Pakistan News
Why India could not stop IMF bailout to Pakistan
Last week the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a $1bn (£756m) bailout to Pakistan – a move that drew sharp disapproval from India as military hostilities between the nuclear-armed neighbours flared, before a US-led ceasefire was unexpectedly declared.
Despite India’s protests, the IMF board approved the second instalment of a $7bn loan, saying Islamabad had demonstrated strong programme implementation leading to a continuing economic recovery in Pakistan.
It also said the fund would continue to support Pakistan’s efforts in building economic resilience to “climate vulnerabilities and natural disasters”, providing further access of around $1.4bn in funding in the future.
In a strongly worded statement India raised concerns over the decision, citing two reasons.
Delhi questioned the “efficacy” of such bailouts or the lack thereof, given Pakistan’s “poor track record” in implementing reform measures. But more importantly it flagged the possibility of these funds being used for “state-sponsored cross-border terrorism” – a charge Islamabad has repeatedly denied – and said the IMF was exposing itself and its donors to “reputational risks” and making a “mockery of global values”.
The IMF did not respond to the BBC’s request for a comment on the Indian stance.
Even Pakistani experts argue that there’s some merit to Delhi’s first argument. Pakistan has been prone to persistently seeking the IMF’s help – getting bailed out 24 times since 1958 – without undertaking meaningful reforms to improve public governance.
“Going to the IMF is like going to the ICU [intensive care unit]. If a patient goes 24 or 25 times to the ICU then there are structural challenges and concerns that need to be dealt with,” Hussain Haqqani, former Pakistani ambassador to the US, told the BBC.

But addressing Delhi’s other concerns – that the IMF was “rewarding continued sponsorship of cross-border terrorism” thereby sending a “dangerous message to the global community” – is far more complex, and perhaps explains why India wasn’t able to exert pressure to stall the bailout.
India’s decision to try to prevent the next tranche of the bailout to Islamabad was more about optics then, rather than a desire for any tangible outcome, say experts. As per the country’s own observations, the fund had limited ability to do something about the loan, and was “circumscribed by procedural and technical formalities”.
As one of the 25 members of the IMF board, India’s influence at the fund is limited. It represents a four-country group including Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Bhutan. Pakistan is part of the Central Asia group, represented by Iran.
Unlike the United Nations’ one-country-one-vote system, the voting rights of IMF board members are based on a country’s economic size and its contributions – a system which has increasingly faced criticism for favouring richer Western countries over developing economies.
For example, the US has the biggest voting share – at 16.49% – while India holds just 2.6%. Besides, IMF rules do not allow for a vote against a proposal – board members can either vote in favour or abstain – and the decisions are made by consensus on the board.
“This shows how vested interests of powerful countries can influence decisions,” an economist who didn’t want to speak on the record told the BBC.
Addressing this imbalance was a key proposal in the reforms mooted for the IMF and other multilateral lenders during India’s G20 presidency in 2023.
In their report, former Indian bureaucrat NK Singh and former US treasury secretary Lawrence Summers recommended breaking the link between IMF voting rights and financial contributions to ensure fairer representation for both the “Global North” and the “Global South”. But there has been no progress so far on implementing these recommendations.
Furthermore, recent changes in the IMF’s own rules about funding countries in conflict add more complexity to the issue. A $15.6bn loan by the fund to Ukraine in 2023 was the first of its kind by the IMF to a country at war.
“It bent its own rules to give an enormous lending package to Ukraine – which means it cannot use that excuse to shut down an already-arranged loan to Pakistan,” Mihir Sharma of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) think tank in Delhi told the BBC.

If India really wants to address its grievances, the right forum to present them would be the United Nations FATF (Financial Action Task Force), says Mr Haqqani.
The FATF looks at issues of combating terror finance and decides whether countries need to be placed on grey or black lists that prevent them from accessing funds from bodies like the IMF or the World Bank.
“Grandstanding at the IMF cannot and did not work,” said Mr Haqqani. “If a country is on that [FATF] list it will then face challenges in getting a loan from the IMF – as has happened with Pakistan earlier.”
As things stand though, Pakistan was officially removed from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list in 2022.
Separately, experts also caution that India’s calls to overhaul the IMF’s funding processes and veto powers could be a double-edged sword.
Such reforms “would inevitably give Beijing [rather than Delhi] more power”, said Mr Sharma.
Mr Haqqani agrees. India should be wary of using “bilateral disputes at multilateral fora”, he said, adding that India has historically been at the receiving end of being vetoed out by China in such places.
He points to instances of Beijing blocking ADB (Asian Development Bank) loans sought by India for the north-eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, citing border disputes between the two countries in the region.
Pakistan News
Balochistan Stands Firm Against Terror Security Forces Crush Coordinated Militant Assault
ISPR, Rawalpindi
On 31 January 2026, terrorists of Indian sponsored Fitna al Hindustan attempted to disturb peace of Balochistan by conducting multiple terrorist activities around Quetta, Mastung, Nushki, Dalbandin, Kharan, Panjgur, Tump, Gwadar and Pasni.
On behest of their foreign masters, these cowardly acts of terrorism were aimed at disrupting the lives of local populace and development of Balochistan by targeting innocent civilians in District Gwadar and Kharan, wherein, terrorists maliciously targeted eighteen innocent civilians (including women, children, elderly and labours) who embraced Shahadat.
Security Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies being fully alert immediately responded and successfully thwarted the evil design of terrorists displaying unwavering courage and professional excellence. Our valiant troops carried out engagement of terrorists with precision and after prolong, intense and daring clearance operation across Balochistan, sent ninety two terrorists including three suicide bombers to hell, ensuring security and protection of local populace.
Tragically, during clearance operations and intense standoffs, fifteen brave sons of soil, having fought gallantly, made the ultimate sacrifice and embraced shahadat.
Sanitization operations in these areas are being continuously conducted and the instigators, perpetrators, facilitators and abettors of these heinous and cowardly acts, targeting innocent civilians and Law Enforcement Agencies personals, will be brought to Justice.
Intelligence reports have unequivocally confirmed that the attacks were orchestrated and directed by terrorists ring leaders operating from outside Pakistan, who were in direct
communication with the terrorists throughout the incident.
Earlier on 30 January, forty one terrorists of Fitna al Hindustan and Fitna al Khwarij were killed in Panjgur and Harnai. With these successful operations in last two days, the total number of terrorists killed in the ongoing operations in Balochistan has reached one hundred and thirty three.
Sanitization operations are being conducted to eliminate any other Indian sponsored terrorist found in the area. Relentless Counter Terrorism campaign under vision “Azm e Istehkam” (as approved by Federal Apex Committee on National Action Plan) by Security Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies of Pakistan will continue at full pace to wipe out menace of foreign sponsored and supported terrorism from the country.
Pakistan News
Pakistan’s Choices as Iran Faces a New Encirclement
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Pakistan steered its ship with admirable composure during the “twelve-day war,” which began with Israel–U.S. strikes on Iranian military and nuclear-linked targets in mid-June 2025 and escalated into sustained exchanges that lasted nearly two weeks, ending with a ceasefire around June 24. What made those twelve days unforgettable was not only the intensity, but the symbolism: Iran’s missile and drone barrages repeatedly penetrated Israeli airspace, challenging the psychological aura surrounding Israel’s multi-layered defense architecture—systems such as Iron Dome and David’s Sling that the world had come to view as near-absolute protection.
During that first phase, Tehran discovered that many relationships celebrated in peacetime become conditional in wartime. India—despite years of strategic engagement with Iran and the economic logic of connectivity projects designed to reach Central Asia—did not step forward in a manner Tehran expected. For Iranian observers, this was not merely silence; it felt like calculated distance, shaped by India’s wider strategic alignments and its concern that any global momentum toward a Palestinian two-state framework could echo into renewed international scrutiny of Kashmir. The war thus exposed not only military fault lines, but diplomatic ones, revealing how quickly geopolitics can reorder loyalties when the costs of association rise.
Pakistan, in that first phase, stood out as a notable exception. Islamabad’s political and diplomatic signaling leaned toward defending Iran’s sovereignty and opposing external aggression, a posture framed by regional media as meaningful support and a source of goodwill. Pakistan appeared willing to risk diplomatic discomfort to stand with a neighbor under direct attack, reinforcing a narrative of fraternal ties rooted in geography, culture, and shared historical memory. That moment, however, belonged to a specific kind of conflict—short, explosive, and bounded by the logic of rapid escalation and de-escalation.
The second phase is of a different character altogether. On January 23, 2026, President Donald Trump publicly confirmed that a U.S. armada was moving toward the Middle East, with major naval assets shifting into the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean as Washington framed the deployment around Iran’s internal unrest and the regime’s response to protests. This was not the sudden blaze of a twelve-day exchange; it was the slow, visible architecture of pressure—presence, signaling, and endurance.
In this new moment, Pakistan’s dilemma sharpens. The cost of being misunderstood becomes higher, the penalties of miscalculation more enduring. Islamabad must now decide how to protect its neighborhood, its economy, and its strategic credibility without turning itself into a battlefield, a base, or a bargaining chip in a contest far larger than any single state.
This complexity is deepened by Pakistan’s Middle East relationships. Beyond Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s economic and financial space has long been underpinned by Gulf cooperation through investment flows, energy arrangements, and vast remittance networks tied to Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Yet this support exists within a regional context where many Gulf states view Iran not only as a strategic competitor but also as a religious and political rival, accusing Tehran of deepening sectarian divides and projecting influence through proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Palestine. In this environment, overt Pakistani alignment with Iran would be more likely to unsettle Gulf capitals than reassure them, potentially narrowing Pakistan’s economic and diplomatic room for maneuver.
Against this backdrop, Pakistan’s first choice is open support for Iran—diplomatic, material, and, if forced by circumstances, kinetic. The appeal lies in moral clarity and neighborhood logic. Iran is a neighbor whose stability directly affects Pakistan’s western frontier, border security, and internal cohesion. Open support would reassure Tehran that it is not alone again, strengthening long-term trust and potentially discouraging any future strategic drift that could expose Pakistan’s flank. The cost, however, is immediate and tangible. Visible alignment against Washington risks economic retaliation, pressure through international financial channels, and political isolation in forums where U.S. influence remains decisive, while also unsettling Gulf partners who see Iran through a lens of rivalry rather than fraternity.
The second choice is alignment with the United States and Israel—offering cooperation that could include intelligence sharing, logistical facilitation, or strategic access. This path promises short-term diplomatic favor and potential financial relief, but it is the most combustible domestically and regionally. It would inflame public sentiment, sharpen sectarian and political tensions, and almost certainly provoke Iranian hostility in ways that could destabilize Pakistan’s western borderlands. The strategic blowback could be generational, recasting Pakistan’s image across the Muslim world and entangling it in a conflict whose objectives and endgame are not of its own making.
The third choice is declared neutrality. Pakistan would step back, deny its soil and airspace for conflict, and consistently call for de-escalation. The advantage is immediate insulation. Neutrality reduces the risk of becoming a direct target and preserves working channels with all parties. Yet neutrality in a pressure campaign can become a quiet punishment. Iran may still feel abandoned and revise its trust calculus. Washington may interpret restraint as passive resistance and still apply economic pressure. India could frame Pakistan as irrelevant or opportunistic while consolidating its own partnerships. Neutrality can be a shield, but it can also become an empty space others fill with their own narratives.
The fourth choice is calibrated dual-track strategy. Pakistan avoids loud, provocative rhetoric that triggers U.S. retaliation while quietly extending the maximum permissible support to Iran behind the curtain of diplomacy. This is survival statecraft in a world where economies can be choked without a single missile launched. The advantage is strategic breathing room: Pakistan preserves its financial and diplomatic channels while preventing Iran from feeling strategically orphaned. The risk is fragility. If exposed, secrecy can produce the worst of both worlds—U.S. anger without the protection of honesty and Iranian disappointment if the help appears too cautious or insufficient.
The fifth choice is multilateral internationalization—pushing the crisis into formal global forums such as the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and ad hoc contact groups involving China, Russia, Turkey, and key European states. Instead of positioning itself as a bilateral actor between Tehran and Washington, Pakistan frames itself as a convener and agenda-setter, shifting the burden of mediation, legitimacy, and pressure onto a wider coalition. The advantage is dilution of risk. Decisions and outcomes no longer rest on Pakistan’s shoulders alone, and the crisis is embedded in a global framework that makes unilateral escalation politically costlier. The downside is loss of speed and influence. Multilateral processes are slow, consensus-driven, and often shaped by great-power rivalries that can stall momentum at the very moments when urgency is greatest.
These five paths do not exist in isolation; they overlap, collide, and constrain one another. Pakistan cannot fully embrace one without partially touching the others. Open support for Iran strains Gulf and Western ties. Alignment with Washington risks regional backlash. Neutrality invites suspicion from all sides. Dual-track strategy demands discipline and secrecy. Multilateralization trades immediacy for legitimacy. The art of statecraft lies not in choosing a single lane, but in sequencing these options in a way that preserves room to maneuver as circumstances evolve.
The most sustainable course for Pakistan lies in a disciplined blend of the fourth and fifth choices, anchored by the language of the third. Declared neutrality in public posture provides a shield against direct retaliation. Active, quiet stabilization with Iran preserves neighborly trust and reduces the risk of border spillover, refugee flows, and proxy escalation. Multilateral engagement internationalizes the crisis, embedding it in legal and diplomatic frameworks that slow the march toward unilateral coercion. At the same time, Pakistan must maintain cordial, pragmatic, and economically constructive relations with Washington, carefully calibrating its actions and rhetoric to avoid triggering sanctions or financial pressures that could further strain an already fragile economic landscape.
The twelve-day war proved that old myths can break and that “friends” can vanish when bombs fall. The January 23 mobilization proves something else: pressure campaigns are built to last, and nations survive them through balance, not bravado. Pakistan’s victory will not be found in loud slogans or reckless entanglement. It will be measured in its ability to protect its economy, preserve its Gulf lifelines, prevent western-border chaos, stand close enough to Iran to preserve brotherhood, far enough from provocation to deny adversaries a pretext for retaliation, and engaged enough with the world to ensure that when the region’s future is negotiated, Pakistan is not merely present, but heard.
Pakistan News
Ambassador Mumtaz Zahra Baloch addressed the Association of Pakistani Francophone Professionals
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY):- Ambassador of Pakistan Madam Mumtaz Zahra Baloch addressed the Association of Pakistani Francophone Professionals at an event held at the Embassy of Pakistan in Paris, France.
Speaking on the occasion, the Ambassador outlined the multifaceted relations between Pakistan and France and the wider francophone world. She stated that while Governments create frameworks and agreements, it is the people professionals, academics, entrepreneurs, and civil society leaders, who give life to bilateral relationships between countries.
Ambassador appreciated the work of PPRF and its contribution in promoting professional networking and cultural exchanges between the Francophone Pakistanis and the French society and thus strengthening people-to-people links between Pakistan and France.
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