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Will take on terrorists, enablers both inside and outside Pakistan: DG ISPR

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Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Director General Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry said on Friday that terrorists and their enablers and facilitators would be challenged both inside and outside the country, as he held a press conference in Islamabad related to the Jaffar Express attack.

The attack began on Tuesday afternoon when Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) terrorists ambushed the Peshawar-bound train carrying 440 passengers, opening fire and taking hostages. Security forces launched a two-day operation, concluding on Wednesday evening. Lt Gen Chaudhry confirmed that all 33 terrorists were neutralised, but no hostages were harmed in the final rescue phase. He also said the incident had changed the “rules of the game”.

During the presser — conducted alongside Balochistan Chief Minister Sarfaraz Bugti — Lt Gen Chaudhry was asked whether there had been any changes or developments in the “rules” since his statement.

“Terrorists will be dealt with as they deserve, as those who drag innocent people out of buses and slaughter them, a group that divides people by ethnicity, have no connection to Baloch [ethnicity] or Islam.

“We will deal with them as they deserve. We will take them on, their facilitators, their abettors, whether inside Pakistan or outside Pakistan,” he responded.

DG ISPR then criticised the Indian media for spreading propaganda about the incident.

“The Indian media displayed fake footage of the incident to spread propaganda,” he said, as he showed some video clips on a screen to prove his point.

“They attempted to create a narrative by sharing AI-generated images and fake videos. They were leading an informational warfare.”

The DG ISPR said a “nexus” was working amid the situation to give legitimacy to the terrorists and their narrative.

Showing various clips of Indian officials and personalities discussing efforts to destabilise Balochistan, the DG ISPR said the Jaffar Express attack was a “continuation of the same policy”.

Most successful hostage operation

Providing details of the train attack and the ensuing rescue operation, he said that the terrorists had deliberately selected a remote location to conduct the attack where there were no telecommunication signals, adding that one group of hostages with women and children was kept inside the train, while the other travellers were brought outside and gathered on the ground.

“They operated in multiple groups, taking strategic positions on higher ground. After planting the improvised explosive device (IED), which disabled the train, they took the passengers hostage,” he detailed.

Lt Gen Chaudhry added that the terrorists had suicide bombers among their ranks.

The military media chief gave a detailed breakdown of the operation, describing each step. “Within 36 hours, in a remote area with inaccessible terrain and the presence of suicide bombers, our soldiers, the air force and the FC (Frontier Corps) successfully conducted the operation with professionalism and bravery.”

He added that the Special Services Group’s Zarrar Company had arrived in the area by midday and was monitoring the terrorists from a distance.

“They carried out a situational assessment,” he said. “They had to plan the operation very carefully because of suicide bombers, who could detonate their vests and kill the maximum number of people.”

DG ISPR said that Zarrar Company targeted the suicide bombers from a distance before moving in to secure the hostages, adding that the hostages, who were sitting in the open for 24 hours, took the opportunity to run to safety.

The media chief showed the audience drone footage of people running from the train.

“They ran in multiple directions, wherever they could go,” he said, adding that once they were safe, Zarrar Company operators cleared the train, moving from the front engine to the rear bogie.

Highlighting drone footage of the soldiers moving into the front engine, DG ISPR said, “They entered and cleared the front engine, killing any terrorists they encountered. They then cleared the whole train bogie by bogie.”

“Not even a single casualty was recorded among the hostages during this entire operation,” DG ISPR highlighted. “Despite their intentions, they (the terrorists) were unable to kill even a single hostage,” he added, clarifying that some passengers had embraced martyrdom before the operation.

“In terms of operations carried out on trains, this can very rightly be put out as the most successful hostage operation conducted,” DG ISPR said.

“A group of hostages was released based on their ethnic affiliations. Just as the CM said it, these terrorists have nothing to do with being Baloch, being Pakistani or being a Muslim.”

He added that there were logistical reasons for the terrorists to release some passengers since there were too many on the train for them to be able to control.

He said the terrorists tried to create a “false impression” of humanitarian values by claiming they had released some hostages.

DG ISPR further stated that a Zarrar Comapny soldier was injured by a sniper positioned on higher ground. “He (the sniper) was taken out, but our young soldier was injured.”

Pictures of terrorists killed during the operation and the weapons and equipment they were using were also shown to the audience. Additionally, DG ISPR also showed video clips of soldiers during the operation itself, along with video messages from rescued hostages.

‘No intelligence failure’

Questioned if the attack represented an intelligence failure, the DG ISPR said that Balochistan presented a “very challenging intelligence environment”, adding that agencies were working round the clock to find leads and preempt attacks.

“I don’t agree with the term ‘intelligence failure’ because behind this are thousands of intelligence successes you don’t hear about — the incidents that never happened because our intelligence detected and neutralised them.”

Speaking to the reporter who raised the question, the DG said that as a journalist, one must be getting many leads on stories, but it was impossible to cover all the stories which were unfolding in Pakistan right now.

“It’s not possible,” he said.

When it came to the work of an intelligence agency, he said, what was normally seen and pointed out was failure.

“The intelligence game is such that you don’t thump your chest on your successes.

“Firstly, we need to realise that Pakistan’s intelligence agencies — in a very challenging hostile environment — are trying their level best,” he said, adding that one should be careful to characterise such incidents as an intelligence failure.

He said that the terrorists operating in the region were not the only threat to the intelligence agencies as they were also backed by the complete intelligence support of their sponsors.

The DG ISPR added that the intelligence agencies knew that in this area, a threat existed, adding that it was because of the intelligence agencies that the security forces were able to respond in a successful manner.

26 passengers martyred

Giving a breakdown of the figures in the incident, the DG ISPR said 33 terrorists were killed, while the count of martyred passengers had been updated to 26 from the previous figure of 21.

He said 354 passengers were successfully identified and rescued, bringing the total passenger count to 380.

Questioned later on about the number of fatalities and discrepancies with figures reported in international media, DG ISPR reiterated that there were 26 fatalities with the potential for more since he said 37 of the 354 recovered hostages were injured.

Chaudhry added that 18 of the 26 martyred belonged to the army or FC, three were linked to the railways and other departments, while the remaining five were civilians.

He said the operational fatalities—those not aboard the train—included three FC personnel killed at the picket, one FC soldier martyred on Wednesday morning, and another stationed for security duty on the train.

Speaking about the rise in terrorism, the DG ISPR said the pace of implementation of the National Action Plan’s 14 points needed to be considered first.

He said law enforcement agencies conducted 59,775 intelligence-based operations, both major and minor, in 2024. So far in 2025, 11,654 IBOs have been carried out.

“This year, we are averaging 180 IBOs per day,” he added. Meanwhile, around 1,250 terrorists were “sent to hell” in 2024 and 2025, while 563 security personnel were martyred in the line of duty, he said.

‘Purely evil forces’

Taking over the press conference, CM Bugti denounced the attack on unarmed people, saying that the “so-called fight against the state” was a farce, driven by purely evil forces. Therefore, the perpetrators should only be referred to as “terrorists.”

“We’re in an intelligence-driven war waged against the state of Pakistan by RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) and other hostile agencies through Afghanistan, especially because Afghan soil is being used against us,” Bugti said.

Islamabad has repeatedly demanded that Kabul take action against the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other terrorist factions using Afghan soil to launch attacks in Pakistan. Kabul denies the allegations.

Adding to the comment, the military’s media chief said the train incident was yet another that could be traced back to Afghanistan, noting that the terrorists remained in contact with their handlers there throughout.

“It is part of an ongoing process,” he said, adding that the groups involved were composed of Afghan nationals.

Echoing Chaudhry’s point, Bugti said the past policy of “appeasement” followed by some previous governments toward terrorist groups had allowed key figures to be released, enabling them to reestablish insurgent camps against the state.

Bugti said the security forces had the capacity and capability to “handle this mess very soon”, saying that such a surge was not a new thing.

In 2021, former prime minister Imran Khan had offered a general pardon to the TTP, provided the banned group laid down weapons. In 2023, Imran admitted that his government had planned to relocate at least 5,000 TTP fighters and their families, totaling around 35,000 people, but the plan fell through as provinces refused to bear the cost.

BLA attacks

Balochistan has witnessed an uptick in terrorist attacks over the past year. In November 2024, at least 26 people were killed and 62 injured after a suicide blast ripped through a Quetta Railway Station.

In 2024, the banned BLA emerged as a key perpetrator of terrorist violence in Pakistan, according to a report by Islamabad-based think tank Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS).

In August last year, dozens of militants affiliated with BLA launched numerous attacks across the province, in which at least 50 people, including 14 security men, lost their lives. In response, security forces had neutralised 21 militants.

Earlier that month, then-Panjgur deputy commissioner Zakir Baloch was shot dead on the Quetta-Karachi National Highway, with CM Bugti stating that the BLA was the group behind it.

In October 2024, a suicide bombing near Karachi airport killed two Chinese nationals and a Pakistani citizen, for which two BLA suspects were sent to jail on judicial remand while a probe body was formed as well.

The group also claimed responsibility for the Quetta railway suicide bombing in November last year, in which at least 26 people, including 16 security personnel, lost their lives, and 61 others were injured.

Pakistan designated the BLA as a terrorist organisation in April 2006 after the group repeatedly attacked security personnel.

In January this year, a former BLA member said during a press conference that the banned group “brainwashed average citizens into thinking a certain way about Balochistan and resorting to terrorist activities.”

Last month, the BLA claimed responsibility for an attack in Balochistan’s Barkhan, where seven Punjab-bound passengers were offloaded from a bus and shot dead.

In earlier grand-scale hijackings in the country, one that particularly comes to mind was in 1994, when three armed militants from Afghanistan took control of a school bus near Peshawar and took around 70 children hostage. The bus was driven to the Embassy of Afghanistan in Islamabad, where units of elite commandoes gunned them down the next day.

Taken From DAWN News

https://www.dawn.com/news/1897846/will-take-on-terrorists-enablers-both-inside-and-outside-pakistan-dg-ispr

Pakistan News

Pakistan Prime Minister attend Leaders’ Summit of COP-31 in Antalya, Türkiye

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Antalya (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY):- Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif will visit Antalya, Republic of Türkiye, from 10–12 November 2026 to participate in the Leaders’ Summit of the 31st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
 
Prime Minister will address the Leaders’ Summit on 11 November 2026, during which he will urge the global community to take concrete actions to address the threat posed by climate change to the planet. He will highlight Pakistan’s steps towards rapid solarization and expansion of its renewable energy capacity, as part of its transition towards a cleaner and more resilient economy, along with its efforts to strengthen disaster preparedness and early-warning systems.

In addition, he will also call for predictable, adequate and accessible climate finance for developing countries to strengthen their resilience and pursue sustainable development.

The Prime Minister will also attend a High-Level Roundtable convened by the Presidency of the COP-31 on the sidelines of the Leaders’ Summit, and hold bilateral meetings with the Turkish leadership as well as several other world leaders.

Prime Minister’s participation in the COP-31 Leaders’ Summit is an expression of Pakistan’s strong support for the climate agenda, and will provide Pakistan with an opportunity to reaffirm its commitment towards working closely with the international community to address the climate crisis.

COP 31 starting Yesterday, Minister Climate Change of Pakistan Mr. Tasadaq Malik attended the opening ceremony in Antalya, Türkiye.

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Tehran’s Diplomatic Bombshell

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The arrival in Tehran of the defence minister of Saudi Arabia, the army chief of Pakistan and the intelligence chief ofTürkiye may prove more consequential than another round of American or Israeli military threats. Three powerfulMuslim countries, bound by the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, sat across the table from Iran while Washington and Israel contemplated renewed military operations. The question is not merely what these leaders discussed, but what they may have quietly agreed to do—or refuse to do—when the next missiles begin flying.
The delegation was extraordinary in its composition. Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Pakistan’s FieldMarshal Asim Munir and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin represented countries possessing enormous financial, military, diplomatic and strategic influence. Their collective appearance conveyed that Iran’s security could no longer be treated exclusively as a confrontation between Tehran, Washington and Tel Aviv. Regional powers were asserting their own interests in determining whether another devastating war would engulf their neighbourhood.
The war with Iran has transformed American military installations across the Gulf from instruments of deterrence into potential targets of retaliation. Reports and assessments of American military repositioning toward Israel, Jordan and other locations reflect this wider vulnerability. For Washington, geographic access remains a military advantage; for Gulf governments, that same access increasingly carries the possibility of devastating retaliation.
Saudi Arabia consequently faces an exceptionally difficult choice. American air defence systems, intelligence cooperation, maintenance arrangements and advanced weapons remain important to its security. Yet the presence ofAmerican forces can expose Saudi oil installations, airports, industrial infrastructure and civilian populations to Iranian orHouthi attacks. The attacks around Ras Tanura have demonstrated how rapidly regional warfare can threaten energy supplies and global economic stability. Riyadh must therefore calculate whether American protection is reducing its vulnerability or contributing to it.
Here lies the first possible hidden significance of the Tehran meeting. Iran may have sought assurances that Saudi Arabia,Pakistan and Türkiye would neither participate in renewed American-Israeli attacks nor facilitate them through military installations, airspace, intelligence or logistical support. No publicly disclosed agreement establishes that such promises were made. Nevertheless, the subject would be entirely consistent with Iran’s longstanding concern about foreign military infrastructure being used against it.
The second possibility points in the opposite direction. The Makkah Pact countries may have arrived not simply as sympathetic neighbours, but as a collective deterrent. Their defence agreement treats an attack against one member as a matter of common security. The presence of nuclear-armed Pakistan, NATO member Türkiye and economically powerful Saudi Arabia could therefore convey a warning that further Iranian or Houthi attacks against Saudi territory risk widening the conflict. Collective defence, however, does not automatically establish a commitment to join an American war.
This dual character makes the delegation particularly significant. It could simultaneously reassure Iran against foreign aggression and warn Tehran against attacking Saudi Arabia. Such diplomacy is not necessarily contradictory. It reflects an attempt to establish reciprocal restraint: regional states would avoid becoming launching platforms for attacks on Iran,while Iran would avoid retaliating against countries that remained outside the fighting. Whether such an understanding was actually reached remains undisclosed.
The third possibility concerns Qatar’s parallel diplomatic initiative. Unlike the three Makkah Pact countries, Qatar has maintained an intermediary role between Washington and Tehran. Its proposed seven-day confidence-building framework sought to bridge disagreements over nuclear activities, sanctions, maritime access and the wider conflict. Reports also indicate support for mediation from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. Thus, the Tehran consultations could represent complementary diplomatic tracks rather than competing initiatives.
Iran’s response to the Qatari proposal was nevertheless uncompromising. Tehran objected to demands for nuclear concessions before meaningful economic relief, insisting that the American blockade of Iranian ports and restrictions on oil exports must be addressed first. Washington, conversely, wanted nuclear commitments from the beginning. The dispute was therefore not merely over the contents of a peace agreement, but over which party would surrender its leverage before receiving guarantees.
The most consequential outcome of the Tehran meeting may lie not in what was publicly announced, but in what was deliberately withheld. A day-long consultation involving the defence minister of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s army chief, Türkiye’s intelligence chief and Iran’s highest political and security authorities could hardly have been confined to the four lines of the joint communiqué. Such meetings necessarily involve extensive deliberations on the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats arising from an ongoing war, including American military bases, Iranian retaliation, Saudi security, the Strait of Hormuz, economic sanctions and the consequences of another American-Israeli offensive.
Drawing upon my experience attending high-level meetings as Press Secretary and media adviser to the President of Pakistan, I know that public statements rarely disclose the full substance of sensitive diplomatic and security consultations.
The positive assessments expressed by the Iranian leadership and the visiting delegations strongly suggest that the participants found sufficient common ground to explore practical understandings and a coordinated pathway for responding to future developments.
Such understandings may include assurances of non-participation in renewed attacks against Iran, restrictions on the use of regional military facilities, reciprocal restraint toward Gulf countries and mechanisms for further consultations should Washington and Israel resume hostilities.
Kuwait and the other Gulf countries will therefore become important indicators. Their decisions concerning American bases, airspace, logistical support and diplomatic engagement could reveal whether the Tehran initiative develops into a broader regional non-aggression arrangement. The Houthis’ conduct will be equally revealing. A sustained reduction in attacks on Saudi infrastructure could indicate that Tehran and Riyadh have found a mechanism to separate Gulf security from the wider American-Israeli confrontation, although Houthi decision-making cannot simply be equated with Iranian instructions.
The timing adds urgency. Reports indicate concern about renewed American and Israeli military action around the November 3 American midterm elections. Whether such an offensive actually occurs remains uncertain. But if it does, the military effectiveness of the campaign will depend partly on regional access, intelligence, logistics and the willingness of neighbouring governments to absorb the consequences of Iranian retaliation.
Ultimately, Tehran may have achieved something strategically important without obtaining a single publicly declared concession: it has compelled influential regional governments to discuss security with Iran rather than merely discuss Iran with Washington. That is a meaningful diplomatic shift, even if its durability remains untested.
The real verdict on the Tehran meeting will not emerge from its carefully worded communiqué. It will emerge whenWashington next demands military access, when Israel considers another strike, and when Iran decides where its missiles will—or will not—fall. If regional governments refuse to become instruments of another war, the Makkah Pact may be remembered not as an alliance formed to confront Iran, but as the beginning of a Middle East determined to prevent outside powers from deciding its fate.

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Pakistan’s Moment Beyond the Battlefield

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : While Pakistan wrestles with political confrontation at home, its diplomacy is opening doors abroad. From the Badr memorandum signed in Doha to the earlier Mecca defence agreement, and from Riyadh’s security consultations to mediation with Tehran and Washington, Pakistan is acquiring a place at tables where regional security is being negotiated. The opportunity is considerable. The challenge is to turn international recognition into domestic stability, industrial strength and prosperity.
The Badr Memorandum of Understanding, signed on October 21 by Qatar, Türkiye, Pakistan and Indonesia, marks the latest advance. Its central purpose is defence industrial cooperation: joint production, technical training, research, development and stronger manufacturing capabilities. It offers a means of building the technological and industrial capacity that makes security sustainable.
Its promise lies in combining complementary strengths. Türkiye brings an expanding defence industry and experience in developing and integrating complex systems. Pakistan contributes military experience, technical manpower and established production facilities. Indonesia offers manufacturing capacity, a substantial domestic market and an important Southeast Asian base. Qatar brings investment potential and demand. Together, these assets could support projects beyond the reach of countries working separately.
The resulting opportunity extends beyond buying and selling weapons. Shared design, component manufacturing, software development, testing, maintenance and training could create enduring industrial relationships. A country that helps manufacture a system develops skills and supplier networks that an ordinary purchase may never deliver. The real prize is the ability to understand, sustain and improve equipment throughout its working life.
But signatures cannot run factories. Badr needs an efficient institution to translate ambition into projects, with agreed financing, clear responsibilities and deadlines. Partners must settle technology access, intellectual property, export permissions and the division of production before these become disputes. Each project should have accountable leadership and measurable milestones. Good faith must be matched by management capable of delivering on time.
For Pakistan, Türkiye is a particularly valuable partner. Their existing naval cooperation demonstrates how procurement can support domestic construction and technical learning. Turkish progress in drones, electronics, armoured platforms and naval systems offers further possibilities. Pakistan should seek arrangements that allow its engineers and manufacturers to become development partners, accumulating knowledge with every successive project.
This industrial initiative follows the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan in August, which established a powerful principle: an armed attack against one would be regarded as an attack against all. Its resemblance to NATO’s collective defence commitment explains the attraction of calling it a “mini-NATO”. For Pakistan, it represents recognition that its military capacity and strategic position have value well beyond South Asia.
Yet solidarity becomes complicated when it must move from declarations to decisions. These countries share Islamic bonds, but their relationships, interests and vulnerabilities differ. A confrontation involving Saudi Arabia and Iran, or attacks from Yemen, would confront Pakistan with difficult choices. Religious, social and historical connections cross the very boundaries that security arrangements seek to defend. An effective pact must therefore combine credible deterrence with political judgment and clearly understood responsibilities.
Nor does Mecca constitute a comprehensive Muslim alliance addressing every shared concern. The Palestinian question and Israel’s military actions remain central to public sentiment across the Muslim world, while the agreement’s immediate operation is shaped by its members’ security needs. Its worth will depend on whether it protects its participants while helping contain regional conflict. Pakistan’s strongest contribution would be to make collective security reinforce reconciliation rather than deepen divisions.
Pakistan also brings a distinction no other Muslim country possesses: nuclear weapons capability. Alongside this stands an experienced army, a capable air force and a smaller navy responsible for demanding maritime duties. The May 2025 confrontation with India, which Pakistan regards as a major defensive success, reinforced the importance of readiness and technological competence. India’s acknowledgment of initial aircraft losses underlined the seriousness of that contest.
Military standing, however, achieves its greatest value when it supports diplomacy. Field Marshal Asim Munir’s October 20 visit to Tehran formed part of Pakistan’s continuing effort to help bring the United States and Iran towards an accommodation. Such engagement requires persistence because the parties approach negotiations through deep distrust, competing security demands and domestic political pressures.
Pakistan is attempting a difficult balancing act: sustaining communication with Washington and President Donald Trump, preserving access to Iran’s leadership, and maintaining Saudi confidence. Its usefulness rests on remaining a credible channel across these relationships. Every conversation that clarifies intentions, reduces miscalculation or identifies a possible compromise adds value, even when a final settlement remains elusive.
This is where Pakistan’s defence partnerships and diplomatic role must reinforce each other. Friendship with Saudi Arabia should strengthen its ability to explain Saudi concerns to Tehran. Relations with Iran should help it communicate Iranian concerns elsewhere. Close ties with Türkiye and Qatar add further channels. Pakistan can gain lasting influence by helping countries find an exit from confrontation that preserves security and dignity.
That achievement would be more persuasive if accompanied by reconciliation at home. Continuing confrontation around Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and the imprisonment of former prime minister Imran Khan consumes political energy the country urgently needs for reconstruction. Pakistan should ensure fair and transparent judicial proceedings, end politically motivated restrictions and pursue his release through lawful means. He should have the opportunity to participate in normal democratic politics.
The way forward also requires free, fair and impartial elections, credible institutions and acceptance that political opponents belong within the constitutional system. Protest must remain peaceful, and the state must protect lawful political participation. A country seeking to mediate between bitter international adversaries should apply the same patience and confidence to resolving its own political disputes.
Peace along Pakistan’s borders is equally necessary. Terrorism must be confronted firmly, but lasting security also requires sustained diplomacy with Afghanistan. Islamabad and Kabul need practical arrangements to prevent armed groups from exploiting territory, manage border disputes and preserve legitimate trade. With Iran, cooperation should protect a peaceful frontier. With India, Pakistan should continue seeking dialogue and measures that reduce the risk of another military escalation.
Economic recovery must give these efforts a material foundation. Pakistan’s mineral resources can contribute far more if extraction is connected to processing and domestic manufacturing. Copper, gold and other commercially viable deposits should support infrastructure, technical education and industries that add value at home. Mineral wealth becomes national wealth when it creates productive skills, competitive businesses and lasting employment.
Badr could help cultivate some of the engineering, electronics and materials expertise relevant to that broader transformation. Pakistan should connect its diplomatic partnerships with universities, industrial estates, reliable energy and local suppliers. Exporting raw materials alone would leave much of the value elsewhere; building industries around them would allow Pakistanis to retain a larger share.
Pakistan has earned an opening. Its task now is to make external confidence durable through internal consent, peaceful borders and productive industry. The country’s finest strategic achievement would be a Pakistan whose citizens experience the gains its diplomats announce: greater security, meaningful work and a future worth investing in.

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