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How India and Pakistan share one of the world’s most dangerous borders

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To live along the Line of Control (LoC) – the volatile de facto border that separates India and Pakistan – is to exist perpetually on the razor’s edge between fragile peace and open conflict.

The recent escalation after the Pahalgam attack brought India and Pakistan to the brink once again. Shells rained down on both sides of the LoC, turning homes to rubble and lives into statistics. At least 16 people were reportedly killed on the Indian side, while Pakistan claims 40 civilian deaths, though it remains unclear how many were directly caused by the shelling.

“Families on the LoC are subjected to Indian and Pakistani whims and face the brunt of heated tensions,” Anam Zakaria, a Pakistani writer based in Canada, told the BBC.

“Each time firing resumes many are thrust into bunkers, livestock and livelihood is lost, infrastructure – homes, hospitals, schools – is damaged. The vulnerability and volatility experienced has grave repercussions for their everyday lived reality,” Ms Zakaria, author of a book on Pakistan-administered Kashmir, said.

India and Pakistan share a 3,323km (2,064-mile) border, including the 740km-long LoC; and the International Border (IB), spanning roughly 2,400km. The LoC began as the Ceasefire Line in 1949 after the first India-Pakistan war, and was renamed under the 1972 Simla Agreement.

The LoC cutting through Kashmir – claimed in full and administered in parts by both India and Pakistan – remains one of the most militarised borders in the world. Conflict is never far behind and ceasefires are only as durable as the next provocation.

Ceasefire violations here can range from “low-level firing to major land grabbing to surgical strikes“, says Happymon Jacob, a foreign policy expert at Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). (A land grab could involve seizing key positions such as hilltops, outposts, or buffer zones by force.)

The LoC, many experts say, is a classic example of a “border drawn in blood, forged through conflict”. It is also a line, as Ms Zakaria says, “carved by India and Pakistan, and militarised and weaponised, without taking Kashmiris into account”.

Getty Images A man inspects his damaged house in Neelum Valley in Pakistan-administered Kashmir
A man inspects his damaged house in Neelum Valley in Pakistan-administered Kashmir

Such wartime borders aren’t unique to South Asia. Sumantra Bose, professor of international and comparative politics at Krea University in India and author of Kashmir at the Crossroads: Inside a 21st-Century Conflict, says the most well-known is the ‘Green Line’ – the ceasefire line of 1949 – which is the generally recognised boundary between Israel and the West Bank.

Not surprisingly, the tentative calm along the LoC that had endured since the 2021 ceasefire agreement between the two nuclear-armed neighbours crumbled easily after the latest hostilities.

“The current escalation on the LoC and International Border (IB) is significant as it follows a four-year period of relative peace on the border,” Surya Valliappan Krishna of Carnegie India told the BBC.

Violence along the India-Pakistan border is not new – prior to the 2003 ceasefire, India reported 4,134 violations in 2001 and 5,767 in 2002.

The 2003 ceasefire initially held, with negligible violations from 2004 to 2007, but tensions resurfaced in 2008 and escalated sharply by 2013.

Between 2013 and early 2021, the LoC and the IB witnessed sustained high levels of conflict. A renewed ceasefire in February 2021 led to an immediate and sustained drop in violations through to March 2025.

“During periods of intense cross-border firing we’ve seen border populations in the many thousands be displaced for months on end,” says Mr Krishna. Between late September and early December 2016, more than 27,000 people were displaced from border areas due to ceasefire violations and cross-border firing.

Getty Images A Kashmiri woman stands inside her shell-damaged home in Salamabad, near the LoC in Uri
A Kashmiri woman stands inside her shell-damaged home in Salamabad, near the LoC in Uri

It’s looking increasingly hairy and uncertain now.

Tensions flared after the Pahalgam attack, with India suspending the key water-sharing treaty between India and Pakistan, known as the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). Pakistan responded by threatening to exit the 1972 Simla Agreement, which formalised the LoC – though it hasn’t followed through yet.

“This is significant because the Simla Agreement is the basis of the current LoC, which both sides agreed to not alter unilaterally in spite of their political differences,” says Mr Krishna.

Mr Jacob says for some “curious reason”, ceasefire violations along the LoC have been absent from discussions and debates about escalation of conflict between the two countries.

“It is itself puzzling how the regular use of high-calibre weapons such as 105mm mortars, 130 and 155mm artillery guns and anti-tank guided missiles by two nuclear-capable countries, which has led to civilian and military casualties, has escaped scholarly scrutiny and policy attention,” Mr Jacob writes in his book, Line On Fire: Ceasefire Violations and India-Pakistan Escalation Dynamics.

Mr Jacob identifies two main triggers for the violations: Pakistan often uses cover fire to facilitate militant infiltration into Indian-administered Kashmir, which has witnessed an armed insurgency against Indian rule for over three decades. Pakistan, in turn, accuses India of unprovoked firing on civilian areas.

He argues that ceasefire violations along the India-Pakistan border are less the product of high-level political strategy and more the result of local military dynamics.

The hostilities are often initiated by field commanders – sometimes with, but often without, central approval. He also challenges the notion that the Pakistan Army alone drives the violations, pointing instead to a complex mix of local military imperatives and autonomy granted to border forces on both sides.

Some experts believe It’s time to revisit an idea shelved nearly two decades ago: turning the LoC into a formal, internationally recognised border. Others insist that possibility was never realistic – and still isn’t.

Getty Images A resident of Bakoat village walks through the entrance of a bunker prepared for protection from cross-border fire
Residents of Bakoat village near the LoC in Pakistan-administered Kashmir prepare bunkers for protection from cross-border fire

“The idea is completely infeasible, a dead end. For decades, Indian maps have shown the entire territory of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir as part of India,” Sumantra Bose told the BBC.

“For Pakistan, making the LoC part of the International Border would mean settling the Kashmir dispute – which is Pakistan’s equivalent of the Holy Grail – on India’s preferred terms. Every Pakistani government and leader, civilian or military, over the past seven decades has rejected this.”

In his 2003 book, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, Prof Bose writes: “A Kashmir settlement necessitates that the LoC be transformed – from an iron curtain of barbed wire, bunkers, trenches and hostile militaries to a linen curtain. Realpolitik dictates that the border will be permanent (albeit probably under a different name), but it must be transcended without being abolished.”

“I stressed, though, that such a transformation of the LoC must be embedded in a broader Kashmir settlement, as one pillar of a multi-pillared settlement,” he told the BBC.

Between 2004 and 2007, turning the LoC into a soft border was central to a fledgling India-Pakistan peace process on Kashmir – a process that ultimately fell apart.

Today, the border has reignited, bringing back the cycle of violence and uncertainty for those who live in its shadow.

“You never know what will happen next. No one wants to sleep facing the Line of Control tonight,” an employee of a hotel in Pakistan-administered Kashmir told BBC Urdu during the recent hostilities.

It was a quiet reminder of how fragile peace is when your window opens to a battlefield.

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Pakistan Prime Minister attend Leaders’ Summit of COP-31 in Antalya, Türkiye

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Antalya (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY):- Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif will visit Antalya, Republic of Türkiye, from 10–12 November 2026 to participate in the Leaders’ Summit of the 31st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
 
Prime Minister will address the Leaders’ Summit on 11 November 2026, during which he will urge the global community to take concrete actions to address the threat posed by climate change to the planet. He will highlight Pakistan’s steps towards rapid solarization and expansion of its renewable energy capacity, as part of its transition towards a cleaner and more resilient economy, along with its efforts to strengthen disaster preparedness and early-warning systems.

In addition, he will also call for predictable, adequate and accessible climate finance for developing countries to strengthen their resilience and pursue sustainable development.

The Prime Minister will also attend a High-Level Roundtable convened by the Presidency of the COP-31 on the sidelines of the Leaders’ Summit, and hold bilateral meetings with the Turkish leadership as well as several other world leaders.

Prime Minister’s participation in the COP-31 Leaders’ Summit is an expression of Pakistan’s strong support for the climate agenda, and will provide Pakistan with an opportunity to reaffirm its commitment towards working closely with the international community to address the climate crisis.

COP 31 starting Yesterday, Minister Climate Change of Pakistan Mr. Tasadaq Malik attended the opening ceremony in Antalya, Türkiye.

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Tehran’s Diplomatic Bombshell

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The arrival in Tehran of the defence minister of Saudi Arabia, the army chief of Pakistan and the intelligence chief ofTürkiye may prove more consequential than another round of American or Israeli military threats. Three powerfulMuslim countries, bound by the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, sat across the table from Iran while Washington and Israel contemplated renewed military operations. The question is not merely what these leaders discussed, but what they may have quietly agreed to do—or refuse to do—when the next missiles begin flying.
The delegation was extraordinary in its composition. Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Pakistan’s FieldMarshal Asim Munir and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin represented countries possessing enormous financial, military, diplomatic and strategic influence. Their collective appearance conveyed that Iran’s security could no longer be treated exclusively as a confrontation between Tehran, Washington and Tel Aviv. Regional powers were asserting their own interests in determining whether another devastating war would engulf their neighbourhood.
The war with Iran has transformed American military installations across the Gulf from instruments of deterrence into potential targets of retaliation. Reports and assessments of American military repositioning toward Israel, Jordan and other locations reflect this wider vulnerability. For Washington, geographic access remains a military advantage; for Gulf governments, that same access increasingly carries the possibility of devastating retaliation.
Saudi Arabia consequently faces an exceptionally difficult choice. American air defence systems, intelligence cooperation, maintenance arrangements and advanced weapons remain important to its security. Yet the presence ofAmerican forces can expose Saudi oil installations, airports, industrial infrastructure and civilian populations to Iranian orHouthi attacks. The attacks around Ras Tanura have demonstrated how rapidly regional warfare can threaten energy supplies and global economic stability. Riyadh must therefore calculate whether American protection is reducing its vulnerability or contributing to it.
Here lies the first possible hidden significance of the Tehran meeting. Iran may have sought assurances that Saudi Arabia,Pakistan and Türkiye would neither participate in renewed American-Israeli attacks nor facilitate them through military installations, airspace, intelligence or logistical support. No publicly disclosed agreement establishes that such promises were made. Nevertheless, the subject would be entirely consistent with Iran’s longstanding concern about foreign military infrastructure being used against it.
The second possibility points in the opposite direction. The Makkah Pact countries may have arrived not simply as sympathetic neighbours, but as a collective deterrent. Their defence agreement treats an attack against one member as a matter of common security. The presence of nuclear-armed Pakistan, NATO member Türkiye and economically powerful Saudi Arabia could therefore convey a warning that further Iranian or Houthi attacks against Saudi territory risk widening the conflict. Collective defence, however, does not automatically establish a commitment to join an American war.
This dual character makes the delegation particularly significant. It could simultaneously reassure Iran against foreign aggression and warn Tehran against attacking Saudi Arabia. Such diplomacy is not necessarily contradictory. It reflects an attempt to establish reciprocal restraint: regional states would avoid becoming launching platforms for attacks on Iran,while Iran would avoid retaliating against countries that remained outside the fighting. Whether such an understanding was actually reached remains undisclosed.
The third possibility concerns Qatar’s parallel diplomatic initiative. Unlike the three Makkah Pact countries, Qatar has maintained an intermediary role between Washington and Tehran. Its proposed seven-day confidence-building framework sought to bridge disagreements over nuclear activities, sanctions, maritime access and the wider conflict. Reports also indicate support for mediation from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. Thus, the Tehran consultations could represent complementary diplomatic tracks rather than competing initiatives.
Iran’s response to the Qatari proposal was nevertheless uncompromising. Tehran objected to demands for nuclear concessions before meaningful economic relief, insisting that the American blockade of Iranian ports and restrictions on oil exports must be addressed first. Washington, conversely, wanted nuclear commitments from the beginning. The dispute was therefore not merely over the contents of a peace agreement, but over which party would surrender its leverage before receiving guarantees.
The most consequential outcome of the Tehran meeting may lie not in what was publicly announced, but in what was deliberately withheld. A day-long consultation involving the defence minister of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s army chief, Türkiye’s intelligence chief and Iran’s highest political and security authorities could hardly have been confined to the four lines of the joint communiqué. Such meetings necessarily involve extensive deliberations on the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats arising from an ongoing war, including American military bases, Iranian retaliation, Saudi security, the Strait of Hormuz, economic sanctions and the consequences of another American-Israeli offensive.
Drawing upon my experience attending high-level meetings as Press Secretary and media adviser to the President of Pakistan, I know that public statements rarely disclose the full substance of sensitive diplomatic and security consultations.
The positive assessments expressed by the Iranian leadership and the visiting delegations strongly suggest that the participants found sufficient common ground to explore practical understandings and a coordinated pathway for responding to future developments.
Such understandings may include assurances of non-participation in renewed attacks against Iran, restrictions on the use of regional military facilities, reciprocal restraint toward Gulf countries and mechanisms for further consultations should Washington and Israel resume hostilities.
Kuwait and the other Gulf countries will therefore become important indicators. Their decisions concerning American bases, airspace, logistical support and diplomatic engagement could reveal whether the Tehran initiative develops into a broader regional non-aggression arrangement. The Houthis’ conduct will be equally revealing. A sustained reduction in attacks on Saudi infrastructure could indicate that Tehran and Riyadh have found a mechanism to separate Gulf security from the wider American-Israeli confrontation, although Houthi decision-making cannot simply be equated with Iranian instructions.
The timing adds urgency. Reports indicate concern about renewed American and Israeli military action around the November 3 American midterm elections. Whether such an offensive actually occurs remains uncertain. But if it does, the military effectiveness of the campaign will depend partly on regional access, intelligence, logistics and the willingness of neighbouring governments to absorb the consequences of Iranian retaliation.
Ultimately, Tehran may have achieved something strategically important without obtaining a single publicly declared concession: it has compelled influential regional governments to discuss security with Iran rather than merely discuss Iran with Washington. That is a meaningful diplomatic shift, even if its durability remains untested.
The real verdict on the Tehran meeting will not emerge from its carefully worded communiqué. It will emerge whenWashington next demands military access, when Israel considers another strike, and when Iran decides where its missiles will—or will not—fall. If regional governments refuse to become instruments of another war, the Makkah Pact may be remembered not as an alliance formed to confront Iran, but as the beginning of a Middle East determined to prevent outside powers from deciding its fate.

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Pakistan’s Moment Beyond the Battlefield

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : While Pakistan wrestles with political confrontation at home, its diplomacy is opening doors abroad. From the Badr memorandum signed in Doha to the earlier Mecca defence agreement, and from Riyadh’s security consultations to mediation with Tehran and Washington, Pakistan is acquiring a place at tables where regional security is being negotiated. The opportunity is considerable. The challenge is to turn international recognition into domestic stability, industrial strength and prosperity.
The Badr Memorandum of Understanding, signed on October 21 by Qatar, Türkiye, Pakistan and Indonesia, marks the latest advance. Its central purpose is defence industrial cooperation: joint production, technical training, research, development and stronger manufacturing capabilities. It offers a means of building the technological and industrial capacity that makes security sustainable.
Its promise lies in combining complementary strengths. Türkiye brings an expanding defence industry and experience in developing and integrating complex systems. Pakistan contributes military experience, technical manpower and established production facilities. Indonesia offers manufacturing capacity, a substantial domestic market and an important Southeast Asian base. Qatar brings investment potential and demand. Together, these assets could support projects beyond the reach of countries working separately.
The resulting opportunity extends beyond buying and selling weapons. Shared design, component manufacturing, software development, testing, maintenance and training could create enduring industrial relationships. A country that helps manufacture a system develops skills and supplier networks that an ordinary purchase may never deliver. The real prize is the ability to understand, sustain and improve equipment throughout its working life.
But signatures cannot run factories. Badr needs an efficient institution to translate ambition into projects, with agreed financing, clear responsibilities and deadlines. Partners must settle technology access, intellectual property, export permissions and the division of production before these become disputes. Each project should have accountable leadership and measurable milestones. Good faith must be matched by management capable of delivering on time.
For Pakistan, Türkiye is a particularly valuable partner. Their existing naval cooperation demonstrates how procurement can support domestic construction and technical learning. Turkish progress in drones, electronics, armoured platforms and naval systems offers further possibilities. Pakistan should seek arrangements that allow its engineers and manufacturers to become development partners, accumulating knowledge with every successive project.
This industrial initiative follows the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan in August, which established a powerful principle: an armed attack against one would be regarded as an attack against all. Its resemblance to NATO’s collective defence commitment explains the attraction of calling it a “mini-NATO”. For Pakistan, it represents recognition that its military capacity and strategic position have value well beyond South Asia.
Yet solidarity becomes complicated when it must move from declarations to decisions. These countries share Islamic bonds, but their relationships, interests and vulnerabilities differ. A confrontation involving Saudi Arabia and Iran, or attacks from Yemen, would confront Pakistan with difficult choices. Religious, social and historical connections cross the very boundaries that security arrangements seek to defend. An effective pact must therefore combine credible deterrence with political judgment and clearly understood responsibilities.
Nor does Mecca constitute a comprehensive Muslim alliance addressing every shared concern. The Palestinian question and Israel’s military actions remain central to public sentiment across the Muslim world, while the agreement’s immediate operation is shaped by its members’ security needs. Its worth will depend on whether it protects its participants while helping contain regional conflict. Pakistan’s strongest contribution would be to make collective security reinforce reconciliation rather than deepen divisions.
Pakistan also brings a distinction no other Muslim country possesses: nuclear weapons capability. Alongside this stands an experienced army, a capable air force and a smaller navy responsible for demanding maritime duties. The May 2025 confrontation with India, which Pakistan regards as a major defensive success, reinforced the importance of readiness and technological competence. India’s acknowledgment of initial aircraft losses underlined the seriousness of that contest.
Military standing, however, achieves its greatest value when it supports diplomacy. Field Marshal Asim Munir’s October 20 visit to Tehran formed part of Pakistan’s continuing effort to help bring the United States and Iran towards an accommodation. Such engagement requires persistence because the parties approach negotiations through deep distrust, competing security demands and domestic political pressures.
Pakistan is attempting a difficult balancing act: sustaining communication with Washington and President Donald Trump, preserving access to Iran’s leadership, and maintaining Saudi confidence. Its usefulness rests on remaining a credible channel across these relationships. Every conversation that clarifies intentions, reduces miscalculation or identifies a possible compromise adds value, even when a final settlement remains elusive.
This is where Pakistan’s defence partnerships and diplomatic role must reinforce each other. Friendship with Saudi Arabia should strengthen its ability to explain Saudi concerns to Tehran. Relations with Iran should help it communicate Iranian concerns elsewhere. Close ties with Türkiye and Qatar add further channels. Pakistan can gain lasting influence by helping countries find an exit from confrontation that preserves security and dignity.
That achievement would be more persuasive if accompanied by reconciliation at home. Continuing confrontation around Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and the imprisonment of former prime minister Imran Khan consumes political energy the country urgently needs for reconstruction. Pakistan should ensure fair and transparent judicial proceedings, end politically motivated restrictions and pursue his release through lawful means. He should have the opportunity to participate in normal democratic politics.
The way forward also requires free, fair and impartial elections, credible institutions and acceptance that political opponents belong within the constitutional system. Protest must remain peaceful, and the state must protect lawful political participation. A country seeking to mediate between bitter international adversaries should apply the same patience and confidence to resolving its own political disputes.
Peace along Pakistan’s borders is equally necessary. Terrorism must be confronted firmly, but lasting security also requires sustained diplomacy with Afghanistan. Islamabad and Kabul need practical arrangements to prevent armed groups from exploiting territory, manage border disputes and preserve legitimate trade. With Iran, cooperation should protect a peaceful frontier. With India, Pakistan should continue seeking dialogue and measures that reduce the risk of another military escalation.
Economic recovery must give these efforts a material foundation. Pakistan’s mineral resources can contribute far more if extraction is connected to processing and domestic manufacturing. Copper, gold and other commercially viable deposits should support infrastructure, technical education and industries that add value at home. Mineral wealth becomes national wealth when it creates productive skills, competitive businesses and lasting employment.
Badr could help cultivate some of the engineering, electronics and materials expertise relevant to that broader transformation. Pakistan should connect its diplomatic partnerships with universities, industrial estates, reliable energy and local suppliers. Exporting raw materials alone would leave much of the value elsewhere; building industries around them would allow Pakistanis to retain a larger share.
Pakistan has earned an opening. Its task now is to make external confidence durable through internal consent, peaceful borders and productive industry. The country’s finest strategic achievement would be a Pakistan whose citizens experience the gains its diplomats announce: greater security, meaningful work and a future worth investing in.

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