Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The recent summit hosted by President Donald Trump, with Egypt’s Prime Minister beside him, carried moments that went beyond protocol. When Trump extended an affectionate greeting to Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, it was more than a warm gesture—it symbolized a historic shift in U.S.–Pakistan relations. That moment showed how Islamabad’s civilian leadership and its military command under Field Marshal Asim Munir had moved from the margins of suspicion to the heart of Washington’s strategic calculus. This closeness did not emerge overnight. It had been cultivated in the months before America’s devastating strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, when Pakistan’s leadership first engaged with Trump in serious dialogue. Since then, Pakistan has become central in persuading the Muslim world and wealthy Arab capitals to support Trump’s ambitious 21-point Gaza Peace Plan.
What followed at the summit underscored the depth of this bond. While European leaders, presidents, and prime ministers from around the globe sat on the sidelines, Shehbaz Sharif was invited by Trump to take the podium and publicly offer praise. No other leader was given such a platform. Trump, clearly pleased, remarked that the true achievement of the summit was not only the signing of the Hamas–Israel agreement but the dawn of a new era of friendship, reconstruction, and hope for Gaza. In a further gesture, Trump mentioned Field Marshal Munir by name, praising his leadership and role in regional stability. It was a recognition that carried consequences far beyond the hall, signaling to the world that Pakistan was no longer merely a participant but an indispensable partner in shaping the future of the Middle East.
The political consequences at home are equally profound. A country that only recently teetered on the brink of economic collapse now finds itself under the protective shield of Washington’s goodwill. Trump’s personal embrace of Pakistan’s leadership, combined with the IMF’s readiness to release fresh funds and the global media’s acknowledgment of reforms, all but ensures that Shehbaz Sharif’s government will complete its five-year term. Bloomberg’s recent report, which placed Pakistan as the second most improved emerging economy in terms of sovereign default risk, has become an anchor for this perception of stability. It suggests that regime change, once a lingering fear, is no longer an imminent threat.
For the opposition led by Imran Khan, this represents a near-terminal blow. PTI, once a movement with momentum, now appears fractured, riddled with blame games and leadership rifts. International recognition of government performance compounds the decline of PTI’s appeal. The likelihood of Khan’s return to power grows slimmer with each passing day, not only in this term but perhaps in the next electoral cycle as well. Continuity, not disruption, now defines the political horizon.
Bloomberg’s endorsement is more than a headline. Between June 2024 and September 2025, Pakistan’s sovereign default probability fell by as much as 2,200 basis points. From being ranked among the riskiest economies in the world, Pakistan rose to the second-best performer among emerging markets, behind only Turkiye. The turnaround was achieved through strict fiscal discipline, compliance with IMF conditions, timely debt repayments, and reforms that improved investor confidence. To lenders and investors, the message is clear: Pakistan is no longer a default story but a recovery story. To citizens, it signals hope that the worst may be behind them.
Yet beneath this optimism lies a more complex reality. The improvement in sovereign risk is significant but does not tell the whole story. Pakistan’s growth for FY25 was revised upward to 3.04% after industrial output rebounded, while third-quarter growth came in at 2.4%. These figures are encouraging but modest, reflecting stabilization rather than a boom. Inflation, which had once spiraled above 30%, cooled dramatically to just 4.1% by late 2024, allowing the State Bank to cut policy rates from a suffocating 22% down to 12%. This drop, however, owes as much to global commodity relief as it does to policy discipline.
Investment has shown some sparkle: the Special Investment Facilitation Council pushed foreign direct investment up by 16% in one month, IT exports rose 32%, and the Karachi Stock Exchange doubled in a single year. Exports rose by 10% to $30.64 billion in FY2024, though a persistent trade deficit remains, fueled by costly imports of petroleum and machinery. Most recently, a $1.2 billion IMF agreement reached in October 2025 has shored up liquidity, while the 2025–26 budget ambitiously targets 4.2% growth.
These data points reinforce Bloomberg’s narrative to an extent. Inflation is under control, growth is stabilizing, investors are returning, and credit risk has narrowed. Yet deep challenges persist. Job creation remains weak, and official data is thin. Small and medium enterprises, which form the backbone of domestic employment, still face crushing costs from energy tariffs, taxation, and financing constraints. Structural reforms in governance, energy, and taxation continue to lag. Pakistan’s revival, while real, is fragile—dependent on external goodwill and vulnerable to global shocks.
What makes the Bloomberg recognition consequential is its convergence with Trump’s embrace. Together, they create a powerful narrative dividend: Pakistan is not only stable, but strategically indispensable. For Washington, Islamabad’s role in rallying Muslim and Arab states behind the Gaza framework is invaluable. For Pakistan, the dividend is survival and the chance to thrive under international endorsement. IMF funds flow more smoothly, investors take notice, and international media highlight the recovery rather than the collapse. Confidence breeds confidence, and the government’s legitimacy is strengthened at home.
But overreliance on narrative is dangerous. Recognition from Bloomberg or praise from Trump cannot substitute for deep economic transformation. If oil prices spike, if U.S. interest rates rise, or if domestic reforms stall, the narrative could unravel quickly. Investors are patient only as long as reforms continue; corruption or complacency could break the cycle of confidence. Pakistan’s future cannot rest solely on symbolic endorsements. It must be built on durable change that translates into jobs, thriving businesses, and improved living standards.
The outlook is both promising and precarious. If Pakistan can maintain fiscal prudence, expand exports, exploit its mineral wealth, and modernize its economy, this Bloomberg moment may be remembered as the beginning of a genuine turnaround. With Washington’s backing, the country enjoys a rare window of stability that could last five to ten years, enough time to set the foundation for durable prosperity. But history offers harsh lessons: moments of reprieve squandered, opportunities lost to complacency or discord.
The challenge now is not to mistake recognition for resolution. Trump’s embrace and Bloomberg’s endorsement are powerful signals of global confidence, but unless they are matched by tangible improvements in jobs, trade, and technology, they will remain fleeting headlines. Pakistan stands at a turning point, its reprieve fragile but full of possibility. Whether this moment becomes a renaissance or a relapse depends not on the applause abroad but on the reforms at home.

By Akhtar Hussain Sandhu

Pakistan has been passing through a turbulent phase by means of internal and external challenges. All the administrative authorities are trying to bridle this nuisance and menace. The crucial national and international problems, including terrorism, failure of the political parties, the impotent role of bureaucracy, and the external threats to the state, have popularized the military leadership. Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir leads the only organized institution of army in Pakistan that performs its duties tremendously and vigilantly.

The maleficent and precarious plans of India, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and Tehrik-i-Labbaik Pakistan, the violent role of political parties have multiplied the challenges for Pakistan. It is even Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf Pakistan that supports extremist and violent activities, which ultimately damages the image of the country. Although the civil government is credited in restoring the performance of foreign affairs, but the real credit goes to the Chief of Army Staff Gen. Gen. Asim Munir, who paved the way for cordial relations with the Arab and powerful countries, including USA, China, and Russia. The Afghan Taliban government is already supporting TTP, which attacked the Pakistan Army’s posts and martyred 23 soldiers. The TTP had already martyred many civilians, law enforcement officials, and military officers and soldiers in the recent past.

Moreover, the Afghan foreign minister Amir Muttaqi’s visit to India set in a new collaboration against Pakistan. Under the influence of this Afghan-India understanding, the long Pak-Afghan border was hit by the TTP militants and the Afghan army, but the Pakistan army bulldozed their sinister and nefarious aims and defeated the Afghan army within two hours testifying the myth that Afghanistan never defeated any attacking nation without external support. The Pakistan Army has not interfered with the election process of the Chief Minister KPK, which indicates that the army would remain aloof from the politics. Gen. Asim Munir proved his professional ethics, fairplay, and impartiality to uplift the image of Pakistan in the world. Pakistan’s armed forces, with their great professionalism, defended the country and retaliated with full thrust when Iran, India, and Afghanistan attacked Pakistan. An honest and visionary leadership is the asset of a nation; therefore, the majority of Pakistani people are proud of their institutions especially the army and leadership.

On the other hand, such circumstances pave the way for a military dictatorship because the failure of the political parties results in the decay of the democratic system. Pakistan at the moment experiences the best model of collaboration between the government and army, along with the best model of foreign relations but at the same time, Pakistan is undergoing the worst phase because of the violent politics of PTI, TTP, TLP, along with grave danger on the eastern and western borders. India and Afghanistan are inflicting a collaborative aggression on the civilians and armed forces of Pakistan.

Despite this critical situation, moral and administrative corruption by almost all government institutions, including police, revenue, customs, smuggling, nepotism, drug sale, media abuse, atrocities by the rich, encroachments, leasing government lands, commission on contracts, weak performance in the education sector, impotent role in expelling the Afghan refugees, ill-treatment at the airports by the dealing staff, slave mindset of the bureaucracy, and sifarash  seem toeing the traditionally dirty politics, corrupt mindset and rotten governance by the government institutions which will definitely increase a favorable sentiments for the army chief and detestation for the political parties.

On all fronts, the people of Pakistan witness an effective role of Gen. Asim Munir that will result in the extension or direct rule of the Field Marshal. The performance of the political parties is declining their prestige in the eyes of the people as the PTI does not get rid of the violent and anti-Pakistan politics; PMLN, being in the government, is losing the sympathy base among the masses, and PPP has already no rising potential in the national politics. They have focused on the role of pressure groups confined to the provincial forces.

            The PPP confined itself to Sindh, PMLN in Punjab, PTI in KPK, while no political genuine process in Balochistan, Azad Kashmir, and Gilgit-Baltistan. Although the Pakistani establishment is away from the politics of Pakistan but it cannot remain silent on the assumptions perceived by the establishment. The Supreme Court of Pakistan is divided between the judges having a ‘populist approach’ and a ‘constitutionalist mindset.’ Most of the judges are inducted based on their political affiliation, and the political parties expect them to return the same love, which has led the Pakistani judicial system to the worst performance list issued at international level.

The Police and other departments are used by the ruling party to embarrass the opposition. Even the political parties have internal groups that are taken and treated as rival political forces. The political parties use their offshoots in the educational institutions as their armed supporters. The lawyers have political and financial predilections; therefore, the main leadership producing institution has become a political stooge, blackmailer, qabza mafia, and drumbeater of the politicians and pseudo-religious leaders. Sometimes, some people assume that Pakistan is perhaps not suitable for democracy. I assume that western societies, where democracy is successful, develop different social and cultural dynamics. Pakistan’s socio-cultural reality is different from the West; therefore, the imported Western system cannot work effectively in Pakistan. It is the moral obligation of Pakistan’s social scientists to develop and adapt a conducive system fit to our socio-political reality. In this perspective, local cultures and mindset is to be considered to make democracy successful in our country. An honest and dedicated leadership is need of the time, our politicians are required to be trustworthy through their fair political decision-making.             Amidst the prevailing circumstances, one cannot find any honest, uncompromised, and strong leadership in the political parties of Pakistan. In the state of crisis, people look forward toward the military leadership in Pakistan. There has been a game of hide and seek between democracy and dictatorship in Pakistan. During the tenure of Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, the political crisis emerged based on the doubt of the military intervention for ten years, but external and internal threats and economic crisis did not allow the military to occupy Islamabad. The coming years seem to be crucial, and the constant political crises may give chance to military leadership to lead the country directly.

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : When Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Taliban’s acting foreign minister, arrived in New Delhi in October 2025, his message to Pakistan resonated with both challenge and invitation. Speaking in Urdu at moments—an echo of time spent within Pakistani linguistic and cultural space—he proclaimed that Afghanistan seeks peaceful ties with all neighbors but would not accept interference. He claimed the Taliban regime had cleansed its soil of terror groups and demanded Pakistan reciprocate. Behind his words lay the centuries-deep entanglement of Pakistan and Afghanistan: geography, religion, culture, trade, and social contact all wound together.
Yet Islamabad heard not conciliation alone, but a rebuke. For years, Pakistani security forces and civilians have paid a steep cost to militant violence, particularly from the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In 2023 alone, nearly 1,000 Pakistanis were killed in terrorist attacks, including security personnel, police, and civilians. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, ACLED recorded 754 and 416 security-incidents respectively in 2023. The TTP’s attacks have surged, tripling between 2021 and 2023. In 2024, militant bombings and gun attacks claimed over 1,600 lives—both civilians and uniformed personnel.
These are not remote skirmishes: even within provincial capitals and main arteries, attacks persist. In January 2023, a suicide bomber struck the Peshawar Police Lines mosque, killing 84 people and wounding 217 during congregational prayers at a high-security compound. In February, militants attacked a Karachi police station, killing four and wounding 14. In March, an IED blast at a Saddar police station in Lakki Marwat killed four policemen, including a Deputy Superintendent. In May 2023, a suicide bombing targeting a security checkpoint in North Waziristan killed four (including two soldiers).
In response, Pakistan’s military has struck hard. In September 2025, raids near the Afghan border killed 12 soldiers and 35 militants. In October 2025, Pakistan claimed to have eliminated 30 militants responsible for an ambush killing 11 soldiers. A recent “sanitisation” operation in Orakzai (KP) left 11 soldiers and 19 militants dead. In Bajaur, Operation Sarbakaf reportedly cost 12 security personnel and eliminated 145 militants. (This figure is claimed in Pakistani press reporting.)
Thus, what was once presumed fraternal kinship becomes a strangling war of where theology, ideology, and authority diverge. Pakistani Taliban fighters—many Pashtun, many local—are killed as enemies; Pakistan’s security forces and civilians are slain as victims of insurgency. The same soil sees brothers on opposite sides, dying for rival claims of divine sanction.
This perpetual mutual bloodletting underscores the futility of purely kinetic solutions. Both sides claim legitimacy: Pakistan through constitutional and institutional authority; the Taliban through scriptural and revolutionary legitimacy. Neither accepts the other’s claim, and so reconciliation becomes a chimera. Yet if one could shift from exclusivity to cooperation, from confrontation to construction, that cycle might be broken. A shift toward shared infrastructure, trade, civil institutions, and education holds the power to cancel out destructive divergence.
In this regard, China offers a potent model. Unlike the United States’ pattern of military intervention, regime change attempts, and kinetic intrusion, China’s long game has been investment, noninterference, and resource diplomacy. Instead of toppling governments, Beijing builds roads, structures, mines, and connectivity. Its approach in Afghanistan underscores this philosophy.
China’s engagement with the Taliban regime is growing, although not without constraints. It continues to insist on noninterference in Afghan domestic politics, preferring to negotiate trade, investment, mining rights, and connectivity rather than dictate internal governance. Beijing has offered tariff-free access to Chinese markets for Afghan goods. It has negotiated BRI/China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) integration with Afghan alignment. In January 2023, a $540 million contract was agreed for oil extraction in the Amu Darya basin, in partnership with a Chinese firm (CAPEIC). China openly discusses mining of rare earths, copper, lithium—strategic minerals vital to modern industry.
By contrast, U.S. interventions often came with regime change doctrine, drone strikes, “nation-building” campaigns, and military bases on foreign soil. Such methods provoke backlash, resentment, proxy insurgencies, and dependency. China’s hands-off posture—sovereign engagement rather than regime dominance—has thus gained deeper traction among regimes suspicious of Western coercion. Pakistan itself has benefited from Chinese nonassertive but persistent infrastructure investment under CPEC, turning strategic roads, energy, and ports into national assets rather than zones of domination.
Pakistan could draw lessons from China’s approach in this theatre. It could ease off dictating ideology and instead channel its strength into bridging—building trade corridors, supporting Afghan industrial zones, aiding civil institutions, promoting educational exchange, and partnering in mineral processing. If Afghanistan’s economy, transport, natural resource sectors, and human capital become intimately tied to Pakistan, Kabul’s tolerance for hosting anti-Pakistan militants would decline. Islamabad could then shift from enforcing security to shaping stakes.
Within this framework, the conciliatory elements in Muttaqi’s New Delhi address carry fresh potential. His invocation of mutual respect, shared history, and noninterference could become the basis for a Pakistan-Afghanistan partnership, rather than grudging recrimination. But Pakistan’s swift diplomatic rebuke—warning Kabul against interference in its internal affairs—missed the chance to lay the foundation for constructive engagement.
To move forward, Islamabad must integrate three strategic pillars: security, economics, and narrative. Security cannot be abandoned—but kinetic force must be complemented with institutional channels for dialogue, track II diplomacy, and mechanisms to separate hardline factions from moderate elements. Economy cannot be constrained by suspicion—Pakistan must initiate cross-border trade, joint investment in mining and infrastructure, transit corridors, and cross-training in governance. And narrative cannot be dominated by zero-sum theological certitude—it must shift toward shared destiny, mutual elevation, and overlapping interests.
Absent such a pivot, the consequences are grim. Pakistani soldiers, militants, and civilians will continue to bleed. Families will remain fractured. The border will stay a trench of ideology and death. But if Pakistan can adopt a China-style posture—noninterference, investment, cooperation—the negative torque of theological divergence can be neutralized. Two neighbors, bound by history and faith, might then lean not toward perpetual war, but toward a future of shared prosperity and peace.