Pakistan News
India and Pakistan just stepped back from the brink of war. Here’s how it unfolded
Drones, Rafales, JF-17s, and scathing rebukes — India and Pakistan, both nuclear-armed states, witnessed one of their biggest escalations last week. While the neighbours are not new to conflict, this time, the breakdown in their relations was different, given the frequency and intensity of the aggression.
It began with the horrific killing of 26 tourists at a hill station in the Indian-occupied Kashmir. India blamed Pakistan for the attack, an accusation the latter denies. Islamabad has since called for an international independent probe into the massacre.
However, on the night of May 6-7, New Delhi took things a step forward and launched a series of air strikes on Pakistan, resulting in civilian casualties. Both sides then exchanged missiles, which stretched over the week. It took American intervention for both sides to finally drop their guns.
On Saturday, when tensions between the two countries peaked, US President Donald Trump announced that a ceasefire had been reached between India and Pakistan.
However, as a Dawn editorial puts it, “While foreign friends can certainly help create a conducive atmosphere, it is Islamabad and New Delhi that will have to do the heavy lifting themselves to secure peace.”
Here’s a timeline of how the latest conflict unfolded:
April 22: Gunmen shot and killed at least 26 tourists at Pahalgam resort in Indian-held Kashmir. At least 17 others are wounded. A group called Kashmir Resistance, which India accuses Pakistan of backing, claims the attack.
April 23: Pakistan’s foreign office released a statement expressing concern at the loss of tourists’ lives in the attack.
https://www.dawn.com/news/card/1906274
In swift measures taken following the attack, India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) with Pakistan with immediate effect. The Attari border check post was closed, and Pakistanis in India under the Saarc Visa Exemption Scheme (SVES) had 48 hours to leave the country, while others could return by May 1. Defence personnel at the Pakistani High Commission in India were declared persona non grata and given a week to leave the country. The staff at the high commissions were also to be reduced.
Meanwhile, students from occupied Kashmir reported harassment and intimidation in other cities.
April 24: In its response, Pakistan called any attempt to stop or divert the flow of water per the IWT an “act of war”. In a slew of decisions, Islamabad suspended trade and closed the airspace with India. It also announced the closure of the Wagah border. Those who had crossed the border were ordered to return by April 30. All visas under the SVES issued to Indian nationals were cancelled with immediate effect, with the exception of Sikh religious pilgrims. Indian nationals in Pakistan at the time under SVES were instructed to exit within 48 hours.
Moreover, Pakistan also declared the Indian defence, naval and air advisers in Islamabad as persona non grata. They were directed to leave the country immediately, but not later than April 30, 2025. These posts in the Indian High Commission were deemed annulled. The support staff of these advisers were also directed to return to India. The strength of the Indian High Commission in Islamabad was to be reduced to 30 diplomats and staff members, with effect from April 30, 2025.
Meanwhile, the Indian Foreign Ministry announced that all Pakistani citizens in India must leave the country by April 29. India closed down the main border transit point and summoned Saad Ahmad Warraich, the top Pakistani diplomat in New Delhi. The Modi-led regime also blocked the Pakistani government’s X account in the country.
April 25: Indian and Pakistani troops exchanged fire overnight across the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. Syed Ashfaq Gilani, a government official in Azad Kashmir, told AFP that there was no firing on the civilian population.
April 26: “Pakistan is open to participating in any neutral, transparent, and credible investigation (into the Pahalgam attack),” Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said.
He also drew a hard line on the issue of water resources, stressing continued water flow under the Indus Waters Treaty as a red line. “Water is a vital national interest of Pakistan, our lifeline,” he said. “Any attempt to stop, reduce, or divert the flow of water belonging to Pakistan under the Indus River Treaty would be responded to with full force and might.”
April 28: Pakistan and India continued trading fire across the Line of Control, with each blaming the other for provocation. On the other hand, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said Pakistan was ready for any incursion by India.
He added that Pakistan was on high alert and that it would only use its arsenal of nuclear weapons if “there is a direct threat to our existence”.
Separately, the Indian government banned 16 Pakistani YouTube channels on recommendations from its Ministry of Home Affairs
April 29: Information Minister Attaullah Tarar said Pakistan had “credible intelligence” reports that indicated India was planning to conduct military action against Pakistan in the next 24 to 36 hours.
In a Senate session the same day, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said Pakistan would not strike India but reserved the right to retaliate.
In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave his military “operational freedom” to respond to the Pahalgam attack.
April 30: According to Associated Press of Pakistan, Pakistani security forces delivered a robust response to India’s unprovoked ceasefire violation along the LoC, destroying an Indian checkpost after late-night aggression on April 29-30.
Sources told APP that the retaliatory strikes destroyed several bunkers, including the Chakputra post in India-held Kashmir. Separately, state media also reported that a “timely and swift response” by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) had forced four Indian Rafale jets to retreat.
Pakistan also briefly closed the airspace over Gilgit-Baltistan, while India shut its airspace for all Pakistan-registered aircraft, or those owned and operated by Pakistani airlines or operators, including military craft.
May 1: Army chief General Asim Munir warned that any “misadventure” by India would be met with a quick and decisive response.
“Let there be no ambiguity: any military misadventure by India will be met with a swift, resolute, and notch-up response. While Pakistan remains committed to regional peace, our preparedness and resolve to safeguard national interests are absolute,” he was quoted as saying by the Inter-Services Public Relations.
The same day, authorities stopped tourists from entering Neelum Valley and other sensitive areas near the LoC in view of the security situation. All religious seminaries in the region were also ordered to remain closed for 10 days, while the owners of hotels, guesthouses, restaurants, and marriage halls have pledged to place their establishments at the military’s disposal in case India launches an attack.
Pakistan also announced that certain sections of airspace over the two largest cities — Karachi and Lahore — would remain closed for eight hours a day throughout the month of May.
May 2: The Indian government blocked access to the official YouTube channel of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif for users in India. It said the move was part of a wider crackdown on Pakistani digital content.
Separately, India also asked global multilateral agencies, including the IMF, to review funds and loans provided to Pakistan, as New Delhi sought “to corner the neighbouring state diplomatically”.
May 3: Pakistan conducted a successful training launch of the Abdali Weapon System, a surface-to-surface missile with a range of 450 kilometres.
The missiles were not fired toward the border area with India; they were normally fired into the Arabian Sea or the deserts of the southwest Balochistan province, the Associated Press reported.
AP added that India suspended the exchange of all mail from Pakistan through air and surface routes and banned the direct and indirect import of goods from the neighbour. It also barred Pakistani-flagged ships from entering its ports and prohibited Indian-flagged vessels from visiting Pakistani ports.
May 6-7: India launched Operation Sindoor, carrying out late-night missile strikes at six Pakistani sites, including Subhan Mosque in Bahawalpur’s Ahmedpur East, Bilal Mosque in Muzaffarabad, Abbas Mosque in Kotli, Umalkura Mosque in Muridke, the village of Kotki Lohara in Sialkot district, and Shakargarh. The Neelum-Jhelum Hydropower Project was shelled by Indian forces as well.
https://www.dawn.com/news/card/1908824
Pakistan took down five Indian jets, including three Rafale planes. Eight civilian deaths, 35 injured people and one missing person were reported.
Subsequently, the National Security Committee authorised the country’s armed forces to respond to Indian aggression at “time and manner” of their choosing, while unprovoked firing and ceasefire violations by Indian forces continued at the Line of Control.
Meanwhile, 21 airports were shut in northern and north-western parts of India until May 10.
May 8: DG ISPR said Indian drones were neutralised in the following locations: Lahore, Attock, Gujranwala, Chakwal, Rawalpindi, Bahawalpur, Miano, Chhor, and near Karachi. Four army men were injured in this “serious serious provocation” by India, according to the military spokesperson. Around 30 drones were neutralised by Pakistan.
India’s government, on the other hand, claimed that 13 civilians were killed by Pakistani fire in “ceasefire violations” along their de facto border after violence escalated into artillery shelling following Indian strikes.
https://www.dawn.com/news/card/1909566
The UN renewed its call for “maximum restraint”. Countries from all over the world began talks with leadership from both countries and expressed “deep concern” over the issue, while encouraging both countries to exercise restraint. Flight operations at Karachi, Islamabad, Sialkot and Lahore airports were suspended. In Delhi, 90 flights were cancelled.
May 9: DG ISPR said Pakistan neutralised 77 Israeli drones sent by India. “We are taking each one of them out. Not one of them has been able to go back to India, and not one of them will be able to go back,” he said in a press conference.
He further stated that “if you are so fond of Pakistan firing at you, we will fulfil your demand at a time, place and means of our choosing”. He added that 33 people were slain and 76 injured in Indian attacks.
On the other hand, Pakistan postponed eight remaining matches of the Pakistan Super League X, while the Indian Premier League 2025 was suspended for a week.
May 10: India targeted the PAF’s Nur Khan (Chaklala, Rawalpindi), Murid (Chakwal) and Rafiqui (Shorkot in Jhang district) air bases, but the majority of them were intercepted by Pakistan’s air defence systems. Soon after, the Pakistan Airports Authority announced the closure of the country’s airspace till noon.
In the wee hours of the day, Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos was launched by Pakistan. In its response to Indian aggression, the military destroyed a storage site of the Brahmos missiles in India’s Beas region and the Udhampur airbase in India-occupied Kashmir as part of its retaliatory operation. According to Pakistani state media and security sources, Pakistan hit the following:
- India’s power grid
- Indian military intelligence’s training centre in IOK’s Rajouri
- KG Top Brigade Headquarters
- Uri field supply depot
- Adampur, Udhampur, Pathankot, Suratgarh, Sirsa, Bhatinda and Halwara airfields, as well as the Akhnoor aviation base
- S-400 system in Adampur,
- Brahmos storage site in Beas
- Artillery gun positions in Dehrangyari, occupied Kashmir’s Mankot
- Indian posts directly opposite in the Phuklian sector
- Rabtanwali Post, Jazeera Post Complex, Kafir Mehri, Shahpar 3, and Ghadar Top across the LoC
Amid the attacks from both ends, talks continued in the back-end. At around 5pm, US President Donald Trump announced that both India and Pakistan agreed to a full and immediate ceasefire. The same was also confirmed by both the neighbours.
Air traffic across Pakistan resumed later that night.
May 11: In a press conference, DG ISPR Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry paid tribute to those who were martyred in Indian aggression and their families, while praying for the speedy recovery of the wounded.
He confirmed that Pakistan hit 26 Indian targets, including their air force and aviation bases at Suratgarh, Sirsa, Adampur, Bhooj, Nalia, Bathinda, Barnala, Halwara, Avantipura, Srinagar, Jammu, Mamoon, Ambala, Udampur and Pathankot — all of which sustained major damage. He further added that the Barhmos facilities, which had fired missiles in Pakistan and killed innocent civilians, were also destroyed.
Dawn News
Pakistan News
Pakistan Prime Minister attend Leaders’ Summit of COP-31 in Antalya, Türkiye
Antalya (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY):- Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif will visit Antalya, Republic of Türkiye, from 10–12 November 2026 to participate in the Leaders’ Summit of the 31st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
Prime Minister will address the Leaders’ Summit on 11 November 2026, during which he will urge the global community to take concrete actions to address the threat posed by climate change to the planet. He will highlight Pakistan’s steps towards rapid solarization and expansion of its renewable energy capacity, as part of its transition towards a cleaner and more resilient economy, along with its efforts to strengthen disaster preparedness and early-warning systems.

In addition, he will also call for predictable, adequate and accessible climate finance for developing countries to strengthen their resilience and pursue sustainable development.
The Prime Minister will also attend a High-Level Roundtable convened by the Presidency of the COP-31 on the sidelines of the Leaders’ Summit, and hold bilateral meetings with the Turkish leadership as well as several other world leaders.

Prime Minister’s participation in the COP-31 Leaders’ Summit is an expression of Pakistan’s strong support for the climate agenda, and will provide Pakistan with an opportunity to reaffirm its commitment towards working closely with the international community to address the climate crisis.
COP 31 starting Yesterday, Minister Climate Change of Pakistan Mr. Tasadaq Malik attended the opening ceremony in Antalya, Türkiye.
Pakistan News
Tehran’s Diplomatic Bombshell
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The arrival in Tehran of the defence minister of Saudi Arabia, the army chief of Pakistan and the intelligence chief ofTürkiye may prove more consequential than another round of American or Israeli military threats. Three powerfulMuslim countries, bound by the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, sat across the table from Iran while Washington and Israel contemplated renewed military operations. The question is not merely what these leaders discussed, but what they may have quietly agreed to do—or refuse to do—when the next missiles begin flying.
The delegation was extraordinary in its composition. Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Pakistan’s FieldMarshal Asim Munir and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin represented countries possessing enormous financial, military, diplomatic and strategic influence. Their collective appearance conveyed that Iran’s security could no longer be treated exclusively as a confrontation between Tehran, Washington and Tel Aviv. Regional powers were asserting their own interests in determining whether another devastating war would engulf their neighbourhood.
The war with Iran has transformed American military installations across the Gulf from instruments of deterrence into potential targets of retaliation. Reports and assessments of American military repositioning toward Israel, Jordan and other locations reflect this wider vulnerability. For Washington, geographic access remains a military advantage; for Gulf governments, that same access increasingly carries the possibility of devastating retaliation.
Saudi Arabia consequently faces an exceptionally difficult choice. American air defence systems, intelligence cooperation, maintenance arrangements and advanced weapons remain important to its security. Yet the presence ofAmerican forces can expose Saudi oil installations, airports, industrial infrastructure and civilian populations to Iranian orHouthi attacks. The attacks around Ras Tanura have demonstrated how rapidly regional warfare can threaten energy supplies and global economic stability. Riyadh must therefore calculate whether American protection is reducing its vulnerability or contributing to it.
Here lies the first possible hidden significance of the Tehran meeting. Iran may have sought assurances that Saudi Arabia,Pakistan and Türkiye would neither participate in renewed American-Israeli attacks nor facilitate them through military installations, airspace, intelligence or logistical support. No publicly disclosed agreement establishes that such promises were made. Nevertheless, the subject would be entirely consistent with Iran’s longstanding concern about foreign military infrastructure being used against it.
The second possibility points in the opposite direction. The Makkah Pact countries may have arrived not simply as sympathetic neighbours, but as a collective deterrent. Their defence agreement treats an attack against one member as a matter of common security. The presence of nuclear-armed Pakistan, NATO member Türkiye and economically powerful Saudi Arabia could therefore convey a warning that further Iranian or Houthi attacks against Saudi territory risk widening the conflict. Collective defence, however, does not automatically establish a commitment to join an American war.
This dual character makes the delegation particularly significant. It could simultaneously reassure Iran against foreign aggression and warn Tehran against attacking Saudi Arabia. Such diplomacy is not necessarily contradictory. It reflects an attempt to establish reciprocal restraint: regional states would avoid becoming launching platforms for attacks on Iran,while Iran would avoid retaliating against countries that remained outside the fighting. Whether such an understanding was actually reached remains undisclosed.
The third possibility concerns Qatar’s parallel diplomatic initiative. Unlike the three Makkah Pact countries, Qatar has maintained an intermediary role between Washington and Tehran. Its proposed seven-day confidence-building framework sought to bridge disagreements over nuclear activities, sanctions, maritime access and the wider conflict. Reports also indicate support for mediation from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. Thus, the Tehran consultations could represent complementary diplomatic tracks rather than competing initiatives.
Iran’s response to the Qatari proposal was nevertheless uncompromising. Tehran objected to demands for nuclear concessions before meaningful economic relief, insisting that the American blockade of Iranian ports and restrictions on oil exports must be addressed first. Washington, conversely, wanted nuclear commitments from the beginning. The dispute was therefore not merely over the contents of a peace agreement, but over which party would surrender its leverage before receiving guarantees.
The most consequential outcome of the Tehran meeting may lie not in what was publicly announced, but in what was deliberately withheld. A day-long consultation involving the defence minister of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s army chief, Türkiye’s intelligence chief and Iran’s highest political and security authorities could hardly have been confined to the four lines of the joint communiqué. Such meetings necessarily involve extensive deliberations on the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats arising from an ongoing war, including American military bases, Iranian retaliation, Saudi security, the Strait of Hormuz, economic sanctions and the consequences of another American-Israeli offensive.
Drawing upon my experience attending high-level meetings as Press Secretary and media adviser to the President of Pakistan, I know that public statements rarely disclose the full substance of sensitive diplomatic and security consultations.
The positive assessments expressed by the Iranian leadership and the visiting delegations strongly suggest that the participants found sufficient common ground to explore practical understandings and a coordinated pathway for responding to future developments.
Such understandings may include assurances of non-participation in renewed attacks against Iran, restrictions on the use of regional military facilities, reciprocal restraint toward Gulf countries and mechanisms for further consultations should Washington and Israel resume hostilities.
Kuwait and the other Gulf countries will therefore become important indicators. Their decisions concerning American bases, airspace, logistical support and diplomatic engagement could reveal whether the Tehran initiative develops into a broader regional non-aggression arrangement. The Houthis’ conduct will be equally revealing. A sustained reduction in attacks on Saudi infrastructure could indicate that Tehran and Riyadh have found a mechanism to separate Gulf security from the wider American-Israeli confrontation, although Houthi decision-making cannot simply be equated with Iranian instructions.
The timing adds urgency. Reports indicate concern about renewed American and Israeli military action around the November 3 American midterm elections. Whether such an offensive actually occurs remains uncertain. But if it does, the military effectiveness of the campaign will depend partly on regional access, intelligence, logistics and the willingness of neighbouring governments to absorb the consequences of Iranian retaliation.
Ultimately, Tehran may have achieved something strategically important without obtaining a single publicly declared concession: it has compelled influential regional governments to discuss security with Iran rather than merely discuss Iran with Washington. That is a meaningful diplomatic shift, even if its durability remains untested.
The real verdict on the Tehran meeting will not emerge from its carefully worded communiqué. It will emerge whenWashington next demands military access, when Israel considers another strike, and when Iran decides where its missiles will—or will not—fall. If regional governments refuse to become instruments of another war, the Makkah Pact may be remembered not as an alliance formed to confront Iran, but as the beginning of a Middle East determined to prevent outside powers from deciding its fate.
Pakistan News
Pakistan’s Moment Beyond the Battlefield
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : While Pakistan wrestles with political confrontation at home, its diplomacy is opening doors abroad. From the Badr memorandum signed in Doha to the earlier Mecca defence agreement, and from Riyadh’s security consultations to mediation with Tehran and Washington, Pakistan is acquiring a place at tables where regional security is being negotiated. The opportunity is considerable. The challenge is to turn international recognition into domestic stability, industrial strength and prosperity.
The Badr Memorandum of Understanding, signed on October 21 by Qatar, Türkiye, Pakistan and Indonesia, marks the latest advance. Its central purpose is defence industrial cooperation: joint production, technical training, research, development and stronger manufacturing capabilities. It offers a means of building the technological and industrial capacity that makes security sustainable.
Its promise lies in combining complementary strengths. Türkiye brings an expanding defence industry and experience in developing and integrating complex systems. Pakistan contributes military experience, technical manpower and established production facilities. Indonesia offers manufacturing capacity, a substantial domestic market and an important Southeast Asian base. Qatar brings investment potential and demand. Together, these assets could support projects beyond the reach of countries working separately.
The resulting opportunity extends beyond buying and selling weapons. Shared design, component manufacturing, software development, testing, maintenance and training could create enduring industrial relationships. A country that helps manufacture a system develops skills and supplier networks that an ordinary purchase may never deliver. The real prize is the ability to understand, sustain and improve equipment throughout its working life.
But signatures cannot run factories. Badr needs an efficient institution to translate ambition into projects, with agreed financing, clear responsibilities and deadlines. Partners must settle technology access, intellectual property, export permissions and the division of production before these become disputes. Each project should have accountable leadership and measurable milestones. Good faith must be matched by management capable of delivering on time.
For Pakistan, Türkiye is a particularly valuable partner. Their existing naval cooperation demonstrates how procurement can support domestic construction and technical learning. Turkish progress in drones, electronics, armoured platforms and naval systems offers further possibilities. Pakistan should seek arrangements that allow its engineers and manufacturers to become development partners, accumulating knowledge with every successive project.
This industrial initiative follows the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan in August, which established a powerful principle: an armed attack against one would be regarded as an attack against all. Its resemblance to NATO’s collective defence commitment explains the attraction of calling it a “mini-NATO”. For Pakistan, it represents recognition that its military capacity and strategic position have value well beyond South Asia.
Yet solidarity becomes complicated when it must move from declarations to decisions. These countries share Islamic bonds, but their relationships, interests and vulnerabilities differ. A confrontation involving Saudi Arabia and Iran, or attacks from Yemen, would confront Pakistan with difficult choices. Religious, social and historical connections cross the very boundaries that security arrangements seek to defend. An effective pact must therefore combine credible deterrence with political judgment and clearly understood responsibilities.
Nor does Mecca constitute a comprehensive Muslim alliance addressing every shared concern. The Palestinian question and Israel’s military actions remain central to public sentiment across the Muslim world, while the agreement’s immediate operation is shaped by its members’ security needs. Its worth will depend on whether it protects its participants while helping contain regional conflict. Pakistan’s strongest contribution would be to make collective security reinforce reconciliation rather than deepen divisions.
Pakistan also brings a distinction no other Muslim country possesses: nuclear weapons capability. Alongside this stands an experienced army, a capable air force and a smaller navy responsible for demanding maritime duties. The May 2025 confrontation with India, which Pakistan regards as a major defensive success, reinforced the importance of readiness and technological competence. India’s acknowledgment of initial aircraft losses underlined the seriousness of that contest.
Military standing, however, achieves its greatest value when it supports diplomacy. Field Marshal Asim Munir’s October 20 visit to Tehran formed part of Pakistan’s continuing effort to help bring the United States and Iran towards an accommodation. Such engagement requires persistence because the parties approach negotiations through deep distrust, competing security demands and domestic political pressures.
Pakistan is attempting a difficult balancing act: sustaining communication with Washington and President Donald Trump, preserving access to Iran’s leadership, and maintaining Saudi confidence. Its usefulness rests on remaining a credible channel across these relationships. Every conversation that clarifies intentions, reduces miscalculation or identifies a possible compromise adds value, even when a final settlement remains elusive.
This is where Pakistan’s defence partnerships and diplomatic role must reinforce each other. Friendship with Saudi Arabia should strengthen its ability to explain Saudi concerns to Tehran. Relations with Iran should help it communicate Iranian concerns elsewhere. Close ties with Türkiye and Qatar add further channels. Pakistan can gain lasting influence by helping countries find an exit from confrontation that preserves security and dignity.
That achievement would be more persuasive if accompanied by reconciliation at home. Continuing confrontation around Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and the imprisonment of former prime minister Imran Khan consumes political energy the country urgently needs for reconstruction. Pakistan should ensure fair and transparent judicial proceedings, end politically motivated restrictions and pursue his release through lawful means. He should have the opportunity to participate in normal democratic politics.
The way forward also requires free, fair and impartial elections, credible institutions and acceptance that political opponents belong within the constitutional system. Protest must remain peaceful, and the state must protect lawful political participation. A country seeking to mediate between bitter international adversaries should apply the same patience and confidence to resolving its own political disputes.
Peace along Pakistan’s borders is equally necessary. Terrorism must be confronted firmly, but lasting security also requires sustained diplomacy with Afghanistan. Islamabad and Kabul need practical arrangements to prevent armed groups from exploiting territory, manage border disputes and preserve legitimate trade. With Iran, cooperation should protect a peaceful frontier. With India, Pakistan should continue seeking dialogue and measures that reduce the risk of another military escalation.
Economic recovery must give these efforts a material foundation. Pakistan’s mineral resources can contribute far more if extraction is connected to processing and domestic manufacturing. Copper, gold and other commercially viable deposits should support infrastructure, technical education and industries that add value at home. Mineral wealth becomes national wealth when it creates productive skills, competitive businesses and lasting employment.
Badr could help cultivate some of the engineering, electronics and materials expertise relevant to that broader transformation. Pakistan should connect its diplomatic partnerships with universities, industrial estates, reliable energy and local suppliers. Exporting raw materials alone would leave much of the value elsewhere; building industries around them would allow Pakistanis to retain a larger share.
Pakistan has earned an opening. Its task now is to make external confidence durable through internal consent, peaceful borders and productive industry. The country’s finest strategic achievement would be a Pakistan whose citizens experience the gains its diplomats announce: greater security, meaningful work and a future worth investing in.
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