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What new changes has the National Assembly made to the 27th Constitutional Amendment bill?

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The National Assembly on Wednesday passed the 27th Constitutional Amendment Bill during a ruckus-marred session attended by political heavyweights, including Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, PML-N President Nawaz Sharif and PPP Chairman Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari.

The bill was passed by a two-way voting process — voting by division and clause-by-clause voting. Presented in the house for voting by Law Minister Azam Nazeer Tarar, the bill will now be referred back to the Senate for the new amendments to be debated upon again and then will be passed by the upper house.

During the session, Tarar presented a list of amendments to the bill, while also omitting some of the bill’s clauses.

From the law minister’s speech in the National Assembly, the amendments were promulgated mainly to incorporate the newly setup Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) in the scheme of the Constitution and to provide clarity regarding the incumbent and future chief justice of Pakistan (CJP) since the new constitutional court means it will have its own chief justice (CJFCC), along with the chief justice of the Supreme Court (CJSC).

Amendments related to Federal Constitutional Court

Substitution of new Clause 2

The first change pertained to Clause 2 of the 27th Amendment Bill, 2025, which dealt with a change to Article 10(4)(1) of the Constitution (safeguards as to arrest and detention). The relevant section currently says that the CJP will form the review board in a case of someone detained under a federal law.

The amendment sought to insert the words “Supreme Court of” in front of the “chief justice of” to now show that the CJSC would be the one to form the board.

However, the new Clause 2 as per the amendments deals with changes to Article 6’s (high treason) clause 2A, which reads as follows:

An act of high treason mentioned in clause (1) or clause (2) shall not be validated by any court, including the SC and a high court.

In the latest amendment, it was stated that after the word “the”, the words “Federal Constitutional Court” and a comma would be inserted, thus adding the FCC to the list of courts that cannot ratify any act of high treason and placing it before the SC in the listing.

Amendments related to Supreme Court, its chief justice and CJP

Insertion of Clause 2A

Meanwhile, the previous Clause 2 of the bill would now be labelled as Clause 2A.

As explained before, the CJSC will now be the one to form the review board for the case of someone detained under a federal law.

Substitution of Clause 23

Article 176 that deals with the makeup of the SC currently says: “The Supreme Court shall consist of a chief justice to be known as the chief justice of Pakistan and so many other Judges as may be determined by Act of [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)] or, until so determined, as may be fixed by the president.”

The original Clause 23 sought to insert the words “of Supreme Court” after the second mention of “justice”, thus meaning that the apex court would comprise its own chief justice — who would not necessarily be the CJP.

However, the law minister said in his NA speech that confusion had been created about the continuity of the CJP, thus the following new amendment was proposed that includes the original Clause 23 but also adds the following part to the full definition at the end of Article 176:

“For the full stop, at the end, a colon shall be substituted and thereafter the following proviso shall be added, namely: ‘Provided that and notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, the incumbent chief justice shall be and continue to be known as the chief justice of Pakistan during his term in office’.”

CJP Yahya Afridi will thus continue to be the country’s chief justice until the end of his term.

Amendment of Clause 56

In the bill, an amendment to Clause 1 of Article 260 (definitions) was proposed, specifically for the definition of the chief justice. The article currently states:

“Chief justice”, in relation to the Supreme Court or a high court, includes the judge for the time being acting as chief justice of the court.

The change (subclause ‘a’ of Clause 56) proposed in the bill sought to add the words “Federal Constitutional Court” to clauses and sub-clauses of Article 260 to incorporate the new court in the framework of the Constitution.

Today’s latest amendment proposed the addition of the following subclause to Clause 56’s subclause ‘a’:

“Chief justice of Pakistan” means the senior amongst the chief justice of the Federal Constitutional Court and the chief justice of Supreme Court.“

Thus, after CJP Afridi’s term comes to an end, the future CJP will be the senior-most judge from the chief justices of the FCC and SC.

Omissions

Omission of Clause 4

Some of the proposed changes in the bill were omitted during the reading, one of which was Clause 4 of the bill.

Clause 4 would amend Article 42 of the Constitution, which reads as follows:

Before entering upon office, the president shall make before the chief justice of Pakistan oath in the form set out in the Third Schedule.

The proposed amendment would have seen the word “Pakistan” replaced with “the Federal Constitutional Court”.

Omission of Clause 19

Clause 19 of the bill proposed an amendment to Article 168 of the Constitution, which mandates that there will be an auditor-general who is appointed by the president. There was meant to be an amendment to Clause 2 of Article 168, which reads as follows:

Before entering upon office, the auditor-general shall make before the chief justice of Pakistan oath in the form set out in the Third Schedule.

The amendment in the bill would insert the words “Supreme Court of” after the words “chief justice of”.

Omission of Clause 51

Clause 51 of the bill proposed an amendment to Article 214 of the Constitution, which states that the chief election commissioner must swear an oath to the chief justice before assuming office, as follows:

Before entering upon office, the commissioner shall make before the chief justice of Pakistan [and a member of the Election Commission shall make before the commissioner] oath in the form set-out in the Third Schedule

The amendment was to replace the word “Pakistan” in the Article with the words “Federal Constitutional Court”.

Omission of Clause 55

Clause 55 of the bill proposed an amendment to Clause 2 of Article 255 (oath of office), which states that if someone cannot take the oath of office before “a specified person”, the chief justice can swear them in, as follows:

Where, under the Constitution, an oath is required to be made before a specified person and, for any reason, it is impracticable for the oath to be made before that person, it may be made before such other person as may be nominated by 3 [the chief justice of a high court, in case of a province and by the chief justice of Pakistan, in all other cases]

The bill proposed an amendment to the second clause of Article 255, substituting the word “Pakistan” with the words “Federal Constitutional Court”.

Pakistan News

CELEBRATES PAKISTAN’S 79TH INDEPENDENCE DAY AND 150TH BIRTH ANNIVERSARY OF QUAID-E-AZAM MOHAMMAD ALI JINNAH IN FRANCE

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Paris ( Imran Y. CHOUDHRY):- On the occasion of the 79th Independence Day of Pakistan, Ambassador Mumtaz Zahra Baloch hoisted national flag to the tune of the national anthem at the Embassy of Pakistan, Paris and welcomed distinguished members of the Pakistani community including large number of children.


Messages of the President, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan were read out on the occasion.
Congratulating all on the Independence Day, the Ambassador said that 14th August was truly auspicious as it brought together the entire nation – in celebration, in paying homage to the Quaid-e-Azam and other leaders of the freedom movement, in remembrance of the supreme sacrifices of our forefathers and drawing inspiration from our glorious past and the tremendous achievements over the decades.


The Government of Pakistan is observing the current year – 2026 – as the “Year of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah” to mark his 150th birth anniversary, she added. The great intellectual vision of Quaid requires the nation to uphold his principles and play its due role in the development and progress of Pakistan. The Ambassador highlighted that Quaid-e-Azam had given the nation three golden principles, faith, unity and discipline and adherence to these principles would lead the nation towards a bright future for the generations to come.
Ambassador Baloch said that as we celebrate our freedom we should remember our Kashmiri and Palestinian brothers and sisters, who have been struggling for over seven decades for their freedom and right to self-determination. She reaffirmed Pakistan’s political and diplomatic support to the people of the Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK) and Palestine for their legitimate rights.


Ambassador also appreciated the contributions of Pakistani diaspora in France in promoting Pakistan-France relations. She reiterated Embassy’s fully commitment to continue to facilitate Pakistanis based in France.
Later, the Ambassador inaugurated the ‘historic photo exhibition’ based on the life and works of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah at the Embassy. The exhibition showcased a remarkable collection of
archival records and photographs chronicling the visionary leadership and enduring
legacy of the founder of Pakistan. The guests especially the children took a keen interest in the exhibition and raised slogans of Pakistan Zindabad.

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Pakistan News

Pakistan PUBG MOBILE team ‘4Thrives’ visited the Embassy of Pakistan in Paris, France.

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Paris ( Imran Y. CHOUDHRY):- Ambassador Mumtaz Zahra Baloch today received the top professional Pakistan PUBG MOBILE team ‘4Thrives’, which is competing in the high-stakes competition, PUBG MOBILE World Cup 2026 Grand Finals at the Esports World Cup (EWC) being held in Paris.

The team members of ‘4Thrives’ briefed the Ambassador on the game and the hard work they all had put in to finish at the top of the qualifying round and reaching the Grand Finals. They were enthusiastic about their performance which has cemented their position among the world’s best PUBG MOBILE teams.

The Ambassador appreciated the team members for their enthusiastic participation and accomplishments and wished them success for the Grand Finals. She said the Pakistani nation has proudly witnessed the recent achievements of the 4Thrives team and expressed confidence that it would win the prestigious trophy in Paris as well.

This is the first time that EWC is being held in Paris – a true global phenomenon represented by more than 2,000 players from 200 clubs and 100 different countries.

Let’s celebrate and cheer Pakistan PUBG MOBILE team ‘4Thrives’ for the Grand Finals this week!

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The Mecca Defence Pact: The Threats Behind the Alliance

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan is being described as a Muslim version of NATO. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan himself said its collective-defence clause is technically similar to NATO’s Article 5: an armed attack on one member will be treated as an attack on all. Yet most commentary has concentrated on the pact’s wording, its possible expansion and whether it is aimed at Iran or Israel. The more important question has received less attention: what threat does each signatory actually perceive?
Without answering that question, analysis of the agreement remains incomplete. Alliances do not acquire meaning merely from ceremonial signatures. Their real character is determined by the dangers their members fear, the capabilities they contribute and the circumstances in which they are prepared to act.
For Saudi Arabia, the immediate security environment is deeply paradoxical. The kingdom has long relied upon the United States, but the presence of American forces and facilities across the Gulf can also attract retaliation whenever Washington uses regional territory or infrastructure in military operations against Iran.
Tehran has repeatedly maintained that its quarrel is not with Gulf societies as such, but with military threats launched from or supported through their territories. Whether one accepts Iran’s justification or not, the underlying dilemma is real: foreign protection can simultaneously become a source of exposure.
This raises a difficult question. If foreign bases had not facilitated attacks against Iran, would Tehran have attacked Gulf countries on the same scale? The answer cannot be proven, but the question exposes Saudi Arabia’s strategic vulnerability. Riyadh wants protection without remaining permanently hostage to decisions made by an external guarantor.
Threats from the Houthis in Yemen and Iran-aligned armed groups in Iraq remain serious, particularly for oil facilities, desalination plants, shipping and civilian infrastructure. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has spent heavily on modern aircraft, missiles, surveillance systems and air defence. These dangers alone do not fully explain the need for an Article 5-style pact with Türkiye and nuclear-armed Pakistan.
The wider concern is Israel’s expanding military reach and the fear that no regional state can assume it will remain permanently outside Israeli calculations. The “Greater Israel” project is not merely a slogan invented by Israel’s critics. It is a documented ideological and political current rooted in expansionist interpretations of biblical territory, including the most extreme vision of land stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates, and in revisionist Zionist ideas of sovereignty on both sides of the Jordan River.
Israel’s wars and military operations across Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere have intensified regional fears that its use of force and territorial ambitions are becoming geographically unconstrained. Because the most expansive interpretation of Greater Israel encompasses territory belonging to several Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Riyadh has legitimate reasons to treat this ideology and Israel’s growing regional reach as a long-term strategic threat.
The Mecca agreement therefore creates strategic depth, reduces Saudi Arabia’s exclusive dependence on Washington and strengthens the kingdom’s leadership position in the Muslim world.
Türkiye enters the pact with a different threat map. It possesses NATO’s second-largest army, an increasingly sophisticated defence industry, formidable drone capabilities, warship and helicopter production, and substantial operational experience in Syria, Iraq and the eastern Mediterranean.
Kurdish militancy and instability along Türkiye’s southern borders remain persistent threats, but Ankara is largely capable of managing these challenges without Pakistani or Saudi military intervention.
The more consequential concern is Israel. Turkish and Israeli rhetoric has become increasingly hostile, while their strategic interests collide in Syria, Gaza and the broader eastern Mediterranean. Türkiye’s conventional size gives it considerable strength, but Israel is widely understood to possess nuclear weapons, while Türkiye does not. This creates a dangerous asymmetry at the highest level of escalation.
Pakistan’s participation therefore adds deterrent weight, but it is essential not to overstate what has formally been agreed. The published language does not establish an explicit Pakistani nuclear umbrella over Türkiye or Saudi Arabia. Nor does it automatically commit Islamabad to nuclear retaliation.
Its value at this stage lies in strategic ambiguity. Any adversary contemplating extreme escalation must now consider the possibility of a broader response involving a nuclear-armed partner. That uncertainty itself can reinforce deterrence, provided consultation mechanisms, command arrangements and red lines are eventually clarified.
Pakistan’s principal state-based threat remains India. Its other challenges—including attacks linked to the Pakistani Taliban, militancy operating from Afghan territory and insurgency in Balochistan—are grave but fall mainly within the domain of counterterrorism and internal security.
Islamabad has also alleged external support for certain militant networks, including from India and Israel other hostile actors, therefore the possibility of hybrid warfare designed to weaken Pakistan cannot be ignored.
The real test for the pact would come during a future India-Pakistan war. Saudi Arabia enjoys extensive economic and political relations with India, while Türkiye also has interests that extend beyond its partnership with Islamabad. Would Riyadh provide intelligence, logistics, financing, air defence or diplomatic support? Would it risk its relationship with New Delhi?
The treaty’s collective-defence formula is powerful, but it does not necessarily mean that every member must respond identically or automatically declare war. Even NATO’s Article 5 requires each ally to take such action as it considers necessary. The Mecca pact’s credibility will similarly depend on agreed procedures, operational planning, military integration and, above all, political will.
Nor should the alliance be framed as an anti-Iranian “Sunni bloc.” That description is analytically shallow and politically dangerous. It imports a sectarian narrative into an agreement whose signatories explicitly maintain that it is not directed against Iran or any other particular country.
Western and regional media extensively are using the Sunni label as convenient shorthand, but repeating it can deepen the very divisions that have repeatedly weakened the Muslim world. It risks presenting Sunni and Shia states as natural enemies, even though they share geography, economic interests, religious bonds and responsibility for regional stability.
Iran has demonstrated formidable missile, drone and asymmetric capabilities and has proven ability to impose severe costs on the combined military might of both the United States and Israel and their alliance in the Middle East and elsewhere in the entire world.
A confrontation between Iran and the combined forces of Pakistan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia would devastate the region, rupture trade and energy routes, inflame sectarian tensions and serve none of the four countries.
The rational objective of the Mecca alliance should therefore be deterrence, collective security and strategic autonomy—not the creation of another front in the Iran war.
The wiser long-term course is to keep the pact open and eventually build a structured security dialogue with Iran. Immediate Iranian membership may be politically unrealistic while war and mistrust persist, but inclusion should remain a strategic objective.
Egypt and other regional countries could also participate in a broader security architecture based on non-aggression, collective consultation, protected shipping lanes, economic connectivity and respect for sovereignty.
The three signatories must also wage an intelligent information campaign. Through official statements, diplomatic outreach, legacy media, social platforms and other forms of communication, they should consistently reject the description of the agreement as a “Sunni NATO.”
They should explain that the pact is intended to protect its members from aggression regardless of the aggressor’s religious, sectarian or national identity. It must not be allowed to become an instrument for turning Muslim countries against one another.
The Mecca agreement will become historic only if it does more than redistribute fear. Properly developed, it can reduce dependence on outside powers, deter Israeli or other aggression, give Pakistan additional diplomatic weight and create the nucleus of an inclusive regional security system.
Mishandled as a sectarian coalition, however, it could produce precisely the confrontation it claims to prevent. Its success will therefore be measured not by how many enemies it names, but by how many wars it prevents.

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