Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : In the United States, democracy is held sacred, yet the question lingers uncomfortably: who really governs this nation—Congress, the embodiment of representative debate, or the president, who issues executive orders at a breakneck pace? Nowhere is this tension more alive than in the story of migration—both of people and of power itself—whose routes are shaped by promises, implemented under seal, and tested by the courts.
When Donald Trump took the oath for his second term in January 2025, the air crackled with urgency, a promise that the long stalemates of Congress would no longer stall America’s progress. In just 147 days, he signed his 163rd executive order—already surpassing the 162 orders President Biden issued in his entire four-year term. By the end of August, that tally had climbed to 198. Coupled with his 220 first-term orders, he had, in fewer than five years, issued more directives than any modern president. Only Franklin D. Roosevelt surpassed his total—and FDR’s presidency spanned a global depression and climate of war. The executive pen, once a tool of occasional recalibration, had become Trump’s primary method of governing, as if power itself had picked up suitcase and migrated swiftly from Congress to the Oval Office.
Many of these orders moved along the path of public endorsement. Campaign promises that had galvanized voters—slashing immigration, limiting foreign trade, remodeling federal architecture—were delivered with immediate force. Endorsed by rallies and ballots, these promises took shape: tariffs were imposed, immigration enforcement tightened, Washington’s monuments and streets cleaned up, and classical architecture mandated for new federal buildings. It was governance by immediate mandate, enacted before Congress could deliberate.
Yet these rushed crossings hit legal checkpoints. One order targeted birthright citizenship—stripping citizenship from children born in the U.S. to non-citizen parents. Courts swiftly struck back: judges across the country blocked it, arguing the constitutional protections of the 14th Amendment could not be overturned with a signature. Federal circuits remain divided, the issue escalated toward the Supreme Court, stalled in multiple hearings—a charge halted gate by gate.
Another directive aimed at expanding “expedited removal,” allowing deportations without judicial hearings for immigrants anywhere in the country. The Justice Department warned of expedited processing for up to a million deportations per year. But a district judge ruled that violating due process would be unconstitutional, and several states filed lawsuits. Detention centers overflowed, protests erupted, and the eruption of legal action forced a partial retreat. Trump’s rapid implementation had collided with America’s entrenched legal norms.
These legal battles multiplied. Orders banning transgender individuals from military service, cutting funding for gender-affirming care, and revoking passports with non-binary markers were met with court injunctions. Judges held fast to equal protection and free speech, labeling some orders as discriminatory. The result: a patchwork where federal policy differed starkly across regions, depending on the rulings in local courts. Democracy, in its procedural wisdom, slow-marched through lawsuits and hearings.
But even as rolling injunctions slowed or blocked dozens of orders, Trump’s economic narrative flickered bright. In the second quarter of 2025, U.S. GDP growth was revised to 3.3 percent—above the initial 3 percent estimate and marking a dramatic rebound from a 0.5 percent contraction in the first quarter. Consumer spending rose, AI investments surged, and stock indices climbed to new highs. The economy, for the moment, seemed to reward a government that governed swiftly. The Federal Reserve, sensing softening labor data, eyed interest-rate cuts. Consumer confidence, bolstered by job stability and spending, contributed to this upward trend.
Yet cracks appeared below the surface. Analysts warned of stagflation risks—tariffs pushing prices higher even as growth slowed. The OECD revised U.S. growth expectations downward, and economists cautioned that Trump’s economic rebound was fragile, driven by temporary factors like inventory shifts rather than sustainable demand.
On the geopolitical front, Trump touted himself as a peacemaker, claiming to have ended multiple wars—from conflicts in Africa to Asia. The reality was murkier: several of the cited wars continued, deals remained incomplete, and analysts called his claims exaggerated. At home, however, aggressive immigration enforcement, trade wars, and detention centers like “Alligator Alcatraz” symbolized executive power in action—power that enforced campaign promises but also fractured international goodwill.
Even policies aimed at improving the capital’s image became flashpoints. A White House order created a “Washington Safe and Beautiful” task force, deploying Park Police and the National Guard to clean encampments, scrub graffiti, and restore order around monuments. Soon after, another directive mandated classical architecture in new federal buildings—a symbolic reclaiming of civic aesthetics. Critics saw it as symbolism over substance, an aesthetic takeover rubber-stamped without consensus.
Behind the symbolic momentum lay legal resistance and civic concern. Immigration centers were sued by environmental groups and tribal nations, courts ordered facilities dismantled, and resistance grew across states, courts, and civil society. Difficult public policies had been enacted swiftly—but their permanence remained in question.
This generational tension—between unchecked executive speed and slow democratic process—was the hallmark of a nation on edge. Trump’s rapid delivery on campaign promises demonstrated both the power and peril of executive orders as tools for public mandate. Speed can enact change—but velocity alone is not governance.
Ultimately, the American story of migration—from promises to policy, from the Oval Office to the courtroom—asks a foundational question: Can democracy thrive when its channels are bypassed? Executive orders are powerful locomotives: they move policy quickly, visibly, sometimes effectively; but without democratic gears, they risk derailment.
In the end, Trump’s second term became the most vivid demonstration of that balance. His rapid implementation of executive orders did enable him to fulfill campaign promises, ease trade tensions, reshape government aesthetics, and catalyze economic growth—however briefly. Yet courts stood as gatekeepers, injunctions blocked orders, cities resisted, and allies questioned U.S. reliability. Power migrated swiftly—but settling it into the republic requires democracy’s architecture: deliberation, legitimacy, and institutional consent. As America moves forward, the question remains: will swift power prove foundational—or fleeting?

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : During the Biden administration, India was elevated from an ordinary bilateral trade partner to a “strategic partner” and “most favored nation” in Washington’s eyes. The U.S. envisioned India as a counterweight to China’s growing influence, pouring political, economic, and strategic support into New Delhi. India was projected as the next global manufacturing hub, with U.S. industries encouraged to set up production plants there and bring their goods back to America, giving India unprecedented access to U.S. markets and raising its global profile. However, this sudden rise inflated India’s ego, making it more assertive and, at times, confrontational—not only with its neighbors like Pakistan and Nepal but also with China and even Western partners.
Confident of Washington’s protection, India began flexing its muscles globally. Its defiance became clear during disputes with the European Union and the U.S., especially after the Ukraine war began. Despite India bypassing sanctions, buying discounted Russian oil, and reselling refined products at a profit, the Biden administration imposed no penalties. For Biden, the calculus was strategic: build India’s economy, enhance its military strength, and position it as a democratic bulwark against China in the Indo-Pacific. Even when India refused to align with Western sanctions on Russia, the administration remained lenient, prioritizing long-term objectives over immediate disagreements.
This approach shifted dramatically with Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025. Viewing U.S.–India relations through a transactional lens, Trump rejected the idea of indulging India unconditionally. He saw India’s growing trade surplus, hidden tariff barriers, and its lucrative energy trade with Russia as a fundamental imbalance. Within months, Trump reversed nearly all the privileges extended under Biden and demanded that India halt Russian oil imports, stop reselling petroleum products to the U.S. and Europe at inflated prices, and lower its exorbitant tariffs on American goods. India refused, defending its “strategic autonomy” and rejecting Washington’s demands outright.
Trump’s response was swift and uncompromising. Starting with a 10% tariff on Indian goods, he escalated it to 15%, then 35%, and finally imposed a sweeping 50% blanket tariff by August 27, 2025. This single policy move crippled India’s position in the U.S. market, rendering billions of dollars’ worth of exports uncompetitive. Indian goods worth $48 to $58 billion annually—including textiles, apparel, seafood, gems, jewelry, furniture, machinery, and metals—became prohibitively expensive. Analysts estimate India could lose up to 43% of its U.S. exports, nearly $40 billion annually, hitting its manufacturing and employment sectors hard. These tariffs marked a decisive recalibration of U.S. policy, reducing India from a privileged strategic partner back to a transactional trading ally.
While the rift between Washington and New Delhi has damaged India’s position, it has created a historic opening for Pakistan. With India’s access to U.S. supply chains disrupted, Pakistan is uniquely positioned to fill the gap. In 2024, Pakistan’s total trade with the U.S. stood at $7.2 billion, with exports accounting for $5.1 billion and growing steadily. By fiscal year 2024–25, exports to the U.S. rose further to $5.83 billion, driven by textiles, apparel, leather products, surgical instruments, and home furnishings. Now, as U.S. buyers seek alternatives to Indian suppliers, Pakistan’s competitive advantages—cheaper costs, quality production, and reliability—make it a natural beneficiary.
Adding to Pakistan’s momentum is the July 2025 Pakistan–U.S. Trade and Energy Deal, signed just weeks before Trump’s final tariff decision. This landmark agreement reduced tariffs on key Pakistani exports, including textiles, leather goods, surgical instruments, agricultural products, and IT services, giving Pakistan a clear pricing edge over India. The deal also paved the way for U.S. investment in Pakistan’s energy sector while strengthening bilateral trade ties. In return, Pakistan aligned closely with U.S. policy objectives, including observing restrictions on Russian oil imports and enhancing counterterrorism cooperation. Pleased with Pakistan’s support, Trump publicly praised Islamabad’s contributions to regional stability, especially its assistance in capturing high-profile terrorists and facilitating U.S. intelligence operations.
Pakistan’s diplomatic prudence has further strengthened its standing in Washington. Unlike India, which openly defied U.S. requests while doubling down on Russian oil imports—reportedly worth $34 billion annually—Pakistan avoided any actions that could conflict with Western sanctions. Its neutral stance on energy, combined with extensive cooperation on security, made it a more trusted partner in the region. The growing relationship was symbolized by an unprecedented White House meeting between President Trump and Pakistan’s Army Chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, signaling elevated strategic confidence.
The implications of these developments are profound. With Indian products now priced out of the American market, billions of dollars’ worth of trade opportunities have opened across multiple sectors—especially textiles, jewelry, seafood, furniture, and machinery. Pakistan can capitalize on this shift by rapidly mobilizing its industrial base, investing in capacity expansion, and ensuring supply chain efficiency. By targeting these sectors and aggressively marketing its competitive advantages, Pakistan could capture a significant share of the U.S. market previously dominated by India.
This moment calls for a coordinated national effort. The government must work with exporters, industry leaders, and the Pakistani diaspora in the U.S. to identify priority sectors and align strategies for substitution. Incentives for new investments in high-demand industries, compliance with international quality standards, and guaranteed reliability in fulfilling large-scale orders will be critical to success. By filling this gap effectively, Pakistan could double or even triple its exports to the U.S. within a few years, creating a ripple effect across other Western markets, particularly Europe, which often follows U.S. trade patterns.
Time, however, is of the essence. Trade realignments happen quickly, and other regional players like Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Indonesia are also competing to replace India’s share. Pakistan must act decisively to strengthen its production capacity, maintain consistent quality, and streamline export processes. The government’s role in facilitating infrastructure improvements, reducing regulatory bottlenecks, and supporting exporters with favorable policies will determine whether Pakistan can fully exploit this opportunity.
In the broader context, India’s inflated confidence, cultivated during years of indulgence under the Biden administration, has collided with Trump’s economic realism. By challenging India’s trade advantages and energy autonomy, Trump has reshaped the dynamics of South Asian commerce, weakening India’s grip on U.S. markets and opening the door for Pakistan. For Islamabad, this is more than a commercial opportunity—it is a strategic chance to redefine its economic partnership with the United States, expand its global trade profile, and accelerate long-term industrial growth.
The window is open but will not remain so indefinitely. If Pakistan acts with agility, coordination, and vision, it can transform this disruption into a turning point for its economy, positioning itself as the primary South Asian beneficiary of U.S. trade and reshaping regional economic dynamics for years to come.

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : When Donald Trump reassumed the presidency in January 2025, he came with a determination to reset the United States, to restore what he called its lost glory, and to end the long years of exploitation by allies and adversaries alike. His first and fiercest target was China. Even before his administration had taken shape, when his cabinet was being scrutinized in the Senate and the Congress, it was clear that nearly every appointee, from the national security leadership to the economic team, carried one unifying agenda: to confront China, to cut down its growing influence, and to reclaim for America the leadership of the international order. The early months carried the full weight of this antagonism. Tariffs were slapped on Chinese goods, hawkish statements were made about containing Beijing in the Pacific, and even talk of stopping the flow of Chinese students to American universities was floated. The tone was confrontational, the stance uncompromising, and the ambition was nothing less than to push China back not only from American shores but from Asia, Europe, and beyond.
Yet as the weeks unfolded, a sobering reality dawned on Washington. The United States no longer had the leverage it once commanded. The global order had shifted. China was not a fragile power dependent on American markets and technology; it was a formidable actor that had, over the past decade, consolidated its dominance in manufacturing, technology, and finance. By 2024, China accounted for nearly 31% of global manufacturing output, making it the indispensable workshop of the world. Its grip on rare earth elements was even more decisive, producing nearly 70% and processing about 85% of the world’s supply, the backbone of modern technologies from smartphones and electric vehicles to satellites and fighter jets. To think that tariffs alone could bend such a power was wishful, and it quickly became apparent that the United States was staring at a competitor far too entrenched to be bullied.
Trump’s early declarations that allies like Europe, Canada, and Mexico had been “plundering” the United States found quick results there. NATO states, under American pressure, agreed to hike defense spending from 2% to as high as 5% of GDP, and European negotiators conceded to humiliating trade deals that forced them to buy more American goods while swallowing a 15% tariff on their exports to the U.S. Canada, too, suffered greatly, as disputes over trade, security, and investment battered its economy and its political stability.
In those regions, Trump’s heavy-handed tactics worked because the dependency on the United States remained asymmetric. But with China, the playbook misfired. Beijing did not bend. It retaliated with equal tariffs, diverted exports to Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, and doubled down on its Belt and Road Initiative, which by 2025 had already drawn in more than 150 countries and over a trillion dollars in investment. Far from retreating, China used America’s confrontation to strengthen its global alternatives.
The attempt to ban Chinese students quickly collapsed as well. In 2024, more than 290,000 Chinese students were enrolled in American universities, contributing over $15 billion annually to tuition and living expenses. When proposals were made to cut them off, university presidents, governors, and state legislators raised the alarm that such a move would devastate higher education budgets and gut critical research programs. By the summer of 2025, Trump reversed course, openly admitting that these students were vital not only for finances but also for America’s scientific and technological advancement. What had been framed as a security threat was rebranded as a necessary lifeline for institutions already struggling with deficits.
On the military front, too, harsh reality intruded. American officials initially talked of quadrupling the U.S. presence in the South China Sea to contain Beijing. But the Pentagon’s own assessments made clear that China now had the largest navy in the world by ship count, and that sustaining such deployments would bleed the U.S. treasury without altering China’s resolve. With a defense budget already at $850 billion in 2024, America faced the prospect of draining itself in a contest it could not decisively win. It was not Beijing that appeared overstretched but Washington, and in the calculus of resources, the United States realized that escalation could only sap its strength.
Even the most powerful weapon in America’s arsenal, the dollar, proved less decisive than hoped. The dollar still made up about 58% of global foreign exchange reserves in 2024, but China and its BRICS partners had been steadily eroding this dominance. By early 2025, nearly a quarter of intra-BRICS trade was being conducted outside of the dollar, through local currency swaps and yuan settlements. At the same time, Beijing reduced its U.S. Treasury holdings to under $775 billion, its lowest in more than a decade, subtly weakening America’s ability to weaponize its debt dependence. The weaponization of finance, so effective against weaker adversaries, had limited effect on a China that had prepared its defenses.
It was on rare earths and supply chains that the hardest lesson was learned. Any disruption from Beijing would paralyze entire sectors of the U.S. economy. Defense contractors building F-35s, tech companies producing semiconductors, automakers racing to transition to EVs—all were dependent on Chinese supply chains. Attempts to reshore production or find alternative suppliers in Africa and Australia were years away from maturity. In the meantime, tariffs and restrictions only drove up prices at home. Walmart, Target, and Home Depot reported that household goods were rising by 10–15%, squeezing American consumers and fueling inflationary pressures. What had been billed as a strategy to punish China threatened to punish the very voters Trump had pledged to protect.
Trump is not a leader who easily admits defeat, but he is a pragmatist when forced by circumstances. Gradually, the rhetoric softened. Where once he threatened to choke off Chinese students, now he welcomed them. Where once he promised to multiply naval deployments, now he quietly acknowledged that China was too big to intimidate. Where once he boasted that tariffs would bring Beijing to its knees, now he conceded in his own words that “both China and the United States hold powerful cards, but I do not want to use these cards anymore.” It was a rare admission of limits, but also a demonstration of flexibility, of learning fast and adjusting course in the face of hard realities.
The implications of this shift are global. For Europe and Canada, the price of submission to American tariffs has been humiliation and economic loss. For developing countries, especially those bound to China through investment and infrastructure like Pakistan, the easing of U.S.-China tensions offers relief, stability, and opportunities. Supply chains can stabilize, inflationary shocks can be tempered, and the specter of a bifurcated technological order can be postponed. The nervousness that gripped global markets in early 2025 may yet give way to a calmer, more predictable environment.
This is not submission by the United States, nor is it triumph for China alone. It is a recognition of a multipolar world, one where interdependence outweighs the fantasies of domination. It is also a testament to Trump’s instinct for survival, his ability to correct course, and his willingness to pivot when faced with the immovable weight of reality. The United States still holds cards—in its consumer market, its technology base, its dollar system, and its alliances. But China holds cards too—in its manufacturing dominance, its rare earths, its investments, and its financial innovation. The test now is not who can outplay the other, but who can recognize that destroying the table destroys the game for all.
The course correction we are witnessing may prove to be one of the most consequential strategic adjustments of Trump’s presidency. It suggests not weakness, but wisdom—the wisdom to see that America cannot remain a hegemon in a world where China has become the indispensable player. In showing flexibility, Trump has revealed that leadership is not only about force but about judgment. He has acknowledged that America’s power, though vast, must coexist with China’s, and that a stable balance is the only path to safeguard prosperity at home and stability abroad. To some, this may feel like compromise. To others, like survival. But history may remember it as something larger: the moment the United States accepted the reality of a multipolar world, and chose coexistence over collision.