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The Forgotten 804

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis: In the long arc of global politics, some stories are not merely about one man or one nation, but about the deliberate removal of obstacles that could derail larger designs. The imprisonment of Imran Khan, referred to by many as the forgotten “Prisoner 804,” is not only a chapter in Pakistan’s turbulent democracy but part of a larger geopolitical strategy in which the United States, Israel, and their allies sought to ensure that no disruptive force could interfere with their unfolding project in the Middle East. His incarceration is not just a punishment for defiance at home; it is a calculated silencing of a leader whose stubborn refusal to obey foreign dictates could have unsettled the plan to reshape Palestine, neutralize resistance, and entrench the vision of a greater Israel.
The United States has long been accused of thinking not just about present crises but of planning far ahead, identifying potential threats to its policies and eliminating them before they can materialize. From Latin America in the 20th century to the Middle East after 9/11, the record is replete with instances of intervention, destabilization, and regime change to pave the way for American interests. Pakistan, with its nuclear arsenal and ideological centrality to the Muslim world, has always been watched with particular suspicion whenever a leader emerged who spoke of independence, dignity, or solidarity with oppressed Muslims abroad. Imran Khan, by the time he matured into a national statesman, fit this profile perfectly: a man too self-confident to obey and too popular to be ignored.
It was during one of his interviews that the world caught a glimpse of his defiance. Asked whether Pakistan would allow American bases on its soil, his answer was sharp, unequivocal, and without diplomatic varnish: “Absolutely not.” For Washington, such a response was more than a sound bite. It was a warning that when the time came to launch broader operations in the region, including in Gaza, Khan would be an unpredictable and dangerous obstacle. The United States and Israel were moving towards their long-prepared campaign to dismantle Hamas and, more brutally, to ethnically cleanse Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank. In that plan, Pakistan mattered. Its nuclear status, its army’s conventional strength, its historic role in the Muslim world, and the ability of its leader to mobilize opinion could all complicate the campaign. And so, before the bombs fell on Gaza, before the massacres of civilians filled the headlines, Pakistan’s loudest and most defiant voice was removed from the stage and locked in prison.
Khan’s removal was achieved through the time-tested formula of intrigue, betrayal, and manipulation. Once firmly established in power, his popularity was not eroded by scandal or economic collapse but by conspiracies spun from within, aided by external encouragement. He was stabbed in the back by allies, deceived by those he trusted, and undermined by the very establishment that should have protected him. His removal through a no-confidence vote in 2022 was presented as constitutional theater, but the timing and the subsequent unfolding of events revealed a deeper orchestration. He was expected, even by detractors, to return to power after elections. Yet the military establishment, in close alignment with U.S. preferences, ensured that even that possibility was closed off. For Washington, it was not enough to remove him once; they had to make sure he could never again return to disrupt the silence that was required when Gaza burned.
What followed was a demonstration of how external powers reward obedience and punish defiance. The civilian government led by Shehbaz Sharif and the military leadership under General Asim Munir quickly aligned themselves with Washington’s designs. Donald Trump himself revealed that both Sharif and Munir had been taken into confidence during the preparations for the U.S. strike on Iran and Israel’s onslaught on Gaza. The symbolism was unmistakable. For the first time in living memory, the president of the United States bypassed Pakistan’s civilian prime minister and held direct consultations with a serving general, elevating a subordinate servant of the state to the rank of geopolitical partner. The bypassing of the civilian chain of command spoke volumes: it was a reminder that power in Pakistan could be stabilized or destabilized at Washington’s will, depending on whether it complied or resisted.
The results were immediate and telling. When Israel unleashed its fury on Gaza and the West Bank, demolishing neighborhoods, bombing hospitals, and slaughtering women, children, and journalists, Pakistan’s response was muted. The country that had historically been among the loudest defenders of the Palestinian cause was suddenly silent. The same Pakistan whose leaders once thundered in international forums against Israeli occupation now mumbled routine statements while ensuring that no real action was taken. The silence was not accidental; it was the price paid for staying in power. Washington, in turn, ensured that Pakistan’s economy did not collapse entirely. IMF loans were eased, debt repayments were tolerated, and inflation was kept under some measure of control. The army and police were allowed to unleash brute force against protesters without fear of sanctions or reprimand. In exchange for obedience, the state was stabilized enough to carry out Washington’s commands.
Meanwhile, Prisoner 804 remained behind bars. Courts disregarded arguments by senior advocates and witnesses, not because the evidence was weak but because justice was never the point. The plan was clear: Imran Khan was to remain imprisoned until the Israeli project in Palestine was complete. His release, whether legally warranted or not, would have risked giving voice to the Muslim world at a moment when silence was most precious to Israel and its backers. His love for Islam, his admiration for the Prophet, his ability to galvanize millions of ordinary Pakistanis, and his influence across the Muslim world posed the very real danger of rallying states to oppose the genocide in Gaza. He could have called for collective action, perhaps even kinetic action, uniting Pakistan with Iran or other Muslim nations to confront Israeli aggression. That risk could not be taken, and so he was kept locked away, forgotten by the courts, ignored by the establishment, and silenced by force.
In this tragic arrangement, Pakistan has been reduced to a pawn. Its elected leadership lacks legitimacy, having been installed “by hook or by crook,” without genuine majority support. Its military leadership has overstayed retirements and rules with impunity, rewarded for obedience and secured by foreign approval. Together, they preside over a silenced population, cowed into submission by fear of the army and police, pacified by small economic concessions, and deprived of the leader who once embodied their aspirations for independence. The entire spectacle demonstrates how Washington’s leverage works: stabilize those who obey, destabilize those who defy.
The case of the forgotten 804, therefore, is not merely about one man’s imprisonment. It is about the systematic silencing of resistance in the Muslim world to clear the path for Israel’s project of ethnic cleansing and annexation. It is about the quiet submission of a nuclear-armed nation to foreign diktats, reduced from potential leader of an Islamic bloc to a bystander while atrocities unfold before the world’s eyes. It is about the reminder that in the theater of geopolitics, legality, democracy, and even human life itself are subordinated to the interests of the powerful.
Yet history has a way of proving that silence never lasts forever. Imran Khan’s imprisonment may achieve its short-term purpose, but the questions it raises will not vanish. How long can Pakistan endure the contradiction between its people’s convictions and its rulers’ obedience? How long can the Muslim world remain fragmented when the suffering of Palestinians continues to demand a collective response? And how long can any leader who bends too easily to foreign will sustain their own legitimacy at home? The forgotten 804 may one day emerge, and if he does, it will not only be as a man but as the embodiment of a suppressed nation’s voice. Until then, his silence echoes in every demolished home in Gaza, every unmarked grave in the West Bank, and every tear of those who still look to Pakistan for leadership and find only compliance.

Pakistan News

Pakistan Prime Minister attend Leaders’ Summit of COP-31 in Antalya, Türkiye

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Antalya (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY):- Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif will visit Antalya, Republic of Türkiye, from 10–12 November 2026 to participate in the Leaders’ Summit of the 31st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
 
Prime Minister will address the Leaders’ Summit on 11 November 2026, during which he will urge the global community to take concrete actions to address the threat posed by climate change to the planet. He will highlight Pakistan’s steps towards rapid solarization and expansion of its renewable energy capacity, as part of its transition towards a cleaner and more resilient economy, along with its efforts to strengthen disaster preparedness and early-warning systems.

In addition, he will also call for predictable, adequate and accessible climate finance for developing countries to strengthen their resilience and pursue sustainable development.

The Prime Minister will also attend a High-Level Roundtable convened by the Presidency of the COP-31 on the sidelines of the Leaders’ Summit, and hold bilateral meetings with the Turkish leadership as well as several other world leaders.

Prime Minister’s participation in the COP-31 Leaders’ Summit is an expression of Pakistan’s strong support for the climate agenda, and will provide Pakistan with an opportunity to reaffirm its commitment towards working closely with the international community to address the climate crisis.

COP 31 starting Yesterday, Minister Climate Change of Pakistan Mr. Tasadaq Malik attended the opening ceremony in Antalya, Türkiye.

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Tehran’s Diplomatic Bombshell

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The arrival in Tehran of the defence minister of Saudi Arabia, the army chief of Pakistan and the intelligence chief ofTürkiye may prove more consequential than another round of American or Israeli military threats. Three powerfulMuslim countries, bound by the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, sat across the table from Iran while Washington and Israel contemplated renewed military operations. The question is not merely what these leaders discussed, but what they may have quietly agreed to do—or refuse to do—when the next missiles begin flying.
The delegation was extraordinary in its composition. Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Pakistan’s FieldMarshal Asim Munir and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin represented countries possessing enormous financial, military, diplomatic and strategic influence. Their collective appearance conveyed that Iran’s security could no longer be treated exclusively as a confrontation between Tehran, Washington and Tel Aviv. Regional powers were asserting their own interests in determining whether another devastating war would engulf their neighbourhood.
The war with Iran has transformed American military installations across the Gulf from instruments of deterrence into potential targets of retaliation. Reports and assessments of American military repositioning toward Israel, Jordan and other locations reflect this wider vulnerability. For Washington, geographic access remains a military advantage; for Gulf governments, that same access increasingly carries the possibility of devastating retaliation.
Saudi Arabia consequently faces an exceptionally difficult choice. American air defence systems, intelligence cooperation, maintenance arrangements and advanced weapons remain important to its security. Yet the presence ofAmerican forces can expose Saudi oil installations, airports, industrial infrastructure and civilian populations to Iranian orHouthi attacks. The attacks around Ras Tanura have demonstrated how rapidly regional warfare can threaten energy supplies and global economic stability. Riyadh must therefore calculate whether American protection is reducing its vulnerability or contributing to it.
Here lies the first possible hidden significance of the Tehran meeting. Iran may have sought assurances that Saudi Arabia,Pakistan and Türkiye would neither participate in renewed American-Israeli attacks nor facilitate them through military installations, airspace, intelligence or logistical support. No publicly disclosed agreement establishes that such promises were made. Nevertheless, the subject would be entirely consistent with Iran’s longstanding concern about foreign military infrastructure being used against it.
The second possibility points in the opposite direction. The Makkah Pact countries may have arrived not simply as sympathetic neighbours, but as a collective deterrent. Their defence agreement treats an attack against one member as a matter of common security. The presence of nuclear-armed Pakistan, NATO member Türkiye and economically powerful Saudi Arabia could therefore convey a warning that further Iranian or Houthi attacks against Saudi territory risk widening the conflict. Collective defence, however, does not automatically establish a commitment to join an American war.
This dual character makes the delegation particularly significant. It could simultaneously reassure Iran against foreign aggression and warn Tehran against attacking Saudi Arabia. Such diplomacy is not necessarily contradictory. It reflects an attempt to establish reciprocal restraint: regional states would avoid becoming launching platforms for attacks on Iran,while Iran would avoid retaliating against countries that remained outside the fighting. Whether such an understanding was actually reached remains undisclosed.
The third possibility concerns Qatar’s parallel diplomatic initiative. Unlike the three Makkah Pact countries, Qatar has maintained an intermediary role between Washington and Tehran. Its proposed seven-day confidence-building framework sought to bridge disagreements over nuclear activities, sanctions, maritime access and the wider conflict. Reports also indicate support for mediation from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. Thus, the Tehran consultations could represent complementary diplomatic tracks rather than competing initiatives.
Iran’s response to the Qatari proposal was nevertheless uncompromising. Tehran objected to demands for nuclear concessions before meaningful economic relief, insisting that the American blockade of Iranian ports and restrictions on oil exports must be addressed first. Washington, conversely, wanted nuclear commitments from the beginning. The dispute was therefore not merely over the contents of a peace agreement, but over which party would surrender its leverage before receiving guarantees.
The most consequential outcome of the Tehran meeting may lie not in what was publicly announced, but in what was deliberately withheld. A day-long consultation involving the defence minister of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s army chief, Türkiye’s intelligence chief and Iran’s highest political and security authorities could hardly have been confined to the four lines of the joint communiqué. Such meetings necessarily involve extensive deliberations on the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats arising from an ongoing war, including American military bases, Iranian retaliation, Saudi security, the Strait of Hormuz, economic sanctions and the consequences of another American-Israeli offensive.
Drawing upon my experience attending high-level meetings as Press Secretary and media adviser to the President of Pakistan, I know that public statements rarely disclose the full substance of sensitive diplomatic and security consultations.
The positive assessments expressed by the Iranian leadership and the visiting delegations strongly suggest that the participants found sufficient common ground to explore practical understandings and a coordinated pathway for responding to future developments.
Such understandings may include assurances of non-participation in renewed attacks against Iran, restrictions on the use of regional military facilities, reciprocal restraint toward Gulf countries and mechanisms for further consultations should Washington and Israel resume hostilities.
Kuwait and the other Gulf countries will therefore become important indicators. Their decisions concerning American bases, airspace, logistical support and diplomatic engagement could reveal whether the Tehran initiative develops into a broader regional non-aggression arrangement. The Houthis’ conduct will be equally revealing. A sustained reduction in attacks on Saudi infrastructure could indicate that Tehran and Riyadh have found a mechanism to separate Gulf security from the wider American-Israeli confrontation, although Houthi decision-making cannot simply be equated with Iranian instructions.
The timing adds urgency. Reports indicate concern about renewed American and Israeli military action around the November 3 American midterm elections. Whether such an offensive actually occurs remains uncertain. But if it does, the military effectiveness of the campaign will depend partly on regional access, intelligence, logistics and the willingness of neighbouring governments to absorb the consequences of Iranian retaliation.
Ultimately, Tehran may have achieved something strategically important without obtaining a single publicly declared concession: it has compelled influential regional governments to discuss security with Iran rather than merely discuss Iran with Washington. That is a meaningful diplomatic shift, even if its durability remains untested.
The real verdict on the Tehran meeting will not emerge from its carefully worded communiqué. It will emerge whenWashington next demands military access, when Israel considers another strike, and when Iran decides where its missiles will—or will not—fall. If regional governments refuse to become instruments of another war, the Makkah Pact may be remembered not as an alliance formed to confront Iran, but as the beginning of a Middle East determined to prevent outside powers from deciding its fate.

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Pakistan’s Moment Beyond the Battlefield

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : While Pakistan wrestles with political confrontation at home, its diplomacy is opening doors abroad. From the Badr memorandum signed in Doha to the earlier Mecca defence agreement, and from Riyadh’s security consultations to mediation with Tehran and Washington, Pakistan is acquiring a place at tables where regional security is being negotiated. The opportunity is considerable. The challenge is to turn international recognition into domestic stability, industrial strength and prosperity.
The Badr Memorandum of Understanding, signed on October 21 by Qatar, Türkiye, Pakistan and Indonesia, marks the latest advance. Its central purpose is defence industrial cooperation: joint production, technical training, research, development and stronger manufacturing capabilities. It offers a means of building the technological and industrial capacity that makes security sustainable.
Its promise lies in combining complementary strengths. Türkiye brings an expanding defence industry and experience in developing and integrating complex systems. Pakistan contributes military experience, technical manpower and established production facilities. Indonesia offers manufacturing capacity, a substantial domestic market and an important Southeast Asian base. Qatar brings investment potential and demand. Together, these assets could support projects beyond the reach of countries working separately.
The resulting opportunity extends beyond buying and selling weapons. Shared design, component manufacturing, software development, testing, maintenance and training could create enduring industrial relationships. A country that helps manufacture a system develops skills and supplier networks that an ordinary purchase may never deliver. The real prize is the ability to understand, sustain and improve equipment throughout its working life.
But signatures cannot run factories. Badr needs an efficient institution to translate ambition into projects, with agreed financing, clear responsibilities and deadlines. Partners must settle technology access, intellectual property, export permissions and the division of production before these become disputes. Each project should have accountable leadership and measurable milestones. Good faith must be matched by management capable of delivering on time.
For Pakistan, Türkiye is a particularly valuable partner. Their existing naval cooperation demonstrates how procurement can support domestic construction and technical learning. Turkish progress in drones, electronics, armoured platforms and naval systems offers further possibilities. Pakistan should seek arrangements that allow its engineers and manufacturers to become development partners, accumulating knowledge with every successive project.
This industrial initiative follows the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan in August, which established a powerful principle: an armed attack against one would be regarded as an attack against all. Its resemblance to NATO’s collective defence commitment explains the attraction of calling it a “mini-NATO”. For Pakistan, it represents recognition that its military capacity and strategic position have value well beyond South Asia.
Yet solidarity becomes complicated when it must move from declarations to decisions. These countries share Islamic bonds, but their relationships, interests and vulnerabilities differ. A confrontation involving Saudi Arabia and Iran, or attacks from Yemen, would confront Pakistan with difficult choices. Religious, social and historical connections cross the very boundaries that security arrangements seek to defend. An effective pact must therefore combine credible deterrence with political judgment and clearly understood responsibilities.
Nor does Mecca constitute a comprehensive Muslim alliance addressing every shared concern. The Palestinian question and Israel’s military actions remain central to public sentiment across the Muslim world, while the agreement’s immediate operation is shaped by its members’ security needs. Its worth will depend on whether it protects its participants while helping contain regional conflict. Pakistan’s strongest contribution would be to make collective security reinforce reconciliation rather than deepen divisions.
Pakistan also brings a distinction no other Muslim country possesses: nuclear weapons capability. Alongside this stands an experienced army, a capable air force and a smaller navy responsible for demanding maritime duties. The May 2025 confrontation with India, which Pakistan regards as a major defensive success, reinforced the importance of readiness and technological competence. India’s acknowledgment of initial aircraft losses underlined the seriousness of that contest.
Military standing, however, achieves its greatest value when it supports diplomacy. Field Marshal Asim Munir’s October 20 visit to Tehran formed part of Pakistan’s continuing effort to help bring the United States and Iran towards an accommodation. Such engagement requires persistence because the parties approach negotiations through deep distrust, competing security demands and domestic political pressures.
Pakistan is attempting a difficult balancing act: sustaining communication with Washington and President Donald Trump, preserving access to Iran’s leadership, and maintaining Saudi confidence. Its usefulness rests on remaining a credible channel across these relationships. Every conversation that clarifies intentions, reduces miscalculation or identifies a possible compromise adds value, even when a final settlement remains elusive.
This is where Pakistan’s defence partnerships and diplomatic role must reinforce each other. Friendship with Saudi Arabia should strengthen its ability to explain Saudi concerns to Tehran. Relations with Iran should help it communicate Iranian concerns elsewhere. Close ties with Türkiye and Qatar add further channels. Pakistan can gain lasting influence by helping countries find an exit from confrontation that preserves security and dignity.
That achievement would be more persuasive if accompanied by reconciliation at home. Continuing confrontation around Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and the imprisonment of former prime minister Imran Khan consumes political energy the country urgently needs for reconstruction. Pakistan should ensure fair and transparent judicial proceedings, end politically motivated restrictions and pursue his release through lawful means. He should have the opportunity to participate in normal democratic politics.
The way forward also requires free, fair and impartial elections, credible institutions and acceptance that political opponents belong within the constitutional system. Protest must remain peaceful, and the state must protect lawful political participation. A country seeking to mediate between bitter international adversaries should apply the same patience and confidence to resolving its own political disputes.
Peace along Pakistan’s borders is equally necessary. Terrorism must be confronted firmly, but lasting security also requires sustained diplomacy with Afghanistan. Islamabad and Kabul need practical arrangements to prevent armed groups from exploiting territory, manage border disputes and preserve legitimate trade. With Iran, cooperation should protect a peaceful frontier. With India, Pakistan should continue seeking dialogue and measures that reduce the risk of another military escalation.
Economic recovery must give these efforts a material foundation. Pakistan’s mineral resources can contribute far more if extraction is connected to processing and domestic manufacturing. Copper, gold and other commercially viable deposits should support infrastructure, technical education and industries that add value at home. Mineral wealth becomes national wealth when it creates productive skills, competitive businesses and lasting employment.
Badr could help cultivate some of the engineering, electronics and materials expertise relevant to that broader transformation. Pakistan should connect its diplomatic partnerships with universities, industrial estates, reliable energy and local suppliers. Exporting raw materials alone would leave much of the value elsewhere; building industries around them would allow Pakistanis to retain a larger share.
Pakistan has earned an opening. Its task now is to make external confidence durable through internal consent, peaceful borders and productive industry. The country’s finest strategic achievement would be a Pakistan whose citizens experience the gains its diplomats announce: greater security, meaningful work and a future worth investing in.

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