Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The decision to plunge the United States into a direct confrontation with Iran—taken at the urging and strategic direction of Israel—has triggered a chain of events that few in Washington appear to have fully anticipated. What was originally conceived as a swift military operation designed to cripple Iran’s capabilities and compel regime change has instead evolved into a widening regional conflict whose consequences are now rippling through military, political, and economic systems across the globe. Inside the United States, the mood has shifted from early confidence to growing anxiety as policymakers, military planners, and the public begin to reckon with the scale of the unfolding crisis.
From the earliest hours of the conflict, Iran responded with an intensity that surprised even seasoned defense analysts. Waves of drones and missiles targeted American and allied installations throughout the Middle East. Several facilities used by U.S. forces experienced direct hits or operational disruption, forcing commanders to reassess their logistics and operational posture across the region. While Washington maintains that the majority of its capabilities remain intact, the attacks have nevertheless exposed the vulnerability of a military architecture heavily dependent on forward bases and allied infrastructure.
These bases—spread across the Gulf and the broader Middle East—serve as the backbone of American air and naval power projection. They are critical for refueling aircraft, replenishing munitions, and maintaining sustained combat operations. Once they became targets, the operational calculus changed dramatically. Aircraft carriers, naval task groups, and combat aircraft that had been positioned for sustained operations suddenly faced logistical strain. War planners who assumed a short campaign now confront the reality of an adversary capable of prolonged resistance.
Compounding the strategic difficulty has been the hesitation of several allied countries to allow their territory or bases to be used as launch platforms for the campaign. Spain publicly declined to allow its bases to be used for offensive operations against Iran, while Britain clarified that it would not join offensive strikes and imposed restrictions on the use of its installations. Several Gulf states adopted a posture of neutrality, unwilling to risk retaliation by becoming direct participants in the conflict. Even allies who expressed rhetorical support have quietly avoided deeper involvement, reflecting their fear that the war could spread across the region.
This reluctance among partners has further constrained Washington’s options. Modern warfare, especially for expeditionary forces like those of the United States, depends not only on military power but also on the political willingness of allies to provide territory, logistics, and legitimacy. When that support becomes uncertain, the operational environment becomes far more complex.
Inside the United States itself, the political atmosphere is rapidly evolving. Members of Congress from both parties have begun questioning the strategic purpose of the war. Media commentators and policy analysts are asking what the ultimate objective is—whether it is regime change, deterrence, or simply punishment. Even the president’s own public statements have hinted at a reassessment. After initially projecting confidence in the military campaign, Donald Trump acknowledged in later remarks that Iran had signaled a willingness to talk and that diplomatic channels could be reopened.
This shift reflects a growing realization that the conflict may not be as controllable as originally assumed. Iran’s strategy appears to rely not on conventional military parity but on asymmetric endurance. Years of sanctions forced Tehran to accept that it could not compete with the United States in traditional air and naval warfare. Instead, it invested heavily in missile technology, drones, underground facilities, and decentralized command structures. Many of its most important missile centers are buried deep beneath mountains or fortified bunkers, rendering them extremely difficult to destroy even with advanced bunker-busting munitions.
As the war drags on, the economic consequences are beginning to reverberate far beyond the battlefield. One of the most dramatic developments has been Iran’s declaration that the Strait of Hormuz—the narrow maritime corridor through which a significant portion of the world’s oil supply passes—will be closed to commercial shipping except vessels carrying Chinese flags. Whether fully enforceable or not, the announcement alone has sent shockwaves through global energy markets.
Oil prices surged almost immediately. Markets reacted with alarm to the prospect that even partial disruption of shipping through Hormuz could remove millions of barrels of oil per day from global supply chains. The result has been a rapid rise in crude prices, which is already being felt at gasoline stations across the United States and Europe. Higher oil prices inevitably translate into higher transportation costs, and those costs cascade through the entire economy.
The economic logic is straightforward but devastating. When fuel becomes more expensive, the cost of transporting goods—from food to consumer products—increases. Airlines raise ticket prices, trucking companies pass on their fuel surcharges, and shipping costs climb. These increases ripple outward, affecting nearly every product and service used by ordinary citizens. Inflationary pressures intensify, eroding household purchasing power and deepening public frustration.
For political leaders, the consequences are immediate. Rising gasoline prices have historically been among the most sensitive indicators of public discontent in the United States. When voters see the cost of filling their cars jump dramatically, the issue quickly becomes political. Analysts already warn that if the conflict continues to disrupt oil markets, the economic backlash could undermine the administration’s domestic support and influence the outcome of upcoming midterm elections.
Beyond the economic sphere lies an even deeper concern: the potential for the conflict to ignite wider instability. Israel has already expanded its operations into neighboring theaters such as Lebanon, attempting to suppress rocket attacks from Hezbollah. Meanwhile, reports indicate that Kurdish opposition groups are being encouraged to challenge the Iranian government, raising the possibility of internal unrest inside Iran itself. Such strategies carry enormous risk. History has repeatedly shown that arming or empowering insurgent groups can produce unintended consequences, sometimes turning yesterday’s proxy into tomorrow’s adversary.
In the streets of American cities and towns, ordinary citizens are grappling with a mixture of fear and uncertainty. Many worry that a prolonged war could provoke retaliatory actions or terrorist incidents far from the Middle Eastern battlefield. Others question whether the United States had sufficient justification to launch the attack at a moment when diplomatic negotiations—mediated by Oman—were reportedly making progress toward a nuclear agreement.
According to diplomatic sources involved in those talks, Iran had indicated a willingness to dilute highly enriched uranium by mixing it with lower-grade material, effectively reducing its weapons potential while allowing continued civilian nuclear activity. Negotiators believed a framework agreement was within reach. If true, the abrupt shift from diplomacy to war has left many observers wondering whether a peaceful solution was abandoned prematurely.
The result is a conflict that now appears increasingly difficult to control. What began as a calculated show of force has become a contest of endurance between a global superpower and a regional state determined to resist. The United States still possesses overwhelming military superiority, yet military power alone cannot easily resolve the complex political and economic dynamics now unfolding.
For that reason, voices calling for diplomacy are growing louder. Even those who supported the initial strikes increasingly acknowledge that negotiations may be the only realistic path toward de-escalation. Wars often begin with confidence and resolve, but they end through dialogue and compromise.
At this critical juncture, the choice facing Washington is stark. Continuing down the path of escalation risks widening the conflict, destabilizing global markets, and entrenching hostility across the region. Reopening diplomatic channels, by contrast, offers at least the possibility of limiting the damage and preventing the war from spiraling into a broader catastrophe.
History may ultimately judge this moment not by the missiles fired or the targets destroyed, but by whether leaders possessed the wisdom to step back from the brink and rediscover the power of diplomacy before the costs became irreversible.

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : As tensions escalate between Iran and the joint forces of the United States and Israel, the most pressing question dominating strategic circles is deceptively simple: Who would win? Yet modern warfare—especially among technologically advanced and regionally entrenched powers—is no longer a matter of tanks crossing borders or flags planted on captured capitals. Victory today is layered, conditional, and defined by political objectives rather than territorial conquest alone. To assess the probability of winning, one must first define what “winning” actually means.
If victory is defined as regime survival and preservation of fighting capability, Iran’s probability of success appears stronger than many assume. Historically, external air campaigns have struggled to topple deeply entrenched governments without significant ground intervention. Iran’s geography alone presents a formidable challenge. Its mountainous terrain, expansive landmass, and dispersed military infrastructure complicate any attempt at rapid decisive victory. Much of its missile arsenal is believed to be stored in underground facilities designed precisely to withstand aerial bombardment. Even sustained precision strikes may degrade capabilities, but eliminating them entirely is another matter.
Moreover, Iran’s doctrine is built around resilience and asymmetric endurance. Rather than matching Western air superiority aircraft for aircraft, Tehran relies on ballistic missiles, drones, cyber operations, and proxy networks across the region. This model does not aim to dominate the skies; it aims to outlast and impose cost. If the objective of Washington and Tel Aviv were to collapse the Iranian state or compel unconditional surrender, the probability of achieving that quickly would remain relatively low without a major ground campaign—an option that carries enormous political and military risk. In that scenario, Iran’s likelihood of “winning” through survival could reasonably be considered moderate to high.
However, if victory is defined differently—say, as the ability to significantly degrade Iran’s military capacity and limit its ability to launch sustained retaliation—the balance shifts. The United States maintains overwhelming air superiority, advanced stealth platforms, satellite surveillance, cyber dominance, and long-range precision strike capabilities. Israel brings decades of experience in targeted operations, missile defense innovation, and real-time battlefield intelligence integration. Together, they possess unmatched technological coordination.
In the early phases of a high-intensity conflict, joint U.S.–Israeli forces would likely dominate the airspace, suppress air defenses, and strike high-value targets including command centers, missile storage sites, naval facilities, and communications infrastructure. Iran’s conventional air force is comparatively limited, and its air defense systems, while upgraded over the years, would struggle against advanced stealth bombers and electronic warfare. Under this definition of victory—crippling Iran’s infrastructure and reducing its capacity for sustained attacks—the coalition’s probability of success would be moderate to high.
Yet degrading capability is not synonymous with eliminating threat. Missile forces are mobile. Drones are inexpensive and produced in significant quantities. Even if command structures suffer damage, decentralized networks can continue operations. Thus, while U.S.–Israel forces could inflict substantial destruction, the probability of completely stopping Iranian retaliation remains uncertain. The difference between “damaging” and “neutralizing” is strategically profound.
Another potential definition of victory is economic and psychological leverage. Iran’s geographic position near the Strait of Hormuz gives it influence over one of the world’s most critical energy corridors. Even partial disruption of maritime traffic would elevate global oil prices, strain supply chains, and create political pressure in energy-importing nations. While Iran itself would suffer economically from prolonged instability, it could still leverage regional disruption as a strategic equalizer. If the objective becomes forcing negotiations by generating economic shock, Iran’s probability of achieving leverage increases.
On the other hand, prolonged conflict risks devastating Iran’s own infrastructure. Energy facilities, ports, and industrial assets could become targets, further weakening its economy. The United States, with a diversified economy and global alliances, is better positioned to absorb long-term financial strain. Israel, though geographically smaller, maintains advanced civil defense systems and missile interception layers that mitigate, though do not eliminate, the impact of incoming threats. Thus, in a war of economic attrition, neither side emerges unscathed, but the coalition likely retains greater structural resilience.
Regime change remains the most ambitious—and least probable—outcome. History offers cautionary examples of external interventions that underestimated the complexity of internal political dynamics. Airpower alone rarely achieves political transformation. Ground occupation in a country the size of Iran would require vast troop deployments and sustained logistical commitment, with unpredictable consequences. Under this scenario, the probability of rapid decisive regime collapse appears low. Iran’s political system, though internally contested, has demonstrated endurance under decades of sanctions and pressure.
Therefore, when evaluating probability, the answer depends on which strategic objective is prioritized. If the goal is to survive and maintain core sovereignty, Iran’s odds are comparatively stronger. If the goal is to inflict extensive military degradation and assert technological superiority, the U.S.–Israel coalition holds the advantage. If the goal is total capitulation or permanent elimination of threat, probabilities on both sides decline sharply, as modern warfare between capable states rarely produces absolute outcomes.
There is also the factor of escalation management. A broader regional spread involving additional actors could alter calculations dramatically. The longer a conflict persists, the more unpredictable it becomes. Domestic political pressures in all three countries would shape decision-making. Public tolerance for casualties, economic hardship, and prolonged instability could either harden resolve or accelerate diplomatic engagement.
Ultimately, the most realistic outcome in such a confrontation may not be traditional victory at all, but a negotiated pause after significant destruction. In modern high-intensity conflicts, wars often end not because one side is annihilated, but because costs outweigh objectives. The probability that both sides declare partial success—while privately recognizing the limits of military solutions—may be higher than outright triumph for either camp.
In strategic terms, Iran is more likely to “win” by surviving, absorbing damage, and continuing to function as a sovereign actor. The United States and Israel are more likely to “win” by demonstrating overwhelming tactical superiority and degrading Iran’s operational capabilities. Neither outcome represents total dominance. Both involve trade-offs.
War among technologically advanced powers with asymmetric tools is less about decisive victory and more about shaping post-conflict narratives. Survival can be framed as victory. Deterrence can be framed as success. Destruction of infrastructure can be presented as strategic achievement. Yet beneath these narratives lies a sobering truth: in such conflicts, the probability of absolute victory for any side remains limited.
The real question, then, may not be who would win—but at what cost, and for how long.

For two days now, Dubai residents have mainly stayed indoors as their city is hit by missiles and drones – part of an attack launched by Iran across the region in response to the latest massive and ongoing attack against it by US and Israel.

Luxury hotels and its main airport – one of the busiest in the world by passenger traffic – were damaged.

The BBC has spoken to people who live in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as well as those on holiday, who describe situations far from the usual flow of daily life.

Resident Becky Williams said she saw about 15 missiles “launched from behind my house yesterday”, referring to missiles fired by UAE authorities to intercept incoming Iranian projectiles. “You can hear the interceptions happening in the air.”

But she added that she and her family were remaining calm and trusted the UAE military to defend its airspace, saying she believed it would “all blow over soon”.

Iran’s attacks in retaliation for the US-Israeli strikes continued into Sunday.

On the Palm Jumeirah, Dubai’s luxury man-made archipelago, the five-star Fairmont The Palm hotel was struck by a large explosion.

Debris from an intercepted drone resulted in a “minor fire” on the outer facade of the five-star Burj Al Arab hotel, authorities have said.

Another Dubai resident told the BBC: “What we’ve lived through over the past 24 hours is a fraction of what others have been living through in areas of conflict so it puts things in perspective.”

Meanwhile, Satya Jaganathan’s weekend plans for a hike on Sunday were foiled by the events.

“And here we are, sheltering in place,” she said.

The 35-year-old said her sister’s family and pets had to seek shelter in their apartment because they lived close to the Jebel Ali port, where there was “a lot of debris falling”.

On Saturday, officials said debris from an “aerial interception” caused a fire in a berth at the port, which is the world’s ninth busiest.

“It’s still relatively calm as there are only loud noises every few hours, but it is eerie because this is not the Dubai we are used to,” Jaganathan explained.

Dubai International Airport was also damaged in what authorities have called an “incident”.

Thousands of flights have been grounded to and from the Middle East, in one of the most serious disruptions to global travel since the Covid-19 pandemic.

Judy Trotter was supposed to return to London from her holiday on Saturday, but was told all flights were cancelled when she arrived at the airport.

“I’ve met people who were very upset about their travel plans, there were thousands of people in the airport, I met people who told me they were missing funerals,” she said.

She added a lot of passengers “were in transit, just passing through” and are now stuck.

Trotter was one of around 1,000 stranded passengers sent to stay at a hotel, where they were warned to stay away from the windows.

“There is a lot of glass in the hotel which is worrying,” she said, adding, they have heard “several missiles throughout the day”.

Another British holidaymaker – Kate Fischer from Buckinghamshire – said she and her family are “very frightened.”

On Saturday evening, she and her partner packed “a grab bag” as the children slept, she said, adding that she “doused bathrobes and towels” in water in case they needed to “escape during the night in fire conditions”.

Sunday, she said, was a strange day.

“It’s a very surreal experience being surrounded by everyone trying to enjoy their holiday and trying to entertain their children whilst we can see visible smoke from nearby areas that have been hit by drones or missiles.”

Strictly Come Dancing competitor Vicky Pattison was among those who had to take shelter in Dubai, which is also popular destination for the rich and famous.

Pattison had been enjoying a break with her husband, Ercan Ramada, but their outbound flight to Australia was cancelled.

Writing on her Instagram, the former I’m A Celebrity… Get Me Out Of Here winner said: “We’re thinking of everyone who is feeling unsettled and unsafe right now.”