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China Poised to Outpace the USA in the AI Race

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : In a recent interview, a senior NVIDIA executive offered perhaps the most candid assessment yet of the global AI race, admitting openly that China is going full throttle across the entire AI ecosystem and will soon surpass the United States in building and deploying advanced AI platforms. According to him, AI is not a single monolithic technology; it is a vertical stack of more than five layers, stretching from the bottom layer of raw energy to the very top layer of applications. And across this entire stack, China is now moving with a speed, scale, and national purpose unmatched by any other country.
He began with the foundational fact that AI is ultimately an energy-hungry technology. Training frontier models requires immense electricity — entire power stations dedicated to data centers — and here the gap is stunning. China today generates over 9,600 terawatt-hours of electricity annually, nearly double the roughly 4,800 terawatt-hours produced in the United States.
Massive hydropower, coal, solar, and wind installations continuously expand China’s energy base, giving it the ability to power tens of thousands of new data centers and fabrication plants. Without this energy, nothing else in the AI stack functions. The United States, he warned, simply does not have enough electricity to reindustrialize, reshore manufacturing, or scale AI at the level required to maintain global leadership. Even if America decided today to double its energy output, it would take five to ten years to build the necessary power infrastructure.
The second structural difference is speed. In the U.S., constructing a semiconductor manufacturing facility can take three years or more because of permitting, regulation, zoning, and litigation. In China, the same facility can be erected in a matter of months, sometimes weeks, because the national system aligns government, regulation, industry, and capital around a single purpose: build fast, build big, and build continuously. This difference in time — not technology — is the decisive strategic advantage. Every month lost is a compounding delay. Every month gained is a compounding lead.
He further explained that semiconductors are the backbone of the AI chain, and here again the numbers speak for themselves. China has been expanding its semiconductor manufacturing capacity at an annual rate approaching 30–40 percent, with some categories even doubling year over year, particularly in mature nodes below 14nm. The United States and Europe, by contrast, expand capacity by barely 10–20 percent annually. If this trend continues, China’s domestic production will increasingly cover its own AI needs, reducing dependence on imported chips and eventually surpassing rivals in total volume. The idea that China would always lag in semiconductors is collapsing under the weight of its own accelerated progress.
Then comes the higher layer of the AI stack: the models, platforms, and applications that convert computation into economic value. Here the cultural and institutional differences are profound. In China, almost every major AI model is open source, from Baidu’s ERNIE to Alibaba’s Qwen to models emerging from startups like Zhipu and 01.AI. Tens of thousands of researchers, students, surgeons, engineers, and small businesses use these models freely, improving productivity and innovation across society. China is not earning money from these open models; instead, it is earning capability, scale, and national momentum. Open-source AI becomes a nationwide accelerator that multiplies learning, experimentation, and economic output.
In the United States, by contrast, almost all frontier models are closed and commercial. They are powerful, but they are fenced behind subscriptions, APIs, restrictions, and corporate ownership. This produces revenue, not widespread capability. The NVIDIA executive made a critical point: China is not monetizing AI at the application level; it is weaponizing openness to democratize AI across its entire population. This is why Chinese AI applications are spreading faster than American ones — because the barriers to entry are near zero.
He also offered a striking cultural insight. When surveyed, nearly 80 percent of Chinese citizens view AI as a positive force for society. In the United States, the sentiment is almost the reverse — roughly 20 percent view AI positively while 80 percent express fear, distrust, or resentment. Innovation cannot thrive in a cultural climate of suspicion. China has fused optimism, national pride, and collective ambition into its AI mission. The U.S. has not.
One example he gave was Huawei, now emerging as one of the fastest-growing AI companies despite American sanctions. The company builds chips, models, cloud platforms, and 5G systems simultaneously and is advancing at a speed that even American executives privately acknowledge with respect. When the U.S. president asked him for recommendations on how to reindustrialize America, he replied that the first requirement is not money or technology but energy — without doubling America’s energy output, no amount of reshoring will succeed. AI factories, semiconductor fabs, and advanced manufacturing all require stable, abundant, and cheap electricity. China has it. The United States does not.
He also warned that the U.S. system, while superior in pure innovation and scientific breakthroughs, is deeply constrained by regulation, litigation, and slow infrastructure development. China, meanwhile, has government coordination, manufacturing speed, infrastructure readiness, and cultural enthusiasm. As a result, the remaining AI gap between China and the United States is now as small as six months — and shrinking.
Behind these observations lies a broader truth: China is building the full AI stack. Energy, infrastructure, semiconductors, compute clusters, models, applications, and societal adoption. Every layer reinforces the others. The United States excels in some layers, particularly research and frontier architecture design, but lags in foundational layers like energy, manufacturing, and large-scale deployment. Without rebuilding the bottom of the stack, America cannot maintain leadership at the top of the stack.
Yet he was not pessimistic about America. He emphasized that the United States is a nation of extraordinary people, extraordinary innovators, extraordinary scientists, and extraordinary entrepreneurs. If the country decides to renew itself — doubling energy capacity, rebuilding industrial infrastructure, streamlining regulations, enabling faster construction, and fostering a cultural shift that welcomes AI rather than fears it — then the United States can still compete with China, perhaps even share global leadership. But without such a national transformation, the momentum is clearly with Beijing.
The verdict from within America’s own technology leadership is unmistakable. China is not catching up; China is accelerating past. It is building more, deploying more, training more, and opening more. It has the energy, the infrastructure, the manpower, the optimism, the manufacturing base, and the national will to dominate the AI century. If trends continue, then sooner rather than later, China will indeed be number one in the AI business — and the world will be shaped by the platforms it builds.

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America’s Iran Strategy in Disarray

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The United States’ confrontation with Iran has entered a dangerous and increasingly incoherent phase as after months of military action, diplomacy, renewed bombing and contradictory declarations from Washington, the central question remains unanswered: What, precisely, does the United States seek to achieve?
President Donald Trump had already warned that Iran would be hit hard. Yet, almost in the same breath, he indicated that he did not expect the wider war to restart, that any further action would end quickly and that negotiations involving Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner could continue.
These are not merely variations in tone. They represent fundamentally different strategic paths: renewed diplomacy, limited punitive strikes, prolonged coercion, comprehensive military defeat or regime change.
A great power can keep its adversary guessing as a deliberate tactic. But unpredictability becomes dangerous when allies, markets, military commanders, diplomats and citizens cannot determine whether the ambiguity is calculated or whether policy itself is being improvised from one crisis to the next.
The original justification for military action centered on the assertion that Iran was approaching nuclear weapons capability and posed an urgent threat to Israel and the United States. However, Vice President J.D. Vance later suggested that Iran remained far from developing an immediate nuclear threat. Such a statement inevitably weakens the urgency that was invoked to justify the war. If the threat was not imminent, why was a large-scale attack necessary? If it was imminent, why has the conflict now narrowed primarily to tankers, tolls and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz?
The war’s declared goals have repeatedly shifted. Preventing nuclear weaponization was followed by demands to destroy missile and drone infrastructure. The contradiction became especially visible in Washington’s position on transit charges. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated unequivocally that no country may impose tolls or fees on an international waterway.
President Trump later announced that the United States, acting as the “Guardian of the Hormuz Strait,” would charge a fee equal to 20 percent of the value of cargo moving through the waterway as compensation for American protection. He subsequently reversed that proposal and said Gulf states would instead provide trade and investment commitments to the United States.
The Memorandum of Understanding was supposed to create a pathway back from war. Iran claimed that Washington had breached the agreement through renewed sanctions, attacks in southern Iran and continued support for Israeli military action.
American officials accused Tehran of attacking commercial shipping and violating the spirit of the ceasefire. Rather than serving as a bridge toward a comprehensive settlement, the MOU became another contested document interpreted differently by each side.
The crisis also exposed major differences between Washington and Israel. Vice President Vance accused elements within the Israeli government of attempting to manipulate American public opinion and derail U.S.-Iran diplomacy. He argued that a well-funded influence campaign was designed to keep the war going and shift U.S. policy away from negotiation.
His remarks were extraordinary. Disagreements between American and Israeli governments are not unprecedented, but a sitting vice president publicly alleging that figures within an allied government were attempting to manipulate U.S. political judgment marked a profound rupture. Vance went even further by suggesting that, without Israeli influence, the United States might not have entered the conflict in the same manner.
This raises a question that can no longer be avoided: Is American policy toward Iran being determined primarily by the independent national interests of the United States, or is it being shaped by Israel’s separate strategic objective of permanently weakening Iran?
Israel may consider a fragmented, militarily devastated and politically unstable Iran advantageous because it would remove its strongest regional rival. But such an outcome would impose enormous costs on the United States, Europe and the wider Middle East. Iran is not a small or institutionally hollow state. It has nearly 95 million people, a substantial industrial base, deep historical institutions, strategic geography and a complex society.
Destroying Iran without a credible plan for what follows could produce state fragmentation, insurgency, terrorism, economic collapse, refugee flows and prolonged regional warfare. The consequences would not remain confined to Israel’s immediate security environment. They would affect global energy supplies, European migration, shipping insurance, American military deployments and international markets.
Trump himself now appears trapped between escalation and restraint. Weeks of American and Israeli attacks failed to force Iran into unconditional surrender. The economic reality limits Washington’s freedom of action. A prolonged conflict in the Strait of Hormuz could raise fuel, transportation, manufacturing and food costs across the United States. Trump must therefore reconcile his promise to demonstrate military strength with his domestic political need to avoid another inflationary shock before congressional elections.
The war has never commanded overwhelming public support. Influential conservative voices, including Tucker Carlson and Megyn Kelly, have argued that Trump was manipulated into pursuing Israel’s war. Meanwhile, hawkish conservatives attacked the MOU for conceding too much to Iran and questioned why the conflict had been fought if Washington was ultimately prepared to compromise.
Trump is thus pressured from both directions. Restraint invites criticism from hawks who demand Iran’s defeat. Escalation risks alienating anti-war elements of his political base, increasing oil prices and dragging the country into another open-ended Middle Eastern conflict.
Congress is reflecting this transformation. In July 2026, 103 House Democrats voted to remove approximately $3.3 billion in military assistance to Israel from a spending measure. The amendment failed because almost every Republican and a substantial number of Democrats voted to retain the aid. Nevertheless, it was the first time in modern memory that a majority of House Democrats voting on such an amendment supported eliminating Israel’s military funding.
At the same time, Section 219 of the National Defense Authorization Act, which seeks deeper U.S.-Israel integration in artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, biotechnology, data fusion and defense networks, has generated concerns that Israel could gain excessive access to sensitive American technology and greater influence over U.S. defense policy.
The absence of coherence is now evident across the American leadership. Trump alternates between threats, negotiations, economic demands and talk of decisive victory. Rubio invokes international law against Iranian tolls while serving an administration that briefly proposed its own 20 percent maritime charge. Vance supports diplomacy and publicly accuses Israeli figures of undermining American policy. Congress is divided over aid, technology sharing and the legality of military action.
These are not minor messaging differences. They suggest that competing power centers are pursuing different diagnoses of the conflict, different priorities and different endgames.
The latest reported pause in attacks, following diplomatic intervention involving Pakistan and Field Marshal Asim Munir, may offer another opportunity to return to negotiations. But another temporary pause will not be enough. The United States needs a comprehensive strategy with clearly stated objectives, enforceable obligations, a realistic exit mechanism and a distinction between American and Israeli national interests.
The writing is now on the wall. American society is increasingly skeptical of wars without clear objectives, aid without accountability and alliances that appear to constrain independent policy. Unless Washington restores coherence, the Iran conflict will deepen public distrust, unsettle markets, weaken diplomatic credibility and create lasting psychological and economic costs at home.

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Is Israel the Biggest Threat to the US?

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : For decades, the United States has viewed Israel as its most trusted ally in the Middle East—a beacon of democracy, a strategic bulwark, and a partner in shared values. Yet a growing body of evidence suggests this relationship has evolved into something far more complicated, raising an uncomfortable question: could Israel actually be the biggest threat to American security and sovereignty?

When we examine cyber capabilities, espionage activities, influence operations, and legislative maneuvers, Israel emerges as a uniquely dangerous actor—one whose authorized access to American systems makes it more capable of doing harm than any traditional adversary.

Israel’s cyber warfare capabilities are widely considered among the most sophisticated in the world, with the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency rating its espionage threat against the US as “critical”—the highest designation available.

The country has demonstrated this prowess through operations like the mass pager explosions in Lebanon and the Stuxnet virus, but what makes Israel uniquely threatening is that these capabilities were largely built with American assistance, meaning they understand US systems from the inside out.

This insider knowledge, combined with their own innovations, arguably gives them an asymmetric advantage over other adversaries like China or Russia, who lack the same level of authorized access to American military and intelligence infrastructure.

The espionage is not hypothetical—Israel has been caught numerous times planting spyware on the phones of American Iran negotiators, attempting to place listening devices inside US Secret Service vehicles, and running the infamous Jonathan Pollard spy ring.

These incidents represent a pattern of behavior inconsistent with an ally relationship and more characteristic of an adversarial power operating against American interests. While China and Russia certainly conduct espionage against the US, neither has the same level of institutionalized access to American systems, making Israel’s intelligence-gathering capabilities uniquely dangerous and harder to detect.

Perhaps the most alarming development is the revelation that the Israeli government engaged Brad Parscale, Donald Trump’s former campaign manager, to run a multimillion-dollar digital influence campaign targeting American conservatives to prevent them from turning against Israel.

The operation escalated to the point where Vice President JD Vance publicly accused elements within the Israeli government of funding a campaign “to try to derail the negotiation” of a US-Iran deal and attacking him personally to shift American foreign policy in Israel’s favor.

When a sitting US Vice President must publicly call out a foreign government for attempting to undermine American foreign policy, the relationship has moved beyond normal ally dynamics into dangerous territory.

The legislative threat is even more concrete—Section 219 of the NDAA would have effectively merged the US and Israeli military industrial bases, allowing joint weapons development and granting Israel co-ownership of American weapons systems.

While the Senate blocked this proposal by a narrow 50-46 vote, the fact that nearly half of US senators supported such an unprecedented surrender of sovereignty demonstrates the depth of Israeli influence within the American legislative branch.

Prime Minister Netanyahu framed this as moving “from aid to partnership,” but critics like Representative Thomas Massie called it an “unprecedented escalation of foreign involvement” that amounts to “fully capitulating our nation’s autonomy to foreign influence.”

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee functions as a powerful lobbying force that has effectively shaped US foreign policy to serve Israeli interests, sometimes against American interests, with documented “revolving-door” relationships between AIPAC, the US government, and the Israeli government.

Unlike other countries seeking to influence US policy, Israel has legal and institutionalized access through these organizations, giving it a level of domestic influence that no other foreign power can match. This access extends beyond lobbying to actual legislative drafting, with critics charging that Netanyahu runs Congress through the legislation he writes and sends to American lawmakers.

The current crisis is exacerbated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s personal legal troubles—facing corruption charges that would likely end his political career, he has been described as taking aggressive actions to secure Israel’s position while simultaneously fighting for his political survival.

This introduces an unstable element into US-Israel relations: a foreign leader willing to manipulate American politics and policy to serve his personal legal and political interests, with critics arguing his aggressive policies are driven more by self-preservation than Israeli national security. The combination of capability, access, influence, and personal motivation makes Israel a uniquely dangerous actor in the American political landscape.

To determine if Israel is truly the biggest threat, we must compare it to other adversaries—China remains America’s primary strategic competitor with global ambitions to displace US dominance, while Russia poses an immediate military threat through its war in Ukraine and proven willingness to interfere in American elections.

However, neither China nor Russia has the same level of authorized access to US military technology, intelligence systems, and governmental processes that Israel enjoys, nor do they have domestic lobbying networks as powerful as AIPAC operating on their behalf. The old adage “trust, but verify” does not apply when you have literally integrated your defense systems with a foreign power.

If “biggest threat” means greatest military potential or most expansive geopolitical ambitions, China retains that title, but if “biggest threat” means greatest capability to harm the United States from within through espionage, influence operations, and legislative capture, then Israel is at minimum among the top tier and arguably the most dangerous.

The distinction between “biggest” and “most unique” is crucial—Israel presents a threat unlike any other because it comes from an “ally” where the US has let its guard down, making it more capable of doing damage than any traditional adversary precisely because of the trust extended to it.

The Defense Department’s own intelligence assessments placing Israel’s espionage threat above even China and Russia confirm that this is not mere conspiracy theory but a genuine intelligence concern. If we compare any other country with influence in the United States, no nation can be more dangerous than Israel itself should the relationship turn adversarial.

This is not to say that Israel is currently an enemy or that the alliance should be abandoned, but rather that the current trajectory of ever-deepening integration without appropriate safeguards is dangerously naive and threatens American sovereignty in unprecedented ways.

The central question for US policymakers is whether the current path of military integration, intelligence sharing, and legislative deference serves the American people or a foreign power with its own distinct interests.

When a foreign government can fund social media campaigns to shape American public opinion, draft legislation for US lawmakers, and threaten to derail American foreign policy when it doesn’t align with its interests, the alliance has fundamentally shifted from partnership to something resembling dependency. America’s founders warned against entangling alliances that could compromise sovereignty—their wisdom deserves renewed attention in this context.

Ultimately, whether Israel is the “biggest” threat depends on whether we define threat as “potential for conflict” or “capacity for harm from within.” In the latter category, Israel may well be the single greatest danger to American sovereignty and security—hidden in plain sight, protected by the very alliance that makes it so dangerous, and operating with capabilities that no other nation can match.

The time for honest conversation about this relationship is now, before the integration becomes so complete that disentanglement becomes impossible.

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The Missing Guarantor in U.S.-Iran Diplomacy

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : President Donald Trump has consistently portrayed himself as a man of faith who draws guidance from Christian values and surrounds himself with pastors, priests, and religious leaders. Christianity teaches honesty, compassion, humility, forgiveness, keeping one’s promises, protecting the innocent, respecting one’s neighbors, and seeking peace before conflict. These ideals also reflect many of the civic virtues that Americans deeply value—integrity, fairness, accountability, respect for the law, and honoring one’s commitments.
America’s global influence has never rested solely on its unmatched military or economic power. Equally important has been its reputation that its word carries weight. Allies have cooperated with Washington because they generally believed that American commitments would endure beyond immediate political circumstances. That credibility has often proven more valuable than military strength itself.
It is against this backdrop that President Trump’s foreign policy approach since returning to office in January 2025. His strategic unpredictability is designed to maximize leverage. His frequent policy reversals, shifting deadlines, changing public positions, and abrupt diplomatic turns have created uncertainty among allies, mediators, financial markets, and adversaries alike.
The recent diplomatic efforts involving the United States and Iran illustrate this concern. Multiple rounds of diplomacy took place over many months with the assistance of regional mediators. Discussions began in Egypt, later continued through negotiations in Pakistan and Geneva, and culminated in a Memorandum of Understanding brokered with the assistance of countries including Pakistan, Qatar, Oman, Egypt, and Türkiye.
There is a recurring pattern. Negotiations would begin with optimism. Temporary understandings would be announced. Deadlines would be established. New demands, military developments, sanctions, or conflicting public statements would follow. Each cycle reduced confidence that diplomatic commitments would survive until implementation. The perception itself matters enormously in diplomacy. Once confidence is weakened, every subsequent negotiation becomes significantly more difficult.
This raises a deeper structural weakness in modern international mediation. Mediation succeeds only when agreements can realistically be implemented and monitored. Yet many of today’s mediators possess diplomatic goodwill but very limited leverage over the parties they seek to reconcile.
Pakistan, Qatar, Oman, Egypt, and Türkiye have each invested considerable diplomatic capital in attempting to reduce tensions and facilitate dialogue. Their role deserves recognition. However, none possesses sufficient political, economic, or military leverage to compel either Washington or Tehran to comply with an agreement if either side ultimately decides otherwise. Their influence depends almost entirely upon persuasion and goodwill rather than enforceable authority.
This reveals perhaps the greatest weakness of such agreements. When the guarantors are less powerful than the parties themselves, enforcement becomes largely voluntary. If one party concludes that strategic circumstances have changed, there is often no effective international mechanism capable of ensuring compliance or imposing meaningful consequences.
The imbalance becomes even more pronounced when one party is the world’s most powerful nation. The United States possesses unmatched economic influence, military capability, financial reach, and diplomatic weight. No mediator can realistically compel Washington to implement an agreement against its own policy choices. Likewise, Iran cannot be expected to rely solely on assurances if it believes commitments may change unexpectedly.
Consequently, the durability of any agreement depends less upon external enforcement than upon the willingness of the parties—especially the more powerful one—to demonstrate consistency, restraint, and respect for the commitments they voluntarily undertake.
History offers many examples in which successive U.S. administrations have withdrawn from, revised, or renegotiated international agreements negotiated by previous administrations. These frequent reversals have weakened confidence among allies and negotiating partners, who may begin questioning whether any agreement will remain durable beyond the next political transition. This is not merely a legal issue. It is fundamentally a question of credibility.
Markets understand this reality immediately. Every presidential statement concerning sanctions, military deployments, shipping routes, tariffs, or energy policy affects oil prices, insurance costs, shipping rates, exchange markets, and stock exchanges worldwide. Investors dislike uncertainty more than almost anything else. When official messaging changes frequently, volatility naturally increases.
The Strait of Hormuz demonstrates this dynamic vividly. Even conflicting public statements regarding freedom of navigation, proposed shipping arrangements, economic measures, or maritime security can produce significant movements in global energy markets within hours. In today’s interconnected economy, presidential rhetoric alone can affect the daily lives of billions of people through higher transportation costs, inflation, and energy prices.
This tactical uncertainty may produce short-term bargaining advantages while gradually eroding the strategic trust that underpins alliances, diplomacy, and long-term American leadership. If partners become uncertain whether today’s commitments will remain valid tomorrow, they may increasingly seek alternative security arrangements or reduce their reliance on Washington.
For a superpower, leadership requires more than overwhelming strength. It also requires steadiness. The strongest nation should ideally demonstrate confidence rather than impulsiveness, consistency rather than contradiction, and principled leadership rather than purely transactional calculations.
The United States remains uniquely positioned to shape the international order. That position carries extraordinary responsibility. Because American decisions influence virtually every region of the world, they inevitably affect not only governments but also ordinary families whose livelihoods depend upon stable energy markets, predictable trade, secure shipping, and peaceful diplomacy.
Ultimately, America’s greatest asset is neither its aircraft carriers nor its financial markets. It is the confidence others place in its word. Military power can compel compliance. Economic power can impose costs. But only credibility inspires lasting partnerships and voluntary cooperation.
If the United States consistently demonstrates that it honors its commitments, respects international law, protects humanitarian principles, and approaches diplomacy with patience and predictability, its leadership will continue to command respect across the globe. If, however, unpredictability becomes its defining characteristic, countries may continue to cooperate out of necessity while gradually losing confidence in American leadership.
History suggests that fear can produce obedience, but only trust produces enduring influence. For a nation that has long presented itself as the leader of the free world, preserving that trust may prove to be its greatest strategic challenge in the years ahead.

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