Paris ( Imran Y. CHOUDHRY):- On the occasion of the 79th Independence Day of Pakistan, Ambassador Mumtaz Zahra Baloch hoisted national flag to the tune of the national anthem at the Embassy of Pakistan, Paris and welcomed distinguished members of the Pakistani community including large number of children.

Messages of the President, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan were read out on the occasion.
Congratulating all on the Independence Day, the Ambassador said that 14th August was truly auspicious as it brought together the entire nation – in celebration, in paying homage to the Quaid-e-Azam and other leaders of the freedom movement, in remembrance of the supreme sacrifices of our forefathers and drawing inspiration from our glorious past and the tremendous achievements over the decades.

The Government of Pakistan is observing the current year – 2026 – as the “Year of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah” to mark his 150th birth anniversary, she added. The great intellectual vision of Quaid requires the nation to uphold his principles and play its due role in the development and progress of Pakistan. The Ambassador highlighted that Quaid-e-Azam had given the nation three golden principles, faith, unity and discipline and adherence to these principles would lead the nation towards a bright future for the generations to come.
Ambassador Baloch said that as we celebrate our freedom we should remember our Kashmiri and Palestinian brothers and sisters, who have been struggling for over seven decades for their freedom and right to self-determination. She reaffirmed Pakistan’s political and diplomatic support to the people of the Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK) and Palestine for their legitimate rights.

Ambassador also appreciated the contributions of Pakistani diaspora in France in promoting Pakistan-France relations. She reiterated Embassy’s fully commitment to continue to facilitate Pakistanis based in France.
Later, the Ambassador inaugurated the ‘historic photo exhibition’ based on the life and works of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah at the Embassy. The exhibition showcased a remarkable collection of
archival records and photographs chronicling the visionary leadership and enduring
legacy of the founder of Pakistan. The guests especially the children took a keen interest in the exhibition and raised slogans of Pakistan Zindabad.

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan is being described as a Muslim version of NATO. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan himself said its collective-defence clause is technically similar to NATO’s Article 5: an armed attack on one member will be treated as an attack on all. Yet most commentary has concentrated on the pact’s wording, its possible expansion and whether it is aimed at Iran or Israel. The more important question has received less attention: what threat does each signatory actually perceive?
Without answering that question, analysis of the agreement remains incomplete. Alliances do not acquire meaning merely from ceremonial signatures. Their real character is determined by the dangers their members fear, the capabilities they contribute and the circumstances in which they are prepared to act.
For Saudi Arabia, the immediate security environment is deeply paradoxical. The kingdom has long relied upon the United States, but the presence of American forces and facilities across the Gulf can also attract retaliation whenever Washington uses regional territory or infrastructure in military operations against Iran.
Tehran has repeatedly maintained that its quarrel is not with Gulf societies as such, but with military threats launched from or supported through their territories. Whether one accepts Iran’s justification or not, the underlying dilemma is real: foreign protection can simultaneously become a source of exposure.
This raises a difficult question. If foreign bases had not facilitated attacks against Iran, would Tehran have attacked Gulf countries on the same scale? The answer cannot be proven, but the question exposes Saudi Arabia’s strategic vulnerability. Riyadh wants protection without remaining permanently hostage to decisions made by an external guarantor.
Threats from the Houthis in Yemen and Iran-aligned armed groups in Iraq remain serious, particularly for oil facilities, desalination plants, shipping and civilian infrastructure. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has spent heavily on modern aircraft, missiles, surveillance systems and air defence. These dangers alone do not fully explain the need for an Article 5-style pact with Türkiye and nuclear-armed Pakistan.
The wider concern is Israel’s expanding military reach and the fear that no regional state can assume it will remain permanently outside Israeli calculations. The “Greater Israel” project is not merely a slogan invented by Israel’s critics. It is a documented ideological and political current rooted in expansionist interpretations of biblical territory, including the most extreme vision of land stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates, and in revisionist Zionist ideas of sovereignty on both sides of the Jordan River.
Israel’s wars and military operations across Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere have intensified regional fears that its use of force and territorial ambitions are becoming geographically unconstrained. Because the most expansive interpretation of Greater Israel encompasses territory belonging to several Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Riyadh has legitimate reasons to treat this ideology and Israel’s growing regional reach as a long-term strategic threat.
The Mecca agreement therefore creates strategic depth, reduces Saudi Arabia’s exclusive dependence on Washington and strengthens the kingdom’s leadership position in the Muslim world.
Türkiye enters the pact with a different threat map. It possesses NATO’s second-largest army, an increasingly sophisticated defence industry, formidable drone capabilities, warship and helicopter production, and substantial operational experience in Syria, Iraq and the eastern Mediterranean.
Kurdish militancy and instability along Türkiye’s southern borders remain persistent threats, but Ankara is largely capable of managing these challenges without Pakistani or Saudi military intervention.
The more consequential concern is Israel. Turkish and Israeli rhetoric has become increasingly hostile, while their strategic interests collide in Syria, Gaza and the broader eastern Mediterranean. Türkiye’s conventional size gives it considerable strength, but Israel is widely understood to possess nuclear weapons, while Türkiye does not. This creates a dangerous asymmetry at the highest level of escalation.
Pakistan’s participation therefore adds deterrent weight, but it is essential not to overstate what has formally been agreed. The published language does not establish an explicit Pakistani nuclear umbrella over Türkiye or Saudi Arabia. Nor does it automatically commit Islamabad to nuclear retaliation.
Its value at this stage lies in strategic ambiguity. Any adversary contemplating extreme escalation must now consider the possibility of a broader response involving a nuclear-armed partner. That uncertainty itself can reinforce deterrence, provided consultation mechanisms, command arrangements and red lines are eventually clarified.
Pakistan’s principal state-based threat remains India. Its other challenges—including attacks linked to the Pakistani Taliban, militancy operating from Afghan territory and insurgency in Balochistan—are grave but fall mainly within the domain of counterterrorism and internal security.
Islamabad has also alleged external support for certain militant networks, including from India and Israel other hostile actors, therefore the possibility of hybrid warfare designed to weaken Pakistan cannot be ignored.
The real test for the pact would come during a future India-Pakistan war. Saudi Arabia enjoys extensive economic and political relations with India, while Türkiye also has interests that extend beyond its partnership with Islamabad. Would Riyadh provide intelligence, logistics, financing, air defence or diplomatic support? Would it risk its relationship with New Delhi?
The treaty’s collective-defence formula is powerful, but it does not necessarily mean that every member must respond identically or automatically declare war. Even NATO’s Article 5 requires each ally to take such action as it considers necessary. The Mecca pact’s credibility will similarly depend on agreed procedures, operational planning, military integration and, above all, political will.
Nor should the alliance be framed as an anti-Iranian “Sunni bloc.” That description is analytically shallow and politically dangerous. It imports a sectarian narrative into an agreement whose signatories explicitly maintain that it is not directed against Iran or any other particular country.
Western and regional media extensively are using the Sunni label as convenient shorthand, but repeating it can deepen the very divisions that have repeatedly weakened the Muslim world. It risks presenting Sunni and Shia states as natural enemies, even though they share geography, economic interests, religious bonds and responsibility for regional stability.
Iran has demonstrated formidable missile, drone and asymmetric capabilities and has proven ability to impose severe costs on the combined military might of both the United States and Israel and their alliance in the Middle East and elsewhere in the entire world.
A confrontation between Iran and the combined forces of Pakistan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia would devastate the region, rupture trade and energy routes, inflame sectarian tensions and serve none of the four countries.
The rational objective of the Mecca alliance should therefore be deterrence, collective security and strategic autonomy—not the creation of another front in the Iran war.
The wiser long-term course is to keep the pact open and eventually build a structured security dialogue with Iran. Immediate Iranian membership may be politically unrealistic while war and mistrust persist, but inclusion should remain a strategic objective.
Egypt and other regional countries could also participate in a broader security architecture based on non-aggression, collective consultation, protected shipping lanes, economic connectivity and respect for sovereignty.
The three signatories must also wage an intelligent information campaign. Through official statements, diplomatic outreach, legacy media, social platforms and other forms of communication, they should consistently reject the description of the agreement as a “Sunni NATO.”
They should explain that the pact is intended to protect its members from aggression regardless of the aggressor’s religious, sectarian or national identity. It must not be allowed to become an instrument for turning Muslim countries against one another.
The Mecca agreement will become historic only if it does more than redistribute fear. Properly developed, it can reduce dependence on outside powers, deter Israeli or other aggression, give Pakistan additional diplomatic weight and create the nucleus of an inclusive regional security system.
Mishandled as a sectarian coalition, however, it could produce precisely the confrontation it claims to prevent. Its success will therefore be measured not by how many enemies it names, but by how many wars it prevents.

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The latest restrictions imposed on international journalists in Pakistan have once again exposed a deeper crisis of governance. Under the new guidelines, foreign correspondents and even Pakistani journalists working for international media may require prior government permission before travelling outside a limited number of major cities for reporting assignments. In practical terms, breaking news may now have to wait for administrative approval.
The government describes these measures as an administrative mechanism rather than an attempt to suppress journalism. Critics, however, see them as an effort to control the flow of information, especially from sensitive regions where public unrest, political agitation, security operations or protests may be taking place. International media organizations are often relied upon to provide independent coverage when local journalists face pressure, censorship, intimidation or professional insecurity. Restricting their movement therefore raises serious questions about transparency, accountability and the public’s right to know.
This latest development cannot be viewed in isolation. It is part of a much broader pattern in which civilian institutions have steadily lost their independence and decision-making authority. Over the decades, Pakistan has gradually evolved into a system where the military institution exerts influence far beyond its constitutional responsibility for national defence.
During the tenure of General Pervez Musharraf, the idea of an “umbrella leadership” became deeply embedded in the structure of governance. Under this philosophy, the military was not merely responsible for security. It was expected to guide, supervise or influence almost every important sector, including administration, taxation, infrastructure, economic planning, development, law and order, communications and public policy.
Military officers were placed in civilian departments and assigned responsibilities for which they had not necessarily received professional training. A brigadier or general could be asked to supervise matters involving taxation, public finance, infrastructure, local government or economic development. Such officers naturally depended upon civilian experts for technical advice, yet the civilian officials understood that the final decision rested elsewhere.
As a result, many officers stopped offering independent professional opinions and instead provided advice that they believed would satisfy the expectations of the military leadership.
This arrangement weakened the civilian system from within. Bureaucrats became reluctant to take responsibility. Ministers lost authority. Professional expertise was subordinated to institutional preference. The civilian machinery, which should have been the engine of national growth, administration and public service, became cautious, dependent and increasingly ineffective.
Although Musharraf eventually left power, the culture of military dominance did not disappear. It survived informally and continued to shape national life. The military remained influential in areas including major development projects, public administration, security policy, political management, strategic industries and national economic initiatives.
More seriously, the military establishment has repeatedly been accused of influencing the composition of parliament, the rise and fall of political governments, the selection of prime ministers, the formation of political alliances and the careers of civilian officers.
Whether every allegation is fully accurate or not, the widespread public perception of interference is itself damaging. A political system cannot command confidence when citizens believe that the final authority rests outside parliament.
Civilian governments created under such circumstances remain weak because their survival depends less upon public legitimacy and more upon institutional approval.
Ministers, advisers, bureaucrats and political leaders understand that their continuation in office may be linked to support from powerful quarters. This weakens their willingness to resist pressure, challenge policy or defend civilian authority.
The contradiction becomes obvious during official press conferences. Military spokespersons may initially state that political and administrative matters belong to the civilian domain.
Yet the discussion often moves deeply into politics, governance, economic performance, internal administration and national policy. The military may publicly distance itself from civilian failures while simultaneously remaining heavily influential in the very system that produced those failures.
Pakistan is therefore trapped in a dangerous cycle. Civilian institutions are denied genuine independence, yet they are blamed for poor performance.
Politicians are weakened, but they are blamed for lacking strength. Bureaucrats are prevented from exercising professional authority, but they are blamed for administrative paralysis. The democratic system is not allowed to function freely, yet democracy is blamed for failing.
Against this background, a new narrative is now being promoted: that Pakistan’s problems can be solved by dividing the existing provinces and creating several new administrative units.
Supporters argue that population growth has made the current provincial structure too large and that smaller provinces would bring government closer to the people.
The argument may appear attractive at first glance, but it ignores the real causes of failure. Pakistan already has divisions, districts, tehsils, local administrations, commissioners, deputy commissioners and numerous departments intended to deliver services.
New districts have repeatedly been created. Yet governance has not improved because the central problem is not simply the size of the provinces. It is the collapse of accountability, political legitimacy, institutional independence and democratic authority.
Creating additional provinces would also impose enormous financial costs. Each new province would require a governor, chief minister, cabinet, provincial assembly, secretariat, departments, residences, security arrangements, vehicles, staff and administrative infrastructure. Billions would be spent on buildings and bureaucracies rather than schools, hospitals, clean water, employment, agriculture and local development.
More provinces may also create more political offices to distribute, more budgets to control and more opportunities for institutional manipulation. Instead of empowering the people, such a structure could strengthen centralized control by fragmenting political authority and making regional governments more dependent upon the establishment.
The proposal therefore risks becoming another narcissistic illusion: a belief that by redrawing the map, the system will automatically improve.
But a dysfunctional political order cannot be repaired through geography alone. If the same culture of interference, manipulation, censorship and administrative domination continues, ten provinces will fail just as four provinces have failed.
Pakistan does not primarily need new provincial boundaries. It needs a new democratic understanding.
The solution is to allow the Constitution, parliament, judiciary, media, civil service and elected governments to function independently.
The people must be allowed to choose the representatives they genuinely trust, support and love—leaders whom they believe can rescue the country from its present political, economic and administrative quagmire.
Elections must be held fairly, transparently and without interference. Political parties must be allowed to compete on equal terms. Popular leaders must not be removed through manipulation, coercion or manufactured political engineering. Governments must rise and fall through the ballot box, not through decisions made behind closed doors.
The army must return fully to its constitutional responsibility of defending the country. It should remain respected, professional and powerful within its legitimate domain, but it should not determine who governs, who enters parliament, who becomes prime minister, which political party survives or which civilian officer receives promotion.
Pakistan’s people are not incapable of choosing their leaders. They have repeatedly demonstrated political awareness, courage and commitment. What they require is not guardianship but freedom. They must be trusted to make their own decisions and, when necessary, correct those decisions through future elections.
Breaking the provinces will not heal Pakistan. Breaking the cycle of interference will.
The country can move toward progress and prosperity only when authority flows from the people, when institutions remain within constitutional limits and when elected representatives are allowed to govern without fear or external control.
Pakistan’s map does not need to be repeatedly redrawn. Its democratic contract needs to be restored. The real reset is not administrative fragmentation. The real reset is free elections, civilian supremacy, constitutional governance, press freedom and the unconditional right of the people to choose their own future.