Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : For more than half a century, the United States and Israel have been viewed as inseparable strategic partners in the Middle East. Successive American administrations, regardless of party affiliation, generally aligned their regional policies with Israel’s security concerns, often treating the two nations’ interests as largely identical.
Yet the diplomatic developments that followed the recent Iran war suggest that this assumption may no longer hold true. Rather, it is the beginning of something far more consequential: the gradual decoupling of American strategic interests from Israel’s broader regional agenda.
The clearest evidence of this shift is not coming from Tehran or Islamabad. It is coming from within the United States itself. The political shockwave generated by Tucker Carlson’s public break with the Republican Party illustrates a growing debate within conservative America.
Carlson, one of the most influential voices on the American right, declared that he could no longer support a political movement that, in his view, places the interests of a foreign country ahead of those of the United States. Whether one agrees with his conclusion or not, the significance lies in the fact that such criticism is no longer confined to the political fringes. Questions that were once whispered are now being discussed openly among conservatives, libertarians, progressives, and independent voters alike.
The debate intensified following the U.S.-Iran diplomatic initiative that emerged after the war. The architecture of this process is noteworthy. Rather than attempting to solve every dispute at once, the framework creates a pathway for addressing complex issues over time. The objective is not to produce instant solutions but to establish a structure capable of managing disagreements before they escalate into war.
Pakistan’s role in this process has been particularly significant. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s visit to Islamabad on 23rd June underscored the importance Tehran attaches to Pakistan’s mediation efforts. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif reaffirmed Pakistan’s commitment to facilitating dialogue and helping both sides move toward a durable peace. The symbolism was powerful: a regional Muslim power acting as a bridge between Washington and Tehran at a moment when military confrontation seemed inevitable only months earlier.
Yet the most important development may be the evolution of American objectives themselves. For years, Israeli strategic thinking has viewed Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missile capability, drone industry, cyber warfare assets, Revolutionary Guard networks, and relationships with Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis as components of a single threat architecture. From this perspective, lasting security requires not merely preventing nuclear weaponization but substantially weakening Iran’s broader ability to project power throughout the region.
The emerging American position appears different. President Donald Trump has drawn a clear distinction between Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its conventional military capabilities. In remarks that surprised many observers, Trump argued that if neighboring states possess missiles, drones, cyber capabilities, and conventional deterrent forces, it would be difficult to justify denying Iran every means of self-defense.
Interestingly, the MOU is formally bilateral between Washington and Tehran, mediated by Pakistan and Qatar. But its effects reach Israel, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, Gaza, Lebanon, the Strait of Hormuz, and the GCC. None of these actors fully sits at the table. The assumption is simple: America will manage Israel and its Arab allies; Iran will manage Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. If that assumption holds, the deal can reshape the region. If it fails, the Middle East may again slide into fire.
Israel is the elephant in the room. Netanyahu has already signaled that Israel reserves “full freedom of action” in Lebanon, even while Washington tries to stabilize the ceasefire. That statement exposes the central problem: America may want de-escalation, but Israel still wants operational freedom. If Israel refuses to follow Washington’s larger strategy, then the U.S. will have to decide whether it is a superpower or merely Israel’s security subcontractor.
These goals of the USA and Israel are not identical but divergent. This divergence became more visible when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reaffirmed Israel’s determination to maintain operational freedom in Lebanon, even as diplomatic efforts sought to stabilize ceasefire arrangements. While Washington is investing political capital in de-escalation and negotiation, Israel continues to conduct military operations against threats it considers immediate and existential.
The growing gap between these approaches represents the core of the emerging decoupling. The debate surrounding Senator Lindsey Graham, a close associate of Donald Trump and staunch supporter of Israel. Graham openly warned that if the talks failed, which he hoped will, President Trump would seize control of the Strait of Hormuz by force, place the strategic waterway under American control, and charge transit fees on commercial shipping to recover the costs of military operations. He further declared that if Iran resisted such a move, the United States would “obliterate” Iran.
More significantly, Graham linked the success or failure of the negotiations to a broader regional realignment involving the expansion of the Abraham Accords and the normalization of relations between Israel and key Arab states. His comments reflected the traditional strategic school that has dominated Middle East policy debates for decades: maintain maximum pressure, preserve overwhelming military leverage, and keep the option of force constantly on the table.
The implications of Israel’s manipulative ability extend beyond the USA. Across Western democracies and especially in the UK parliament, public debate is intensifying over the role of Israeli influence, its lobbying networks, campaign financing, and the relationship between national interests and alliance commitments. Discussions that once centered exclusively on security concerns now increasingly include questions about accountability, transparency, and whether governments are acting primarily in the interests of their own citizens.
Nevertheless, the direction of travel appears increasingly clear. America is beginning to define its Middle East strategy through the lens of American interests rather than through automatic alignment with the preferences of Israel.
The real story of the current negotiations is therefore larger than Iran, larger than Israel, and larger than any single agreement. It is the story of a superpower rediscovering the distinction between partnership and dependency, between alliance and alignment, between supporting an ally and adopting all of that ally’s objectives as its own.
If that trend continues, historians may one day view post-Iran-war diplomacy not merely as a ceasefire initiative, but as the moment when Washington began charting a more independent course in the Middle East. And that may prove to be the most significant geopolitical shift of all.

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The world is witnessing two sharply different models of power. One is built on guns, wars, sanctions, blockades, occupations, assassinations, regime-change operations and destruction. The other is built on ports, roads, railways, power plants, industrial zones, trade corridors, reconstruction and development. The first model is represented most visibly by the United States and Israel. The second is increasingly associated with China.
History is full of evidence that the American model of global power has often revolved around war. Some wars may have been unavoidable, especially when great powers were pulled into global conflicts such as World War I and World War II. But many others were wars of choice, launched or prolonged to impose American will, reshape regions, control resources, punish governments, or demonstrate military supremacy. Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Iran and now the wider Middle East are all examples where American power has produced extraordinary destruction, displacement and instability.
The financial and human cost of this approach is staggering. World War II cost the United States more than $4 trillion in today’s dollars and caused over 405,000 American military deaths, while the global death toll exceeded 70 million. The American Civil War killed between 620,000 and 750,000 Americans. The Vietnam War cost around $1 trillion and killed more than 58,000 U.S. soldiers, besides millions of Vietnamese. The Korean War cost nearly $389 billion and killed over 36,000 American troops. The post-9/11 wars alone have cost around $8 trillion, according to Brown University’s Costs of War project, while direct violence killed more than 940,000 people and indirect consequences may have caused several million more deaths.
These wars did not merely kill soldiers. They destroyed homes, schools, universities, hospitals, bridges, factories, roads, water systems and entire economies. They triggered mass migrations that reshaped Europe, America and many other host countries, creating new social, cultural, religious and political tensions. The victims were not statistics. They were sons, fathers, mothers, daughters, workers, teachers, doctors, soldiers and civilians whose lives were crushed under the machinery of geopolitics.
Israel has acted as a miniature version of this same model in the Middle East. It has lived in permanent conflict with its neighbors and has repeatedly used overwhelming military force in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iran and beyond. Its doctrine of retaliation is often grossly disproportionate: one rocket, one soldier, or one security incident is used to justify the destruction of entire apartment blocks, neighborhoods and civilian infrastructure. Gaza has been reduced to rubble. Lebanon has been repeatedly bombed. Iran has been targeted through airstrikes, sabotage and assassinations. The West Bank is being swallowed through occupation, settlements and military domination.
Even more dangerous is the growing use of civilian technology for military and assassination purposes. Phones, cameras, digital platforms, satellites, navigation systems and commercial data can be turned into tools of tracking, targeting and killing. When such technologies are used to assassinate officials, scientists, commanders or political figures across borders, it violates not only sovereignty but also the basic principles of international law and humanitarian conduct.
The recent war involving Iran, Israel and the United States has again exposed this destructive logic. According to the timeline reported by the Center for Preventive Action and several media outlets cited in that record, the conflict included U.S. strikes, Iranian retaliation, Israeli attacks in Lebanon and Iran, disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, damage to infrastructure, and serious questions over implementation of a U.S.-Iran framework agreement. By mid-June 2026, reports suggested a preliminary agreement that included a sixty-day cessation of hostilities, reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, phased sanctions relief, possible release of frozen Iranian assets, and a reported $300 billion private investment fund for Iran, with more than half already committed.
This is where the contrast becomes most striking. The countries that bombed, sanctioned, blockaded, occupied and destroyed are reluctant to pay for reconstruction. According to reported statements, the United States does not want to spend its own dollars rebuilding Iran, even though its military role contributed directly to the destruction. Instead, Washington wants other countries and private capital to finance recovery. This is the old imperial pattern: destroy with public military power, then outsource reconstruction to others.
China, by contrast, has stepped forward with a different language. Beijing has expressed sadness over the destruction in Iran and Lebanon and indicated willingness to participate in recovery and reconstruction. Even if the exact financial amount is not yet fully defined, the symbolism is powerful. While others dropped bombs, China offered to rebuild. While others destroyed roads, bridges, power stations and cities, China speaks of reconstruction, livelihood restoration and development.
This is not an isolated gesture. It fits China’s broader global strategy. The Belt and Road Initiative has become one of the largest development and connectivity programs in modern history. Its cumulative global financial engagement has reportedly reached around $1.399 trillion, including roughly $837 billion in construction contracts and $561 billion in non-financial corporate investments. Around 150 countries have joined the BRI through agreements with Beijing. In 2025 alone, BRI engagement reportedly reached $213.5 billion across hundreds of deals.
The economic impact is immense. Trade between China and BRI partner countries has reached nearly $19.1 trillion over the decade. BRI countries now account for roughly half of China’s exports and more than half of its imports. The initiative has financed roads, ports, railways, power plants, industrial parks, mining projects, renewable energy, digital networks and manufacturing facilities. In 2025 alone, reported BRI activity included $93.9 billion in energy, $32.6 billion in mining and metals, and $28.7 billion in technology and manufacturing.
Pakistan is one of the clearest examples. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, officially launched in 2015, became the flagship project of the BRI. Its first phase was initially valued at $46 billion and later expanded to about $62 billion. Around $33 billion was directed toward energy projects, including coal, solar and transmission infrastructure. About $11 billion went into transport infrastructure, including road modernization and strategic connectivity. Other funds supported Gwadar, urban transport, industrial development and communications.
The results are visible. Pakistan, once crippled by energy shortages, added thousands of megawatts of electricity generation capacity. Projects such as the Port Qasim Coal Power Project, Quaid-e-Azam Solar Power Park, Orange Line Metro Train in Lahore, road networks, Gwadar development and transmission lines changed the country’s infrastructure landscape. Around $25 billion has reportedly already been executed across dozens of completed or operational ventures. CPEC Phase II now aims to move beyond roads and energy into industrialization, agriculture modernization, special economic zones, mining, IT, research, corporate farming, small and medium enterprises and export-led growth.
This is how China projects power: by creating dependencies, yes, but also by creating assets. A road remains after the ceremony ends. A power plant keeps producing electricity. A port creates jobs. A railway connects markets. An industrial zone gives people work. A reconstructed bridge restores life. Whether one supports or criticizes Chinese policy, its method of influence is fundamentally different from the method of bombs and blockades.
The lesson for the developing world is clear. A country may be destroyed by military might, but a nation cannot be won by destruction. Fear can silence people temporarily, but respect is earned by helping them live, work, trade, travel and prosper. The United States and Israel may win battles through firepower, but China is winning influence through infrastructure, investment and reconstruction. In the end, history will not only remember who fired the missiles. It will also remember who rebuilt the bridges.

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Politics is full of surprises, but few developments in recent history have been as dramatic as the transformation of President Donald Trump’s position on Iran. Only months ago, Washington’s rhetoric revolved around maximum pressure, overwhelming force, and the language of unconditional surrender. Iran was portrayed as an adversary that could be subdued through military power and economic strangulation.
Today, the same president is defending a peace agreement with Iran, advocating reconstruction, supporting the return of frozen Iranian assets, criticizing aspects of Israeli military conduct in Lebanon, and warning against actions that could derail the ceasefire he now champions.
The question is obvious: What changed?
How did a leader who once spoke of destroying Iran’s military capabilities become the chief defender of an agreement designed to reintegrate Iran into regional stability? How did the United States move from threats of escalation to discussions of reconstruction and diplomacy? The answer lies in the collision between ideology and reality.
At the outset of the conflict, many in Washington appeared convinced that overwhelming military pressure would quickly force Tehran into submission. Yet as the confrontation unfolded, it became increasingly clear that military victories do not automatically translate into strategic success.
President Trump himself provided clues to this transformation during his remarks at the G7 Summit. Defending the agreement, he openly acknowledged that continuing the war would have imposed catastrophic economic costs on the world economy.
“If we didn’t do this deal,” Trump declared, “we could have dropped more bombs for another three weeks, two years, whatever. But you would never have the Strait of Hormuz open. Your market would go down at levels nobody had ever seen before.” This statement reveals the first and perhaps most important reason for Washington’s change of course: economics.
The prospect of prolonged conflict threatened global energy markets, international trade routes, and investor confidence. Every discussion of peace pushed markets higher. Every hint of escalation drove uncertainty into global commerce. Trump himself repeatedly noted that financial markets reacted positively whenever negotiations appeared likely to succeed. For a president who closely associates economic performance with political success, the message from the markets was impossible to ignore.
The second factor was geopolitical reality. The United States is not Israel. Israel’s strategic focus is naturally centered on its immediate neighborhood. The United States, however, is a global superpower whose interests span every continent. Washington must maintain relationships with Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Muslim world simultaneously.
As the conflict expanded, American policymakers increasingly recognized that unlimited support for military escalation carried substantial diplomatic costs. Relations with Gulf states, broader Muslim-majority countries, and important global partners risked deterioration.
This broader perspective became increasingly evident in Trump’s remarks. Speaking about Lebanon, he departed sharply from traditional rhetoric. “I feel very bad for Lebanon,” Trump said. “It was a great culture. It was an incredible culture. For the last 50 or 60 years they have been living in hell.”
Even more strikingly, he publicly criticized the Israeli approach to Hezbollah, arguing that “when two drones are shot into the desert and dropped harmlessly, you don’t have to knock down buildings in Beirut.” Such comments would have been almost unimaginable from an American president at the beginning of the conflict.
The third factor was the realization that economic warfare and military operations have limits. Trump repeatedly emphasized that the objective of preventing nuclear proliferation had been achieved. He argued that Israel’s greatest security concern was the possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon. His message to Israeli critics was simple: the agreement delivers exactly what Israel has always claimed to want.
Vice President JD Vance reinforced this position even more bluntly. Responding to criticism from members of the Israeli cabinet, Vance stated: “Donald J. Trump is the only head of state in the entire world who is sympathetic to the nation of Israel at this moment in time.” He added a pointed reminder: “Two-thirds of the defensive weapons that have protected Israel have been built by American hands and paid for by American tax dollars.”
Most remarkably, Vance challenged the assumption that military force alone could solve every security challenge. “You can’t just kill your way out of solving every single national security problem that you have,” he said. Those words represent a profound shift in tone from Washington.
For decades, American officials often defended Israeli military actions without publicly questioning the underlying strategy. Vance’s comments suggest growing frustration within the administration regarding what it perceives as the absence of a long-term political solution.
A fourth factor was military sustainability. Wars consume resources at extraordinary rates. Ammunition stockpiles, advanced weapons systems, naval deployments, and logistical support all impose enormous burdens on national budgets. Trump himself highlighted the staggering financial cost of continued operations, noting that hundreds of millions of dollars were being spent in a matter of days. Even the world’s strongest military cannot wage unlimited campaigns without consequences.
The fifth factor was the fear of global economic disruption. Trump repeatedly argued that keeping the Strait of Hormuz open was essential not only for regional stability but also for preventing worldwide economic turmoil. He warned that prolonged conflict could have triggered severe disruptions to shipping, energy supplies, and international trade. At one point he bluntly stated that the world was avoiding a potential economic disaster. Rather than presiding over a global downturn, Trump chose to pursue a settlement that promised lower oil prices, stronger markets, and renewed economic confidence.
Another revealing moment came when Trump addressed the issue of frozen Iranian assets. Historically, American administrations have often treated sanctions and frozen funds as permanent leverage. Yet Trump acknowledged a fundamental principle that surprised many observers. “We have taken their money,” he said. “It’s not our money. It’s their money.” He went even further.”If we didn’t give it back, nobody would ever invest in the dollar again.”
This statement reflects a recognition that America’s financial power ultimately depends on trust in the international system. If foreign governments believe their assets can be permanently confiscated, confidence in that system inevitably erodes.
Perhaps the most significant transformation, however, occurred at the level of strategic vision. As the conflict unfolded, Washington increasingly realized that its interests and Israel’s interests were not always identical. The United States must manage relationships with dozens of nations across the Middle East. It must protect global commerce, preserve alliances, maintain military readiness, and avoid unnecessary economic shocks. Israel’s concerns are immediate and regional. America’s concerns are global. At some point, Washington appears to have concluded that continued escalation served neither American interests nor global stability.
This helps explain why Trump increasingly praised diplomatic efforts involving regional actors, including Pakistan and Qatar. He publicly acknowledged their role in facilitating negotiations and reducing tensions. In doing so, he signaled a broader shift away from confrontation and toward managed coexistence.
None of this means that Trump has become soft on Iran. On the contrary, he repeatedly emphasized that military force remains available if Tehran violates the agreement. His position is not one of surrender but conditional engagement. The difference is that Washington now appears to view diplomacy as the preferred mechanism and military action as the last resort rather than the first.
That is a major transformation. Whether critics describe it as pragmatism, realism, or strategic necessity, the shift is undeniable. The president who once spoke primarily of bombs now speaks of reconstruction. The administration that once emphasized pressure now speaks of investment and economic recovery. The government that once focused exclusively on confrontation now emphasizes stability, trade, and regional normalization.
History will determine whether this policy succeeds. But one conclusion is already clear: faced with the prospect of economic turmoil, diplomatic isolation, and an open-ended conflict, Washington changed course. Trump did not simply negotiate a deal with Iran. He redefined America’s approach to the conflict itself. And in doing so, he may have altered the future trajectory of the Middle East for years to come.