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Iran War: The Energy Trap for China and Russia

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : This war may be presented as a fight over nuclear fear, missiles, or regime behavior, but beneath the headlines lies a far larger strategic contest: who will command the chokepoints through which the lifeblood of the global economy flows.
Wars are often sold to the world in moral language, but fought for strategic outcomes. The ongoing confrontation centered on Iran is no exception. To the United States, Israel, Britain, France, and much of the Western media, the war is projected as a campaign of necessity: a preemptive effort to stop an alleged nuclear threat, weaken Iranian missile power, and restore security to a volatile region. In that narrative, Western force is disciplined, purposeful, and increasingly successful, while Iran is portrayed as cornered, degraded, and losing ground.
But from Tehran, and from those across the world who reject the Western reading of the conflict, the war appears entirely different. There, it is seen as a story of one nation, battered yet unbowed, resisting the most powerful military coalition on earth and still retaining the capacity to impose pain, uncertainty, and strategic cost. In this second narrative, Iran’s endurance itself becomes a kind of victory. A nation under siege is not expected to dominate the skies, but merely to survive, retaliate, and deny its enemies a clean triumph. That denial carries military, political, and moral weight.
Both sides choose facts that flatter their case. Both highlight only those developments that fit their desired conclusion. Yet when the smoke of propaganda begins to clear, a deeper question emerges: what, in truth, is this war really about?
The official Western justifications do not fully satisfy the scale of the conflict. Iran has long been accused of standing only days or weeks away from weaponization, yet no public evidence has shown an actual nuclear test, a declared bomb, or the unmistakable operationalization of such a weapon. If Tehran had already crossed that threshold, the world would likely have seen far clearer proof by now. The gap between nuclear capability and an actual deliverable bomb is vast, and it is precisely within that gap that political narratives are often built.
The second argument, that Iran must be attacked because of its ballistic missile capability, has greater strategic logic but also exposes a double standard. Yes, Iran’s missiles threaten U.S. bases, allied infrastructure, shipping routes, and Israel. But many states possess missile capabilities without becoming targets of such an overwhelming multinational military design. North Korea, for example, is more isolated, more repressive, and openly nuclear-armed, yet it has not been subjected to this kind of sustained Western-Israeli military pressure. Why? The answer is not found in moral principle. It is found in geography.
Iran sits beside the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most critical energy chokepoints in human history. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration data you provided, about 20.9 million barrels per day of oil moved through Hormuz in the first half of 2025. That amounts to roughly one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption and about one-quarter of globally traded maritime oil. In the same period, around 11.4 billion cubic feet per day of LNG also transited the strait, representing more than one-fifth of global LNG trade. These are not marginal figures. They are the circulatory system of the industrial world.
That is what makes Iran categorically different from North Korea. Iran does not merely possess missiles, a controversial nuclear program, or an adversarial ideology. Iran sits astride a waterway through which the economic oxygen of Asia and much of the wider world must pass. China, India, Japan, and South Korea together accounted for nearly three-quarters of Hormuz crude and condensate flows in the first half of 2025. In other words, the great Asian engines of growth remain heavily dependent on the uninterrupted movement of Gulf energy through waters adjoining Iran.
Now consider the wider maritime map. The Strait of Malacca handled 23.2 million barrels per day in the first half of 2025, even more than Hormuz, making it the largest oil chokepoint in the world by volume. It is the shortest and most efficient route connecting Middle Eastern energy suppliers with East and Southeast Asia. China alone accounted for 48% of the import volumes passing through Malacca in that period. Meanwhile, the Cape of Good Hope, though not a chokepoint, carried 9.1 million barrels per day as rerouted shipping avoided attacks and instability around the Red Sea. Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez-SUMED route, once central arteries to Europe, saw their flows nearly halved from 2023 levels due to insecurity and rerouting. The global energy system is therefore not merely about production; it is about maritime passage, route vulnerability, insurance cost, naval reach, and the ability to protect or disrupt the channels through which supply moves.
If the United States, through military presence, alliance architecture, naval supremacy, and regional basing, were able to dominate the security environment around Hormuz while retaining influence across the broader chain of maritime corridors stretching toward Bab el-Mandeb, the Red Sea, the Cape route, and onward to Asia’s receiving lanes, then Washington would possess extraordinary leverage over the global energy order. It would not legally “own” these waterways, nor permanently command every vessel that crosses them, but it could shape the conditions under which oil moves, slows, detours, becomes more expensive, or becomes politically hostage to security calculations.
And that leverage would be immense. The United States today is itself a top oil producer and far less dependent on Gulf imports than in previous decades. By contrast, Asia remains far more exposed to disruptions in Gulf exports. This asymmetry matters. A power less dependent on a chokepoint but more capable of militarily policing it enjoys a structural advantage over powers whose economies rely heavily on its uninterrupted use. Such an arrangement would allow Washington to pressure adversaries not necessarily by stopping every cargo physically, but by raising risk, insurance, delay, and uncertainty to levels that alter trade behavior. In global energy markets, fear itself is a weapon.
Venezuela adds another layer to this picture. It possesses the world’s largest proven crude reserves, and while sanctions, infrastructure decay, and underinvestment have kept production far below its potential, the country remains a massive latent energy asset in the Western Hemisphere. If Washington can tighten its grip over western supply sources while also exerting naval and strategic influence over eastern chokepoints, then it is not difficult to imagine a future in which energy becomes an even sharper geopolitical instrument. That would not mean total American control of global oil, but it would mean an ability to influence supply routes, pricing pressure, and economic vulnerability in ways few empires in history have ever possessed.
Such a scenario would place China in particular under long-term strategic stress. Its factories, transport networks, petrochemical industries, and export machines all depend on steady access to imported energy. Russia too would face increasing pressure if maritime and sanctioned routes became narrower, longer, costlier, or more politically constrained. Even U.S. allies would not be immune. Any state that disobeyed Washington on key matters could face indirect coercion through a security system that determines how safely and cheaply energy reaches world markets.
That, then, is the terrifying possibility hidden beneath the daily headlines. The war on Iran may not simply be about uranium enrichment, missiles, democracy, or the suffering of the Iranian people. It may be about who commands the valves of the global economy. It may be about transforming maritime geography into a mechanism of strategic obedience. It may be about giving one power the ability, in moments of crisis, to squeeze rivals, discipline allies, and bend energy-dependent economies toward submission.
And that is why this conflict is so dangerous. If Russia and China conclude that Iran is not merely a regional partner but the front line of a broader struggle over the future control of Eurasia’s energy lifelines, then the war may not remain confined to Iran at all. It could widen not because anyone desires world war, but because the consequences of inaction may appear even more catastrophic than the risks of confrontation.
The world therefore stands before a historic choice. Either the major powers step back and preserve a plural, negotiated, and open energy order, or they continue down a path in which chokepoints become instruments of domination and commerce becomes a hostage of force. If the second path prevails, then the attack on Iran will be remembered not as a regional war, but as the opening move in a far larger campaign to place the world’s economic bloodstream under strategic command. And if that day comes, nations will discover too late that oil was never just a commodity. It was power, mobility, sovereignty, and survival. Whoever controls its pathways does not merely influence the market. They hold a hand on the throat of the modern world.

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How the World Is Forced to Fund the Iran War

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The most defining feature of the Iran War is not the missiles, the targets, or even the scale of destruction—it is the silent and systematic transfer of its cost to those who are not fighting it. In an extraordinary display of modern economic engineering, all three principal actors—Iran, United States, and Israel—have structured this conflict in a way that allows them to wage war without bearing its full financial burden. Instead, that burden is being shifted outward to global consumers, trade-dependent economies, and regional allies, transforming a regional conflict into a worldwide economic obligation.
This is what makes the Iran War fundamentally different from traditional wars. Historically, nations financed wars through taxation, borrowing, or internal sacrifice. Today, however, the interconnected nature of the global economy allows powerful states to externalize these costs. Oil prices rise, shipping costs surge, insurance premiums spike, and supply chains tighten—not as unintended consequences, but as embedded mechanisms through which the cost of war is distributed globally. The battlefield may be regional, but the bill is international.
At the center of this economic and strategic equation lies the Strait of Hormuz, the most critical energy chokepoint in the world. A significant portion of global oil, liquefied natural gas, and commercial goods passes through this narrow corridor every day. Control over this passage offers not only military leverage but also unparalleled economic influence.
Current estimates suggest that approximately $1.2 trillion worth of trade flows through Hormuz annually, including around $800 billion in energy shipments and $400 billion in non-energy goods such as fertilizers, chemicals, metals, and manufactured products. A 10 percent toll on this trade would generate roughly $120 billion per year. Such a mechanism would allow Iran, in theory, to recoup the economic damage of war within a single year—not through aid or borrowing, but by leveraging its geographic position within the global trade system.
This is where the economic dimension of the war becomes unmistakably clear. Any increase in shipping costs through Hormuz would be passed on to importing countries, raising energy prices, increasing transportation costs, and fueling inflation worldwide. Consumers in distant nations, far removed from the battlefield, would ultimately bear the financial burden. In effect, the Iran War would be funded not just by those involved, but by the entire global economy.
At the same time, the United States operates within its own system of cost distribution. With daily war expenditures estimated at around $1 billion, a conflict lasting 60 to 70 days would cost approximately $60 to $70 billion. However, much of the U.S. military presence in the region is sustained through security arrangements with Gulf states. These host nations, dependent on American protection, often absorb a significant share of these costs. Thus, the United States projects power while redistributing its financial burden to its allies.
Israel follows a similar model. Its wartime expenditures, estimated in the tens of billions, are largely offset through extensive financial and military support from the United States and allied networks. This support ensures that Israel can sustain prolonged military operations without bearing the full economic impact domestically. In this way, Israel also participates in the broader system of cost externalization.
The result is a striking and deeply troubling paradox. The nations directly engaged in the Iran War are not the ones paying for it. Instead, the financial burden is transferred to a diffuse and largely uninvolved global audience. Energy-importing countries, trade-dependent economies, and ordinary consumers all become indirect financiers of the conflict. The war, in effect, is globalized—not only in its consequences but in its funding.
In addition, the indirect cost transfer is already visible across continents. The biggest burden of the war is not military spending—it is the imported economic shock spreading through energy markets, shipping routes, inflation, and financial systems. Nearly one-fifth of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and any disruption instantly translates into higher fuel prices, increased freight costs, and cascading inflation worldwide. Countries far removed from the battlefield are paying through rising grocery bills, higher transport costs, and tightening monetary conditions.
The Middle East itself is already absorbing heavy indirect costs. Countries not directly involved in the war are facing fuel price shocks, subsidy burdens, and logistical disruptions. Pakistan, for instance, has raised diesel prices by over 50 percent and petrol by more than 40 percent, while struggling to sustain subsidy programs. India is considering trade restrictions to stabilize domestic markets as energy and freight costs surge. Across the Gulf and surrounding regions, shipping disruptions, stranded vessels, and rising insurance premiums are increasing the cost of doing business, effectively turning the war into a regional economic tax.
Europe is experiencing the same phenomenon through a renewed energy and inflation crisis. Oil prices have surged above $100 per barrel, forcing governments to cap fuel margins, cut taxes, and release reserves to protect consumers. At the same time, inflationary pressure is pushing borrowing costs higher, affecting mortgages, business financing, and household stability. The war’s economic shock is thus embedded not only in fuel prices but in the broader financial architecture of European economies.
For Asia and Africa, the impact is even more severe. Many countries in these regions depend heavily on Middle Eastern energy and trade flows. The war is functioning as a direct economic tax, triggering shortages, subsidy crises, and potential social unrest. African economies, already vulnerable, face slower growth due to rising food, fuel, and fertilizer costs, with projections showing measurable GDP losses if the conflict persists. Across the developing world, the cost of the Iran War is not theoretical—it is immediate, tangible, and deeply destabilizing.
The implications of this model extend far beyond the current conflict. If wars can be structured in such a way that their costs are borne by others, the traditional economic constraints on warfare begin to disappear. This lowers the threshold for conflict and increases the risk of prolonged and repeated wars. The deterrent effect of financial burden—once a powerful force for restraint—is weakened when that burden can be shifted outward.
In the end, the most important question is not who is winning on the battlefield, but who is paying for the war. And the answer is increasingly evident: it is the world at large. Through rising energy prices, disrupted trade, and cascading economic effects, the cost of the Iran War is being distributed across borders and societies, often without acknowledgment or consent.
This is the hidden economy of modern warfare—a system in which power is exercised, destruction is inflicted, and the bill is quietly passed on to others. In such a system, victory is no longer defined solely by military success, but by the ability to fight without paying. And by that measure, the Iran War reveals a profound and unsettling truth: those who wage war have learned how to make the world fund it.

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Scholars Urge UN to Protect Iran’s Scientific Sites Amid Airstrikes Global Academics Warn Attacks Threaten Research, Health, and Civilian Safety

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LONDON / GENEVA / PARIS / NEW YORK (Shabnam Delfani) — A broad coalition of academics, researchers, students, and members of the international scholarly community has issued a strongly worded open letter condemning a series of strikes on universities, laboratories, hospitals, and research facilities in Iran, urging immediate international action to safeguard civilian scientific infrastructure amid the ongoing U.S.-Israeli military operations against the country.

The letter, addressed to United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, UNESCO Director-General Audrey Azoulay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk, and the governments of all parties involved, highlights at least 21 reported attacks on scientific and educational institutions. It warns that such assaults endanger researchers, students, medical personnel, and the broader public while inflicting irreversible damage on scientific progress and societal well-being.

Recent strikes between March 28 and 31, 2026, have drawn particular alarm. Attacks targeted Isfahan University of Technology in Isfahan, as well as Iran University of Science and Technology and Amirkabir University of Technology in Tehran. On March 31, one of Iran’s largest pharmaceutical research and development centers, Tofigh Daru (also known as Tofiq Daru), was severely damaged. The facility is a major producer of anesthetics and critical treatments for multiple sclerosis and cancer.

“Scientific and educational institutions are civilian spaces essential to public health, knowledge, and human survival,” the open letter declares. “Their destruction endangers researchers, students, medical personnel, and the broader public, while causing lasting harm to science and society.”

The signatories issue a forceful call for all parties to the conflict to immediately cease attacks on civilian scientific and educational sites, including laboratories, universities, hospitals, research centers, libraries, and archives. They further demand that the United Nations, UNESCO, and other relevant international bodies take concrete steps: thoroughly document the damage inflicted on these institutions, provide protection and support to affected scholars and students, launch independent investigations into potential violations of international humanitarian law, and ensure that those responsible for unlawful strikes on protected civilian infrastructure are identified and held accountable through impartial legal mechanisms.

“Science is not a military target. Universities and laboratories must not become battlefields,” the letter asserts. It concludes with an urgent appeal to the international community to act decisively to protect scientific infrastructure, defend academic life, and uphold the fundamental principle that institutions dedicated to the advancement of knowledge must never be treated as expendable in times of war.

In response to the escalating strikes, Iranian officials have warned of possible retaliation against American and Israeli-linked academic campuses in the region, raising fears of a dangerous widening of the conflict into educational spheres.

The open letter, signed collectively by “academics, researchers, students, and members of the global scholarly community,” underscores the long-standing international consensus on preserving the sanctity of scientific and educational institutions even amid geopolitical tensions and armed conflict. It stresses that safeguarding academic freedom and scientific capacity serves the collective well-being of humanity and must be defended against future assaults.

This appeal comes as reports continue to emerge of significant material damage to Iranian academic and medical research facilities, with some accounts noting injuries among university staff. The global scholarly community’s unified stance reflects growing concern that the targeting of Iranian Scientists and knowledge-producing institutions threatens not only Iran but the broader fabric of international scientific cooperation.

Please Sign: https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSd9yA3741PhNbeae-pWxiNU-buR5PJTgi5lYHXmvB11ZoMybA/viewform

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How Iran Humiliated U.S. and Israeli Power

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Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The synchronized declarations from Washington and Tel Aviv—that objectives have been achieved and the war is nearing its end—are being projected as victory. Yet the ground reality tells a harsher story. When a war concludes with one side still striking, still deterring, still shaping the battlefield, and still holding the world’s most critical energy artery at risk, declarations of success begin to sound less like triumph and more like an organized exit.
President Donald Trump’s announcement of a withdrawal within weeks, echoed by Benjamin Netanyahu’s claim that the Iranian threat has been neutralized, collides directly with what is unfolding across the region. Iran remains operationally active, strategically coherent, and economically consequential. The Strait of Hormuz remains under pressure, global markets remain unsettled, and U.S. and Israeli deterrence has been openly challenged.
This was a war launched to break Iran. Instead, it has exposed the limits of American and Israeli power. From the outset, the strategy was clear: decapitate leadership, shatter command and control, demoralize the military, and trigger internal collapse. But Iran did not behave like previous targets of such doctrine. It was prepared. Leadership was decentralized. Decision-making was distributed. Authority was layered. Even after successive eliminations of senior figures, the system did not collapse—it adapted. It continued. It responded with discipline and precision.
This was not survival by chance. It was survival by design. Instead of paralysis, there was continuity. Instead of panic, there was proportionate retaliation. Iranian forces did not wait for instructions from the top; they operated with clarity at multiple levels, responding in a coordinated and calculated manner. This single factor alone dismantled one of the core assumptions of the war—that Iran could be broken from the top down.
At the same time, Iran demonstrated a level of strategic reach that redefined the conflict. It struck where necessary, deterred where required, and maintained pressure across multiple fronts. It challenged U.S. positions, responded to Israeli actions, and signaled its ability to extend the battlefield beyond conventional limits. Even the perceived threat to maritime flows in the Strait of Hormuz was enough to shake global confidence, disrupt trade, and push major economies into
While Washington and Tel Aviv adjusted narratives, Iran maintained a consistent posture. It framed itself as resisting aggression, responding proportionally, and defending sovereignty. That narrative gained traction. In modern conflict, perception is power, and Iran captured that domain with striking effectiveness.
What, then, has this war actually produced? For Iran, the gains are unmistakable. It has shattered the myth of American military invincibility. It has broken the perception of Israeli untouchability. It has proven that a sanctioned nation can withstand and counter the most powerful military alliance in the world. It has elevated its status from a constrained regional actor to a central force capable of influencing global economics and geopolitics.
Most critically, it has turned geography into power. By demonstrating its ability to control or disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, Iran now holds leverage over a significant portion of the world’s energy supply. This changes everything. Countries that once supported sanctions must now consider their own survival. Their ships must pass through waters influenced by Iran. Their economies depend on uninterrupted flow.
Sanctions, in this new reality, begin to lose meaning. A country that can influence the movement of global trade cannot be easily isolated. On the contrary, nations may find themselves negotiating with Iran—not from a position of strength, but necessity. The possibility emerges that Iran could impose conditions: removal or dilution of sanctions, economic concessions, and even transit fees on shipping. In effect, the war may have handed Iran the very tool to recoup its losses—by monetizing the artery the world cannot avoid.
For Israel, the losses are equally significant. The aura of invincibility is gone. The ability to act without consequence has been challenged. The assumption of uncontested regional dominance has been exposed as fragile. Israel has not been destroyed, but it has been reduced to size—forced into a strategic reality where every action carries a cost and every escalation invites a response.
This has direct implications for the broader region. In Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank, the strategic environment has shifted. The space for unchecked expansion or unilateral military action is narrowing. The vision of dominance now faces a counterweight that is both capable and willing to respond.
For the United States, the implications are even broader. After decades of spending trillions to build the most powerful military machine in history, it now faces a sobering conclusion: superiority does not guarantee victory. A sanctioned nation, isolated for years, has not only survived but imposed costs and shaped outcomes. This is not merely a battlefield setback—it is a blow to credibility, deterrence, and global perception.
Yet beyond strategy, missiles, and geopolitics, the war has revealed something deeper about Iran itself. The strength of the Iranian system did not lie only in its weapons or its geography, but in its political cohesion and societal resolve. Despite sustained attacks, leadership losses, and economic pressure, the state did not fracture. Its constitutional structure held. Its political hierarchy remained intact. Most importantly, its people did not turn inward—they rallied.
Instead of division, there was unity. Instead of fatigue, there was resolve. Instead of collapse, there was collective resistance. This reflects a nation bound not only by institutions but by identity—by a shared commitment to sovereignty, independence, and the legacy of its revolution. In the face of external aggression, the Iranian population appears to have responded not with fear but with heightened patriotism, reinforcing loyalty to the state and its leadership.
Such moments often define nations. Rather than weakening the system, the war may have strengthened belief in it. Rather than undermining the revolution, it may have reaffirmed its relevance. And with that renewed confidence, a new possibility emerges: that Iran, secure in its strength, may now have both the space and the incentive to pursue internal political reforms while engaging more openly with the global economy—on its own terms, and from a position of power.
Yet even as declarations of withdrawal dominate headlines, the war itself may not be over. The possibility remains that these announcements are tactical—designed to calm global markets, stabilize oil prices, and ease domestic pressures—while leaving room for renewed escalation, including potential ground operations. The United States has, in past conflicts, shifted objectives even after signaling de-escalation. That pattern cannot be ignored.
Iran, for its part, appears prepared for that possibility. But if the withdrawal proves genuine—if escalation does not follow and hostilities truly subside—then the conclusion becomes unavoidable. In that case, the war stands as a strategic victory for Iran: a conflict in which it withstood the combined force of the United States and Israel, preserved its system, expanded its leverage, and reshaped the regional balance of power.
This was a war intended to break Iran. Instead, it has strengthened it. Strengthened its system. Strengthened its people. Strengthened its place in the world. And if this war truly ends here, history will not remember the declarations of victory—it will remember the reality that a nation under pressure did not break, did not bend, and instead emerged more united, more confident, and more powerful than before.

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