Pakistan News
Balochistan govt warns BNP-M to limit march to Quetta’s Sariab Road or face legal action
Balochistan government spokesperson Shahid Rind on Saturday offered the Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNP-M) to march till Quetta’s Shahwani Stadium on Sariab Road and warned the party of action if the city’s Red Zone is breached.
The BNP-M had announced a “long march” from Wadh to Quetta last Friday to protest against the arrests of Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) leaders and activists, including Dr Mahrang Baloch and Sammi Deen Baloch, as well as the police crackdown on their sit-in in Quetta. Sammi was released on Tuesday.
The BNP-M sit-in has entered its ninth day today. On Thursday in Mastung, party chief Sardar Akhtar Mengal announced three demands during its protest against the recent arrests of rights activists. Mengal stated the demands: “Either release all prisoners of the BYC, including women, or then let us march on to Quetta, where we can hold a peaceful sit-in there. Or then arrest us.
Rind, while addressing a press conference in Quetta, said: “The provincial government held a dialogue and proposed that BNP-M will be allowed till Shawani Stadium [on] Sariab Road, but they did not agree and wanted to hold the demonstration in the Red Zone. However, the government will not accept that.”
He added that peaceful protest is a right, but the specifics of where and for how long the protest will be held are for the district administration to determine.
“They have announced bringing the march to Quetta, and they should know that Section 144 has already been declared, and if it will be violated, then the law will take its course,” Rind continued.
While answering a question regarding how the government would enforce its decision, he responded: “No permission will be given to hold the Red Zone and government functionaries hostage.”
He also claimed that the platform of a registered political party was used for anti-state speeches in reference to the BNP-M, adding that appropriate legal action has been initiated.
“On the remarks made against the Balochistan government by [Akhtar] Mengal yesterday, the government reserves the right and capacity to respond but Balochistan Chief Minister Sarfraz Bugti had directed from day one that no such remarks should be made that would derail this political process, and hence this is not the moment to respond,” Rind said.
On the topic of negotiations with the BNP-M, he added that two rounds of negotiations have taken place with the party, and apart from them, the Balochistan CM has talked to Dr Abdul Malik Baloch, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl and the Balochistan Awami Party and developed a political consensus.
“[Akhtar] Mengal claimed that the negotiation committee was without authority, so they were given authority, and they [BNP] had three demands that were the release of Mahrang and BYC leadership and our stance was clear that if courts provide relief, the government would not object,” Rind stated.
https://www.dawn.com/news/card/1901966
On Thursday, Mengal said the government’s delegation had asked for more time for consultation after the second round of talks. “The deadlock persists despite two more days being sought for consultation, which ends tonight.”
He added: “If all prisoners, including women, are not released, we will march towards Quetta.”
BNP-M central leader and former senator Sanaullah Baloch had told Dawn.com that all national highways were closed due to government incompetence.
“The BNP has held its sit-in on one side of the Mastung National Highway. However, the government has closed all major and minor highways leading to Quetta, including the Lakpass Tunnel, Mastung, and Kolpur.
Quetta’s land connection with 12 other districts in Balochistan has been cut off for the past nine days due to the closure of highways, including the Quetta-Karachi National Highway, as the administration has dug ditches on Lakpass and the surrounding highways.
Taken From Dawn News
Pakistan News
Balochistan Stands Firm Against Terror Security Forces Crush Coordinated Militant Assault
ISPR, Rawalpindi
On 31 January 2026, terrorists of Indian sponsored Fitna al Hindustan attempted to disturb peace of Balochistan by conducting multiple terrorist activities around Quetta, Mastung, Nushki, Dalbandin, Kharan, Panjgur, Tump, Gwadar and Pasni.
On behest of their foreign masters, these cowardly acts of terrorism were aimed at disrupting the lives of local populace and development of Balochistan by targeting innocent civilians in District Gwadar and Kharan, wherein, terrorists maliciously targeted eighteen innocent civilians (including women, children, elderly and labours) who embraced Shahadat.
Security Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies being fully alert immediately responded and successfully thwarted the evil design of terrorists displaying unwavering courage and professional excellence. Our valiant troops carried out engagement of terrorists with precision and after prolong, intense and daring clearance operation across Balochistan, sent ninety two terrorists including three suicide bombers to hell, ensuring security and protection of local populace.
Tragically, during clearance operations and intense standoffs, fifteen brave sons of soil, having fought gallantly, made the ultimate sacrifice and embraced shahadat.
Sanitization operations in these areas are being continuously conducted and the instigators, perpetrators, facilitators and abettors of these heinous and cowardly acts, targeting innocent civilians and Law Enforcement Agencies personals, will be brought to Justice.
Intelligence reports have unequivocally confirmed that the attacks were orchestrated and directed by terrorists ring leaders operating from outside Pakistan, who were in direct
communication with the terrorists throughout the incident.
Earlier on 30 January, forty one terrorists of Fitna al Hindustan and Fitna al Khwarij were killed in Panjgur and Harnai. With these successful operations in last two days, the total number of terrorists killed in the ongoing operations in Balochistan has reached one hundred and thirty three.
Sanitization operations are being conducted to eliminate any other Indian sponsored terrorist found in the area. Relentless Counter Terrorism campaign under vision “Azm e Istehkam” (as approved by Federal Apex Committee on National Action Plan) by Security Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies of Pakistan will continue at full pace to wipe out menace of foreign sponsored and supported terrorism from the country.
Pakistan News
Pakistan’s Choices as Iran Faces a New Encirclement
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Pakistan steered its ship with admirable composure during the “twelve-day war,” which began with Israel–U.S. strikes on Iranian military and nuclear-linked targets in mid-June 2025 and escalated into sustained exchanges that lasted nearly two weeks, ending with a ceasefire around June 24. What made those twelve days unforgettable was not only the intensity, but the symbolism: Iran’s missile and drone barrages repeatedly penetrated Israeli airspace, challenging the psychological aura surrounding Israel’s multi-layered defense architecture—systems such as Iron Dome and David’s Sling that the world had come to view as near-absolute protection.
During that first phase, Tehran discovered that many relationships celebrated in peacetime become conditional in wartime. India—despite years of strategic engagement with Iran and the economic logic of connectivity projects designed to reach Central Asia—did not step forward in a manner Tehran expected. For Iranian observers, this was not merely silence; it felt like calculated distance, shaped by India’s wider strategic alignments and its concern that any global momentum toward a Palestinian two-state framework could echo into renewed international scrutiny of Kashmir. The war thus exposed not only military fault lines, but diplomatic ones, revealing how quickly geopolitics can reorder loyalties when the costs of association rise.
Pakistan, in that first phase, stood out as a notable exception. Islamabad’s political and diplomatic signaling leaned toward defending Iran’s sovereignty and opposing external aggression, a posture framed by regional media as meaningful support and a source of goodwill. Pakistan appeared willing to risk diplomatic discomfort to stand with a neighbor under direct attack, reinforcing a narrative of fraternal ties rooted in geography, culture, and shared historical memory. That moment, however, belonged to a specific kind of conflict—short, explosive, and bounded by the logic of rapid escalation and de-escalation.
The second phase is of a different character altogether. On January 23, 2026, President Donald Trump publicly confirmed that a U.S. armada was moving toward the Middle East, with major naval assets shifting into the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean as Washington framed the deployment around Iran’s internal unrest and the regime’s response to protests. This was not the sudden blaze of a twelve-day exchange; it was the slow, visible architecture of pressure—presence, signaling, and endurance.
In this new moment, Pakistan’s dilemma sharpens. The cost of being misunderstood becomes higher, the penalties of miscalculation more enduring. Islamabad must now decide how to protect its neighborhood, its economy, and its strategic credibility without turning itself into a battlefield, a base, or a bargaining chip in a contest far larger than any single state.
This complexity is deepened by Pakistan’s Middle East relationships. Beyond Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s economic and financial space has long been underpinned by Gulf cooperation through investment flows, energy arrangements, and vast remittance networks tied to Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Yet this support exists within a regional context where many Gulf states view Iran not only as a strategic competitor but also as a religious and political rival, accusing Tehran of deepening sectarian divides and projecting influence through proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Palestine. In this environment, overt Pakistani alignment with Iran would be more likely to unsettle Gulf capitals than reassure them, potentially narrowing Pakistan’s economic and diplomatic room for maneuver.
Against this backdrop, Pakistan’s first choice is open support for Iran—diplomatic, material, and, if forced by circumstances, kinetic. The appeal lies in moral clarity and neighborhood logic. Iran is a neighbor whose stability directly affects Pakistan’s western frontier, border security, and internal cohesion. Open support would reassure Tehran that it is not alone again, strengthening long-term trust and potentially discouraging any future strategic drift that could expose Pakistan’s flank. The cost, however, is immediate and tangible. Visible alignment against Washington risks economic retaliation, pressure through international financial channels, and political isolation in forums where U.S. influence remains decisive, while also unsettling Gulf partners who see Iran through a lens of rivalry rather than fraternity.
The second choice is alignment with the United States and Israel—offering cooperation that could include intelligence sharing, logistical facilitation, or strategic access. This path promises short-term diplomatic favor and potential financial relief, but it is the most combustible domestically and regionally. It would inflame public sentiment, sharpen sectarian and political tensions, and almost certainly provoke Iranian hostility in ways that could destabilize Pakistan’s western borderlands. The strategic blowback could be generational, recasting Pakistan’s image across the Muslim world and entangling it in a conflict whose objectives and endgame are not of its own making.
The third choice is declared neutrality. Pakistan would step back, deny its soil and airspace for conflict, and consistently call for de-escalation. The advantage is immediate insulation. Neutrality reduces the risk of becoming a direct target and preserves working channels with all parties. Yet neutrality in a pressure campaign can become a quiet punishment. Iran may still feel abandoned and revise its trust calculus. Washington may interpret restraint as passive resistance and still apply economic pressure. India could frame Pakistan as irrelevant or opportunistic while consolidating its own partnerships. Neutrality can be a shield, but it can also become an empty space others fill with their own narratives.
The fourth choice is calibrated dual-track strategy. Pakistan avoids loud, provocative rhetoric that triggers U.S. retaliation while quietly extending the maximum permissible support to Iran behind the curtain of diplomacy. This is survival statecraft in a world where economies can be choked without a single missile launched. The advantage is strategic breathing room: Pakistan preserves its financial and diplomatic channels while preventing Iran from feeling strategically orphaned. The risk is fragility. If exposed, secrecy can produce the worst of both worlds—U.S. anger without the protection of honesty and Iranian disappointment if the help appears too cautious or insufficient.
The fifth choice is multilateral internationalization—pushing the crisis into formal global forums such as the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and ad hoc contact groups involving China, Russia, Turkey, and key European states. Instead of positioning itself as a bilateral actor between Tehran and Washington, Pakistan frames itself as a convener and agenda-setter, shifting the burden of mediation, legitimacy, and pressure onto a wider coalition. The advantage is dilution of risk. Decisions and outcomes no longer rest on Pakistan’s shoulders alone, and the crisis is embedded in a global framework that makes unilateral escalation politically costlier. The downside is loss of speed and influence. Multilateral processes are slow, consensus-driven, and often shaped by great-power rivalries that can stall momentum at the very moments when urgency is greatest.
These five paths do not exist in isolation; they overlap, collide, and constrain one another. Pakistan cannot fully embrace one without partially touching the others. Open support for Iran strains Gulf and Western ties. Alignment with Washington risks regional backlash. Neutrality invites suspicion from all sides. Dual-track strategy demands discipline and secrecy. Multilateralization trades immediacy for legitimacy. The art of statecraft lies not in choosing a single lane, but in sequencing these options in a way that preserves room to maneuver as circumstances evolve.
The most sustainable course for Pakistan lies in a disciplined blend of the fourth and fifth choices, anchored by the language of the third. Declared neutrality in public posture provides a shield against direct retaliation. Active, quiet stabilization with Iran preserves neighborly trust and reduces the risk of border spillover, refugee flows, and proxy escalation. Multilateral engagement internationalizes the crisis, embedding it in legal and diplomatic frameworks that slow the march toward unilateral coercion. At the same time, Pakistan must maintain cordial, pragmatic, and economically constructive relations with Washington, carefully calibrating its actions and rhetoric to avoid triggering sanctions or financial pressures that could further strain an already fragile economic landscape.
The twelve-day war proved that old myths can break and that “friends” can vanish when bombs fall. The January 23 mobilization proves something else: pressure campaigns are built to last, and nations survive them through balance, not bravado. Pakistan’s victory will not be found in loud slogans or reckless entanglement. It will be measured in its ability to protect its economy, preserve its Gulf lifelines, prevent western-border chaos, stand close enough to Iran to preserve brotherhood, far enough from provocation to deny adversaries a pretext for retaliation, and engaged enough with the world to ensure that when the region’s future is negotiated, Pakistan is not merely present, but heard.
Pakistan News
Ambassador Mumtaz Zahra Baloch addressed the Association of Pakistani Francophone Professionals
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY):- Ambassador of Pakistan Madam Mumtaz Zahra Baloch addressed the Association of Pakistani Francophone Professionals at an event held at the Embassy of Pakistan in Paris, France.
Speaking on the occasion, the Ambassador outlined the multifaceted relations between Pakistan and France and the wider francophone world. She stated that while Governments create frameworks and agreements, it is the people professionals, academics, entrepreneurs, and civil society leaders, who give life to bilateral relationships between countries.
Ambassador appreciated the work of PPRF and its contribution in promoting professional networking and cultural exchanges between the Francophone Pakistanis and the French society and thus strengthening people-to-people links between Pakistan and France.
-
Europe News11 months agoChaos and unproven theories surround Tates’ release from Romania
-
American News11 months agoTrump Expels Zelensky from the White House
-
American News11 months agoTrump expands exemptions from Canada and Mexico tariffs
-
American News11 months agoZelensky bruised but upbeat after diplomatic whirlwind
-
Art & Culture11 months agoThe Indian film showing the bride’s ‘humiliation’ in arranged marriage
-
Art & Culture11 months agoInternational Agriculture Exhibition held in Paris
-
Pakistan News7 months agoComprehensive Analysis Report-The Faranian National Conference on Maritime Affairs-By Kashif Firaz Ahmed
-
Politics11 months agoUS cuts send South Africa’s HIV treatment ‘off a cliff’
