Pakistan News
Pakistan and Afghanistan: From Tensions to Trust?
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : When Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Taliban’s acting foreign minister, arrived in New Delhi in October 2025, his message to Pakistan resonated with both challenge and invitation. Speaking in Urdu at moments—an echo of time spent within Pakistani linguistic and cultural space—he proclaimed that Afghanistan seeks peaceful ties with all neighbors but would not accept interference. He claimed the Taliban regime had cleansed its soil of terror groups and demanded Pakistan reciprocate. Behind his words lay the centuries-deep entanglement of Pakistan and Afghanistan: geography, religion, culture, trade, and social contact all wound together.
Yet Islamabad heard not conciliation alone, but a rebuke. For years, Pakistani security forces and civilians have paid a steep cost to militant violence, particularly from the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In 2023 alone, nearly 1,000 Pakistanis were killed in terrorist attacks, including security personnel, police, and civilians. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, ACLED recorded 754 and 416 security-incidents respectively in 2023. The TTP’s attacks have surged, tripling between 2021 and 2023. In 2024, militant bombings and gun attacks claimed over 1,600 lives—both civilians and uniformed personnel.
These are not remote skirmishes: even within provincial capitals and main arteries, attacks persist. In January 2023, a suicide bomber struck the Peshawar Police Lines mosque, killing 84 people and wounding 217 during congregational prayers at a high-security compound. In February, militants attacked a Karachi police station, killing four and wounding 14. In March, an IED blast at a Saddar police station in Lakki Marwat killed four policemen, including a Deputy Superintendent. In May 2023, a suicide bombing targeting a security checkpoint in North Waziristan killed four (including two soldiers).
In response, Pakistan’s military has struck hard. In September 2025, raids near the Afghan border killed 12 soldiers and 35 militants. In October 2025, Pakistan claimed to have eliminated 30 militants responsible for an ambush killing 11 soldiers. A recent “sanitisation” operation in Orakzai (KP) left 11 soldiers and 19 militants dead. In Bajaur, Operation Sarbakaf reportedly cost 12 security personnel and eliminated 145 militants. (This figure is claimed in Pakistani press reporting.)
Thus, what was once presumed fraternal kinship becomes a strangling war of where theology, ideology, and authority diverge. Pakistani Taliban fighters—many Pashtun, many local—are killed as enemies; Pakistan’s security forces and civilians are slain as victims of insurgency. The same soil sees brothers on opposite sides, dying for rival claims of divine sanction.
This perpetual mutual bloodletting underscores the futility of purely kinetic solutions. Both sides claim legitimacy: Pakistan through constitutional and institutional authority; the Taliban through scriptural and revolutionary legitimacy. Neither accepts the other’s claim, and so reconciliation becomes a chimera. Yet if one could shift from exclusivity to cooperation, from confrontation to construction, that cycle might be broken. A shift toward shared infrastructure, trade, civil institutions, and education holds the power to cancel out destructive divergence.
In this regard, China offers a potent model. Unlike the United States’ pattern of military intervention, regime change attempts, and kinetic intrusion, China’s long game has been investment, noninterference, and resource diplomacy. Instead of toppling governments, Beijing builds roads, structures, mines, and connectivity. Its approach in Afghanistan underscores this philosophy.
China’s engagement with the Taliban regime is growing, although not without constraints. It continues to insist on noninterference in Afghan domestic politics, preferring to negotiate trade, investment, mining rights, and connectivity rather than dictate internal governance. Beijing has offered tariff-free access to Chinese markets for Afghan goods. It has negotiated BRI/China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) integration with Afghan alignment. In January 2023, a $540 million contract was agreed for oil extraction in the Amu Darya basin, in partnership with a Chinese firm (CAPEIC). China openly discusses mining of rare earths, copper, lithium—strategic minerals vital to modern industry.
By contrast, U.S. interventions often came with regime change doctrine, drone strikes, “nation-building” campaigns, and military bases on foreign soil. Such methods provoke backlash, resentment, proxy insurgencies, and dependency. China’s hands-off posture—sovereign engagement rather than regime dominance—has thus gained deeper traction among regimes suspicious of Western coercion. Pakistan itself has benefited from Chinese nonassertive but persistent infrastructure investment under CPEC, turning strategic roads, energy, and ports into national assets rather than zones of domination.
Pakistan could draw lessons from China’s approach in this theatre. It could ease off dictating ideology and instead channel its strength into bridging—building trade corridors, supporting Afghan industrial zones, aiding civil institutions, promoting educational exchange, and partnering in mineral processing. If Afghanistan’s economy, transport, natural resource sectors, and human capital become intimately tied to Pakistan, Kabul’s tolerance for hosting anti-Pakistan militants would decline. Islamabad could then shift from enforcing security to shaping stakes.
Within this framework, the conciliatory elements in Muttaqi’s New Delhi address carry fresh potential. His invocation of mutual respect, shared history, and noninterference could become the basis for a Pakistan-Afghanistan partnership, rather than grudging recrimination. But Pakistan’s swift diplomatic rebuke—warning Kabul against interference in its internal affairs—missed the chance to lay the foundation for constructive engagement.
To move forward, Islamabad must integrate three strategic pillars: security, economics, and narrative. Security cannot be abandoned—but kinetic force must be complemented with institutional channels for dialogue, track II diplomacy, and mechanisms to separate hardline factions from moderate elements. Economy cannot be constrained by suspicion—Pakistan must initiate cross-border trade, joint investment in mining and infrastructure, transit corridors, and cross-training in governance. And narrative cannot be dominated by zero-sum theological certitude—it must shift toward shared destiny, mutual elevation, and overlapping interests.
Absent such a pivot, the consequences are grim. Pakistani soldiers, militants, and civilians will continue to bleed. Families will remain fractured. The border will stay a trench of ideology and death. But if Pakistan can adopt a China-style posture—noninterference, investment, cooperation—the negative torque of theological divergence can be neutralized. Two neighbors, bound by history and faith, might then lean not toward perpetual war, but toward a future of shared prosperity and peace.
Pakistan News
Strategic Siege: Is Pakistan Being Surrounded
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Geopolitics has never been governed by sentiment. Not religion, not shared history, not cultural brotherhood—only interests. The unfolding realignments across South Asia and the Middle East illustrate this truth with striking clarity. Alliances are shifting, rivalries are recalibrating, and Pakistan finds itself increasingly positioned at the intersection of competing strategic designs.
The roots of today’s complexity stretch back to 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Pakistan became the frontline state in a U.S.-backed campaign to counter Moscow. Billions of dollars in American and Saudi assistance flowed through intelligence networks to arm and train Afghan fighters. The mobilization of religious ideology was not incidental—it was strategic. Fighters from across the Muslim world converged in Afghanistan. By 1989, the Soviet withdrawal marked a Cold War victory for Washington and its partners.
But militant infrastructures rarely dissolve once their immediate utility ends. The Taliban emerged in the 1990s from the ashes of war, establishing control over Kabul in 1996. Pakistan was among the few nations to recognize their regime. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, however, the same Taliban became the primary target of American military intervention. The subsequent 20-year war cost over $2 trillion and claimed more than 170,000 lives before the U.S. withdrawal in August 2021.
The Taliban’s return to power reshaped the region yet again. Instead of ushering in stability for Pakistan, however, cross-border militancy intensified. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), operating from Afghan soil, escalated attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Islamabad responded with cross-border airstrikes against militant sanctuaries. While tactically decisive, these actions strained relations with Kabul and risked civilian backlash.
Instead, Pakistan with its deep intelligence roots in Afghanistan, had the option to adopt the same tactics which Afghanistan is using by infiltrating Pakistani Taliban in Pakistan and killing innocent people mostly by detonating human bombs in Mosque. This could have been a more discrete way to weed out the menace of TTP. History suggests that purely kinetic responses can produce unintended strategic consequences. Airstrikes may eliminate immediate threats, but they can also deepen mistrust and create diplomatic openings for rival powers.
In geopolitics, tactical victories can sometimes yield strategic setbacks. By intensifying overt military pressure, Islamabad may have inadvertently accelerated Kabul’s search for diversified partnerships.
That diversification is perhaps the most striking development. The Taliban government, ideologically committed to Islamic governance, has increasingly explored diplomatic and economic engagement beyond traditional Islamic partners. India reopened diplomatic channels in Kabul and expanded humanitarian assistance. Israel has pledged billions of dollars of aid to Kabul in alignment with India. This is a profound geopolitical entanglement: an Islamic Emirate seeking expanded engagement with a Hindu-majority India and a Jewish-majority Israel, even as tensions simmer with neighboring Muslim Pakistan.
This underscores a fundamental principle of realpolitik: states pursue survival and leverage, not theological alignment. Religious brotherhood and shared culture matter, but only when they coincide with national interest calculations. Facing economic collapse, frozen reserves, and diplomatic isolation, Kabul seeks diversification. India offers infrastructure and access. Israel offers technological cooperation and strategic outreach. Ideology yields to necessity.
For Pakistan, however, the optics intensify concerns of encirclement. On its eastern border, India remains a strategic competitor, particularly over Kashmir. On its western frontier now stands an Afghanistan willing to engage Islamabad’s rivals. To the southwest lies Iran, itself navigating tense relations with the United States. This evolving geometry fuels perceptions of a tightening strategic ring.
An additional dimension complicates matters further: Bagram Airbase. During the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, Bagram served as the largest American military installation in the country, with dual runways capable of handling heavy aircraft and advanced surveillance platforms. Its geographic location—approximately 500 kilometers from China’s Xinjiang region—made it strategically significant.
U.S. President Donald Trump publicly criticized the abandonment of Bagram in 2021, arguing that retaining the base would have preserved American leverage, particularly in the context of intensifying U.S.-China rivalry. Bagram’s proximity to Central Asia, Iran, and western China positions it as more than a counterterrorism platform—it is a potential springboard in great-power competition.
While direct American military reentry into Afghanistan appears unlikely in the near term, evolving regional alignments could create indirect pathways of influence. The strengthening of India’s presence in Kabul, combined with Israel’s strategic engagement in broader Asian geopolitics, introduces analytical possibilities. Washington maintains deep defense partnerships with both New Delhi and Tel Aviv. If Afghanistan continues diversifying toward these actors, space may gradually reopen for U.S. strategic leverage—without formal troop deployments.
Interestingly, geopolitics often unfolds through indirect channels. For Washington, containing China remains a central strategic priority. For India, Afghanistan offers westward strategic depth. For Israel, expanded regional engagement broadens diplomatic influence. For Kabul, diversified partnerships reduce isolation. For Pakistan, however, these convergences heighten strategic anxiety.
For Israel, extending its engagement with Kabul through India would provide a strategic foothold in South Asia and enhance its capacity to deter Pakistan from aligning with Turkey and Saudi Arabia in any configuration perceived as intimidating to Israel. Such cooperation could be viewed as a counterweight to a potential alignment involving Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and nuclear-armed Pakistan, which some analysts argue might aim to exert strategic pressure or encirclement against Israel.
Simultaneously, the Persian Gulf remains heavily militarized. The U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain deploys advanced naval assets, while Iran has invested in ballistic missiles, drones, and anti-ship systems designed to offset conventional asymmetry. China, importing substantial Gulf energy supplies, and Russia, expanding ties with Tehran, both observe carefully.
Any escalation between Washington and Tehran would reverberate in Pakistan. The country already hosts approximately 1.3 million registered Afghan refugees. A major Iran conflict could trigger further displacement, compounding economic strain amid IMF-backed reforms and domestic political polarization.
Internally, Pakistan faces political turbulence, including debates surrounding the incarceration of former Prime Minister Imran Khan and federal-provincial tensions. External pressure combined with internal division magnifies vulnerability.
Yet one broader truth emerges from this complex web: strategic encirclement is not solely a product of adversarial design. It can also arise from miscalculation, overreliance on hard power, and insufficient diplomatic agility. States that rely exclusively on military tools risk narrowing their strategic options.
This is a defining moment. Great-power rivalry, regional insecurity, and ideological contradictions intersect at fragile fault lines. Afghanistan’s outreach beyond traditional religious alignments demonstrates the primacy of interest over identity. Bagram symbolizes the enduring shadow of great-power competition. India and Israel’s evolving engagement in Kabul reflects the fluidity of modern alliances.
But history offers a sobering lesson. From the Soviet-Afghan war to the U.S. intervention, military campaigns have reshaped borders without resolving deeper grievances. Stability requires not merely deterrence but diplomacy.
Encirclement strategies may promise leverage. Hybrid doctrines may promise precision. Yet sustainable security demands cooperation grounded in mutual recognition of vulnerabilities.
Geopolitics may be ruthless in its calculations, but peace remains the only enduring strategic victory.
Pakistan News
Pakistan and Russia deepen media and diplomatic dialogue ahead of PM Sharif’s visit to Moscow
Monitoring Desk: The Moscow–Islamabad Media Forum will be held on February 27, 2026, to coincide with the official visit of the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif, to Moscow, scheduled for the first week of March 2026.
The forum will serve as a platform for journalists, political experts, and diplomats from Pakistan and Russia to discuss the current state of bilateral relations, explore future opportunities, and analyze how the Russia–Pakistan partnership impacts global politics, the economy, and the contemporary media landscape.
Cooperation between Russia and Pakistan is of particular importance in the context of the transformation of international relations and the formation of a new system of global interaction. In recent years, contacts between the two countries have intensified at inter-parliamentary, expert, and media levels, while practical cooperation in the humanitarian and socio-political spheres continues to expand.
Within the framework of the forum, Russian and Pakistani journalists, political scientists, and representatives of diplomatic circles will discuss the current state and future prospects of bilateral relations, as well as the role of the Russia–Pakistan partnership in political, economic, and information processes shaping the modern world.
The event is timed to coincide with the official visit of the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Shehbaz Sharif, to Moscow from March 3 to 5, 2026.
Admission for media representatives will be granted only through prior accreditation upon presentation of a passport and a valid editorial certificate confirming the journalist’s affiliation with the accredited media organization.
MSPC “Russia Today” reserves the right to refuse accreditation without providing an explanation.
This News is taken from
https://dnd.com.pk/pakistan-and-russia-deepen-media-and-diplomatic-dialogue-ahead-of-pm-sharifs-visit-to-moscow/328726/
Pakistan News
Pakistan launches strikes on Afghanistan, with Taliban saying dozens killed
Pakistan has carried out multiple overnight air strikes on Afghanistan, which the Taliban has said killed and wounded dozens of people, including women and children.
Islamabad said the attacks targeted seven alleged militant camps and hideouts near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and that they had been launched after recent suicide bombings in Pakistan.
Afghanistan condemned the attacks, saying they targeted multiple civilian homes and a religious school.
The fresh strikes come after the two countries agreed to a fragile ceasefire in October following deadly cross-border clashes, though subsequent fighting has taken place.
The Taliban’s defence ministry said the strikes targeted civilian areas of Nangarhar and Paktika provinces.
Officials in Nangarhar told the BBC that the home of a man called Shahabuddin had been hit by one of the strikes, killing about 20 family members, including women and children.
Pakistan’s Ministry of Information and Broadcasting said it had carried out “intelligence based selective targeting of seven terrorist camps and hideouts”.
In a statement on X, it said the targets included members of the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, which the government refers to as “Fitna al Khawarij,” along with their affiliates and the Islamic State-Khorasan Province.
The ministry described the strikes as “a retributive response” to recent suicide bombings in Pakistan by terror groups it said were sheltered by Kabul.
The recent attacks in Pakistan included one on a Shia mosque in the capital Islamabad earlier this month, as well as others that took place since the holy month of Ramadan began this week in the north-western Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.
Pakistan accused the Afghan Taliban of failing to take action against the militants, adding that it had “conclusive evidence” that the attacks were carried out by militants on the instructions of their leadership in Afghanistan.
The Taliban’s defence ministry later posted on X condemning the attacks as a “blatant violation of Afghanistan’s territorial integrity”, adding that they were a “clear breach of international law”.
It warned that “an appropriate and measured response will be taken at a suitable time”, adding that “attacks on civilian targets and religious institutions indicate the failure of Pakistan’s army in intelligence and security.”
The strikes come days after Saudi Arabia mediated the release of three Pakistani soldiers earlier this week, who were captured in Kabul during border clashes last October.
Those clashes ended with a tentative ceasefire that same month after the worst fighting since the Taliban returned to power in 2021.
Pakistan and Afghanistan share a 1,600-mile (2,574 km) mountainous border.
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