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Pakistan’s Choices as Iran Faces a New Encirclement

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Pakistan steered its ship with admirable composure during the “twelve-day war,” which began with Israel–U.S. strikes on Iranian military and nuclear-linked targets in mid-June 2025 and escalated into sustained exchanges that lasted nearly two weeks, ending with a ceasefire around June 24. What made those twelve days unforgettable was not only the intensity, but the symbolism: Iran’s missile and drone barrages repeatedly penetrated Israeli airspace, challenging the psychological aura surrounding Israel’s multi-layered defense architecture—systems such as Iron Dome and David’s Sling that the world had come to view as near-absolute protection.
During that first phase, Tehran discovered that many relationships celebrated in peacetime become conditional in wartime. India—despite years of strategic engagement with Iran and the economic logic of connectivity projects designed to reach Central Asia—did not step forward in a manner Tehran expected. For Iranian observers, this was not merely silence; it felt like calculated distance, shaped by India’s wider strategic alignments and its concern that any global momentum toward a Palestinian two-state framework could echo into renewed international scrutiny of Kashmir. The war thus exposed not only military fault lines, but diplomatic ones, revealing how quickly geopolitics can reorder loyalties when the costs of association rise.
Pakistan, in that first phase, stood out as a notable exception. Islamabad’s political and diplomatic signaling leaned toward defending Iran’s sovereignty and opposing external aggression, a posture framed by regional media as meaningful support and a source of goodwill. Pakistan appeared willing to risk diplomatic discomfort to stand with a neighbor under direct attack, reinforcing a narrative of fraternal ties rooted in geography, culture, and shared historical memory. That moment, however, belonged to a specific kind of conflict—short, explosive, and bounded by the logic of rapid escalation and de-escalation.
The second phase is of a different character altogether. On January 23, 2026, President Donald Trump publicly confirmed that a U.S. armada was moving toward the Middle East, with major naval assets shifting into the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean as Washington framed the deployment around Iran’s internal unrest and the regime’s response to protests. This was not the sudden blaze of a twelve-day exchange; it was the slow, visible architecture of pressure—presence, signaling, and endurance.
In this new moment, Pakistan’s dilemma sharpens. The cost of being misunderstood becomes higher, the penalties of miscalculation more enduring. Islamabad must now decide how to protect its neighborhood, its economy, and its strategic credibility without turning itself into a battlefield, a base, or a bargaining chip in a contest far larger than any single state.
This complexity is deepened by Pakistan’s Middle East relationships. Beyond Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s economic and financial space has long been underpinned by Gulf cooperation through investment flows, energy arrangements, and vast remittance networks tied to Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Yet this support exists within a regional context where many Gulf states view Iran not only as a strategic competitor but also as a religious and political rival, accusing Tehran of deepening sectarian divides and projecting influence through proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Palestine. In this environment, overt Pakistani alignment with Iran would be more likely to unsettle Gulf capitals than reassure them, potentially narrowing Pakistan’s economic and diplomatic room for maneuver.
Against this backdrop, Pakistan’s first choice is open support for Iran—diplomatic, material, and, if forced by circumstances, kinetic. The appeal lies in moral clarity and neighborhood logic. Iran is a neighbor whose stability directly affects Pakistan’s western frontier, border security, and internal cohesion. Open support would reassure Tehran that it is not alone again, strengthening long-term trust and potentially discouraging any future strategic drift that could expose Pakistan’s flank. The cost, however, is immediate and tangible. Visible alignment against Washington risks economic retaliation, pressure through international financial channels, and political isolation in forums where U.S. influence remains decisive, while also unsettling Gulf partners who see Iran through a lens of rivalry rather than fraternity.
The second choice is alignment with the United States and Israel—offering cooperation that could include intelligence sharing, logistical facilitation, or strategic access. This path promises short-term diplomatic favor and potential financial relief, but it is the most combustible domestically and regionally. It would inflame public sentiment, sharpen sectarian and political tensions, and almost certainly provoke Iranian hostility in ways that could destabilize Pakistan’s western borderlands. The strategic blowback could be generational, recasting Pakistan’s image across the Muslim world and entangling it in a conflict whose objectives and endgame are not of its own making.
The third choice is declared neutrality. Pakistan would step back, deny its soil and airspace for conflict, and consistently call for de-escalation. The advantage is immediate insulation. Neutrality reduces the risk of becoming a direct target and preserves working channels with all parties. Yet neutrality in a pressure campaign can become a quiet punishment. Iran may still feel abandoned and revise its trust calculus. Washington may interpret restraint as passive resistance and still apply economic pressure. India could frame Pakistan as irrelevant or opportunistic while consolidating its own partnerships. Neutrality can be a shield, but it can also become an empty space others fill with their own narratives.
The fourth choice is calibrated dual-track strategy. Pakistan avoids loud, provocative rhetoric that triggers U.S. retaliation while quietly extending the maximum permissible support to Iran behind the curtain of diplomacy. This is survival statecraft in a world where economies can be choked without a single missile launched. The advantage is strategic breathing room: Pakistan preserves its financial and diplomatic channels while preventing Iran from feeling strategically orphaned. The risk is fragility. If exposed, secrecy can produce the worst of both worlds—U.S. anger without the protection of honesty and Iranian disappointment if the help appears too cautious or insufficient.
The fifth choice is multilateral internationalization—pushing the crisis into formal global forums such as the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and ad hoc contact groups involving China, Russia, Turkey, and key European states. Instead of positioning itself as a bilateral actor between Tehran and Washington, Pakistan frames itself as a convener and agenda-setter, shifting the burden of mediation, legitimacy, and pressure onto a wider coalition. The advantage is dilution of risk. Decisions and outcomes no longer rest on Pakistan’s shoulders alone, and the crisis is embedded in a global framework that makes unilateral escalation politically costlier. The downside is loss of speed and influence. Multilateral processes are slow, consensus-driven, and often shaped by great-power rivalries that can stall momentum at the very moments when urgency is greatest.
These five paths do not exist in isolation; they overlap, collide, and constrain one another. Pakistan cannot fully embrace one without partially touching the others. Open support for Iran strains Gulf and Western ties. Alignment with Washington risks regional backlash. Neutrality invites suspicion from all sides. Dual-track strategy demands discipline and secrecy. Multilateralization trades immediacy for legitimacy. The art of statecraft lies not in choosing a single lane, but in sequencing these options in a way that preserves room to maneuver as circumstances evolve.
The most sustainable course for Pakistan lies in a disciplined blend of the fourth and fifth choices, anchored by the language of the third. Declared neutrality in public posture provides a shield against direct retaliation. Active, quiet stabilization with Iran preserves neighborly trust and reduces the risk of border spillover, refugee flows, and proxy escalation. Multilateral engagement internationalizes the crisis, embedding it in legal and diplomatic frameworks that slow the march toward unilateral coercion. At the same time, Pakistan must maintain cordial, pragmatic, and economically constructive relations with Washington, carefully calibrating its actions and rhetoric to avoid triggering sanctions or financial pressures that could further strain an already fragile economic landscape.
The twelve-day war proved that old myths can break and that “friends” can vanish when bombs fall. The January 23 mobilization proves something else: pressure campaigns are built to last, and nations survive them through balance, not bravado. Pakistan’s victory will not be found in loud slogans or reckless entanglement. It will be measured in its ability to protect its economy, preserve its Gulf lifelines, prevent western-border chaos, stand close enough to Iran to preserve brotherhood, far enough from provocation to deny adversaries a pretext for retaliation, and engaged enough with the world to ensure that when the region’s future is negotiated, Pakistan is not merely present, but heard.

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New Chapter for Dragon Boating in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial associations officially set up with sights locked on national competitions and international representation.

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Dragon Boat Associations Established in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
PSHAWAR/LAHORE: Dragon boat associations have been established in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, marking a step towards organising and promoting the sport across Pakistan.
Prominent political and social figure Ameer Bahadur Khan Hoti will serve as president of the Punjab Dragon Boat Association (PDBA), while a notification has been issued confirming the election of former bureaucrat Javed Marwat as president of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Dragon Boat Association (KPDBA). At a meeting in Lahore, prominent sports journalist Muhammad Yousuf was elected secretary general of the Punjab association. Uzma Zaidi will serve as senior vice president and Naveed Akhtar Malik as treasurer.
At a separate meeting in Peshawar, Javed Marwat, who previously held several senior administrative positions in the province, was unanimously elected president of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa association, while renowned sports organiser Naeem Gul was elected secretary general. Shamim Akhtar Jadoon will serve as senior vice president, Junaid Khan vice president and Bilal Aslam as treasurer. Newly elected Punjab association president Ameer Bahadur Khan Hoti said Pakistan’s first dragon boat festival and competitions on the Kabul River had opened new avenues for the sport’s development. He said the enthusiasm shown by participants and the sport’s promising prospects had highlighted the need to establish a Pakistan Dragon Boat Federation to coordinate training, organise competitions and support athletes. Dragon boat associations would be established in all four provinces and the federal capital, Islamabad, before the formal announcement of the national federation, he added.
Newly elected Khyber Pakhtunkhwa association president Javed Marwat said efforts would focus on introducing the sport at the provincial level and providing athletes with opportunities to compete nationally and demonstrate their abilities. Teams would also be sent to represent Pakistan in international competitions. He said the sport would help strengthen people-to-people exchanges and further promote Pakistan-China friendship. Marwat expressed confidence that dragon boat racing would soon gain popularity throughout Pakistan.

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Pakistan’s Yemen Dilemma

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Pakistan’s military commitment to Saudi Arabia raises a question that cannot be answered simply by identifying where its soldiers are stationed. Modern warfare allows forces to attack through aircraft, missiles, drones and targeting support without sending infantry across a border. The decisive issue is whether Pakistani personnel and capabilities will participate in hostilities against Yemen’s Houthis—and what consequences could follow.
Scott Ritter, renowned American podcaster, military and geopolitical analyst captures the central danger: Saudi Arabia could obtain through collective defence the Pakistani involvement in Yemen that Islamabad previously resisted. An initially limited commitment could expand through casualties, retaliation and demands for reinforcement, leaving Pakistan responsible for a war whose objectives it does not control.
CNN reported on October 7 that Pakistani troops were already stationed in Saudi Arabia. In the interview, Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, director general of Inter-Services Public Relations, declined to disclose their numbers or capabilities. Asked about operations across the Yemeni border, he invoked military confidentiality, explaining that participating countries do not publicly disclose how and where they will employ their forces. His response offered no categorical exclusion of ground operations or offensive action inside Yemen, even as he described Pakistani involvement as defensive.
That distinction matters. Operational secrecy may protect military personnel, but it also leaves the public without clear answers about the mission’s boundaries. The description “defensive” cannot establish those boundaries by itself. Governments routinely invoke defence to justify attacks beyond their territory; the relevant questions concern what forces actually do, whom they target and under whose authority.
Pakistani forces operating from Saudi territory could potentially support or conduct attacks inside Yemen without deploying infantry there. Air operations and targeting assistance could carry substantial consequences. If Pakistani personnel participate in attacks against Houthi positions, Ansarullah could regard Pakistan as belligerent. Tehran could interpret the same activity as participation in a campaign against Iranian regional interests.
The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye on August 7, 2026, reportedly treats an attack against one member as an attack against all three. Its deterrent promise is substantial, but so is the danger of importing one member’s confrontation into the security calculations of the others.
An October 5 statement published by Türkiye’s Foreign Ministry committed the partners to implement collective defence arrangements and rapidly deploy agreed military forces and capabilities to Saudi Arabia, subject to national legislation. Türkiye therefore shares the deployment commitment. However, the evidence reviewed does not establish a Turkish ground combat commitment against the Houthis or an equal distribution of operational risks.
For Islamabad, the unanswered questions are fundamental. Who authorizes Pakistani involvement in cross-border attacks? Can Pakistan refuse a particular operation? Who finances a prolonged deployment, and what conditions permit withdrawal? Confidential operational details need not be published to explain the political mandate governing the use of force.
Pakistan brings potential strengths to the alliance: experienced personnel, established military institutions and longstanding cooperation with Riyadh. Saudi infrastructure and financing could support a substantial deployment. Islamabad’s relationships with both Riyadh and Tehran might also create diplomatic opportunities, provided military involvement does not undermine its credibility as an intermediary.
Yet those strengths do not resolve the weaknesses of an extended campaign. Destroying particular weapons or positions is different from ending an adversary’s ability and determination to fight. Dispersed forces, local networks and adaptation can frustrate superior firepower. Tactical gains could therefore coexist with an expanding mission and an elusive political settlement.
Ritter’s warning is strongest when understood in these terms. Predicting inevitable Pakistani defeat is less useful than asking what victory would require. Protecting defined facilities offers measurable objectives. Permanently eliminating the Houthi threat could entail commitments far beyond what Pakistan initially intended—and costs that additional military capability cannot necessarily overcome.
Saudi financial assistance complicates Islamabad’s freedom of choice. The State Bank of Pakistan confirmed that a $3 billion Saudi deposit maturing in December 2025 was extended for another year. Such support gives Pakistan a substantial interest in maintaining Saudi confidence.
Saudi’s financial influence does not require an explicit threat. A government facing external financing pressures may find it difficult to reject security requests from an important creditor. The danger is that short-term economic reassurance encourages military obligations carrying much greater long-term costs.
Iran introduces a further risk. Pakistani attacks against an Iranian-supported movement could damage relations with a neighbouring country and generate security pressures closer to home. The Houthis also possess their own Yemeni objectives, and attacking them is not automatically equivalent to attacking Iran. Political escalation, however, can advance through perceptions and retaliation before governments agree on legal distinctions.
International law offers no reliable assurance that this confrontation would remain contained. Legal obligations persist, but their enforcement is uneven, and states may invoke self-defence while pursuing military objectives beyond their borders. Pakistan therefore cannot assume that legal distinctions between defending Saudi territory and attacking Houthi positions would restrain retaliation. If Tehran perceives Pakistani operations as threatening its interests, the danger would turn on strategic calculations, perceived threats and the risk of escalation—not simply on competing interpretations of the UN Charter. Shared religion and geographical proximity would offer no dependable protection against that outcome.
Pakistan’s domestic divisions make a widening conflict especially consequential. The supporters of imprisoned former prime minister Imran Khan began marching from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa toward Islamabad on October 4, demanding his release, hospital treatment and family access. An overseas campaign would impose additional demands on resources and political legitimacy amid an already polarized environment.
Parliament’s April 2015 resolution remains relevant. It supported neutrality in Yemen alongside solidarity against threats to Saudi territorial integrity and the holy sites, while urging diplomacy through the United Nations and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. That distinction deserves renewed parliamentary examination before military commitments overtake political debate.
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye should pursue an emergency OIC initiative linked to UN diplomacy, involving Iran and meaningful Yemeni participation. Reciprocal de-escalation, civilian protection and humanitarian access should take priority. Their collective influence should also sustain action for Palestinian rights rather than dissipate through another prolonged regional confrontation.
The Makkah Pact’s credibility will depend on whether it improves security. Secrecy about military methods cannot replace clarity about political objectives. Before Pakistan’s commitment deepens, its leaders must explain what they are defending, how far that obligation extends and how they intend to prevent it from becoming an open-ended war.

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Pakistan Reaffirms Commitment to Multilateralism, Peace and International Cooperation at the Executive Board of UNESCO

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Paris ( Imran Y. CHOUDHRY):- Advisor to the Prime Minister of Pakistan and Representative of Pakistan to UNESCO, Syed Tauqeer Hussain Shah, delivered Pakistan’s national statement at the 225th Session of the UNESCO Executive Board in Paris, France, reaffirming its steadfast commitment to multilateralism, international cooperation and the promotion of peace through dialogue and mutual understanding.

In his statement,

  • Underscored Pakistan’s firm support for multilateral institutions, South-South cooperation and collaborative efforts to address global challenges, particularly those confronting developing countries;
  • Highlighted the urgent need to protect human life, educational institutions and cultural heritage amid conflicts and crisis, especially in Gaza;

-Called for an international action plan to confront the challenge of out-of-school children;

  • Stressed the importance of equitable access to scientific knowledge, international scientific collaboration and reducing technological inequalities;

-Underlined the need to combat racism, misogyny, Islamophobia, disinformation and hate speech, while encouraging responsible and ethical governance of artificial intelligence and emerging technologies; and

  • Expressed support for institutional reform of UNESCO to enhance its effectiveness and impact worldwide.

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