• Petroleum dealers lament lack of clarity on payment mechanism, timeline
• PM wants facilitation desks to help people trying to buy subsidised fuel
• Ogra attributes hike to elevated crude prices despite decline in int’l rates

ISLAMABAD: Even as members of the public who have signed up for the PM’s Fuel Relief Scheme queued up at fuel pumps late on Wednesday night, petroleum dealers were still not clear about the mechanism whereby they would be compensated.

The concern was voiced by the Pakistan Petroleum Dealers Association (PPDA) during a presser in Karachi, where its chairman Malik Khuda Bakhsh said that no fuel pump could afford to bear a loss of Rs100 per litre without clarity on how they will be compensated.

He claimed that between the petroleum ministry, Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (Ogra) and even the finance ministry, no one had been able to answer their questions.

“Officials from Ogra and oil marketing companies say that the petroleum ministry will possibly pay the subsidy amount, whereas ministry officials maintain that payments will be made by the finance ministry, while finance ministry officials assure us that the State Bank will release the funds in a day or two,“ Mr Bakhsh added.

A day earlier, the National Steering Com­mittee on Fuel Subsidy — chaired by Deputy PM Ishaq Dar — had ordered that payments to fuel stations under the PM’s scheme be processed within 24 hours through the State Bank of Pakistan.

However, Mr Bakhsh said the federal government had assured dealers that they would be taken into confidence before the launch of the fuel relief package, but lamented that no such consultation took place.

”The government has to understand that if payments are not reimbursed in time, many dealers will stop participating in [the scheme], as many previous promises were also not fulfilled by the government,” he added.

PPDA Vice Chairman Tariq Hassan said that around 14,000 dealers across the country have been trying desperately to contact the government over the past three days, adding that whenever Islamabad wants to enforce something, it stops communication.

Another vice chairman, Anwar Kamal, said that if the scheme was to be successful, the government must negotiate with dealers, adding that dealers could not afford to have billions tied up for a long period under this scheme.

Mr Bakhsh later told Dawn they had been invited to a virtual meeting with the relevant federal secretary on Thursday morning.

He added that Ogra officials had also reached out to brief him, but he had asked for that information in writing, so he could relay that to the members of his association.

Facilitation desks

Earlier, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif ordered authorities to set up facilitation desks comprising administration officials, volunteers and petrol pump staff to assist citizens in easily obtaining fuel subsidy under the special relief scheme, which was rolled out across the country at Wednesday midnight, following the launch of the pilot phase in Islamabad.

Presiding over a meeting to review progress on the scheme, PM Shehbaz directed that personnel deployed at the facilitation desks should guide eligible citizens and provide them with all possible assistance in registration and other necessary procedures.

The prime minister also asked the relevant authorities to remain proactive in creating public awareness about the scheme, which will benefit people from all four provinces, Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.

The meeting was informed that the scheme had been designed in a simple and easy-to-understand manner for the public. Only four pieces of information were required for registration: the applicant’s CNIC number, vehicle number plate, province of registration and vehicle registration date.

According to an official, the number of successful registrations was gradually rising, while provincial governments were extending “full cooperation” for nationwide implementation of the scheme.

Oil prices

Meanwhile, notifying fresh POL rates on Wednesday night, Ogra attributed the steep hikes to elevated international crude oil and petroleum product prices.

The price of high-speed diesel was increased by Rs5.62 per litre to Rs421.45, while petrol became costlier by Rs6.88 per litre, taking its new price to Rs391.22 per litre.

Brent crude futures fell $2.92, or 2.7 per cent, to settle at $105.83 a barrel. US West Texas Intermediate futures fell $3.40, or 3.2pc, to close at $102.43, Reuters reported.

Saudi Arabia is offering more loadings of crude oil to Asian refiners via ship-to-ship transfers off Oman’s Sohar port, people familiar with the matter said, blunting some of the hit to global supply from attacks on the country’s East-West pipeline to the Red Sea.

Oil prices had gained more than $3 in the previous session after shipping industry sources said crude loadings at Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea export hub of Yanbu had been suspended and Riyadh had cancelled some cargo deliveries to European customers.

The suspension followed strikes on the East-West pipeline, which feeds the Saudi port of Yanbu. It became the main Saudi outlet for oil exports after Iran began blockading the Strait of Hormuz after US and Israeli attacks on the country.

Published in Dawn, September 17th, 2026

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan and China on Wednesday operationalised a long pending joint mechanism for managing their common border, with Islamabad des­cribing the move as a significant milestone in bilateral relations and a step toward closer coordination on border management, trade and cross-border connectivity.

“The inaugural meeting of the Commission was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Islamabad,” the Foreign Office said in a statement.

The meeting was co-led by Li Ya, deputy director general of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs at China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Bilal Mahmood Chaudhary, director general for China at Pakistan’s Foreign Office.

The FO described the ope­r­ationalisation of the Pakis­tan-China Boundary Joint Com­m­ission as a “significant milestone for Pak­istan-China relations”, saying it would set “the stage for enh­anced cooperation in border management, joint border surveys, trade flows and people to people connectivity.”

The commission has its origins in the 2013 Agre­ement on the Boundary Mana­gement System signed during the visit of then Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to Islamabad. Article 45 of the agreement provides for establishment of the joint commission to oversee implementation of the border management arrangements.

The mechanism would provide an institutional framework for dealing with practical issues along the border, including maintenance and inspection of the boundary, joint surveys, boundary marker issues, management of cross-border facilities and handling of incidents involving the border.

Its activation also gives the two countries a mechanism for regular coordination on a border that is important for movement between Pakistan and China, including thr­ough the Khunjerab crossing, and for trade and connectivity linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

The new commission is distinct from the Joint Boundary Demarcation Commission that was established under the Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of March 2, 1963. The earlier commission had a specific and essentially one time mandate to conduct surveys, establish boundary markers, prepare detailed maps and set out the alignment of the boundary.

Its work ended after the signing of the protocol and maps completing the demarcation process. The 1963 agreement was signed in Beijing by then-Pakistani foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Chinese counterpart Chen Yi.

It also provided that, following a settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the relevant sovereign authority would reopen negotiations with China on the boundary.

The 2013 agreement, by contrast, established a continuing system for managing the already demarcated boundary, including provisions for dealing with boundary markers and cross-border infrastructure. The agreement says that if a marker cannot be restored at its original location, the joint commission can determine another suitable location, provided the boundary line itself is not altered.

India, which disputes the validity of the 1963 agreement and regards the territory covered by it as part of Occupied Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, rejected the new mechanism.

“We have seen reports in this regard. Our position on this matter is clear and consistent. There is no boundary between Pakistan and China. We reject the so-called Joint Commission, which is without any legal basis,” Ind­ian Foreign Ministry spokesman Randhir Jaiswal said.

For Pakistan and China, however, the commission provides a new institutional arrangement for managing their border relationship and dealing with practical issues that have emerged since the 2013 agreement, while leaving the broader territorial positions of the parties unchanged.

Published in Dawn, September 17th, 2026

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Pakistan’s armed forces have frequently attracted international attention, sometimes for their military performance and sometimes because of controversies surrounding their domestic influence and use of national resources. Those political debates are important, but they are not the subject of this article. The purpose here is to examine a different question: can Pakistan transform the capabilities accumulated by its Army, Navy, Air Force and defense-industrial institutions into a powerful source of strategic influence, exports and foreign exchange?
Pakistan possesses one of the developing world’s most extensive military ecosystems. It includes experienced personnel, military academies, defense manufacturers, aviation and shipbuilding facilities, research organizations, and an expanding base of expertise in missiles, radar, electronic warfare and unmanned systems. Properly governed and commercially developed, this ecosystem could become an important pillar of Pakistan’s economy.
Pakistan already exports textiles, sporting goods, surgical instruments, rice and other traditional products. These industries remain essential, but many operate in highly competitive markets with narrow profit margins. Defense and aerospace products belong to a different category. They are technologically sophisticated, command higher prices and generate continuing revenue through maintenance, training, spare parts and modernization contracts. A successful defense sale can create economic activity lasting decades.
The JF-17 Thunder combat aircraft is Pakistan’s most visible defense product. Jointly developed with China, it demonstrates Pakistan’s ability to manufacture, assemble, maintain and modernize an advanced aviation platform. It offers countries with limited budgets a multirole aircraft supported by training, simulators, maintenance facilities and weapons-integration options.
Pakistan Aeronautical Complex can build on this achievement by becoming a regional center for aircraft maintenance, component production and technical training. Many developing countries cannot afford the cost or political conditions attached to the most advanced Western aircraft. Pakistan can serve part of this market with affordable systems, provided that it delivers consistent quality, transparent contracts and reliable after-sales support.
Land systems provide another significant opportunity. Pakistani industries manufacture or maintain tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, small arms, ammunition, communications equipment and specialized military vehicles. The Al-Khalid tank demonstrates the country’s ability to integrate complex armored-platform technologies. Export packages can combine equipment with crew instruction, maintenance training, spare parts and upgrades tailored to each customer.
The maritime sector should receive equal attention. Pakistan’s naval institutions have experience in shipbuilding, vessel maintenance, maritime surveillance and coastal defense. Karachi Shipyard and associated organizations can pursue markets for patrol vessels, auxiliary ships, fast-attack craft and support services. Many developing states require affordable platforms to protect their ports, fisheries, sea lanes and exclusive economic zones.
Drones may offer the greatest potential for future growth. Modern armed forces need unmanned systems for surveillance, border monitoring, communications, logistics and, where legally authorized, combat operations. Pakistan has experience developing and operating several classes of unmanned aircraft. It should cultivate a connected industry involving universities, private technology companies and state institutions. Sensors, secure communications, navigation, artificial intelligence, electronic protection and counter-drone systems can all become valuable exports.
The most strategically important dimension of Pakistan’s military power, however, is its nuclear deterrent. Pakistan is the only Muslim-majority country possessing nuclear weapons. That capability was developed primarily to deter existential aggression against Pakistan, but its significance now extends beyond South Asia.
This strategic weight must not be confused with the commercial sale or transfer of nuclear weapons, materials or sensitive technology. Pakistan’s nuclear capability is not an ordinary export commodity. Its potential value lies instead in extended deterrence: the possibility that Pakistan’s strategic strength could reinforce collective-defense commitments and discourage a major attack upon its closest partners.
This question has become particularly important in the Middle East, where Israel maintains a longstanding policy of nuclear ambiguity and is widely understood to possess nuclear weapons. Middle Eastern states confronted by severe regional instability naturally seek credible protection against existential threats. Pakistan’s deterrent gives it a special position in such discussions—not as a promoter of nuclear war, but as a possible counterbalancing power intended to prevent one.
Pakistan could therefore develop an extended-deterrence doctrine under strict national command and control. Such a doctrine would make clear that its purpose is to prevent existential aggression, not facilitate adventurism or provide a license for offensive war. It would involve no transfer of nuclear weapons and no surrender of Pakistan’s decision-making authority. Any strategic response would remain subject to Pakistan’s sovereign leadership, rigorous safeguards and the gravest possible threshold.
This protective role could strengthen wider economic and defense relationships. Countries benefiting from credible security cooperation are more likely to enter long-term arrangements for conventional weapons, air and missile defense, joint exercises, intelligence coordination, maintenance services and military training. Strategic deterrence would consequently serve as an umbrella beneath which lawful conventional-defense partnerships and industrial cooperation could grow.
Pakistan’s most immediately exportable military asset may still be its human capital. Its armed forces have accumulated experience in conventional operations, counterterrorism, mountain warfare, aviation, maritime security, engineering, logistics, disaster relief and peacekeeping. Pakistani personnel have served extensively in United Nations missions. Military academies and specialist schools can translate this experience into structured programs for partner countries.
Foreign officers already attend Pakistani institutions, but professional military education could be expanded into a coordinated service-export sector. Courses could cover staff planning, pilot instruction, naval operations, cybersecurity, military medicine, engineering and peacekeeping. Mobile training teams and advisory missions could supplement instruction delivered inside Pakistan.
The economic benefits would extend far beyond the armed forces. Defense production supports engineers, technicians, software developers and skilled industrial workers. It can stimulate metallurgy, electronics, telecommunications, precision machining, aviation services and advanced materials. Military technologies can also generate civilian applications in transportation, agriculture, emergency response and communications.
Success will require dependable quality, punctual delivery, warranties, documentation, intellectual-property protection and continuing customer support. Pakistan also needs transparent civilian laws, parliamentary oversight, end-user safeguards and anti-corruption standards. Weapons must not be supplied where there is a serious risk of unlawful aggression, terrorism or abuse against civilians.
Private companies and universities should be integrated into this national enterprise. A productive defense economy should generate civilian innovation and employment rather than remain a closed commercial domain. Its earnings should help finance education, research, infrastructure and broader industrial development.
Pakistan therefore has an opportunity to build something greater than a conventional arms-export business. It can offer a layered security ecosystem comprising strategic deterrence, combat aircraft, land systems, maritime platforms, drones, maintenance, training and joint production. Its nuclear capability can provide a defensive counterbalance at the highest level, while conventional exports and professional services address the practical requirements of partner states.
If managed responsibly, Pakistan’s military ecosystem can protect the country, reinforce the lawful defense of its allies and become a formidable foreign-exchange engine. Its governing principle must remain unambiguous: strength exists to deter aggression and preserve peace, with force reserved for the last resort when Pakistan or an ally confronts a genuine existential threat.