There is No Way to Peace, Peace is the Way

Akhtar Hussain Sandhu

Chicago (USA)

[email protected]

Iran-US War and Islamabad peace facilitation prompt me to recall the famous quotes of Abraham Johannes Muste, a US-based civil rights and anti-nuclear-weapons activist. To him, nothing can lead to peace, but peace, in fact, facilitates a positive change in relations therefore, not circumstances or ways, but ‘peace’ itself proves a nucleus of attention in the crisis-packed situation in a society or world. Social scientists usually count the factors and circumstances leading to peace in a conflict at the societal and international level, but A. J. Muste believes that ‘peace’ is the greatest force that attracts rival protagonists to create understanding and end conflict. A. J. Muste opposed World War I and the US-Vietnam War and also opposed nuclear weaponry. He worked zealously and nonviolently for labor rights and civil liberties in the United States. The US-Israel led war against Iran on 28 February 2026 caused a catastrophic results and the continuous bombing destroyed Iran’s civil infrastructure, and approximately 180 schoolgirls were killed in an aerial attack. It was condemned by the masses in the US and other countries. Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz as a war tactic, which created a global oil crisis, and all countries’ economies experienced an overnight major setback. The US President changed his initial war objectives and focused on the reopening of the Hormuz because multiple nations were bashing the US President for his unethical war mongering ambition, which caused the energy crisis. US President Donald Trump first decided to isolate the US from this dangerous drive and declared that the affected countries should send their troops to open this sea route for their vessels, but in April 2026, he issued a furious statement that if Iran did not open the Strait of Hormuz, it would be eliminated from the earth. It caused panic in the world because this message meant a nuclear attack on Iran. If it happened, any power could justify the use of nuclear weapons against the rival country, and the world could be an unsafe and hellish place. It could also convince every country, including Iran, to have nuclear weapons in future because having nuclear weaponry was to be left as the only option to survive against a rival nuclear power. However, Pakistan, China, Russia, Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, enjoying cordial relations with the US and Iran, ultimately brought a truce of two weeks, and both countries consented to dialogue in Islamabad on 10 April. Army Chief Gen. Asim Munir, PM Mian Shahbaz Sharif, and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar from Pakistan played a pivotal role in the ongoing parleys between the rival leaders. The ceasefire created an environment in which both camps claimed victory, and both seemed busy proving their military strength and muscles, but despite all, they are heading towards peace through dialogue. Threatening Statements by the US President even before a day before the negotiations is an evidence that the agreement (if it is concluded) would be presented as Iran’s surrender before the US might. A. J. Muste quotes that not circumstances, but ‘peace’ itself pushed the rival forces away from the battlefield. Once, a reporter questioned his presence as a protest in front of the White House: ” Can you change the White House? A. J. Muste replied. ‘I don’t do this to change the country. I do this so the country would not change me.’ The ruling elite always use the name of ‘state’ to change the people as it desires, but the state’s predilections change with the passage of time; therefore, to curb the citizens proves havoc for the social fabric. Dissatisfied masses can hardly produce a beneficial human resource that truly serves a nation. A. J. Must says that the problem after a war is that the victor shows the fight has brought a bright future, and war has paid the nation a lot. In their perception, the war was a new form of reform that would ensure prosperity and psychological pride for the people. Iran and the USA have both been claiming victories and asserting that the conflict has brought blessings. Both countries closed their eyes to the human sufferings and loss of innocent lives, wealth, economy, infrastructure, and hatred generated against each other. Peace proved its importance and motivated them to approach the neutral countries for a ceasefire, which means the war had crippled both the rivals to the extent that they were unable to talk even of ‘peace’, which shows the weakness and impotency of the so-called victors. A. J. Muste opines that no big power in the war accepts itself as an aggressor; instead, it is always the rival that is the aggressor.’ However, I think that every fighting country thinks of itself as a big force, therefore both become ‘big powers’ under their own justifications. Look at the arguments of the US and Iran that have been justifying their righteousness and aggression toward the rival according to their own national narratives. None of them is ready to accept any lapse on the side. Perhaps it happens amid internal and external threats to the political leadership, who twist events and arguments to secure their political position and national morale. This is another form of stress and aggression against peace, humanity, and righteousness. For example, many US military and other officials refused to attack Iran who must be consulted about their current thinking on their decision. A. J. Muste says that peace is impossible if people are only concerned with peace. A war is an outcome of different ways of life. If people desire to attack war, they have to attack that way of life.’ A. J. Muste here can be disagreed because way of life is always different, which does not mean to be in a battlefield all the time. I think he wants to say that if people dislike war, they should change their vision to one of living in societies with divergent ways of life. This quote reflects Muste’s desire that prosperity and civil liberties can change society, and by this, war maneuvering can be suffocated. AJ Must was a member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation in the US, which struggled against war hysteria and the violation of civil liberties and for labor rights. He delivered lectures in different universities on the nonviolent struggle for rights. He joined the Montgomery Bus Boycott, led by Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1955. A. J. Muste’s struggle is still admired by Americans and Europeans because he worked selflessly for humanity, peace, and the dignity of all races.     

Writer is a US-based Historian & Colmunist

9 April 2026

Prime Minister’s Office
Media Wing

ISLAMABAD: 10 April 2026.

Prime Minister’s Telephone Call with Prime Minister Keir Starmer of the United Kingdom

Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif received a telephone call from Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, His Excellency Keir Starmer, this evening.

Prime Minister Starmer deeply appreciated Pakistan’s effective diplomatic efforts in facilitating the U.S.-Iran ceasefire, and the resumption of dialogue. He felicitated Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif on hosting the peace negotiations in Islamabad and offered his best wishes for the success of this endeavor.

Reaffirming Pakistan’s sincere commitment to regional peace and stability, Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif welcomed the joint statement issued by key European and international leaders, including Prime Minister Starmer, endorsing Pakistan’s peace initiatives.

Both leaders emphasized the importance of ensuring that the ceasefire remains in place and creates the necessary conditions for lasting peace and stability in the region.

The two leaders agreed to work together to lend fresh impetus to the longstanding friendly ties between Pakistan and the United Kingdom, across all spheres of mutual interest.

The Prime Minister reiterated his cordial invitation to Prime Minister Starmer to undertake an official visit to Pakistan.

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The most consequential development in the ongoing conflict is not unfolding in the skies over Iran or the waters of the Gulf—it is unfolding inside the Pentagon. In the middle of an active war, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth abruptly removed Army Chief of Staff Randy George along with other senior officers, triggering one of the most destabilizing leadership purges in modern U.S. military history. At a moment that demands continuity, coordination, and institutional stability, Washington has instead projected disruption, uncertainty, and internal fracture.
This purge did not go unnoticed. Iran immediately seized the moment and transformed it into a powerful instrument of narrative warfare. Through its diplomatic channels, including messaging amplified by the Iranian Embassy in South Africa, Tehran mocked Washington with a blunt and calculated taunt: the “regime change” that the United States had long claimed to be engineering in Iran had now taken place within America itself. Images of dismissed U.S. generals were circulated with captions implying that Washington had become the victim of its own doctrine. The message was clear—while the United States spoke of dismantling Iran’s command structure, its own command hierarchy was being shaken from within.
This narrative shift coincided with a far more serious battlefield development. Iranian air defenses successfully downed three advanced U.S. aerial platforms, shattering the long-held assumption of uncontested American air superiority. For decades, U.S. military doctrine has relied on dominance of the skies as the foundation of all subsequent operations. That dominance is no longer absolute. The downing of these aircraft is not merely a tactical loss—it is a strategic rupture.
The consequences unfold immediately across multiple layers. First, operational confidence is shaken; pilots can no longer assume safe penetration of hostile airspace. Second, mission planning becomes more cautious, reducing the tempo and effectiveness of air campaigns. Third, intelligence assumptions are exposed as flawed, revealing gaps in understanding Iran’s air defense capabilities. Fourth, political pressure mounts in Washington as high-value losses demand accountability. Fifth, allies begin to question the reliability of U.S. protection. Sixth, adversaries are emboldened, seeing that the technological gap can be contested. Seventh, escalation becomes more unpredictable, as each loss increases the pressure to respond more forcefully.
It is within this context that the Pentagon purge takes on deeper meaning. Leadership changes in wartime are rarely isolated decisions; they are often reactions to battlefield realities, intelligence failures, or strategic disagreements. The removal of top commanders, therefore, cannot be separated from the emerging operational setbacks. Whether driven by accountability, political loyalty, or internal conflict, the timing reinforces a perception of instability at the highest levels of U.S. military command.
The escalation ladder now becomes the central question. With air superiority contested and leadership in flux, the United States faces a narrowing set of options. Continuing the air campaign carries increased risk. Expanding strikes invites broader regional retaliation. The final and most dangerous step—deploying ground forces—would fundamentally transform the conflict.
However, a ground invasion of Iran would not resemble conventional warfare. There would be no clearly defined frontlines, no visible massing of Iranian divisions waiting for engagement. Instead, the United States would encounter a form of warfare that is largely invisible, decentralized, and deeply embedded within terrain and population. Iranian strategy, shaped by decades of asymmetric doctrine, would avoid direct confrontation. There would be no large-scale battlefield for American forces to dominate—only a constant, elusive threat.
In such a scenario, U.S. troops could find themselves operating in an environment where the enemy is rarely seen but always present. Attacks would be selective, sudden, and dispersed. Supply lines, forward bases, and isolated units would become targets. The battlefield would extend beyond geography into psychology, where uncertainty and constant threat erode operational effectiveness. This is not a war of visibility—it is a war of perception and endurance.
The comparison with groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah is instructive, though Iran operates at a far more sophisticated level. These groups have demonstrated how smaller forces can neutralize technological superiority through tunnel networks, decentralized command, and precision strikes. Iran’s capability extends this model into a state-level framework, combining conventional defenses with asymmetric tactics, cyber operations, and regional proxies.
What emerges is a battlefield where visibility is reversed. American forces, despite their technological advantage, become exposed targets within a complex and unfamiliar environment. Iranian forces, by contrast, remain largely concealed, choosing the timing and location of engagement. This inversion of visibility fundamentally alters the balance of power on the ground.
At the same time, the information war continues to amplify these realities. By linking the Pentagon purge with battlefield developments, Iran reinforces a narrative of American disarray—military setbacks abroad, leadership instability at home, and strategic confusion at the highest levels. Whether or not this perception fully reflects reality is secondary; its impact on global opinion and allied confidence is undeniable.
The United States now faces a convergence of pressures: operational challenges in the field, political scrutiny at home, and a rapidly shifting global perception of its strength. Each element feeds into the other, creating a cycle that is difficult to break. Military losses raise political questions. Political decisions create military uncertainty. Perception amplifies both.
And at the center of this cycle lies the original event—the purge of top military leadership. What may have been intended as a corrective measure now risks being interpreted as a symptom of deeper instability. In war, perception can be as decisive as firepower, and the image of a fractured command structure can weaken deterrence as effectively as any battlefield defeat.
The irony is stark. A nation that has long championed regime change as a tool of foreign policy now finds itself confronting the language, the imagery, and the perception of that very phenomenon turned inward. Not through revolution, but through disruption; not through overthrow, but through fragmentation.
The war, therefore, is no longer confined to Iran. It has expanded into a contest of narratives, resilience, and institutional stability. And in that broader battlefield, the question is no longer who controls the skies or the الأرض—it is who maintains coherence under pressure.
At this moment, the answer remains uncertain. But one reality is clear: when leadership fractures at the top, the consequences cascade downward—and in war, those consequences can define the outcome long before the final shot is fired.