Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : When a member of Congress asked who now holds the advantage between the United States and China, Kurt M. Campbell did not search for diplomatic shelter. He answered plainly—“China, China, China”—and added that America is in a more fragile position. That exchange distilled a wider realization in Washington: the contest is no longer about who has the cleverest idea, but about who can pair ideas with scale, speed, finance, and supply chains that actually deliver.
Across robotics, autonomous systems, shipbuilding, critical minerals, and the green-energy stack, China has assembled an industrial machine that converts plans into production with few seams. The United States still leads in many forms of research and in the highest tiers of AI hardware and software. Yet too often these strengths sit on islands that are hard to connect to the physical economy. China, by contrast, works from the factory outward. It absorbs a technology, replicates it at home, pushes costs down, and then ships it to the world. That pattern—learn, scale, export—now runs through much of its economy.
This is evident on factory floors. China has built the world’s largest base of industrial robots and the domestic suppliers to keep adding more of them, allowing factories to iterate quickly and standardize quality. It shows up in the air as well, where Chinese drones dominate civilian markets and where military variants have spread to buyers that find Western systems unaffordable or unavailable. Autonomy at scale is not just a technical feat; it is a logistics and training advantage that compounds year after year.
The imbalance is even clearer at sea. Chinese yards deliver commercial ships at a rate that American yards cannot currently approach. Those deliveries are not only commercial statistics. They translate into maritime resilience, sealift, and the capacity to replace hulls fast if a crisis damages them. Industrial power is not an abstraction; it is a queue of vessels sliding down the ways, month after month. America’s shipbuilding base, meanwhile, is thin, specialized, and expensive to expand, which leaves the country reliant on time it may not have.
Beneath these visible platforms lies a quieter source of leverage: rare earths and allied magnet materials. Modern electronics, precision weapons, wind turbines, and electric drivetrains all depend on them. China does not merely mine a large share of these inputs; it processes and refines them, and it manufactures the magnets that sit at the end of the chain. When Beijing tightened export restrictions, markets felt the tremor immediately. U.S. officials have pressed China to ease those curbs and have worked to rally partners to reduce concentration risk. That effort is prudent, but it also acknowledges the present reality—critical stages of the chain are outside American control.
It is here that the familiar American toolkit—tariffs, export controls, and the weaponization of data and finance—meets its limit. Measures of this kind can unsettle smaller or more fragile economies; they have done so repeatedly in the past. They are far less effective against a state with a continental-scale market, deep foreign-exchange reserves, a disciplined industrial policy, and broad capacity to substitute or reroute flows when pressured. China has spent years preparing for that pressure by localizing essential inputs, building parallel financial pipes, and hardening its digital and data regimes. A country that can supply so much of its own demand and anchor so many others’ supply is not easily forced to change course from the outside.
That is why the question posed in the hearing—will punitive tariffs work this time—lands differently today. Tariffs can raise Chinese costs at the American border, but they also raise costs for American producers who rely on Chinese inputs at every intermediate step. If the response from Beijing is to ratchet controls on minerals, chemicals, or magnet materials, the downstream impact is immediate: delays, higher bills, and quality slippage as firms scramble for substitutes. The economic effect accumulates in quieter ways as well. Investment decisions are deferred; projects are redesigned; factories operate below capacity. The result is slower growth and a steady erosion of credibility in the claim that America can out-produce its rival where it matters most.
Washington sees this bind and is examining ways to mine, process, and manufacture more of these inputs at home. That path is necessary, but it is not quick. Permitting, capex, skilled labor, environmental safeguards, local consent, and shared infrastructure mean any serious build-out takes well over a decade to mature. Even then, the unit costs will be markedly higher than those produced by an ecosystem in China that has already reached enormous scale. The arithmetic is straightforward: if domestic inputs are several times more expensive than imported ones, consumers pay more, manufacturers lose margin, or both. And if China chooses to restrict intermediate goods while America is still scaling its replacements, the squeeze is immediate. It is the classic choice between the devil and the deep sea.
None of this argues for resignation. It argues for realism. Treating China as an equal party in the global economy does not mean conceding strategic ground; it means recognizing that coercive instruments will not deliver quick or clean wins. A better first step is to lower the temperature of the tariff war by restoring duties toward earlier baselines and by limiting new restrictions to genuinely narrow security cases with clear, auditable justifications. That would not end competition. It would simply replace a spiral of retaliation with rules that both sides can plan around, which is the precondition for any serious industrial strategy at home.
De-escalation abroad must be matched by seriousness at home. The United States needs a long-horizon, bipartisan program that outlasts election cycles and that treats production as a national capability, not a slogan. That means modernizing ports and shipyards so output can compound rather than stall; accelerating permitting without waiving environmental standards; building regional hubs for magnets, specialty chemicals, and advanced components with public-private risk sharing; aligning procurement with delivery so firms are paid to produce, not to promise; and investing in workforce pipelines that can staff mines, mills, fabs, and yards. Recycling and re-use should be embedded from the start so domestic supply is not only larger but also more resilient when prices swing.
The same principle should guide the data front. The United States can and should protect sensitive datasets and core algorithms, but it should avoid broad regimes that punish neutral commercial activity or force partners to choose camps. A narrower, predictably enforced set of rules will better protect security without undermining competitiveness. Data is valuable because it flows; policy that freezes it indiscriminately tends to reduce American firms’ reach more than it constrains China’s.
Some will hear this and worry that stepping back from the tariff cliff signals weakness. The opposite is true. It signals confidence that America’s real advantage lies in the combination of research excellence, entrepreneurial depth, and an open capital market that can scale new industries when the ground rules are stable. Tariffs and blunt data controls may temporarily bruise a competitor, but they rarely build capacity at home. Capacity is built by patient investment, steady rules, and a clear list of priorities that does not change with each headline.
Campbell’s answer in the hearing was a snapshot of the present, not a verdict on the future. China’s strength today rests on a disciplined link between strategy and production. America’s path back runs through the same link. It will not be achieved by trying to bludgeon a rival that has already insulated itself from the tools that once worked on others. It will be achieved by lowering the noise, rebuilding the sinews of industry, and competing on the only terrain that decides enduring power: the ability to design, build, and deliver at scale. If the United States chooses that course, it will find that fragility is not fate. It is a diagnosis—and like any diagnosis, it is most useful when it prompts the right treatment.

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The United States is without question a great country. Its people are hardworking, intelligent, innovative, creative, and generous. From breakthroughs in medicine to technological revolutions in Silicon Valley, America has shaped the modern world in ways unmatched by any other nation. It remains a land where people from every nationality, race, and background are welcomed with open arms and provided with the opportunity to realize their dreams. Millions of immigrants, including myself, have experienced this spirit of hospitality and freedom, and this openness has helped make America a beacon of hope and aspiration for the entire world.
Yet today, the global balance of power is shifting rapidly, and the next two decades may define humanity’s political, economic, and technological future. At the heart of this transformation lies China, a country whose breathtaking rise over the last thirty years is unmatched in modern history and whose trajectory now threatens to challenge America’s position as the world’s leading power.
It is within this context that economists, think tanks, and policy experts around the world have debated when — and whether — China will overtake the United States as the dominant global power. The Council on Foreign Relations and Citigroup estimate that China could surpass the United States by 2035, driven by rapid technological advances, growing influence in international trade, and the vast economic ecosystem built around its Belt and Road Initiative. A report by the Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) places the crossing point around 2036 and predicts China may hold the top position for roughly two decades before the U.S. potentially regains its lead by 2057, underscoring that American decline is not inevitable if the right policies are adopted. Analysts at the RAND Corporation are more cautious, projecting that the tipping point may arrive only in the 2040s due to China’s aging population, rising debt, and slowing growth rates, but they warn that America’s relative decline accelerates if Washington fails to take decisive corrective measures. Meanwhile, The Guardian introduced the concept of “Peak China” in its 2025 economic report, suggesting that while China’s pace of expansion may eventually plateau, its technological leadership, military modernization, and deep integration with 154 countries give it an edge the United States cannot ignore. Despite differences in timelines, most credible institutions converge on one conclusion: the world is approaching a historic turning point where China could match or surpass American power, potentially redefining global leadership as early as the mid-2030s.
China’s leadership has spent decades investing heavily in its people, its industries, and its future. Millions of students were sent abroad with state support to acquire cutting-edge education and technical expertise, returning home to apply their skills to the country’s rapid technological advancement. Research centers and laboratories across the country are producing breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, electric vehicles, semiconductors, biotechnology, and space exploration. With consistent policy, centralized planning, and the ability to execute at extraordinary speed, China has achieved what no other country has attempted in modern times: it has built a knowledge-driven, innovation-focused economy at a scale the world has never seen before. Today, it competes directly with the United States in nearly every strategic sector, from energy to digital technology to defense.
This progress is matched by China’s deep global outreach through the Belt and Road Initiative, which now connects more than 154 nations through infrastructure, trade, and investment partnerships. By building ports, highways, railways, energy grids, and digital corridors across Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, China has positioned itself at the center of emerging economic systems and established influence across continents. In doing so, it offers developing countries access to resources and opportunities while simultaneously expanding its own markets and soft power. Unlike coercive alliances built on dependence, Beijing presents this as a model of shared prosperity — one where growth is mutual and partnerships create new possibilities for all. This resonates deeply with many nations, especially those historically marginalized in the global economic order.
In contrast, the United States stands at a crossroads. For decades, America has been the center of global power, but over time, its overreliance on financial dominance rather than industrial capability has weakened its foundations. Much of its manufacturing base has been outsourced to China, India, Taiwan, Vietnam, Bangladesh, and other nations, leaving the U.S. dependent on foreign supply chains for critical products, including advanced electronics, pharmaceuticals, and energy systems. America’s global influence has long relied on the dominance of the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency, allowing it to print trillions without economic backing and finance its consumption and global strategy. Yet this advantage is eroding rapidly as BRICS nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and other blocs create new frameworks for trade that bypass the dollar entirely. As countries increasingly settle energy, technology, and agricultural trades in local currencies or the Chinese yuan, Washington’s ability to shape the world economy through financial leverage diminishes year after year.
Political polarization compounds these challenges. While China moves forward with a unified vision, the United States struggles to reconcile deep divisions between Democrats and Republicans, preventing the creation of long-term strategies needed to sustain global leadership. Powerful lobbying networks and foreign influence groups, such as AIPAC, steer U.S. policy to serve external interests rather than the nation’s strategic priorities. Meanwhile, traditional allies in Europe and Canada, as well as partners in Latin America, are pursuing greater independence from Washington, no longer willing to follow policies they increasingly view as contrary to their own interests. For many across the globe, America is still admired for its innovation, opportunity, and generosity, but there is growing frustration with its history of military interventions and regime-change policies that have destabilized nations from Iraq to Syria, from Libya to Afghanistan. If the United States wants to sustain its role as a respected leader, it must abandon strategies rooted in coercion and start building partnerships grounded in trust, friendship, and mutual respect.
Yet the United States is not destined to fall behind. It still holds immense strengths — from its culture of innovation and world-class universities to its entrepreneurial spirit and unparalleled capacity to attract global talent. America’s scientific leadership, vibrant democracy, and openness to diversity remain unmatched assets. But sustaining these advantages requires decisive action and renewed purpose.
To match China’s pace and reclaim long-term competitiveness, the U.S. must invest heavily in rebuilding its domestic manufacturing base, revitalizing its infrastructure, and restoring leadership in research and development. It must reform its education system to empower a new generation of engineers, scientists, and innovators, and it must foster unity in policymaking, setting aside partisanship for strategic national goals. Most critically, America must shift from a foreign policy based on dominance to one built on equal partnerships, cooperation, and mutual growth.
China’s rise represents a once-in-a-century transformation of the global order, and whether the coming decades lead to confrontation or collaboration will depend on choices made today. If Beijing sustains its momentum and continues integrating 154 nations into its economic vision, it could emerge as the defining power of the 21st century. But China also presents itself as a nation seeking harmony, offering development opportunities rather than pursuing domination, knowing that shared prosperity fuels its own progress. Meanwhile, the United States has the ability to remain a global leader, but only if it adapts to a rapidly changing world, invests in its people, strengthens its alliances, and treats all nations with dignity, fairness, and respect.
The world stands at the threshold of a profound transformation. America’s greatness lies in its creativity, diversity, and openness, qualities that have long inspired humanity. If it can harness these strengths, end destructive foreign interventions, and focus on building lasting partnerships based on trust and care, it can chart a new path where leadership is not imposed but earned. This is the moment for the United States to rediscover its founding ideals and become not just a superpower but a partner to the world. If it fails to do so, China’s relentless rise will reshape the global balance irreversibly, and the 21st century may well belong to Beijing. But if America chooses wisely, there is room for both nations to thrive, for a multipolar world rooted in cooperation rather than conflict, and for humanity to achieve shared prosperity.

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : On September 3, 2025, Beijing staged one of the most consequential parades in modern history — a stunning display of military power, technological mastery, and economic confidence. While commemorating the end of World War II, the underlying message was unmistakable: China, backed by its allies, is reshaping the global order, and the United States is no longer in control.
The symbolism was striking. Standing alongside Xi Jinping were Russia’s Vladimir Putin, India’s Narendra Modi, Pakistan’s Anwaar-ul-Haq, and leaders from across the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). What was once an informal alliance has now transformed into a strategic political and economic bloc. These nations, once victims of Donald Trump’s tariffs, sanctions, and unilateral dictates, have now coalesced into a united front, openly rejecting Washington’s domination and charting an independent path forward.
The parade showcased China’s breathtaking technological advances and unprecedented military preparedness. Rolling past the gathered leaders were the DF-5C intercontinental ballistic missile with a staggering range of 20,000 kilometers, the road-mobile DF-61 ICBM designed for rapid deployment, and hypersonic YJ-series missiles capable of penetrating U.S. carrier strike groups at Mach speeds. Among the most discussed revelations were the LY-1 laser systems capable of disabling drones, satellites, and ballistic projectiles within seconds; autonomous submarine drones like the AJX-002 designed for stealth nuclear delivery; swarm-capable torpedo-shaped sea drones; AI-powered “robot wolves” engineered for reconnaissance and battlefield dominance; and the Type-100 intelligent battle tank — a next-generation armored platform integrating real-time data with precision strike capabilities. China’s fully operational nuclear triad of land-based missiles, submarine-launched warheads, and air-deployed systems was on full display, demonstrating its complete strategic deterrence readiness.
For decades, the Pentagon believed U.S. technological superiority was untouchable. But Beijing’s show of force shattered that illusion. Analysts in Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo were forced to confront an undeniable reality: China can now match or exceed U.S. capabilities in precision strike, strategic range, and integrated defense. The balance of power has shifted irreversibly, forcing even America’s closest allies to reconsider where true leadership lies.
Yet China’s dominance is not based on weapons alone; it rests on a deeper foundation of economic strength. Trump’s tariffs, designed to cripple Beijing’s industrial power, instead exposed America’s own vulnerabilities. China today controls over 90 percent of global rare-earth magnet production and nearly 85 percent of semiconductor-grade mineral processing — the very materials required for smartphones, electric vehicles, AI chips, advanced computing, fighter jets, precision missiles, and hypersonic weapons. When Beijing announced export restrictions on seven critical rare-earth elements in early 2025, requiring special licenses for buyers, the shockwaves reverberated across the United States. Tesla halted electric vehicle production. Apple suspended multiple iPhone lines. Lockheed Martin delayed its F-35 fighter jet deliveries. Silicon Valley startups braced for mass layoffs. Defense contractors scrambled to secure emergency stockpiles of materials essential to sustain their production pipelines. For the first time, the United States found itself dependent on Beijing’s will to maintain the heartbeat of its technological infrastructure.
Washington responded by pouring billions into domestic rare-earth mining projects under the Defense Production Act, hoping to reduce reliance on China. But without Beijing’s decades-long refining infrastructure, recovery will take at least a decade, if not longer. Even as Trump threatened harsher tariffs to force China’s compliance, Xi Jinping did not flinch. The world saw, perhaps for the first time, that America’s economic lifeline had shifted decisively eastward.
While Washington reacted defensively, Beijing quietly built an entirely new architecture of global trade and influence. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has connected more than 150 countries via roads, railways, ports, energy pipelines, industrial zones, and digital corridors. Unlike the West’s traditional dependency model, Beijing offered investment, infrastructure, and market access on terms many developing nations found more equitable. Across Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe, countries that once relied on U.S. aid and NATO trade structures are now participating in Beijing’s economic ecosystem. By empowering local economies through financing and infrastructure, China created an alternative model of prosperity — one based on cooperation rather than coercion.
India’s defiance of Washington perfectly captures this new reality. When the U.S. demanded New Delhi stop importing discounted Russian oil, India firmly rejected the ultimatum, declaring that no foreign power had the authority to dictate its survival strategy. Through partnerships with Russia, Iran, and China under SCO frameworks, India secured energy stability, modernized its infrastructure, and strengthened its role in regional connectivity projects. Russia, for its part, proved remarkably resilient against U.S. and EU sanctions. Instead of buckling under Western economic isolation, Moscow deepened its energy and defense ties with Beijing and New Delhi, shifted trade settlements into yuan and rupees, and bypassed dollar-dominated systems. This acceleration of de-dollarization weakened Washington’s financial leverage and strengthened the SCO bloc’s independence.
This alliance of Trump’s intended economic “targets” has evolved into an integrated powerhouse. The SCO bloc now represents nearly half the world’s population, accounts for 30 percent of global GDP, and controls over 40 percent of global oil and gas reserves. By aligning supply chains, financial systems, and technological ecosystems, these nations have built collective resilience capable of resisting U.S. pressure. Where Trump’s tariffs once aimed to divide and weaken, they have instead unified and empowered an alternative leadership.
At the same time, the Western bloc is fracturing. The once-cohesive alliance of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the European Union is splintering under the weight of Trump’s unilateral policies. European nations, increasingly frustrated with Washington’s dictates on trade, defense, immigration, and foreign policy, are asserting their independence. This shift became unmistakable when Trump offered unconditional U.S. support for Israel during the Gaza conflict. The move alienated much of Europe, which faced growing public pressure over mounting civilian casualties. In a historic development, several European nations — including Germany, France, Spain, Ireland, and multiple Nordic countries — have declared their intent to recognize the State of Palestine at the upcoming United Nations General Assembly session, directly defying U.S. policy. This unprecedented divergence highlights the erosion of Washington’s influence over its closest allies and demonstrates the widening cracks within NATO’s traditional sphere.
Two competing global models are now emerging. The U.S.-led Western approach remains rooted in military interventions, sanctions, and economic dominance, using pressure to force compliance while destabilizing regions and fueling refugee crises. In contrast, the China-led model prioritizes economic inclusion, infrastructure investment, fair trade, and mutual respect for sovereignty. Developing nations across Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East increasingly see tangible benefits from Beijing’s partnerships — schools, hospitals, roads, digital connectivity — while associating Washington’s interventions with bombing campaigns, regime changes, and social collapse.
In his parade address, Xi Jinping underscored this vision of inclusive leadership, declaring that no force on Earth can stop China’s rise but emphasizing that the world is vast enough for every nation to prosper together. His message of fairness, dignity, and mutual respect resonated far beyond Beijing’s immediate circle. The SCO bloc and Belt and Road partnerships now symbolize an aspirational alternative for hundreds of millions seeking growth without subjugation, stability without domination, and prosperity without conditional dependency.
For Washington, this moment represents an existential challenge. Trump’s tariffs, sanctions, and coercive diplomacy — once feared — now appear hollow against an integrated multipolar order. U.S. dominance is eroding not on the battlefield but in boardrooms, investment platforms, and supply chains. America now faces a stark choice: adapt to this transformed reality, cooperate within a new framework of equality, and rebuild global trust — or cling to outdated tools of force and economic manipulation until its influence fades into irrelevance.
On September 3, 2025, Beijing delivered a message that echoed across continents. China is no longer rising — it is leading. And it leads not through conquest but through trade, technology, investment, and inclusion. The world is reorganizing around this reality, and for the first time in a century, Washington is no longer writing the script.