Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY):- A group of Pakistani delegates of the Model United Nations (MUN) International being held in Paris visited the Embassy today for an interactive briefing session. They were briefed on Pakistan’s priorities in international organizations especially those based in Paris.

Addressing the participants, Ambassador Madam Mumtaz Zahra Baloch underscored Pakistan’s commitment to multilateralism, international law, and peaceful settlement of disputes.

She also briefed them on the constructive role played by Pakistan in advancing the mandate of UNESCO during its tenure as a Vice-Chair of the Executive Board (2023–2025) and championing the priorities of developing countries.

The National Assembly on Wednesday passed the 27th Constitutional Amendment Bill during a ruckus-marred session attended by political heavyweights, including Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, PML-N President Nawaz Sharif and PPP Chairman Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari.

The bill was passed by a two-way voting process — voting by division and clause-by-clause voting. Presented in the house for voting by Law Minister Azam Nazeer Tarar, the bill will now be referred back to the Senate for the new amendments to be debated upon again and then will be passed by the upper house.

During the session, Tarar presented a list of amendments to the bill, while also omitting some of the bill’s clauses.

From the law minister’s speech in the National Assembly, the amendments were promulgated mainly to incorporate the newly setup Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) in the scheme of the Constitution and to provide clarity regarding the incumbent and future chief justice of Pakistan (CJP) since the new constitutional court means it will have its own chief justice (CJFCC), along with the chief justice of the Supreme Court (CJSC).

Amendments related to Federal Constitutional Court

Substitution of new Clause 2

The first change pertained to Clause 2 of the 27th Amendment Bill, 2025, which dealt with a change to Article 10(4)(1) of the Constitution (safeguards as to arrest and detention). The relevant section currently says that the CJP will form the review board in a case of someone detained under a federal law.

The amendment sought to insert the words “Supreme Court of” in front of the “chief justice of” to now show that the CJSC would be the one to form the board.

However, the new Clause 2 as per the amendments deals with changes to Article 6’s (high treason) clause 2A, which reads as follows:

An act of high treason mentioned in clause (1) or clause (2) shall not be validated by any court, including the SC and a high court.

In the latest amendment, it was stated that after the word “the”, the words “Federal Constitutional Court” and a comma would be inserted, thus adding the FCC to the list of courts that cannot ratify any act of high treason and placing it before the SC in the listing.

Amendments related to Supreme Court, its chief justice and CJP

Insertion of Clause 2A

Meanwhile, the previous Clause 2 of the bill would now be labelled as Clause 2A.

As explained before, the CJSC will now be the one to form the review board for the case of someone detained under a federal law.

Substitution of Clause 23

Article 176 that deals with the makeup of the SC currently says: “The Supreme Court shall consist of a chief justice to be known as the chief justice of Pakistan and so many other Judges as may be determined by Act of [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)] or, until so determined, as may be fixed by the president.”

The original Clause 23 sought to insert the words “of Supreme Court” after the second mention of “justice”, thus meaning that the apex court would comprise its own chief justice — who would not necessarily be the CJP.

However, the law minister said in his NA speech that confusion had been created about the continuity of the CJP, thus the following new amendment was proposed that includes the original Clause 23 but also adds the following part to the full definition at the end of Article 176:

“For the full stop, at the end, a colon shall be substituted and thereafter the following proviso shall be added, namely: ‘Provided that and notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, the incumbent chief justice shall be and continue to be known as the chief justice of Pakistan during his term in office’.”

CJP Yahya Afridi will thus continue to be the country’s chief justice until the end of his term.

Amendment of Clause 56

In the bill, an amendment to Clause 1 of Article 260 (definitions) was proposed, specifically for the definition of the chief justice. The article currently states:

“Chief justice”, in relation to the Supreme Court or a high court, includes the judge for the time being acting as chief justice of the court.

The change (subclause ‘a’ of Clause 56) proposed in the bill sought to add the words “Federal Constitutional Court” to clauses and sub-clauses of Article 260 to incorporate the new court in the framework of the Constitution.

Today’s latest amendment proposed the addition of the following subclause to Clause 56’s subclause ‘a’:

“Chief justice of Pakistan” means the senior amongst the chief justice of the Federal Constitutional Court and the chief justice of Supreme Court.“

Thus, after CJP Afridi’s term comes to an end, the future CJP will be the senior-most judge from the chief justices of the FCC and SC.

Omissions

Omission of Clause 4

Some of the proposed changes in the bill were omitted during the reading, one of which was Clause 4 of the bill.

Clause 4 would amend Article 42 of the Constitution, which reads as follows:

Before entering upon office, the president shall make before the chief justice of Pakistan oath in the form set out in the Third Schedule.

The proposed amendment would have seen the word “Pakistan” replaced with “the Federal Constitutional Court”.

Omission of Clause 19

Clause 19 of the bill proposed an amendment to Article 168 of the Constitution, which mandates that there will be an auditor-general who is appointed by the president. There was meant to be an amendment to Clause 2 of Article 168, which reads as follows:

Before entering upon office, the auditor-general shall make before the chief justice of Pakistan oath in the form set out in the Third Schedule.

The amendment in the bill would insert the words “Supreme Court of” after the words “chief justice of”.

Omission of Clause 51

Clause 51 of the bill proposed an amendment to Article 214 of the Constitution, which states that the chief election commissioner must swear an oath to the chief justice before assuming office, as follows:

Before entering upon office, the commissioner shall make before the chief justice of Pakistan [and a member of the Election Commission shall make before the commissioner] oath in the form set-out in the Third Schedule

The amendment was to replace the word “Pakistan” in the Article with the words “Federal Constitutional Court”.

Omission of Clause 55

Clause 55 of the bill proposed an amendment to Clause 2 of Article 255 (oath of office), which states that if someone cannot take the oath of office before “a specified person”, the chief justice can swear them in, as follows:

Where, under the Constitution, an oath is required to be made before a specified person and, for any reason, it is impracticable for the oath to be made before that person, it may be made before such other person as may be nominated by 3 [the chief justice of a high court, in case of a province and by the chief justice of Pakistan, in all other cases]

The bill proposed an amendment to the second clause of Article 255, substituting the word “Pakistan” with the words “Federal Constitutional Court”.

The proposed 27th Constitutional Amendment, which would overhaul Article 243 and recast Pakistan’s military command hierarchy, is the most ambitious restructuring effort in decades and perhaps the most contentious as it collides with entrenched institutional cultures and the fragile equilibrium between civilian and military power.

Its implementation may prove far more difficult than its drafters imagine. The plan collides with entrenched institutional cultures, long-standing inter-service rivalries, and the delicate balance between civilian oversight and military autonomy that has, at least in theory, defined Pakistan’s power structure since 1973.

At the heart of the bill lies the deceptively simple premise of modernising defence coordination by creating a Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) and abolishing the office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC).

But in practice, the reform would elevate the army chief to a constitutionally enshrined position of supremacy — combining operational command with overarching control of all services.

Article 243 overhaul marks a leap towards military centralisation and consolidation of uniformed supremacy

For over four decades, the CJCSC has served as the symbolic head of the armed services, designed to ensure coordination among the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

In practice, the role remained largely ceremonial, with the army — for over two and a half decades — reluctant to rotate it to other branches.

The proposed amendment would dissolve the post entirely on Nov 27, 2025, coinciding with the retirement of the current CJCSC, Gen Sahir Shamshad Mirza, and make the chief of army staff concurrently the Chief of Defence Forces — placing all three services under his authority.

Former human rights minister and defence academic Dr Shireen Mazari highlights an ambiguity left unaddressed in the bill.

“With the end of the CJCSC position, would the joint chiefs of staff committee also be dissolved?” she asks.

If so, which forum would replace it for coordination among the three services though the CJCSC’s ineffectiveness is well known.

The supporters of the legislation argue that the change will streamline decision-making and enhance unified command.

However, critics see it as institutional capture. “By placing an army officer as the Chief of Defence Forces with authority over the Air Force and Navy, the proposed system invites institutional imbalance and potential disaster,” warns retired Lt Gen Asif Yasin Malik, a former defence secretary.

“This amendment appears tailored to benefit a specific individual rather than to strengthen the defence structure,” he adds.

The criticism cuts to the core of the country’s military culture — the deep-seated rivalries among the Army, Air Force, and Navy, each guarding its operational turf and doctrine.

The Air Force and Navy have long resisted attempts to subordinate their autonomy under land-centric command.

Harmonising these distinct traditions — air power’s rapid, decentralised decision cycles versus the army’s hierarchical chain of command — has historically been the Achilles’ heel of every “joint” reform effort.

A critical question under the new system is who would control transfers, postings, and promotions in the Air Force and Navy.

Would the two service chiefs readily cede that authority? Dr Mazari cautions that if promotions in the Air Force and Navy were to be decided by an army-origin CDF, it “could lead to festering resentments and affect morale in the long run”.

She raises another hypothetical scenario: “What if there is a Marshal of the Air Force or Admiral of the Fleet while the COAS is a four-star general — will they then be under a four-star army officer if the latter is the CDF?” she asks. “Too much has been left to ad hoc and arbitrary decisions.”

Equally consequential is the proposal to create a Commander of the National Strategic Command, a position overseeing the country’s nuclear forces.

Under the amendment, the commander would be appointed by the prime minister on the army chief’s recommendation and must be chosen from within the army.

That subtle shift moves control of the country’s most sensitive assets away from the collegial National Command Authority (NCA), designed to ensure civilian oversight and inter-service balance, toward a single service.

Dr Mazari warns the change could have grave operational implications.

“Effectively, all nuclear weapons and delivery systems will be under the army’s control, including second-strike missiles which normally fall under naval command,” she says.

“This could lead to command-and-control problems and time delays, especially in a war-like situation.”

Her concerns recall a rare moment of institutional dissent — the 2019 National Security Committee meeting after the Balakot strikes — when, according to retired Lt Gen Malik, the then-army chief Gen Qamar Bajwa advised restraint but was reportedly overruled by the air chief and the CJCSC.

“Under the proposed arrangement, would such dissent, and the powerful response it ensured, even be possible?” he asks pointedly.

Perhaps the most controversial innovation lies in the clauses granting life-long constitutional protection to officers elevated to five-star ranks — field marshal, marshal of the air force, or admiral of the fleet.

These officers would “retain rank, privileges and remain in uniform for life”, removable only through impeachment under Article 47 and protected by immunities “similar to those enjoyed by the president” under Article 248, applied mutatis mutandis.

The language is designed to legalise the extraordinary promotion of Gen Asim Munir to field marshal following the India-Pakistan confrontation in May this year.

What looks ceremonial on paper, however, amounts to a permanent legal armour around an unelected officeholder — “a parallel authority insulated from the very rule of law it is sworn to defend”, as one constitutional lawyer puts it, asking not to be named.

Such provisions blur the line between honour and power.

“Even in the United States, the chairman of the joint chiefs does not wield absolute powers,” notes Lt Gen Malik.

“Creating lifetime immunities for military officers upends the very idea of civilian supremacy”. The supporters of the amendment, including government ministers, argue the changes merely formalise existing practices.

Yet the bill remains ambiguous about the tenure of the service chiefs.

Minister of State for Law and Justice Barrister Aqeel Malik told reporters that there was “no need for a fresh notification” on the army chief’s tenure, since existing legal provisions already establish a five-year term under the Army Act as amended by the 26th Constitutional Amendment.

But such reassurances overlook a deeper concern, which is that the proposed amendment will move the defence management from statute to constitutional entrenchment, making future civilian corrections exponentially harder.

Military affairs expert Muhammad Faisal, a doctoral researcher in Sydney, sees the bill as “the first phase” of a broader restructuring.

“There could be more updates coming with changes in the Army Act and NCA Acts to reflect new proposals,” he says.

“This could also lead to the restructuring of strategic forces, currently administered by three services separately, into a unified single command.”

That trajectory — toward centralisation rather than coordination — captures the tension at the heart of Pakistan’s military politics. Every attempt at “jointness” risks hardening into hierarchy because institutional habits and prestige are resistant to reform.

The stakes are profound. The country’s Constitution has endured repeated experiments in balancing military power and civilian authority.

A Chief of Defence Forces position can be created, as many democracies have done, through statutory reform subject to parliamentary review.

But embedding such a role in the Cons­titution transforms it from an administrative necessity into a permanent political reality, one that cannot easily be undone.

Ultimately, the question is not whether Pakistan needs a modernised defence structure. However, it definitely needs to be updated.

The question is whether modernisation must come at the cost of institutional equilibrium. History offers a cautionary note that once military power is constitutionalised, it rarely yields ground voluntarily.

Article 243 was meant to preserve civilian command over the armed forces. The 27th Amendment risks rewriting it into a charter of military supremacy.

Published in Dawn, November 9th, 2025

Header image: Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal General Asim Munir addressing the passing out parade of the Pakistan Military Academy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Kakul on April 29. — ISPR