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How India and Pakistan share one of the world’s most dangerous borders

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To live along the Line of Control (LoC) – the volatile de facto border that separates India and Pakistan – is to exist perpetually on the razor’s edge between fragile peace and open conflict.

The recent escalation after the Pahalgam attack brought India and Pakistan to the brink once again. Shells rained down on both sides of the LoC, turning homes to rubble and lives into statistics. At least 16 people were reportedly killed on the Indian side, while Pakistan claims 40 civilian deaths, though it remains unclear how many were directly caused by the shelling.

“Families on the LoC are subjected to Indian and Pakistani whims and face the brunt of heated tensions,” Anam Zakaria, a Pakistani writer based in Canada, told the BBC.

“Each time firing resumes many are thrust into bunkers, livestock and livelihood is lost, infrastructure – homes, hospitals, schools – is damaged. The vulnerability and volatility experienced has grave repercussions for their everyday lived reality,” Ms Zakaria, author of a book on Pakistan-administered Kashmir, said.

India and Pakistan share a 3,323km (2,064-mile) border, including the 740km-long LoC; and the International Border (IB), spanning roughly 2,400km. The LoC began as the Ceasefire Line in 1949 after the first India-Pakistan war, and was renamed under the 1972 Simla Agreement.

The LoC cutting through Kashmir – claimed in full and administered in parts by both India and Pakistan – remains one of the most militarised borders in the world. Conflict is never far behind and ceasefires are only as durable as the next provocation.

Ceasefire violations here can range from “low-level firing to major land grabbing to surgical strikes“, says Happymon Jacob, a foreign policy expert at Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). (A land grab could involve seizing key positions such as hilltops, outposts, or buffer zones by force.)

The LoC, many experts say, is a classic example of a “border drawn in blood, forged through conflict”. It is also a line, as Ms Zakaria says, “carved by India and Pakistan, and militarised and weaponised, without taking Kashmiris into account”.

Getty Images A man inspects his damaged house in Neelum Valley in Pakistan-administered Kashmir
A man inspects his damaged house in Neelum Valley in Pakistan-administered Kashmir

Such wartime borders aren’t unique to South Asia. Sumantra Bose, professor of international and comparative politics at Krea University in India and author of Kashmir at the Crossroads: Inside a 21st-Century Conflict, says the most well-known is the ‘Green Line’ – the ceasefire line of 1949 – which is the generally recognised boundary between Israel and the West Bank.

Not surprisingly, the tentative calm along the LoC that had endured since the 2021 ceasefire agreement between the two nuclear-armed neighbours crumbled easily after the latest hostilities.

“The current escalation on the LoC and International Border (IB) is significant as it follows a four-year period of relative peace on the border,” Surya Valliappan Krishna of Carnegie India told the BBC.

Violence along the India-Pakistan border is not new – prior to the 2003 ceasefire, India reported 4,134 violations in 2001 and 5,767 in 2002.

The 2003 ceasefire initially held, with negligible violations from 2004 to 2007, but tensions resurfaced in 2008 and escalated sharply by 2013.

Between 2013 and early 2021, the LoC and the IB witnessed sustained high levels of conflict. A renewed ceasefire in February 2021 led to an immediate and sustained drop in violations through to March 2025.

“During periods of intense cross-border firing we’ve seen border populations in the many thousands be displaced for months on end,” says Mr Krishna. Between late September and early December 2016, more than 27,000 people were displaced from border areas due to ceasefire violations and cross-border firing.

Getty Images A Kashmiri woman stands inside her shell-damaged home in Salamabad, near the LoC in Uri
A Kashmiri woman stands inside her shell-damaged home in Salamabad, near the LoC in Uri

It’s looking increasingly hairy and uncertain now.

Tensions flared after the Pahalgam attack, with India suspending the key water-sharing treaty between India and Pakistan, known as the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). Pakistan responded by threatening to exit the 1972 Simla Agreement, which formalised the LoC – though it hasn’t followed through yet.

“This is significant because the Simla Agreement is the basis of the current LoC, which both sides agreed to not alter unilaterally in spite of their political differences,” says Mr Krishna.

Mr Jacob says for some “curious reason”, ceasefire violations along the LoC have been absent from discussions and debates about escalation of conflict between the two countries.

“It is itself puzzling how the regular use of high-calibre weapons such as 105mm mortars, 130 and 155mm artillery guns and anti-tank guided missiles by two nuclear-capable countries, which has led to civilian and military casualties, has escaped scholarly scrutiny and policy attention,” Mr Jacob writes in his book, Line On Fire: Ceasefire Violations and India-Pakistan Escalation Dynamics.

Mr Jacob identifies two main triggers for the violations: Pakistan often uses cover fire to facilitate militant infiltration into Indian-administered Kashmir, which has witnessed an armed insurgency against Indian rule for over three decades. Pakistan, in turn, accuses India of unprovoked firing on civilian areas.

He argues that ceasefire violations along the India-Pakistan border are less the product of high-level political strategy and more the result of local military dynamics.

The hostilities are often initiated by field commanders – sometimes with, but often without, central approval. He also challenges the notion that the Pakistan Army alone drives the violations, pointing instead to a complex mix of local military imperatives and autonomy granted to border forces on both sides.

Some experts believe It’s time to revisit an idea shelved nearly two decades ago: turning the LoC into a formal, internationally recognised border. Others insist that possibility was never realistic – and still isn’t.

Getty Images A resident of Bakoat village walks through the entrance of a bunker prepared for protection from cross-border fire
Residents of Bakoat village near the LoC in Pakistan-administered Kashmir prepare bunkers for protection from cross-border fire

“The idea is completely infeasible, a dead end. For decades, Indian maps have shown the entire territory of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir as part of India,” Sumantra Bose told the BBC.

“For Pakistan, making the LoC part of the International Border would mean settling the Kashmir dispute – which is Pakistan’s equivalent of the Holy Grail – on India’s preferred terms. Every Pakistani government and leader, civilian or military, over the past seven decades has rejected this.”

In his 2003 book, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, Prof Bose writes: “A Kashmir settlement necessitates that the LoC be transformed – from an iron curtain of barbed wire, bunkers, trenches and hostile militaries to a linen curtain. Realpolitik dictates that the border will be permanent (albeit probably under a different name), but it must be transcended without being abolished.”

“I stressed, though, that such a transformation of the LoC must be embedded in a broader Kashmir settlement, as one pillar of a multi-pillared settlement,” he told the BBC.

Between 2004 and 2007, turning the LoC into a soft border was central to a fledgling India-Pakistan peace process on Kashmir – a process that ultimately fell apart.

Today, the border has reignited, bringing back the cycle of violence and uncertainty for those who live in its shadow.

“You never know what will happen next. No one wants to sleep facing the Line of Control tonight,” an employee of a hotel in Pakistan-administered Kashmir told BBC Urdu during the recent hostilities.

It was a quiet reminder of how fragile peace is when your window opens to a battlefield.

Pakistan News

CELEBRATES PAKISTAN’S 79TH INDEPENDENCE DAY AND 150TH BIRTH ANNIVERSARY OF QUAID-E-AZAM MOHAMMAD ALI JINNAH IN FRANCE

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Paris ( Imran Y. CHOUDHRY):- On the occasion of the 79th Independence Day of Pakistan, Ambassador Mumtaz Zahra Baloch hoisted national flag to the tune of the national anthem at the Embassy of Pakistan, Paris and welcomed distinguished members of the Pakistani community including large number of children.


Messages of the President, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan were read out on the occasion.
Congratulating all on the Independence Day, the Ambassador said that 14th August was truly auspicious as it brought together the entire nation – in celebration, in paying homage to the Quaid-e-Azam and other leaders of the freedom movement, in remembrance of the supreme sacrifices of our forefathers and drawing inspiration from our glorious past and the tremendous achievements over the decades.


The Government of Pakistan is observing the current year – 2026 – as the “Year of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah” to mark his 150th birth anniversary, she added. The great intellectual vision of Quaid requires the nation to uphold his principles and play its due role in the development and progress of Pakistan. The Ambassador highlighted that Quaid-e-Azam had given the nation three golden principles, faith, unity and discipline and adherence to these principles would lead the nation towards a bright future for the generations to come.
Ambassador Baloch said that as we celebrate our freedom we should remember our Kashmiri and Palestinian brothers and sisters, who have been struggling for over seven decades for their freedom and right to self-determination. She reaffirmed Pakistan’s political and diplomatic support to the people of the Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK) and Palestine for their legitimate rights.


Ambassador also appreciated the contributions of Pakistani diaspora in France in promoting Pakistan-France relations. She reiterated Embassy’s fully commitment to continue to facilitate Pakistanis based in France.
Later, the Ambassador inaugurated the ‘historic photo exhibition’ based on the life and works of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah at the Embassy. The exhibition showcased a remarkable collection of
archival records and photographs chronicling the visionary leadership and enduring
legacy of the founder of Pakistan. The guests especially the children took a keen interest in the exhibition and raised slogans of Pakistan Zindabad.

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Pakistan PUBG MOBILE team ‘4Thrives’ visited the Embassy of Pakistan in Paris, France.

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Paris ( Imran Y. CHOUDHRY):- Ambassador Mumtaz Zahra Baloch today received the top professional Pakistan PUBG MOBILE team ‘4Thrives’, which is competing in the high-stakes competition, PUBG MOBILE World Cup 2026 Grand Finals at the Esports World Cup (EWC) being held in Paris.

The team members of ‘4Thrives’ briefed the Ambassador on the game and the hard work they all had put in to finish at the top of the qualifying round and reaching the Grand Finals. They were enthusiastic about their performance which has cemented their position among the world’s best PUBG MOBILE teams.

The Ambassador appreciated the team members for their enthusiastic participation and accomplishments and wished them success for the Grand Finals. She said the Pakistani nation has proudly witnessed the recent achievements of the 4Thrives team and expressed confidence that it would win the prestigious trophy in Paris as well.

This is the first time that EWC is being held in Paris – a true global phenomenon represented by more than 2,000 players from 200 clubs and 100 different countries.

Let’s celebrate and cheer Pakistan PUBG MOBILE team ‘4Thrives’ for the Grand Finals this week!

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The Mecca Defence Pact: The Threats Behind the Alliance

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan is being described as a Muslim version of NATO. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan himself said its collective-defence clause is technically similar to NATO’s Article 5: an armed attack on one member will be treated as an attack on all. Yet most commentary has concentrated on the pact’s wording, its possible expansion and whether it is aimed at Iran or Israel. The more important question has received less attention: what threat does each signatory actually perceive?
Without answering that question, analysis of the agreement remains incomplete. Alliances do not acquire meaning merely from ceremonial signatures. Their real character is determined by the dangers their members fear, the capabilities they contribute and the circumstances in which they are prepared to act.
For Saudi Arabia, the immediate security environment is deeply paradoxical. The kingdom has long relied upon the United States, but the presence of American forces and facilities across the Gulf can also attract retaliation whenever Washington uses regional territory or infrastructure in military operations against Iran.
Tehran has repeatedly maintained that its quarrel is not with Gulf societies as such, but with military threats launched from or supported through their territories. Whether one accepts Iran’s justification or not, the underlying dilemma is real: foreign protection can simultaneously become a source of exposure.
This raises a difficult question. If foreign bases had not facilitated attacks against Iran, would Tehran have attacked Gulf countries on the same scale? The answer cannot be proven, but the question exposes Saudi Arabia’s strategic vulnerability. Riyadh wants protection without remaining permanently hostage to decisions made by an external guarantor.
Threats from the Houthis in Yemen and Iran-aligned armed groups in Iraq remain serious, particularly for oil facilities, desalination plants, shipping and civilian infrastructure. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has spent heavily on modern aircraft, missiles, surveillance systems and air defence. These dangers alone do not fully explain the need for an Article 5-style pact with Türkiye and nuclear-armed Pakistan.
The wider concern is Israel’s expanding military reach and the fear that no regional state can assume it will remain permanently outside Israeli calculations. The “Greater Israel” project is not merely a slogan invented by Israel’s critics. It is a documented ideological and political current rooted in expansionist interpretations of biblical territory, including the most extreme vision of land stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates, and in revisionist Zionist ideas of sovereignty on both sides of the Jordan River.
Israel’s wars and military operations across Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere have intensified regional fears that its use of force and territorial ambitions are becoming geographically unconstrained. Because the most expansive interpretation of Greater Israel encompasses territory belonging to several Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Riyadh has legitimate reasons to treat this ideology and Israel’s growing regional reach as a long-term strategic threat.
The Mecca agreement therefore creates strategic depth, reduces Saudi Arabia’s exclusive dependence on Washington and strengthens the kingdom’s leadership position in the Muslim world.
Türkiye enters the pact with a different threat map. It possesses NATO’s second-largest army, an increasingly sophisticated defence industry, formidable drone capabilities, warship and helicopter production, and substantial operational experience in Syria, Iraq and the eastern Mediterranean.
Kurdish militancy and instability along Türkiye’s southern borders remain persistent threats, but Ankara is largely capable of managing these challenges without Pakistani or Saudi military intervention.
The more consequential concern is Israel. Turkish and Israeli rhetoric has become increasingly hostile, while their strategic interests collide in Syria, Gaza and the broader eastern Mediterranean. Türkiye’s conventional size gives it considerable strength, but Israel is widely understood to possess nuclear weapons, while Türkiye does not. This creates a dangerous asymmetry at the highest level of escalation.
Pakistan’s participation therefore adds deterrent weight, but it is essential not to overstate what has formally been agreed. The published language does not establish an explicit Pakistani nuclear umbrella over Türkiye or Saudi Arabia. Nor does it automatically commit Islamabad to nuclear retaliation.
Its value at this stage lies in strategic ambiguity. Any adversary contemplating extreme escalation must now consider the possibility of a broader response involving a nuclear-armed partner. That uncertainty itself can reinforce deterrence, provided consultation mechanisms, command arrangements and red lines are eventually clarified.
Pakistan’s principal state-based threat remains India. Its other challenges—including attacks linked to the Pakistani Taliban, militancy operating from Afghan territory and insurgency in Balochistan—are grave but fall mainly within the domain of counterterrorism and internal security.
Islamabad has also alleged external support for certain militant networks, including from India and Israel other hostile actors, therefore the possibility of hybrid warfare designed to weaken Pakistan cannot be ignored.
The real test for the pact would come during a future India-Pakistan war. Saudi Arabia enjoys extensive economic and political relations with India, while Türkiye also has interests that extend beyond its partnership with Islamabad. Would Riyadh provide intelligence, logistics, financing, air defence or diplomatic support? Would it risk its relationship with New Delhi?
The treaty’s collective-defence formula is powerful, but it does not necessarily mean that every member must respond identically or automatically declare war. Even NATO’s Article 5 requires each ally to take such action as it considers necessary. The Mecca pact’s credibility will similarly depend on agreed procedures, operational planning, military integration and, above all, political will.
Nor should the alliance be framed as an anti-Iranian “Sunni bloc.” That description is analytically shallow and politically dangerous. It imports a sectarian narrative into an agreement whose signatories explicitly maintain that it is not directed against Iran or any other particular country.
Western and regional media extensively are using the Sunni label as convenient shorthand, but repeating it can deepen the very divisions that have repeatedly weakened the Muslim world. It risks presenting Sunni and Shia states as natural enemies, even though they share geography, economic interests, religious bonds and responsibility for regional stability.
Iran has demonstrated formidable missile, drone and asymmetric capabilities and has proven ability to impose severe costs on the combined military might of both the United States and Israel and their alliance in the Middle East and elsewhere in the entire world.
A confrontation between Iran and the combined forces of Pakistan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia would devastate the region, rupture trade and energy routes, inflame sectarian tensions and serve none of the four countries.
The rational objective of the Mecca alliance should therefore be deterrence, collective security and strategic autonomy—not the creation of another front in the Iran war.
The wiser long-term course is to keep the pact open and eventually build a structured security dialogue with Iran. Immediate Iranian membership may be politically unrealistic while war and mistrust persist, but inclusion should remain a strategic objective.
Egypt and other regional countries could also participate in a broader security architecture based on non-aggression, collective consultation, protected shipping lanes, economic connectivity and respect for sovereignty.
The three signatories must also wage an intelligent information campaign. Through official statements, diplomatic outreach, legacy media, social platforms and other forms of communication, they should consistently reject the description of the agreement as a “Sunni NATO.”
They should explain that the pact is intended to protect its members from aggression regardless of the aggressor’s religious, sectarian or national identity. It must not be allowed to become an instrument for turning Muslim countries against one another.
The Mecca agreement will become historic only if it does more than redistribute fear. Properly developed, it can reduce dependence on outside powers, deter Israeli or other aggression, give Pakistan additional diplomatic weight and create the nucleus of an inclusive regional security system.
Mishandled as a sectarian coalition, however, it could produce precisely the confrontation it claims to prevent. Its success will therefore be measured not by how many enemies it names, but by how many wars it prevents.

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