said.

At the same time, the government introduced a generous tax relief and incentives for the construction sector, including access to cheaper mortgage financing, in a bid to revive large-scale manufacturing, which has been contracting for the past three years due to unprecedented increases in energy and borrowing costs. To this end, the finance minister announced a reduction in the withholding tax on the purchase of real estate from 4pc to 2.5pc. The next two current withholding tax rates of 3.5pc and 3pc will also be reduced to 2pc and 1.5pc respectively.

Additionally, a 7pc federal excise duty imposed last year on the transfer of commercial properties, plots and houses has also been proposed to be abolished.

As a new initiative, the budget includes a tax credit on mortgages for homes of up to 10 marla (250 square yards) and flats of up to 2,000 square feet. This is in addition to a new scheme aimed at promoting mortgage financing. The finance minister also announced a reduction in stamp duty on property purchases in Islamabad Capital Territory, from 4pc to 1pc, and expressed hope that provincial governments would follow suit by reducing heavy taxation on immovable property.

The government also succeeded in persuading the IMF to exempt fertilisers and insecticides from taxation for the current year, in an effort to position agriculture as the engine of economic growth.

Tightening the net

On the other hand, the finance minister announced an increase in the tax rate on interest income from 15pc to 20pc, a move that may discourage savings. However, he clarified that this would not apply to small savers or investments in national saving schemes.

Similarly, digital marketplaces and online businesses are to be brought into the tax net through courier companies, it was announced. The minister also announced a 5pc income tax on pensions exceeding Rs10m per annum for pensioners under the age of 70. In a move to promote a cashless economy, non-filers will now be subject to a 1pc advance tax on cash withdrawals, up from the existing 0.6pc. Taxpaying businesses will be discouraged from making cash sales exceeding Rs200,000. Additional measures have also been introduced to encourage online transactions and digital payments.

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Strict steps will be taken against non-filers. Only taxpayers who submit their wealth statements will be allowed to undertake large financial transactions, such as the purchase of vehicles, immovable properties, securities, mutual funds, or the opening of certain bank accounts.

Tightening the noose around unregistered traders, the finance minister proposed the freezing of bank accounts, restrictions on property transfers, and the sealing of business premises in cases of serious violations of sales tax laws, with the involvement of trade bodies. In the same vein, he also announced a notional 0.5pc reduction in the super tax for corporate firms with annual incomes between Rs200m and Rs500m.

Improved tax collection

The finance minister noted a rise in the tax-to-GDP ratio, which has historically been one of the weakest aspects of Pakistan’s economy, from 8.8pc in June 2024 to 10.3pc in the first nine months of the current year. This figure is projected to reach 10.4pc by June 30, 2025. Including non-tax revenue, the federal tax-to-GDP ratio has improved to 11.6pc, representing an increase of 1.2 percentage points, up from 0.8 percentage points last year. The consolidated tax-to-GDP ratio, the finance minister added, has reached 12.3pc, including a 0.7pc contribution from the provinces. “The 1.6pc of GDP increase in FBR revenue is not only the highest in Pakistan’s history, but is also rarely seen anywhere else in the world in recent times,” the minister boasted.

Balancing the budget

The government has set the non-tax revenue target for the next year at Rs5.15tr, slightly higher than the current year’s Rs4.9tr. This brings the total gross federal revenue (FBR plus non-tax) to Rs19.28tr, up from the current year’s original budget target of Rs17.8tr, which was later revised down to Rs16.8tr. After transferring Rs8.2tr to the provinces, the net federal revenue is estimated to be Rs11.07tr for the next year, compared to Rs9.8tr this year. This leaves a projected federal deficit of Rs6.5tr, a reduction from the current year’s budgeted Rs8.5tr, which was later revised to Rs7.44tr.

Subsidy allocations have been reduced by 14pc to Rs1.19tr for the next year, down from Rs1.38tr in the current year. This is primarily due to a 13pc (Rs154bn) cut in power sector subsidies. The tariff differential subsidy for ex-Wapda distribution companies has been reduced by 9.7pc (Rs27bn) to Rs249bn, from Rs276bn this year. Meanwhile, the tariff subsidy for K-Electric has been cut by 28pc (Rs49bn), to Rs125bn from Rs174bn. An even larger reduction has been applied to the tariff subsidy for Azad Jammu and Kashmir, which has been reduced to Rs74bn from Rs108bn, reflecting a cut of 31.5pc.

The major non-tax revenue item is expected to be the petroleum levy on POL products, projected at Rs1.47tr, which is a 26pc increase from the current year’s Rs1.16tr. An even larger contribution is anticipated from State Bank of Pakistan profits, estimated at Rs2.4tr for the next year, though this marks a slight decline from Rs2.6tr this year.

The debt servicing cost for next year has been estimated at Rs8.2tr, representing an 8pc decline from actual repayments of Rs8.95tr, and 16pc lower than the original budget estimate of Rs9.78tr. Pension expenditure is expected to rise by around 4pc, reaching Rs1.06tr, up from Rs1.01tr this year. Military pensions are projected to grow by 12pc to Rs742bn, compared to a 10pc increase in civil pensions, which are expected to reach Rs243bn.

As a result, total current expenditure has been set at Rs16.29tr for the next year, slightly below this year’s figure of Rs16.39tr.

Published in Dawn, June 11th, 2025

Pakistan News

Pakistan Prime Minister attend Leaders’ Summit of COP-31 in Antalya, Türkiye

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Antalya (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY):- Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif will visit Antalya, Republic of Türkiye, from 10–12 November 2026 to participate in the Leaders’ Summit of the 31st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
 
Prime Minister will address the Leaders’ Summit on 11 November 2026, during which he will urge the global community to take concrete actions to address the threat posed by climate change to the planet. He will highlight Pakistan’s steps towards rapid solarization and expansion of its renewable energy capacity, as part of its transition towards a cleaner and more resilient economy, along with its efforts to strengthen disaster preparedness and early-warning systems.

In addition, he will also call for predictable, adequate and accessible climate finance for developing countries to strengthen their resilience and pursue sustainable development.

The Prime Minister will also attend a High-Level Roundtable convened by the Presidency of the COP-31 on the sidelines of the Leaders’ Summit, and hold bilateral meetings with the Turkish leadership as well as several other world leaders.

Prime Minister’s participation in the COP-31 Leaders’ Summit is an expression of Pakistan’s strong support for the climate agenda, and will provide Pakistan with an opportunity to reaffirm its commitment towards working closely with the international community to address the climate crisis.

COP 31 starting Yesterday, Minister Climate Change of Pakistan Mr. Tasadaq Malik attended the opening ceremony in Antalya, Türkiye.

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Tehran’s Diplomatic Bombshell

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The arrival in Tehran of the defence minister of Saudi Arabia, the army chief of Pakistan and the intelligence chief ofTürkiye may prove more consequential than another round of American or Israeli military threats. Three powerfulMuslim countries, bound by the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, sat across the table from Iran while Washington and Israel contemplated renewed military operations. The question is not merely what these leaders discussed, but what they may have quietly agreed to do—or refuse to do—when the next missiles begin flying.
The delegation was extraordinary in its composition. Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Pakistan’s FieldMarshal Asim Munir and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin represented countries possessing enormous financial, military, diplomatic and strategic influence. Their collective appearance conveyed that Iran’s security could no longer be treated exclusively as a confrontation between Tehran, Washington and Tel Aviv. Regional powers were asserting their own interests in determining whether another devastating war would engulf their neighbourhood.
The war with Iran has transformed American military installations across the Gulf from instruments of deterrence into potential targets of retaliation. Reports and assessments of American military repositioning toward Israel, Jordan and other locations reflect this wider vulnerability. For Washington, geographic access remains a military advantage; for Gulf governments, that same access increasingly carries the possibility of devastating retaliation.
Saudi Arabia consequently faces an exceptionally difficult choice. American air defence systems, intelligence cooperation, maintenance arrangements and advanced weapons remain important to its security. Yet the presence ofAmerican forces can expose Saudi oil installations, airports, industrial infrastructure and civilian populations to Iranian orHouthi attacks. The attacks around Ras Tanura have demonstrated how rapidly regional warfare can threaten energy supplies and global economic stability. Riyadh must therefore calculate whether American protection is reducing its vulnerability or contributing to it.
Here lies the first possible hidden significance of the Tehran meeting. Iran may have sought assurances that Saudi Arabia,Pakistan and Türkiye would neither participate in renewed American-Israeli attacks nor facilitate them through military installations, airspace, intelligence or logistical support. No publicly disclosed agreement establishes that such promises were made. Nevertheless, the subject would be entirely consistent with Iran’s longstanding concern about foreign military infrastructure being used against it.
The second possibility points in the opposite direction. The Makkah Pact countries may have arrived not simply as sympathetic neighbours, but as a collective deterrent. Their defence agreement treats an attack against one member as a matter of common security. The presence of nuclear-armed Pakistan, NATO member Türkiye and economically powerful Saudi Arabia could therefore convey a warning that further Iranian or Houthi attacks against Saudi territory risk widening the conflict. Collective defence, however, does not automatically establish a commitment to join an American war.
This dual character makes the delegation particularly significant. It could simultaneously reassure Iran against foreign aggression and warn Tehran against attacking Saudi Arabia. Such diplomacy is not necessarily contradictory. It reflects an attempt to establish reciprocal restraint: regional states would avoid becoming launching platforms for attacks on Iran,while Iran would avoid retaliating against countries that remained outside the fighting. Whether such an understanding was actually reached remains undisclosed.
The third possibility concerns Qatar’s parallel diplomatic initiative. Unlike the three Makkah Pact countries, Qatar has maintained an intermediary role between Washington and Tehran. Its proposed seven-day confidence-building framework sought to bridge disagreements over nuclear activities, sanctions, maritime access and the wider conflict. Reports also indicate support for mediation from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. Thus, the Tehran consultations could represent complementary diplomatic tracks rather than competing initiatives.
Iran’s response to the Qatari proposal was nevertheless uncompromising. Tehran objected to demands for nuclear concessions before meaningful economic relief, insisting that the American blockade of Iranian ports and restrictions on oil exports must be addressed first. Washington, conversely, wanted nuclear commitments from the beginning. The dispute was therefore not merely over the contents of a peace agreement, but over which party would surrender its leverage before receiving guarantees.
The most consequential outcome of the Tehran meeting may lie not in what was publicly announced, but in what was deliberately withheld. A day-long consultation involving the defence minister of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s army chief, Türkiye’s intelligence chief and Iran’s highest political and security authorities could hardly have been confined to the four lines of the joint communiqué. Such meetings necessarily involve extensive deliberations on the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats arising from an ongoing war, including American military bases, Iranian retaliation, Saudi security, the Strait of Hormuz, economic sanctions and the consequences of another American-Israeli offensive.
Drawing upon my experience attending high-level meetings as Press Secretary and media adviser to the President of Pakistan, I know that public statements rarely disclose the full substance of sensitive diplomatic and security consultations.
The positive assessments expressed by the Iranian leadership and the visiting delegations strongly suggest that the participants found sufficient common ground to explore practical understandings and a coordinated pathway for responding to future developments.
Such understandings may include assurances of non-participation in renewed attacks against Iran, restrictions on the use of regional military facilities, reciprocal restraint toward Gulf countries and mechanisms for further consultations should Washington and Israel resume hostilities.
Kuwait and the other Gulf countries will therefore become important indicators. Their decisions concerning American bases, airspace, logistical support and diplomatic engagement could reveal whether the Tehran initiative develops into a broader regional non-aggression arrangement. The Houthis’ conduct will be equally revealing. A sustained reduction in attacks on Saudi infrastructure could indicate that Tehran and Riyadh have found a mechanism to separate Gulf security from the wider American-Israeli confrontation, although Houthi decision-making cannot simply be equated with Iranian instructions.
The timing adds urgency. Reports indicate concern about renewed American and Israeli military action around the November 3 American midterm elections. Whether such an offensive actually occurs remains uncertain. But if it does, the military effectiveness of the campaign will depend partly on regional access, intelligence, logistics and the willingness of neighbouring governments to absorb the consequences of Iranian retaliation.
Ultimately, Tehran may have achieved something strategically important without obtaining a single publicly declared concession: it has compelled influential regional governments to discuss security with Iran rather than merely discuss Iran with Washington. That is a meaningful diplomatic shift, even if its durability remains untested.
The real verdict on the Tehran meeting will not emerge from its carefully worded communiqué. It will emerge whenWashington next demands military access, when Israel considers another strike, and when Iran decides where its missiles will—or will not—fall. If regional governments refuse to become instruments of another war, the Makkah Pact may be remembered not as an alliance formed to confront Iran, but as the beginning of a Middle East determined to prevent outside powers from deciding its fate.

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Pakistan’s Moment Beyond the Battlefield

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : While Pakistan wrestles with political confrontation at home, its diplomacy is opening doors abroad. From the Badr memorandum signed in Doha to the earlier Mecca defence agreement, and from Riyadh’s security consultations to mediation with Tehran and Washington, Pakistan is acquiring a place at tables where regional security is being negotiated. The opportunity is considerable. The challenge is to turn international recognition into domestic stability, industrial strength and prosperity.
The Badr Memorandum of Understanding, signed on October 21 by Qatar, Türkiye, Pakistan and Indonesia, marks the latest advance. Its central purpose is defence industrial cooperation: joint production, technical training, research, development and stronger manufacturing capabilities. It offers a means of building the technological and industrial capacity that makes security sustainable.
Its promise lies in combining complementary strengths. Türkiye brings an expanding defence industry and experience in developing and integrating complex systems. Pakistan contributes military experience, technical manpower and established production facilities. Indonesia offers manufacturing capacity, a substantial domestic market and an important Southeast Asian base. Qatar brings investment potential and demand. Together, these assets could support projects beyond the reach of countries working separately.
The resulting opportunity extends beyond buying and selling weapons. Shared design, component manufacturing, software development, testing, maintenance and training could create enduring industrial relationships. A country that helps manufacture a system develops skills and supplier networks that an ordinary purchase may never deliver. The real prize is the ability to understand, sustain and improve equipment throughout its working life.
But signatures cannot run factories. Badr needs an efficient institution to translate ambition into projects, with agreed financing, clear responsibilities and deadlines. Partners must settle technology access, intellectual property, export permissions and the division of production before these become disputes. Each project should have accountable leadership and measurable milestones. Good faith must be matched by management capable of delivering on time.
For Pakistan, Türkiye is a particularly valuable partner. Their existing naval cooperation demonstrates how procurement can support domestic construction and technical learning. Turkish progress in drones, electronics, armoured platforms and naval systems offers further possibilities. Pakistan should seek arrangements that allow its engineers and manufacturers to become development partners, accumulating knowledge with every successive project.
This industrial initiative follows the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan in August, which established a powerful principle: an armed attack against one would be regarded as an attack against all. Its resemblance to NATO’s collective defence commitment explains the attraction of calling it a “mini-NATO”. For Pakistan, it represents recognition that its military capacity and strategic position have value well beyond South Asia.
Yet solidarity becomes complicated when it must move from declarations to decisions. These countries share Islamic bonds, but their relationships, interests and vulnerabilities differ. A confrontation involving Saudi Arabia and Iran, or attacks from Yemen, would confront Pakistan with difficult choices. Religious, social and historical connections cross the very boundaries that security arrangements seek to defend. An effective pact must therefore combine credible deterrence with political judgment and clearly understood responsibilities.
Nor does Mecca constitute a comprehensive Muslim alliance addressing every shared concern. The Palestinian question and Israel’s military actions remain central to public sentiment across the Muslim world, while the agreement’s immediate operation is shaped by its members’ security needs. Its worth will depend on whether it protects its participants while helping contain regional conflict. Pakistan’s strongest contribution would be to make collective security reinforce reconciliation rather than deepen divisions.
Pakistan also brings a distinction no other Muslim country possesses: nuclear weapons capability. Alongside this stands an experienced army, a capable air force and a smaller navy responsible for demanding maritime duties. The May 2025 confrontation with India, which Pakistan regards as a major defensive success, reinforced the importance of readiness and technological competence. India’s acknowledgment of initial aircraft losses underlined the seriousness of that contest.
Military standing, however, achieves its greatest value when it supports diplomacy. Field Marshal Asim Munir’s October 20 visit to Tehran formed part of Pakistan’s continuing effort to help bring the United States and Iran towards an accommodation. Such engagement requires persistence because the parties approach negotiations through deep distrust, competing security demands and domestic political pressures.
Pakistan is attempting a difficult balancing act: sustaining communication with Washington and President Donald Trump, preserving access to Iran’s leadership, and maintaining Saudi confidence. Its usefulness rests on remaining a credible channel across these relationships. Every conversation that clarifies intentions, reduces miscalculation or identifies a possible compromise adds value, even when a final settlement remains elusive.
This is where Pakistan’s defence partnerships and diplomatic role must reinforce each other. Friendship with Saudi Arabia should strengthen its ability to explain Saudi concerns to Tehran. Relations with Iran should help it communicate Iranian concerns elsewhere. Close ties with Türkiye and Qatar add further channels. Pakistan can gain lasting influence by helping countries find an exit from confrontation that preserves security and dignity.
That achievement would be more persuasive if accompanied by reconciliation at home. Continuing confrontation around Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and the imprisonment of former prime minister Imran Khan consumes political energy the country urgently needs for reconstruction. Pakistan should ensure fair and transparent judicial proceedings, end politically motivated restrictions and pursue his release through lawful means. He should have the opportunity to participate in normal democratic politics.
The way forward also requires free, fair and impartial elections, credible institutions and acceptance that political opponents belong within the constitutional system. Protest must remain peaceful, and the state must protect lawful political participation. A country seeking to mediate between bitter international adversaries should apply the same patience and confidence to resolving its own political disputes.
Peace along Pakistan’s borders is equally necessary. Terrorism must be confronted firmly, but lasting security also requires sustained diplomacy with Afghanistan. Islamabad and Kabul need practical arrangements to prevent armed groups from exploiting territory, manage border disputes and preserve legitimate trade. With Iran, cooperation should protect a peaceful frontier. With India, Pakistan should continue seeking dialogue and measures that reduce the risk of another military escalation.
Economic recovery must give these efforts a material foundation. Pakistan’s mineral resources can contribute far more if extraction is connected to processing and domestic manufacturing. Copper, gold and other commercially viable deposits should support infrastructure, technical education and industries that add value at home. Mineral wealth becomes national wealth when it creates productive skills, competitive businesses and lasting employment.
Badr could help cultivate some of the engineering, electronics and materials expertise relevant to that broader transformation. Pakistan should connect its diplomatic partnerships with universities, industrial estates, reliable energy and local suppliers. Exporting raw materials alone would leave much of the value elsewhere; building industries around them would allow Pakistanis to retain a larger share.
Pakistan has earned an opening. Its task now is to make external confidence durable through internal consent, peaceful borders and productive industry. The country’s finest strategic achievement would be a Pakistan whose citizens experience the gains its diplomats announce: greater security, meaningful work and a future worth investing in.

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