Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : As tensions escalate between Iran and the joint forces of the United States and Israel, the most pressing question dominating strategic circles is deceptively simple: Who would win? Yet modern warfare—especially among technologically advanced and regionally entrenched powers—is no longer a matter of tanks crossing borders or flags planted on captured capitals. Victory today is layered, conditional, and defined by political objectives rather than territorial conquest alone. To assess the probability of winning, one must first define what “winning” actually means.
If victory is defined as regime survival and preservation of fighting capability, Iran’s probability of success appears stronger than many assume. Historically, external air campaigns have struggled to topple deeply entrenched governments without significant ground intervention. Iran’s geography alone presents a formidable challenge. Its mountainous terrain, expansive landmass, and dispersed military infrastructure complicate any attempt at rapid decisive victory. Much of its missile arsenal is believed to be stored in underground facilities designed precisely to withstand aerial bombardment. Even sustained precision strikes may degrade capabilities, but eliminating them entirely is another matter.
Moreover, Iran’s doctrine is built around resilience and asymmetric endurance. Rather than matching Western air superiority aircraft for aircraft, Tehran relies on ballistic missiles, drones, cyber operations, and proxy networks across the region. This model does not aim to dominate the skies; it aims to outlast and impose cost. If the objective of Washington and Tel Aviv were to collapse the Iranian state or compel unconditional surrender, the probability of achieving that quickly would remain relatively low without a major ground campaign—an option that carries enormous political and military risk. In that scenario, Iran’s likelihood of “winning” through survival could reasonably be considered moderate to high.
However, if victory is defined differently—say, as the ability to significantly degrade Iran’s military capacity and limit its ability to launch sustained retaliation—the balance shifts. The United States maintains overwhelming air superiority, advanced stealth platforms, satellite surveillance, cyber dominance, and long-range precision strike capabilities. Israel brings decades of experience in targeted operations, missile defense innovation, and real-time battlefield intelligence integration. Together, they possess unmatched technological coordination.
In the early phases of a high-intensity conflict, joint U.S.–Israeli forces would likely dominate the airspace, suppress air defenses, and strike high-value targets including command centers, missile storage sites, naval facilities, and communications infrastructure. Iran’s conventional air force is comparatively limited, and its air defense systems, while upgraded over the years, would struggle against advanced stealth bombers and electronic warfare. Under this definition of victory—crippling Iran’s infrastructure and reducing its capacity for sustained attacks—the coalition’s probability of success would be moderate to high.
Yet degrading capability is not synonymous with eliminating threat. Missile forces are mobile. Drones are inexpensive and produced in significant quantities. Even if command structures suffer damage, decentralized networks can continue operations. Thus, while U.S.–Israel forces could inflict substantial destruction, the probability of completely stopping Iranian retaliation remains uncertain. The difference between “damaging” and “neutralizing” is strategically profound.
Another potential definition of victory is economic and psychological leverage. Iran’s geographic position near the Strait of Hormuz gives it influence over one of the world’s most critical energy corridors. Even partial disruption of maritime traffic would elevate global oil prices, strain supply chains, and create political pressure in energy-importing nations. While Iran itself would suffer economically from prolonged instability, it could still leverage regional disruption as a strategic equalizer. If the objective becomes forcing negotiations by generating economic shock, Iran’s probability of achieving leverage increases.
On the other hand, prolonged conflict risks devastating Iran’s own infrastructure. Energy facilities, ports, and industrial assets could become targets, further weakening its economy. The United States, with a diversified economy and global alliances, is better positioned to absorb long-term financial strain. Israel, though geographically smaller, maintains advanced civil defense systems and missile interception layers that mitigate, though do not eliminate, the impact of incoming threats. Thus, in a war of economic attrition, neither side emerges unscathed, but the coalition likely retains greater structural resilience.
Regime change remains the most ambitious—and least probable—outcome. History offers cautionary examples of external interventions that underestimated the complexity of internal political dynamics. Airpower alone rarely achieves political transformation. Ground occupation in a country the size of Iran would require vast troop deployments and sustained logistical commitment, with unpredictable consequences. Under this scenario, the probability of rapid decisive regime collapse appears low. Iran’s political system, though internally contested, has demonstrated endurance under decades of sanctions and pressure.
Therefore, when evaluating probability, the answer depends on which strategic objective is prioritized. If the goal is to survive and maintain core sovereignty, Iran’s odds are comparatively stronger. If the goal is to inflict extensive military degradation and assert technological superiority, the U.S.–Israel coalition holds the advantage. If the goal is total capitulation or permanent elimination of threat, probabilities on both sides decline sharply, as modern warfare between capable states rarely produces absolute outcomes.
There is also the factor of escalation management. A broader regional spread involving additional actors could alter calculations dramatically. The longer a conflict persists, the more unpredictable it becomes. Domestic political pressures in all three countries would shape decision-making. Public tolerance for casualties, economic hardship, and prolonged instability could either harden resolve or accelerate diplomatic engagement.
Ultimately, the most realistic outcome in such a confrontation may not be traditional victory at all, but a negotiated pause after significant destruction. In modern high-intensity conflicts, wars often end not because one side is annihilated, but because costs outweigh objectives. The probability that both sides declare partial success—while privately recognizing the limits of military solutions—may be higher than outright triumph for either camp.
In strategic terms, Iran is more likely to “win” by surviving, absorbing damage, and continuing to function as a sovereign actor. The United States and Israel are more likely to “win” by demonstrating overwhelming tactical superiority and degrading Iran’s operational capabilities. Neither outcome represents total dominance. Both involve trade-offs.
War among technologically advanced powers with asymmetric tools is less about decisive victory and more about shaping post-conflict narratives. Survival can be framed as victory. Deterrence can be framed as success. Destruction of infrastructure can be presented as strategic achievement. Yet beneath these narratives lies a sobering truth: in such conflicts, the probability of absolute victory for any side remains limited.
The real question, then, may not be who would win—but at what cost, and for how long.

For two days now, Dubai residents have mainly stayed indoors as their city is hit by missiles and drones – part of an attack launched by Iran across the region in response to the latest massive and ongoing attack against it by US and Israel.

Luxury hotels and its main airport – one of the busiest in the world by passenger traffic – were damaged.

The BBC has spoken to people who live in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as well as those on holiday, who describe situations far from the usual flow of daily life.

Resident Becky Williams said she saw about 15 missiles “launched from behind my house yesterday”, referring to missiles fired by UAE authorities to intercept incoming Iranian projectiles. “You can hear the interceptions happening in the air.”

But she added that she and her family were remaining calm and trusted the UAE military to defend its airspace, saying she believed it would “all blow over soon”.

Iran’s attacks in retaliation for the US-Israeli strikes continued into Sunday.

On the Palm Jumeirah, Dubai’s luxury man-made archipelago, the five-star Fairmont The Palm hotel was struck by a large explosion.

Debris from an intercepted drone resulted in a “minor fire” on the outer facade of the five-star Burj Al Arab hotel, authorities have said.

Another Dubai resident told the BBC: “What we’ve lived through over the past 24 hours is a fraction of what others have been living through in areas of conflict so it puts things in perspective.”

Meanwhile, Satya Jaganathan’s weekend plans for a hike on Sunday were foiled by the events.

“And here we are, sheltering in place,” she said.

The 35-year-old said her sister’s family and pets had to seek shelter in their apartment because they lived close to the Jebel Ali port, where there was “a lot of debris falling”.

On Saturday, officials said debris from an “aerial interception” caused a fire in a berth at the port, which is the world’s ninth busiest.

“It’s still relatively calm as there are only loud noises every few hours, but it is eerie because this is not the Dubai we are used to,” Jaganathan explained.

Dubai International Airport was also damaged in what authorities have called an “incident”.

Thousands of flights have been grounded to and from the Middle East, in one of the most serious disruptions to global travel since the Covid-19 pandemic.

Judy Trotter was supposed to return to London from her holiday on Saturday, but was told all flights were cancelled when she arrived at the airport.

“I’ve met people who were very upset about their travel plans, there were thousands of people in the airport, I met people who told me they were missing funerals,” she said.

She added a lot of passengers “were in transit, just passing through” and are now stuck.

Trotter was one of around 1,000 stranded passengers sent to stay at a hotel, where they were warned to stay away from the windows.

“There is a lot of glass in the hotel which is worrying,” she said, adding, they have heard “several missiles throughout the day”.

Another British holidaymaker – Kate Fischer from Buckinghamshire – said she and her family are “very frightened.”

On Saturday evening, she and her partner packed “a grab bag” as the children slept, she said, adding that she “doused bathrobes and towels” in water in case they needed to “escape during the night in fire conditions”.

Sunday, she said, was a strange day.

“It’s a very surreal experience being surrounded by everyone trying to enjoy their holiday and trying to entertain their children whilst we can see visible smoke from nearby areas that have been hit by drones or missiles.”

Strictly Come Dancing competitor Vicky Pattison was among those who had to take shelter in Dubai, which is also popular destination for the rich and famous.

Pattison had been enjoying a break with her husband, Ercan Ramada, but their outbound flight to Australia was cancelled.

Writing on her Instagram, the former I’m A Celebrity… Get Me Out Of Here winner said: “We’re thinking of everyone who is feeling unsettled and unsafe right now.”

Urging Iranians to overthrow their clerical rulers, the US launched “major combat operations” along with Israel against Iran early on Saturday.

The US is calling the operation “Epic Fury”, while the Israelis call it “Lion’s Roar”.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior officials have been killed.

The aerial assault came two days after US-Iranian talks on Tehran’s nuclear programme ended without a deal.

Iran launched counter-attacks throughout the Middle East in retaliation to what its foreign minister called an “unprovoked, illegal” attack by the US and Israel.

Here’s what we know so far:

How many have died?

Three US service members have been killed in action and five seriously injured, US Central Command said on Sunday, without identifying the deceased.

The personnel were based in Kuwait, reports the BBC’s US partner CBS.

“Several others sustained minor shrapnel injuries and concussions – and are in the process of being returned to duty,” Central Command posted on X.

More than 200 people have been killed across Iran and more than 700 injured, according to the Red Crescent on Saturday.

At least 165 people including children have died in an explosion at a school in southern Iran, according to Irna, the state news agency.

At least nine people died when an Iranian missile hit a synagogue bomb shelter in the central Israeli town of Beit Shemesh, the BBC’s Hugo Bachega reports from the scene.

One person died and at least 20 were wounded when an Iranian missile hit several buildings in central Tel Aviv, according to Israeli newspaper Haaretz.

In counterattacks, Iran also fired drones and missiles at Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar the UAE, all of which have a US military presence.

One person was killed and 11 injured at airports in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, authorities and airport officials said.

Did Trump need Congress’ approval to attack Iran?

In his video announcement, Trump described the US-Israel attacks on Iran as “major combat operations”.

Congress reserves the power to officially declare war, as written in Article I of the US Constitution, but it has not done so.

The Constitution does, however, give the president broad authority to engage in military action.

This grey area has been the source of much debate recently in Washington.

Reactions on Capitol Hill to the US-Israel attack on Iran have fallen largely along partisan lines. Republicans, who currently control both chambers of Congress, were mostly in support.

House Speaker Mike Johnson, a Republican, said the Trump administration had notified the “Gang of 8” – a bipartisan group of congressional leaders – ahead of the strikes.

Democrats mostly denounced the attacks, accusing Trump of launching a war without congressional approval.

Democrats renewed calls for Congress to take up a war powers resolution, like the bill that failed last year for lack of Republican support.

If another war powers resolution were introduced and passed, it could block the president’s unilateral use of force without congressional approval.

But the odds of such a bill passing appear unlikely for now.

Few Republicans have indicated they would back such a measure, except for congressman Thomas Massie and Senator Rand Paul.

Why did the US attack Iran?

Shortly after explosions were reported in the Iranian capital on Saturday, Trump took to social media to accuse Tehran of waging an “unending campaign of bloodshed and mass murder targeting the United States”.

He argued Iran had rejected every opportunity to renounce its nuclear programme and claimed it was developing long-range missiles that could threaten Europe, US troops overseas, and even “soon reach the American homeland”.

He further cited the violent takeover of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979, resulting in dozens of Americans being held hostage for 444 days, as well as Iran’s proxies bombing a US Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 that killed 241.

The US president had also pledged in January to intervene when Iranian security forces crushed protests amid an economic crisis.

In June last year, the US bombed three nuclear facilities in Iran. Trump said the US Operation Midnight Hammer had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear programme.

Last summer’s US attacks paved the way for a ceasefire in a 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel.

Israel had launched air strikes on Iranian nuclear, military and infrastructure sites. Tehran had retaliated by firing hundreds of rockets and drones at Israel.

How many of Iran’s leaders have been killed?

Trump announced on social media that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had died, describing him as “one of the most evil people in History”.

Iranian state TV later confirmed the death of Khamenei, 86, who had ruled since 1989, and declared 40 days of mourning.

Trump told Fox News that 48 Iranian leaders had been killed in the operation.

BBC Verify obtained satellite imagery taken over Tehran that showed significant damage to part of Khamenei’s office in the Iranian capital.

Will there be US boots on the ground?

There’s no indication US combat troops will be deployed on the ground in Iran, not least because of the low appetite among the American public for a ground invasion.

“The president has no plan for any kind of large-scale ground force inside of Iran,” Republican Senator Tom Cotton told the BBC’s US partner CBS on Sunday.

The US operation will include “an extended air and naval campaign”, Cotton said, and search-and-rescue efforts could “go in and extract any downed pilot”.

The US has about 13 military bases across the Middle East, with 30,000 to 40,000 troops normally deployed between them.

The US military has been building its presence in the Middle East for weeks and has two aircraft carriers, USS Gerald R Ford and USS Abraham Lincoln, in the region.

Does Iran have the capability to attack the US?

The Iranian regime has always denied it wants a nuclear weapon, but it has enriched uranium to a level that has no civilian use in a nuclear power programme, says the BBC’s international editor Jeremy Bowen.

So far Israel and the US have published no evidence that it was about to build the bomb, he adds.

There have been no public reports of a pending Iranian attack on the US mainland, but local authorities from New York City to Los Angeles said they were on high alert.