US President Donald Trump has said he will impose global tariffs of 15%, as he has continued to rail against a Supreme Court ruling that struck down his previous import taxes.

Trump said on Friday that he would replace the tariffs scrapped by the court with a 10% levy on all goods coming into the US.

But on Saturday, he announced on Truth Social that this would be increased to the maximum allowed under a never-used trade law.

That law allows these new tariffs to stay in place for around five months before the administration must seek congressional approval.

The 10% tariffs were set to come into force on Tuesday, 24 February. It’s unclear if the increased 15% would also be imposed starting then. The BBC has contacted the White House.

The new 15% tax rate – a temporary solution under Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act – raises questions for countries such as the UK and Australia, which had agreed a 10% tariff deal with the US.

Trump said his administration had reached the decision to raise the levy following a review of the Supreme Court’s “ridiculous, poorly written, and extraordinarily anti-American decision on Tariffs issued yesterday”.

In a 6-3 decision, justices on the highest US court found that the president had overstepped his powers when he introduced sweeping global tariffs last year using a 1977 law known as the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

The US has already collected at least $130bn (£96.4bn) in tariffs using IEEPA, according to the most recent government data.

Immediately following the ruling, Trump said that he was “ashamed of certain members of the court” and called the justices who rejected his trade policy “fools”.

Trump’s tariffs are a key plank of his economic policy, which he has said will encourage businesses to invest and produce goods in the US rather than overseas. But the high court’s decision marked a significant check on his power and a major blow to his second-term agenda.

The US president has argued his tariffs are necessary to reduce the trade deficit – the amount by which imports exceed exports – but the US trade deficit reached a fresh high this week, widening by 2.1% compared to 2024 and hitting roughly $1.2 trillion (£890bn).

Drew Greenblatt, owner of Marlin Steel Wire Products, a steel fabrication plant in Baltimore, said he was “very disappointed” by the Supreme Court’s decision.

“It is a setback for poor people in America that had a chance to climb into the middle class with great manufacturing jobs,” he told the BBC.

But John Boyd, a soybean farmer from Virginia and founder of the National Black Farmers Association, said: “This is a huge win for me and a big loss for the president.

“I don’t care how you look at it, President Trump lost on this.”

Yet Allie Renison, a former UK government trade adviser and director at SEC Newgate, said: “While it may seem like a good day for free trade, I think trade actually just got a lot messier.”

She said that businesses are now facing “much more of a patchwork approach” to tariffs under the Trump administration.

It means that US businesses will have to pay a 15% tariff to import most goods into America under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974.

But some products will be exempted such as critical minerals, metals and pharmaceuticals.

Meanwhile, separate tariffs on steel, aluminium, lumber and auto-motives – introduced using a different US law – remain in place, untouched by the Supreme Court’s ruling.

On Friday, a White House official said countries that previously reached trade deals with the US, including the UK, would face the global tariff under Section 122 rather than the tariff rate they had previously negotiated.

However, the UK’s deals around steel, aluminium, pharmaceuticals, autos, and aerospace sectors – which represent most of its trade with the US – were not impacted.

The UK government said it expects Britain’s “privileged trading position with the US” to continue and that it is a “matter for the US to determine” whether those deals still stand.

William Bain, head of trade policy at the British Chambers of Commerce, has said he feared that the president’s response to the Supreme Court ruling “could be worse for British businesses”.

The new 15% import tariffs are “bad for trade, bad for US consumers and businesses” and will “weaken global economic growth”, the leader of a UK business group said.

The chairman of the European Parliament International Trade Committee told BBC Newshour he would call for a pause in ratifying a trade deal between the EU and US after Trump’s announcement.

The committee was due to vote on the deal on Tuesday, but German Social Democrat MEP Bernd Lange said fresh tariffs raised “several issues” that needed clarifying.

The Supreme Court ruling opened the door for consumers and businesses to seek refunds from the unlawful tariffs, though the high court did not make a decision on whether reimbursements should be issued.

On Friday, Trump indicated that refunds would not come without a legal battle which, he claimed, could take years. Companies and trade groups have already vowed to seek such reimbursements.

But Neil Bradley, chief policy officer at the US Chamber of Commerce, said: “Swift refunds of the impermissible tariffs will be meaningful for the more than 200,000 small business importers in this country and will help support stronger economic growth this year.”

While the National Retail Federation, which represents millions of American businesses, urged the courts “to ensure a seamless process to refund the tariffs to US importers”.

US Senator Maria Cantwell, a Democrat representing Washington state, has written a letter to US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, asking whether the administration has a plan to refund businesses.

“Given this Administration has illegally collected hundreds of billions of dollars from American businesses, that now must be refunded, I am requesting detailed information about how the Administration plans to fairly and expeditiously reimburse the payors of those tariffs,” she wrote in a letter to Bessent.

But Senator John Kennedy, a Republican from Louisiana, argued that if Democrats push for refunds, it could backfire and help Republicans in the next election cycle.

He said it could be a boon for the US business community that would make the economy “roar” ahead of the midterm elections in November.

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent rush to Washington was not routine diplomacy. It was a geopolitical stress test. Since President Donald Trump resumed office, the Israeli prime minister has maintained close coordination with Washington. Yet this visit carried an urgency that signaled concern — perhaps even anxiety. The core question hovering over the meeting was unmistakable: Would the United States once again expand confrontation with Iran under Israeli pressure, or was Washington beginning to assert strategic independence?
The regional environment is tense. The United States has reinforced its military posture across the Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean, citing deterrence and stability. Iran’s nuclear enrichment levels — reportedly reaching up to 60% purity according to the International Atomic Energy Agency — remain the focal point of Western concern. Tehran insists its program is peaceful and reversible, while Israel views it as an existential threshold.
Netanyahu arrived seeking expansion of the negotiation framework. Israel has long argued that any agreement must go beyond uranium enrichment to include limits on Iran’s ballistic missile program and restrictions on its regional alliances. In Israeli strategic doctrine, Iran’s missile range and regional deterrence network form a unified threat architecture.
Yet post-meeting signals from Washington were restrained. President Trump indicated that nuclear talks would continue — but remain confined to the nuclear file. No immediate commitment was made to incorporate missile restrictions or regional dismantlement demands. That silence spoke volumes.
For decades, Washington’s Middle East posture closely mirrored Israeli security framing. This time, the United States appeared to draw a boundary. Why now?
First, domestic opinion is shifting. The Gaza war has deeply polarized American society. Estimates from humanitarian agencies suggest total Palestinian fatalities — direct and indirect — have surpassed 80,000 since the conflict’s escalation. The scale of destruction has fueled sustained protests across American universities and major cities. Younger voters increasingly question unconditional military assistance and open-ended strategic alignment.
Organizations such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee remain influential, but the environment has changed. Campaign contributions and policy alignments are scrutinized in real time through digital media ecosystems. Lawmakers now face direct public questioning regarding foreign aid allocations and lobbying relationships.
Second, the economic calculus is sobering. A full-scale war with Iran would dwarf previous Middle Eastern interventions. The Iraq War cost the United States an estimated $2–3 trillion over two decades. Iran is geographically larger, militarily more advanced, and strategically integrated into regional networks. Disruption of the Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly 20% of global oil supply flows — could send crude prices above $150 per barrel. Inflationary shocks would ripple through American households already burdened by high interest rates and federal debt exceeding $34 trillion.
Third, the geopolitical landscape is no longer unipolar. China and Russia maintain strategic partnerships with Tehran. Europe has little appetite for another Middle Eastern war. The Global South increasingly resists Western military adventurism. Any unilateral escalation risks diplomatic isolation rather than coalition-building. In this context, “America First” takes on new meaning. Strategic restraint becomes not weakness, but prudence.
Netanyahu’s urgency reflects Israel’s own vulnerability calculations. From Jerusalem’s perspective, Iran’s missile program and regional alliances create encirclement risk. Israel’s security doctrine prioritizes preemption and dominance. But Washington’s calculus is broader: preserving global stability, economic balance, and strategic bandwidth across multiple theaters — including Ukraine and the Indo-Pacific.
Nuclear containment through verifiable inspection may be imperfect, but it is far less costly than war. The International Atomic Energy Agency remains central to any enforceable framework. If Iran restores comprehensive inspection access and caps enrichment levels, escalation logic weakens. Tehran frequently references a religious decree prohibiting nuclear weapons, though Western governments demand technical verification over theological assurances.
Washington increasingly recognizes that unqualified alignment with Israel carries reputational costs. In a world where emerging powers challenge U.S. moral authority, strategic overreach erodes influence.
There is also the question of sustainability. Continuous regional fragmentation — Iraq, Syria, Libya — has not produced durable stability. Military decapitation strategies have often created power vacuums rather than order. Iran, unlike those states, possesses cohesive national institutions and deep historical identity. Attempting regime destabilization would carry unpredictable consequences.
The emerging signal from Washington is not abandonment of Israel. It is recalibration. Conditional partnership rather than automatic escalation.In geopolitical terms, this is subtle but profound. For the first time in decades, the United States appears willing to define its own negotiation parameters, even when they do not fully align with Israeli maximalist positions.
If diplomacy holds, several outcomes become possible. Nuclear transparency reduces immediate escalation risk. Multilateral engagement on Gaza diffuses regional tension. Economic stabilization limits energy shocks. Strategic focus remains distributed rather than concentrated in one volatile theater.
But if negotiations collapse, pressure will return — from hawkish factions in Washington and from Israeli leadership advocating preemption. The durability of this recalibration will then face its true test. History rarely pivots on dramatic declarations. It turns on measured refusals — on lines quietly drawn.
Netanyahu’s urgent visit may ultimately be remembered not for what was demanded, but for what was declined. If Washington sustains its current posture, it signals a new doctrine: partnership without submission, deterrence without recklessness, and diplomacy before dominance.
In a region long defined by escalation cycles, even strategic restraint can reshape history. The question is no longer whether America supports Israel. The question is whether America will define its Middle East policy by Israeli urgency — or by American interest. The answer to that question may determine the next decade of regional stability.

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent rush to Washington was not routine diplomacy. It was a geopolitical stress test. Since President Donald Trump resumed office, the Israeli prime minister has maintained close coordination with Washington. Yet this visit carried an urgency that signaled concern — perhaps even anxiety. The core question hovering over the meeting was unmistakable: Would the United States once again expand confrontation with Iran under Israeli pressure, or was Washington beginning to assert strategic independence?
The regional environment is tense. The United States has reinforced its military posture across the Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean, citing deterrence and stability. Iran’s nuclear enrichment levels — reportedly reaching up to 60% purity according to the International Atomic Energy Agency — remain the focal point of Western concern. Tehran insists its program is peaceful and reversible, while Israel views it as an existential threshold.
Netanyahu arrived seeking expansion of the negotiation framework. Israel has long argued that any agreement must go beyond uranium enrichment to include limits on Iran’s ballistic missile program and restrictions on its regional alliances. In Israeli strategic doctrine, Iran’s missile range and regional deterrence network form a unified threat architecture.
Yet post-meeting signals from Washington were restrained. President Trump indicated that nuclear talks would continue — but remain confined to the nuclear file. No immediate commitment was made to incorporate missile restrictions or regional dismantlement demands. That silence spoke volumes.
For decades, Washington’s Middle East posture closely mirrored Israeli security framing. This time, the United States appeared to draw a boundary. Why now?
First, domestic opinion is shifting. The Gaza war has deeply polarized American society. Estimates from humanitarian agencies suggest total Palestinian fatalities — direct and indirect — have surpassed 80,000 since the conflict’s escalation. The scale of destruction has fueled sustained protests across American universities and major cities. Younger voters increasingly question unconditional military assistance and open-ended strategic alignment.
Organizations such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee remain influential, but the environment has changed. Campaign contributions and policy alignments are scrutinized in real time through digital media ecosystems. Lawmakers now face direct public questioning regarding foreign aid allocations and lobbying relationships.
Second, the economic calculus is sobering. A full-scale war with Iran would dwarf previous Middle Eastern interventions. The Iraq War cost the United States an estimated $2–3 trillion over two decades. Iran is geographically larger, militarily more advanced, and strategically integrated into regional networks. Disruption of the Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly 20% of global oil supply flows — could send crude prices above $150 per barrel. Inflationary shocks would ripple through American households already burdened by high interest rates and federal debt exceeding $34 trillion.
Third, the geopolitical landscape is no longer unipolar. China and Russia maintain strategic partnerships with Tehran. Europe has little appetite for another Middle Eastern war. The Global South increasingly resists Western military adventurism. Any unilateral escalation risks diplomatic isolation rather than coalition-building. In this context, “America First” takes on new meaning. Strategic restraint becomes not weakness, but prudence.
Netanyahu’s urgency reflects Israel’s own vulnerability calculations. From Jerusalem’s perspective, Iran’s missile program and regional alliances create encirclement risk. Israel’s security doctrine prioritizes preemption and dominance. But Washington’s calculus is broader: preserving global stability, economic balance, and strategic bandwidth across multiple theaters — including Ukraine and the Indo-Pacific.
Nuclear containment through verifiable inspection may be imperfect, but it is far less costly than war. The International Atomic Energy Agency remains central to any enforceable framework. If Iran restores comprehensive inspection access and caps enrichment levels, escalation logic weakens. Tehran frequently references a religious decree prohibiting nuclear weapons, though Western governments demand technical verification over theological assurances.
Washington increasingly recognizes that unqualified alignment with Israel carries reputational costs. In a world where emerging powers challenge U.S. moral authority, strategic overreach erodes influence.
There is also the question of sustainability. Continuous regional fragmentation — Iraq, Syria, Libya — has not produced durable stability. Military decapitation strategies have often created power vacuums rather than order. Iran, unlike those states, possesses cohesive national institutions and deep historical identity. Attempting regime destabilization would carry unpredictable consequences.
The emerging signal from Washington is not abandonment of Israel. It is recalibration. Conditional partnership rather than automatic escalation.In geopolitical terms, this is subtle but profound. For the first time in decades, the United States appears willing to define its own negotiation parameters, even when they do not fully align with Israeli maximalist positions.
If diplomacy holds, several outcomes become possible. Nuclear transparency reduces immediate escalation risk. Multilateral engagement on Gaza diffuses regional tension. Economic stabilization limits energy shocks. Strategic focus remains distributed rather than concentrated in one volatile theater.
But if negotiations collapse, pressure will return — from hawkish factions in Washington and from Israeli leadership advocating preemption. The durability of this recalibration will then face its true test. History rarely pivots on dramatic declarations. It turns on measured refusals — on lines quietly drawn.
Netanyahu’s urgent visit may ultimately be remembered not for what was demanded, but for what was declined. If Washington sustains its current posture, it signals a new doctrine: partnership without submission, deterrence without recklessness, and diplomacy before dominance.
In a region long defined by escalation cycles, even strategic restraint can reshape history. The question is no longer whether America supports Israel. The question is whether America will define its Middle East policy by Israeli urgency — or by American interest. The answer to that question may determine the next decade of regional stability.