World News
Shariah Courts in the UK and the USA: A False Alarm?
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : A strange new alarm is being manufactured in our time—an alarm that travels faster than facts. In social media clips, in talk shows, and now even in parliamentary and congressional messaging, we are hearing a rising cry that “Sharia must be banned” in the United Kingdom and the United States. The claim is repeated with an air of urgency, as if a parallel state is quietly taking over, as if Western civilisation is under legal siege, as if courts have been replaced and constitutions have been hijacked. It sounds dramatic. It sounds mobilising. It sounds like a culture war slogan designed to trigger fear. Yet when one pauses and asks the basic question—what does “Sharia” mean in the UK or the USA in real, legal terms?—the entire narrative starts to collapse under its own exaggerations.
First, Sharia as it exists for Muslims living in non-Muslim countries is not a state law, not a criminal code, not a government “replacement” for British or American law. In practice, what is most often being discussed are voluntary religious opinions and community-based mediation on personal matters such as marriage, divorce, family disputes, and inheritance—issues that Muslims want resolved in a way that aligns with their faith while still living fully under the law of the land. Even in the UK debate, reputable fact-checking has repeatedly stressed that these bodies are not “courts” in the sense of legal authority; they do not override national law, and the word “court” itself misleads the public into imagining a sovereign parallel judiciary.
The “numbers” that inflame public panic are a classic example of how fear grows when precision is absent. Some voices insist that there are “300 Sharia courts” in Britain, and that the UK is “gradually turning into a Muslim country.” But the most responsible public record is blunt: no one has an official, definitive count, and credible estimates vary widely. Reuters, citing the UK’s own independent review, notes that the number of Sharia councils operating in England and Wales is unknown, with academic and anecdotal estimates ranging roughly from 30 to 85—and, importantly, that to the best of the review’s knowledge there were no such councils in Scotland. Full Fact has likewise explained that there are no definitive figures and that claims about large totals often bundle together everything from major councils to small local forums and online services, turning a complicated social phenomenon into a simplistic “invasion” statistic. Even evidence submitted in the UK parliamentary process has described the number as disputed, pointing to research that identified around 30 “major” councils while acknowledging smaller local bodies might not have been captured—again, a far cry from the certainty with which “300 courts” is shouted in viral posts.
So why does this fear persist? Because it is emotionally profitable. In politics, the easiest way to rally a base is to create a symbol of threat, strip it of nuance, and repeat it until the public stops asking questions. When Nigel Farage famously claimed there were “80 practising Sharia courts” in the UK, the line travelled further than the careful corrections that followed. That single sentence became fuel for a decade of “no-go zones,” “Muslim ghettos,” and “parallel legal systems” rhetoric—even though the legal reality remains that Britain’s law is Britain’s law, and religious mediation cannot lawfully supplant it. In Parliament, Baroness Cox has been among the most prominent figures pushing legislation aimed at restricting or regulating these councils, presenting her campaign as a protection against discrimination—particularly against women—while critics argue the wider debate too often spills into civilisational suspicion rather than focused legal reform.
Now look at the United States. Here, the phrase “Sharia courts” is even more misleading. There is no recognised network of Sharia courts governing cities, no constitutional pathway for such a thing, and no American jurisdiction where Islamic law overrides U.S. law. PolitiFact has addressed the underlying rumour directly: there are no communities “under Sharia law” in the United States in the sense alarmists claim; any attempt to force religious code as law would collide immediately with constitutional limits and civil courts. Yet the political theatre continues. “Anti-Sharia” messaging has not been confined to fringe social media; it has been institutionalised through recurring legislative attempts, often framed as “foreign law bans,” even when American courts already operate under the Supremacy Clause and constitutional protections.
The scale of that legislative churn is not small. A well-known academic/public-policy tracking project notes that since 2010, over 230 anti-Muslim bills have been introduced or enacted in U.S. state legislatures, and that “anti-Sharia” efforts are part of that ecosystem of institutionalised othering. The Southern Poverty Law Center has documented waves of anti-Sharia bills over the years, including a spike in state-level introductions in the late 2010s. And now, in the current congressional atmosphere, the slogan has returned again in high-profile federal proposals. Congress.gov records legislation explicitly titled to keep America “Sharia-free,” and House text for a “No Shari’a Act” frames its purpose as reaffirming that only American law governs American courts, even though that principle is already foundational.
The names behind these pushes matter because the user asked for “renowned politicians,” and because the political mainstreaming of suspicion is precisely the engine of Islamophobia. In the United States, Senator John Cornyn and Senator Tommy Tuberville publicly announced a “No Sharia Act” in October 2025. On the House side, public communications around “No Sharia” legislation have been promoted by figures such as Congressman Randy Fine, with references to support from other lawmakers. Separately, Congressman Chip Roy has promoted a “Preserving a Sharia-Free America Act,” reflecting how the phrase has become a repeatable political brand rather than a response to a real legal takeover.
In the United Kingdom, the roster looks different, but the pattern is the same: claims about large numbers, claims about demographic replacement, claims about enclaves, and claims that Britain is “becoming” something else. Petitions have demanded bans on the basis of “85 courts,” illustrating how figures—accurate or not—become a rallying device. The Times has described the UK as a “western capital” for these councils and repeated the figure of 85 in its own framing, which then further recirculates through social media as “proof” that a parallel state exists. Meanwhile, fact-checkers and parliamentary materials keep insisting on what the public debate keeps forgetting: there is no legal authority here that outranks national law, and the uncertainty of numbers is routinely exploited by those who want certainty of fear.
All of this is producing something far more dangerous than the imaginary menace it claims to prevent: a widening social permission structure for hostility toward ordinary Muslims. The suspicion is no longer only about “law.” It bleeds into clothing, prayer, diet, family life, neighbourhoods, and identity—turning everyday religiosity into a presumed pathway to radicalisation. In this climate, even the most basic Islamic principle for minorities living in non-Muslim lands is erased: Muslims are religiously obligated to respect the law of the land they live in, and if a society forbids core worship entirely, classical teachings emphasise either compliance with law or relocation rather than rebellion. The modern anti-Sharia campaign, however, behaves as if Muslims are secretly trained to undermine constitutions—when, in reality, most Muslims are simply trying to preserve family norms, marry, divorce, and distribute inheritance in a manner consistent with faith while remaining loyal citizens bound by national law.
And here is the tragedy of misunderstanding that your narrative rightly points to: Western publics are often told that Islam is “incompatible” with Western civilisation, as if Islam is built on hatred of the West. But the deeper truth is that Islam obliges belief in the prophets revered in Judaism and Christianity, including Jesus (peace be upon him) and Mary—an interfaith common ground that is rarely highlighted in angry soundbites. When that commonality is buried, fear fills the vacuum. Demagogues then sell the public a simplified enemy: “Sharia.” It becomes a code-word, not for a real legal system in London or Texas, but for the presence of Muslims themselves.
If the aim is genuinely to protect women’s rights and protect citizens from coercion, then the honest path is specific reform: ensure civil marriage registration, strengthen legal aid and awareness, clarify that any religious mediation cannot pretend to be a state court, and prosecute coercion or abuse wherever it occurs—without turning an entire faith into a suspect class. That is what serious governance looks like. What we are watching instead is the conversion of ignorance into policy branding, and policy branding into social hostility.
This is why the new “ban Sharia” wave must be confronted with calm, verified facts and moral clarity. In the UK, we do not have “300 Sharia courts”; we have contested estimates of voluntary councils—often described in the range of about 30 to 85 in England and Wales, with no confirmed presence in Scotland in the cited independent review. In the United States, we do not have Sharia-governed towns; we have recurring anti-Sharia bills and rhetoric that treats Muslims as a fifth column even while the Constitution already governs the courts.
The time has come for philosophers, thinkers, and religious scholars—Muslim, Christian, and Jewish—to raise the level of discourse in public spaces, especially on social media where fear spreads fastest. If the West can learn once more to distinguish between a citizen’s private religious ethics and the public law of the state, then Muslims who live in the UK and the USA—obeying the law, contributing to society, paying taxes, raising families, and pursuing dreams—can continue to live in peace, with dignity, and with the freedom that Western civilisation itself claims to cherish.
World News
After Iran, Is Turkey Israel’s Next Target?
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Israel’s rising confrontation with Turkey has opened a disturbing new chapter in Middle Eastern geopolitics. After its war with Iran and its continuing campaigns against Hezbollah and other regional actors, Israel now appears to be widening its strategic lens toward Ankara. Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s warning that “Turkey is the new Iran” was not an isolated slogan; it reflected a growing Israeli security debate that increasingly views Turkey, Qatar, Syria, Hamas, and even Pakistan-linked regional alignments as part of a new strategic challenge to Israeli supremacy.
This raises a central question: how can a tiny state, with a population smaller than many regional cities, speak with such confidence about confronting Iran, Turkey, and even Pakistan? The answer is not conventional military size alone. Israel’s confidence rests on four pillars: its advanced air force, elite intelligence network, U.S. strategic backing, and, above all, its undeclared nuclear arsenal. Together, these have created a state mentality in which Israel does not merely seek security; it seeks regional dominance.
Turkey is not Iran, Lebanon, Gaza, or Syria. It is a major NATO power with a large population, deep military traditions, a growing defense industry, advanced drones, naval reach, missile development, and strategic depth. In any conventional comparison, Turkey is not an easy target. Its manpower, geography, industrial base, and NATO membership make a direct Israeli attempt to “destroy” or subjugate Turkey almost impossible. Turkey has no shared border with Israel, and any major war would require complex operations through Syria, the Mediterranean, or proxy corridors. This is not a battlefield where Israel can easily repeat its air campaigns against weaker or fragmented enemies.
Yet Israel’s confidence comes from a different calculation. It knows that conventional imbalance can be overturned by nuclear deterrence. Israel’s undeclared nuclear capability is the hidden card behind its regional posture. Even if Turkey is stronger in manpower, tanks, drones, ships, and strategic depth, Israel’s nuclear ambiguity gives it a psychological edge. It tells every regional rival: you may hurt Israel, but you cannot safely push Israel to existential panic. This is the dangerous “madness card” — the belief that if Israel feels cornered, it may escalate beyond normal rules.
This creates a frightening asymmetry. Turkey may dominate a conventional confrontation, but Israel may believe that nuclear shadow power gives it the final word. That is why the Turkey-Israel rivalry cannot be judged only by aircraft, tanks, or soldiers. It must be judged by escalation control. Turkey can defeat pressure, but it must avoid giving Israel the pretext to internationalize, nuclearize, or Americanize the conflict.
Many argue that conventional military strength, diplomacy, missile defenses, or asymmetric capabilities can compensate for a nuclear imbalance. Yet the modern strategic record suggests that nuclear weapons remain the ultimate deterrent. Countries that possess a credible nuclear capability are rarely subjected to the kind of existential military pressure faced by states that do not. More importantly, when rival states both possess nuclear weapons, the risk of total war often declines because the consequences become catastrophic for both sides.
The example of India and Pakistan is frequently cited in this context. Before both states became overt nuclear powers, the possibility of large-scale conventional war remained a persistent concern. After nuclearization, despite crises and tensions, leaders on both sides have had to calculate under the shadow of mutually assured destruction. The existence of nuclear weapons has not eliminated conflict, but it has significantly raised the threshold for full-scale war.
A similar argument is made regarding the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s strategic leverage does not come from economic strength or global influence. Rather, its nuclear capability has created a deterrent that makes direct military action against it far more difficult to contemplate. Whatever one thinks of the regime, its nuclear arsenal has fundamentally altered how other powers approach it.
Viewed through this lens, the debate over Iran becomes even more significant. Supporters of nuclear deterrence argue that if a state lacks a nuclear capability while facing a nuclear-armed adversary, it remains vulnerable to coercion and military pressure. They contend that possession of nuclear weapons by both sides can create a balance that discourages war, whereas a monopoly of nuclear power creates strategic inequality.
For this reason, some analysts believe that the central issue in the Middle East is not simply conventional military superiority but the unequal distribution of nuclear deterrence. As long as one state is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons while its rivals do not, the strategic balance will remain tilted. From this perspective, the debate is less about military hardware and more about whether lasting stability can exist when deterrence is available to some states but denied to others.
Turkey must therefore think carefully about the changing strategic environment around it. The challenge is not merely military competition with Israel but understanding how nuclear deterrence shapes regional behavior, perceptions of risk, and calculations of power. Whether one supports or opposes nuclear proliferation, it is difficult to ignore the argument that nuclear capability has become one of the most powerful guarantees against external coercion in the modern world.
Turkey must read the warning signs carefully. Israel’s strategic culture has shifted from survival to expansion, from deterrence to domination, from defense to preemption. A state that sees itself as divinely entitled to security beyond its borders will always identify new enemies after old ones are weakened. Today Iran is the enemy. Tomorrow Turkey is described as the “new Iran.” After that, Pakistan’s nuclear capability may again be framed as a future threat.
If Israel continues to treat every independent regional power as the next Iran, it may achieve short-term military successes while creating long-term instability across the Middle East. From Ankara’s perspective, the lesson of recent conflicts is that diplomatic appeals, international institutions, and conventional military capabilities alone may not always be viewed as sufficient safeguards against a state that believes it enjoys overwhelming strategic superiority. Turkey’s challenge, therefore, is to develop a level of strategic deterrence—political, economic, technological, military, and diplomatic and nuclear—that convinces any potential adversary that the costs of confrontation would far outweigh any conceivable gains.
History suggests that lasting peace is rarely preserved by goodwill alone; it is preserved when both sides recognize that conflict would be mutually damaging and strategically unwinnable. Only such a credible balance can prevent rivalry from escalating into the next great catastrophe of the Middle East.
World News
The“Shavat–Dashoguz”border trade zone as a new model of regional economic intergration
Dr.Beruniy Alimov, Tashkent, Uzbekistan
The opening of the joint Uzbek-Turkmen border trade zone “Shavat–Dashoguz” has become one of the most important economic and social developments in Central Asia’s border regions in recent years. Located between the Khorezm region of Uzbekistan and the Dashoguz velayat of Turkmenistan, the project symbolizes not only the strengthening of bilateral economic relations but also the revival of historical, cultural, and human connections between two neighboring nations. The initiative reflects the growing strategic partnership between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and demonstrates how border regions can transform into active centers of regional cooperation, entrepreneurship, and people-to-people diplomacy.



The official launch of the trade zone took place in November 2025 with the participation of the President of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, and the President of Turkmenistan, Serdar Berdimuhamedow. The participation of both leaders underlined the political significance of the initiative and confirmed the intention of both countries to deepen economic collaboration and improve living standards in border territories.
From an economic perspective, the “Shavat–Dashoguz” zone serves as a strategic platform for expanding bilateral trade and increasing regional connectivity. According to the available materials, the complex occupies six hectares, equally divided between the Uzbek and Turkmen sectors. The trade infrastructure includes 112 open trade rows, 28 specialized shops, and an additional 16 retail outlets located in separate blocks. Such large scale infrastructure creates favorable conditions for small and medium-sized enterprises, allowing entrepreneurs to directly access neighboring markets and establish new commercial partnerships.

One of the most innovative features of the trade zone is the implementation of the “single window” system for public services. This mechanism significantly simplifies customs procedures and document processing, reducing bureaucratic barriers for entrepreneurs and visitors. Administrative offices, customs services, quarantine, phytosanitary, and veterinary departments are integrated within one complex, making border trade more efficient and transparent. The presence of banking services, exchange offices, hotels, medical centers, and large parking facilities further improves the operational environment for traders and visitors.

An especially important aspect of the project is the simplified movement regime introduced for citizens of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Residents of both countries can enter the trade zone without obtaining visas, which greatly facilitates mobility and encourages interpersonal communication. This approach transforms the trade zone from a purely economic facility into a social and cultural bridge between neighboring peoples. Experts note that modern border regions increasingly perform not only economic functions but also diplomatic and humanitarian roles, helping to strengthen trust and regional stability.
The local population on both sides of the border has reacted positively to the launch of the project. Residents of the Khorezm region view the trade center as an opportunity to expand entrepreneurship, create jobs, and increase exports. Entrepreneurs emphasize that direct communication with Turkmen partners opens new possibilities for business cooperation and market diversification. Similar sentiments are expressed by residents of Dashoguz velayat, who consider the project a convenient platform for trade, professional networking, and economic exchange.
The border trade zone is also important in terms of regional economic modernization. Contemporary international practice demonstrates that cross-border economic zones often become laboratories for innovation in customs administration, logistics, and regional commerce. The “Shavat–Dashoguz” initiative follows this model by introducing digitalized customs infrastructure and interactive service systems aimed at accelerating business operations. These improvements are particularly relevant in the context of global economic competition, where logistical efficiency and administrative transparency directly influence investment attractiveness.
The project additionally contributes to export diversification. One practical example is the growing export of Khorezm rice to Turkmenistan. Local entrepreneurs note that Turkmenistan has become a promising and logistically convenient market compared to more distant destinations such as Russia or Kazakhstan. Reduced transportation costs and simplified border procedures make regional trade more sustainable and profitable for local producers. This case demonstrates how border trade zones can directly support domestic agricultural and industrial sectors.
Another important development is the opening of a trading platform operated by the Uzbek Republican Commodity Exchange within the border zone. This initiative introduces transparent market mechanisms, reliable payment systems, and competitive pricing models into bilateral trade relations. The use of exchange-based trading can reduce informal economic practices while increasing confidence among entrepreneurs and investors. Moreover, such mechanisms align the project with modern international standards of commercial regulation and financial transparency.
Beyond economics, the “Shavat–Dashoguz” project carries significant symbolic and geopolitical meaning. For centuries, Central Asian societies were historically interconnected through trade routes, cultural exchange, and common traditions. The creation of modern border trade platforms can therefore be interpreted as a continuation of historical regional integration processes adapted to contemporary economic realities. As one analytical text emphasizes, the border bazaar strengthens the “centuries-old friendship” between the two peoples and reflects the strategic vision of both national leaders.
In the broader regional context, the project may also influence future models of cooperation within Central Asia. Over the past decade, regional governments have increasingly prioritized connectivity, transport integration, and economic openness. Successful implementation of the “Shavat–Dashoguz” initiative may encourage similar cross-border projects involving logistics hubs, industrial cooperation zones, and joint tourism initiatives. Such developments could contribute to the gradual formation of a more integrated Central Asian economic space.
At the same time, the long-term effectiveness of the trade zone will depend on several factors. Continuous modernization of infrastructure, maintenance of simplified administrative procedures, and support for local entrepreneurs remain essential. In addition, both governments will need to ensure transparency, security, and sustainable management practices within the zone. Economic integration projects succeed not only through political declarations but also through practical efficiency and the trust of local communities.
In conclusion, the “Shavat–Dashoguz” border trade zone represents far more than a commercial marketplace. It is a strategic economic platform, a symbol of growing Uzbek-Turkmen cooperation, and a practical mechanism for strengthening regional integration. By combining modern infrastructure, simplified trade procedures, and people-centered connectivity, the initiative demonstrates how border regions can evolve into engines of economic growth and diplomatic partnership. If successfully developed in the coming years, the project may become one of the most successful examples of cross-border cooperation in Central Asia and contribute significantly to regional stability, prosperity, and mutual trust.
World News
Gunfire in Washington Shocks the World
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : When gunfire erupted near the White House Correspondents’ Dinner in Washington on April 25, 2026, President Donald J. Trump, Vice President JD Vance, and other senior officials were swiftly evacuated by the Secret Service. A suspect armed with weapons was apprehended, and an officer narrowly escaped serious injury. The incident, unfolding just outside a gathering meant to celebrate democracy and free speech, sent a chilling signal across the nation and the world.
This was not merely a security scare. It reflected a deeper strain—psychological, political, and strategic—emanating from a war that is no longer confined to the Middle East. At a moment when America was projecting power abroad, it suddenly appeared vulnerable at home. The symbolism was stark: a superpower engaged in high-stakes geopolitical confrontation while facing instability within its own borders.
The timing made the situation even more consequential. Only hours earlier, President Trump had abruptly canceled the planned visit of his top negotiators to Islamabad, effectively derailing a second round of peace talks with Iran before they could begin. Iran’s Foreign Minister had already departed Pakistan, and President Masoud Pezeshkian made it clear in discussions with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif that Tehran would not engage in negotiations under pressure, threats, or blockade. The diplomatic process, already fragile, collapsed under the weight of distrust.
At the heart of this breakdown lies the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most critical energy chokepoints in the world. What appears to be a military standoff is, in reality, a much broader strategic maneuver. The United States is not simply attempting to pressure Iran—it is reshaping global energy flows and redefining economic leverage on a global scale.
By restricting access to this vital waterway, whether directly or indirectly, the United States creates a supply shock in global oil markets. That disruption compels energy-importing nations to seek alternatives, and increasingly, those alternatives are found in American oil and gas. This is not an unintended consequence—it is a structural shift. As traditional supply routes become uncertain, demand for U.S. energy rises, strengthening America’s position as a dominant exporter.
This strategy also reduces reliance on prolonged military engagement. Precision-guided weapons are expensive and often used against targets of relatively low economic value. Instead of relying solely on kinetic warfare, the United States appears to be leveraging economic pressure as a more efficient tool. By controlling access to energy supply chains, it can exert influence over entire economies without the need for sustained battlefield operations.
This leads to a critical observation: the United States currently has little incentive to fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz. As long as the disruption persists, American exports expand, global dependence increases, and strategic leverage grows. The blockade becomes not just a temporary measure, but a sustained instrument of economic and geopolitical influence.
However, this approach is triggering a significant global response.
European leaders such as Emmanuel Macron and Keir Starmer are increasingly advocating for alternative systems that reduce reliance on the United States. There is a growing effort to develop independent financial, trade, and investment mechanisms that can operate outside the influence of U.S. sanctions and economic controls.
This shift is not limited to Europe. Countries across Asia, the Global South, and major economies like China, India, and Brazil are gradually aligning toward a more multipolar system. If these economies—many of which already rival or exceed the United States in combined output—coordinate their efforts, they could form one of the most powerful economic blocs in modern history. Such a coalition would significantly reduce America’s ability to unilaterally influence global markets and political outcomes.
While this emerging alignment is still in its early stages, it is gaining momentum. The more the United States uses military and economic tools to enforce its objectives, the more other nations are incentivized to create parallel systems that bypass its influence. The dominance of the dollar, the reach of sanctions, and the structure of global trade are all being quietly reexamined.
Meanwhile, the Middle East remains highly unstable. In Lebanon, the fragile cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah continues to hold only on the surface. Israeli strikes ordered by Benjamin Netanyahu and retaliatory attacks by Hezbollah keep the region on edge. The risk of escalation remains constant, and any miscalculation could trigger a broader conflict.
Against this backdrop, the Washington shooting incident takes on a deeper significance. While it may ultimately be determined as an isolated act, it reflects the broader atmosphere of tension and uncertainty. Prolonged conflict, aggressive rhetoric, and global instability can influence domestic environments in unpredictable ways. The line between external الحرب and internal security becomes increasingly blurred.
The events of April 25 are therefore not isolated. They represent interconnected developments in a rapidly changing global order: the collapse of diplomacy in Pakistan, the continued blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, the fragile cease-fire in Lebanon, and a security scare at the heart of American political life.
The world is entering a new phase—one where economic power is weaponized, alliances are shifting, and traditional systems are being challenged. The United States may achieve short-term gains through increased exports and expanded influence, but it also risks accelerating the formation of a counterbalancing global structure.
The choice ahead is critical. A strategy based on pressure and control may deliver immediate results, but it may also erode long-term stability. A more sustainable path would require restoring trust, respecting international norms, and engaging in genuine diplomacy.
If current trends continue, the incident in Washington may be remembered not just as a moment of domestic alarm, but as a symbol of a world in transition—where power is contested, systems are redefined, and the future of global order hangs in the balance.
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