Pakistan News
A New Horizon for Pakistan–Indonesia Relations
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The Indonesian president’s two-day visit to Pakistan comes at a defining moment in the regional landscape, and for two nations whose histories, identities and ambitions intersect more deeply than often acknowledged. Pakistan and Indonesia are bound by shared faith, parallel post-colonial struggles, and a mutual desire for economic stability and strategic autonomy. This visit provides the most meaningful opportunity in decades to transform cordial ties into a structured, forward-looking partnership.
The roots of the relationship run back to the early years of independence. Both countries forged a natural bond during the anti-colonial wave of the 1950s and stood side by side at the Bandung Conference of 1955, shaping principles that later influenced the Non-Aligned Movement. Over the decades, Indonesia supported Pakistan during moments of regional tension, while Pakistan backed Indonesia internationally as it consolidated its post-independence identity. Yet despite this warmth, economic cooperation lagged behind political sentiment.
Today the environment is far more conducive. During my tenure as Press Attaché to Malaysia, I witnessed Indonesia evolve from a crisis-strained economy into a disciplined, steadily rising middle-income power. Its reforms in governance, social protection and industrial policy helped it become Southeast Asia’s largest economy and a strong voice in the G20 and Global South. Pakistan, despite recent economic strain, retains undeniable strengths: a vast population of 240 million, an established industrial base, globally competitive export sectors, strategic geography linking multiple economic corridors, and a respected defence industry.
In economic terms, the relationship has already expanded significantly. Bilateral trade, which was under half a billion dollars two decades ago, crossed US$4.2 billion in 2022, rose to approximately US$3.3–3.8 billion in 2023, and has now reached a historic US$4.7 billion in FY 2024–25. The imbalance, however, is stark. Indonesian exports—primarily palm oil, coal, rubber, spices, chemicals and consumer goods—make up nearly US$3.5–4 billion, while Pakistan’s exports hover around US$500–600 million, dominated by textiles, seafood, processed food, sports goods, pharmaceuticals and IT services. The forthcoming negotiations to upgrade the existing Preferential Trade Agreement into a full Free Trade Agreement offer space to correct this imbalance and unlock an estimated US$8–10 billion trade potential over the next five to seven years.
Pakistan’s defence and industrial strengths give substance to this partnership. Its position as a nuclear state with a professional, battle-tested military and a growing defence-industrial base makes Pakistan an attractive partner for Indonesia, which is modernising its forces and diversifying its procurement sources. The JF-17 Thunder, cost-effective and combat-proven, remains a strong candidate for Indonesian interest. If converted into structured cooperation—joint production, maintenance facilities, training programmes and technology transfer—the defence relationship alone could evolve into a US$1–1.5 billion annual ecosystem over the next decade.
Pakistan’s broader industrial and agricultural capabilities also align well with Indonesia’s needs. Pakistani textiles, sports goods, surgical instruments, leather products, halal food and pharmaceuticals all have competitive space in the Indonesian market. The IT sector, with Pakistan’s rapidly expanding pool of software developers and engineers, could capture a significant share of Indonesia’s growing demand for digital services. With supportive policies, Pakistani exports to Indonesia could realistically double to US$1–1.2 billion within five years.
For Indonesia, the opportunities in Pakistan are equally promising. With a large consumer market and strategic access to Central Asia, western China, the Middle East and Africa, Pakistan offers Indonesian investors a broad regional gateway. Indonesia’s strength in palm oil, nickel, copper, coal, rubber and downstream manufacturing aligns with Pakistan’s industrial and energy needs. Indonesia’s mineral wealth—especially nickel, essential for electric-vehicle batteries—could support Pakistan’s emerging automotive and renewable-energy ambitions. Long-term palm oil supply agreements and joint ventures in refining and food processing could solidify a US$2–3 billion supply chain anchored in stability and value addition.
Energy cooperation is another high-value domain. Indonesia’s substantial coal exports already support Pakistan’s power sector, but opportunities now extend to renewable technologies, sustainable agriculture, and climate adaptation. Both nations face frequent natural disasters, rising temperatures and food-security pressures. Joint initiatives in disaster management, coastal protection, agricultural resilience and social-protection systems would translate shared vulnerabilities into shared solutions. Indonesia’s successful nutrition and social-welfare frameworks can be harmonised with Pakistan’s experience in large-scale cash-transfer programmes to create replicable models across the Muslim world.
Maritime and logistics cooperation represents an under-utilised frontier. Indonesia’s control over key shipping lanes in the Malacca and Sunda Straits complements Pakistan’s Arabian Sea ports—Karachi, Port Qasim and Gwadar. Better port-to-port coordination, enhanced shipping routes and integrated logistics corridors could turn the two nations into a bridge connecting ASEAN with the Middle East and Central Asia. Such cooperation could expand bilateral maritime trade by US$1–2 billion and improve security collaboration against piracy and other transnational threats.
Cultural, educational and people-to-people exchanges also hold significant promise. Despite being the world’s first and second largest Muslim-majority nations, Indonesia and Pakistan still know surprisingly little about each other’s societies. Joint academic programmes, Islamic cultural exchanges, student mobility, tourism promotion and co-produced media content could build a deeper social foundation for long-term cooperation. As both nations navigate questions of identity, governance and modernity, intellectual exchanges between their scholars, ulema and policymakers could generate meaningful dialogue.
The Indonesian president’s visit should therefore focus on more than symbolic gestures. It must articulate a roadmap built around strategic defence cooperation, balanced trade, maritime connectivity, industrial partnership and cultural exchange. A clear timeline for concluding the FTA, practical measures to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers, and sector-specific investment frameworks could anchor economic ties at a realistic US$8–10 billion trajectory. Defence collaboration could be formalised through joint committees and production agreements. Maritime security, food security, digital cooperation and energy transition should be placed at the centre of the agenda.
If Islamabad and Jakarta seize this moment with clarity and ambition, Pakistan–Indonesia relations could enter their strongest phase since the Bandung Conference—one defined not by nostalgia, but by shared vision, balanced opportunity and mutual strategic benefit. In a world reshaped by shifting alliances and economic competition, the partnership between these two Muslim nations has the potential not only to uplift their own populations but to contribute to a more stable and empowered Global South.
Pakistan News
CELEBRATES PAKISTAN’S 79TH INDEPENDENCE DAY AND 150TH BIRTH ANNIVERSARY OF QUAID-E-AZAM MOHAMMAD ALI JINNAH IN FRANCE
Paris ( Imran Y. CHOUDHRY):- On the occasion of the 79th Independence Day of Pakistan, Ambassador Mumtaz Zahra Baloch hoisted national flag to the tune of the national anthem at the Embassy of Pakistan, Paris and welcomed distinguished members of the Pakistani community including large number of children.

Messages of the President, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan were read out on the occasion.
Congratulating all on the Independence Day, the Ambassador said that 14th August was truly auspicious as it brought together the entire nation – in celebration, in paying homage to the Quaid-e-Azam and other leaders of the freedom movement, in remembrance of the supreme sacrifices of our forefathers and drawing inspiration from our glorious past and the tremendous achievements over the decades.

The Government of Pakistan is observing the current year – 2026 – as the “Year of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah” to mark his 150th birth anniversary, she added. The great intellectual vision of Quaid requires the nation to uphold his principles and play its due role in the development and progress of Pakistan. The Ambassador highlighted that Quaid-e-Azam had given the nation three golden principles, faith, unity and discipline and adherence to these principles would lead the nation towards a bright future for the generations to come.
Ambassador Baloch said that as we celebrate our freedom we should remember our Kashmiri and Palestinian brothers and sisters, who have been struggling for over seven decades for their freedom and right to self-determination. She reaffirmed Pakistan’s political and diplomatic support to the people of the Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK) and Palestine for their legitimate rights.



Ambassador also appreciated the contributions of Pakistani diaspora in France in promoting Pakistan-France relations. She reiterated Embassy’s fully commitment to continue to facilitate Pakistanis based in France.
Later, the Ambassador inaugurated the ‘historic photo exhibition’ based on the life and works of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah at the Embassy. The exhibition showcased a remarkable collection of
archival records and photographs chronicling the visionary leadership and enduring
legacy of the founder of Pakistan. The guests especially the children took a keen interest in the exhibition and raised slogans of Pakistan Zindabad.
Pakistan News
Pakistan PUBG MOBILE team ‘4Thrives’ visited the Embassy of Pakistan in Paris, France.
Paris ( Imran Y. CHOUDHRY):- Ambassador Mumtaz Zahra Baloch today received the top professional Pakistan PUBG MOBILE team ‘4Thrives’, which is competing in the high-stakes competition, PUBG MOBILE World Cup 2026 Grand Finals at the Esports World Cup (EWC) being held in Paris.
The team members of ‘4Thrives’ briefed the Ambassador on the game and the hard work they all had put in to finish at the top of the qualifying round and reaching the Grand Finals. They were enthusiastic about their performance which has cemented their position among the world’s best PUBG MOBILE teams.

The Ambassador appreciated the team members for their enthusiastic participation and accomplishments and wished them success for the Grand Finals. She said the Pakistani nation has proudly witnessed the recent achievements of the 4Thrives team and expressed confidence that it would win the prestigious trophy in Paris as well.



This is the first time that EWC is being held in Paris – a true global phenomenon represented by more than 2,000 players from 200 clubs and 100 different countries.
Let’s celebrate and cheer Pakistan PUBG MOBILE team ‘4Thrives’ for the Grand Finals this week!
Pakistan News
The Mecca Defence Pact: The Threats Behind the Alliance
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan is being described as a Muslim version of NATO. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan himself said its collective-defence clause is technically similar to NATO’s Article 5: an armed attack on one member will be treated as an attack on all. Yet most commentary has concentrated on the pact’s wording, its possible expansion and whether it is aimed at Iran or Israel. The more important question has received less attention: what threat does each signatory actually perceive?
Without answering that question, analysis of the agreement remains incomplete. Alliances do not acquire meaning merely from ceremonial signatures. Their real character is determined by the dangers their members fear, the capabilities they contribute and the circumstances in which they are prepared to act.
For Saudi Arabia, the immediate security environment is deeply paradoxical. The kingdom has long relied upon the United States, but the presence of American forces and facilities across the Gulf can also attract retaliation whenever Washington uses regional territory or infrastructure in military operations against Iran.
Tehran has repeatedly maintained that its quarrel is not with Gulf societies as such, but with military threats launched from or supported through their territories. Whether one accepts Iran’s justification or not, the underlying dilemma is real: foreign protection can simultaneously become a source of exposure.
This raises a difficult question. If foreign bases had not facilitated attacks against Iran, would Tehran have attacked Gulf countries on the same scale? The answer cannot be proven, but the question exposes Saudi Arabia’s strategic vulnerability. Riyadh wants protection without remaining permanently hostage to decisions made by an external guarantor.
Threats from the Houthis in Yemen and Iran-aligned armed groups in Iraq remain serious, particularly for oil facilities, desalination plants, shipping and civilian infrastructure. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has spent heavily on modern aircraft, missiles, surveillance systems and air defence. These dangers alone do not fully explain the need for an Article 5-style pact with Türkiye and nuclear-armed Pakistan.
The wider concern is Israel’s expanding military reach and the fear that no regional state can assume it will remain permanently outside Israeli calculations. The “Greater Israel” project is not merely a slogan invented by Israel’s critics. It is a documented ideological and political current rooted in expansionist interpretations of biblical territory, including the most extreme vision of land stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates, and in revisionist Zionist ideas of sovereignty on both sides of the Jordan River.
Israel’s wars and military operations across Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere have intensified regional fears that its use of force and territorial ambitions are becoming geographically unconstrained. Because the most expansive interpretation of Greater Israel encompasses territory belonging to several Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Riyadh has legitimate reasons to treat this ideology and Israel’s growing regional reach as a long-term strategic threat.
The Mecca agreement therefore creates strategic depth, reduces Saudi Arabia’s exclusive dependence on Washington and strengthens the kingdom’s leadership position in the Muslim world.
Türkiye enters the pact with a different threat map. It possesses NATO’s second-largest army, an increasingly sophisticated defence industry, formidable drone capabilities, warship and helicopter production, and substantial operational experience in Syria, Iraq and the eastern Mediterranean.
Kurdish militancy and instability along Türkiye’s southern borders remain persistent threats, but Ankara is largely capable of managing these challenges without Pakistani or Saudi military intervention.
The more consequential concern is Israel. Turkish and Israeli rhetoric has become increasingly hostile, while their strategic interests collide in Syria, Gaza and the broader eastern Mediterranean. Türkiye’s conventional size gives it considerable strength, but Israel is widely understood to possess nuclear weapons, while Türkiye does not. This creates a dangerous asymmetry at the highest level of escalation.
Pakistan’s participation therefore adds deterrent weight, but it is essential not to overstate what has formally been agreed. The published language does not establish an explicit Pakistani nuclear umbrella over Türkiye or Saudi Arabia. Nor does it automatically commit Islamabad to nuclear retaliation.
Its value at this stage lies in strategic ambiguity. Any adversary contemplating extreme escalation must now consider the possibility of a broader response involving a nuclear-armed partner. That uncertainty itself can reinforce deterrence, provided consultation mechanisms, command arrangements and red lines are eventually clarified.
Pakistan’s principal state-based threat remains India. Its other challenges—including attacks linked to the Pakistani Taliban, militancy operating from Afghan territory and insurgency in Balochistan—are grave but fall mainly within the domain of counterterrorism and internal security.
Islamabad has also alleged external support for certain militant networks, including from India and Israel other hostile actors, therefore the possibility of hybrid warfare designed to weaken Pakistan cannot be ignored.
The real test for the pact would come during a future India-Pakistan war. Saudi Arabia enjoys extensive economic and political relations with India, while Türkiye also has interests that extend beyond its partnership with Islamabad. Would Riyadh provide intelligence, logistics, financing, air defence or diplomatic support? Would it risk its relationship with New Delhi?
The treaty’s collective-defence formula is powerful, but it does not necessarily mean that every member must respond identically or automatically declare war. Even NATO’s Article 5 requires each ally to take such action as it considers necessary. The Mecca pact’s credibility will similarly depend on agreed procedures, operational planning, military integration and, above all, political will.
Nor should the alliance be framed as an anti-Iranian “Sunni bloc.” That description is analytically shallow and politically dangerous. It imports a sectarian narrative into an agreement whose signatories explicitly maintain that it is not directed against Iran or any other particular country.
Western and regional media extensively are using the Sunni label as convenient shorthand, but repeating it can deepen the very divisions that have repeatedly weakened the Muslim world. It risks presenting Sunni and Shia states as natural enemies, even though they share geography, economic interests, religious bonds and responsibility for regional stability.
Iran has demonstrated formidable missile, drone and asymmetric capabilities and has proven ability to impose severe costs on the combined military might of both the United States and Israel and their alliance in the Middle East and elsewhere in the entire world.
A confrontation between Iran and the combined forces of Pakistan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia would devastate the region, rupture trade and energy routes, inflame sectarian tensions and serve none of the four countries.
The rational objective of the Mecca alliance should therefore be deterrence, collective security and strategic autonomy—not the creation of another front in the Iran war.
The wiser long-term course is to keep the pact open and eventually build a structured security dialogue with Iran. Immediate Iranian membership may be politically unrealistic while war and mistrust persist, but inclusion should remain a strategic objective.
Egypt and other regional countries could also participate in a broader security architecture based on non-aggression, collective consultation, protected shipping lanes, economic connectivity and respect for sovereignty.
The three signatories must also wage an intelligent information campaign. Through official statements, diplomatic outreach, legacy media, social platforms and other forms of communication, they should consistently reject the description of the agreement as a “Sunni NATO.”
They should explain that the pact is intended to protect its members from aggression regardless of the aggressor’s religious, sectarian or national identity. It must not be allowed to become an instrument for turning Muslim countries against one another.
The Mecca agreement will become historic only if it does more than redistribute fear. Properly developed, it can reduce dependence on outside powers, deter Israeli or other aggression, give Pakistan additional diplomatic weight and create the nucleus of an inclusive regional security system.
Mishandled as a sectarian coalition, however, it could produce precisely the confrontation it claims to prevent. Its success will therefore be measured not by how many enemies it names, but by how many wars it prevents.
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