Pakistan News
Does Pakistan Need More Provinces—or a Democratic Reset?
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : The latest restrictions imposed on international journalists in Pakistan have once again exposed a deeper crisis of governance. Under the new guidelines, foreign correspondents and even Pakistani journalists working for international media may require prior government permission before travelling outside a limited number of major cities for reporting assignments. In practical terms, breaking news may now have to wait for administrative approval.
The government describes these measures as an administrative mechanism rather than an attempt to suppress journalism. Critics, however, see them as an effort to control the flow of information, especially from sensitive regions where public unrest, political agitation, security operations or protests may be taking place. International media organizations are often relied upon to provide independent coverage when local journalists face pressure, censorship, intimidation or professional insecurity. Restricting their movement therefore raises serious questions about transparency, accountability and the public’s right to know.
This latest development cannot be viewed in isolation. It is part of a much broader pattern in which civilian institutions have steadily lost their independence and decision-making authority. Over the decades, Pakistan has gradually evolved into a system where the military institution exerts influence far beyond its constitutional responsibility for national defence.
During the tenure of General Pervez Musharraf, the idea of an “umbrella leadership” became deeply embedded in the structure of governance. Under this philosophy, the military was not merely responsible for security. It was expected to guide, supervise or influence almost every important sector, including administration, taxation, infrastructure, economic planning, development, law and order, communications and public policy.
Military officers were placed in civilian departments and assigned responsibilities for which they had not necessarily received professional training. A brigadier or general could be asked to supervise matters involving taxation, public finance, infrastructure, local government or economic development. Such officers naturally depended upon civilian experts for technical advice, yet the civilian officials understood that the final decision rested elsewhere.
As a result, many officers stopped offering independent professional opinions and instead provided advice that they believed would satisfy the expectations of the military leadership.
This arrangement weakened the civilian system from within. Bureaucrats became reluctant to take responsibility. Ministers lost authority. Professional expertise was subordinated to institutional preference. The civilian machinery, which should have been the engine of national growth, administration and public service, became cautious, dependent and increasingly ineffective.
Although Musharraf eventually left power, the culture of military dominance did not disappear. It survived informally and continued to shape national life. The military remained influential in areas including major development projects, public administration, security policy, political management, strategic industries and national economic initiatives.
More seriously, the military establishment has repeatedly been accused of influencing the composition of parliament, the rise and fall of political governments, the selection of prime ministers, the formation of political alliances and the careers of civilian officers.
Whether every allegation is fully accurate or not, the widespread public perception of interference is itself damaging. A political system cannot command confidence when citizens believe that the final authority rests outside parliament.
Civilian governments created under such circumstances remain weak because their survival depends less upon public legitimacy and more upon institutional approval.
Ministers, advisers, bureaucrats and political leaders understand that their continuation in office may be linked to support from powerful quarters. This weakens their willingness to resist pressure, challenge policy or defend civilian authority.
The contradiction becomes obvious during official press conferences. Military spokespersons may initially state that political and administrative matters belong to the civilian domain.
Yet the discussion often moves deeply into politics, governance, economic performance, internal administration and national policy. The military may publicly distance itself from civilian failures while simultaneously remaining heavily influential in the very system that produced those failures.
Pakistan is therefore trapped in a dangerous cycle. Civilian institutions are denied genuine independence, yet they are blamed for poor performance.
Politicians are weakened, but they are blamed for lacking strength. Bureaucrats are prevented from exercising professional authority, but they are blamed for administrative paralysis. The democratic system is not allowed to function freely, yet democracy is blamed for failing.
Against this background, a new narrative is now being promoted: that Pakistan’s problems can be solved by dividing the existing provinces and creating several new administrative units.
Supporters argue that population growth has made the current provincial structure too large and that smaller provinces would bring government closer to the people.
The argument may appear attractive at first glance, but it ignores the real causes of failure. Pakistan already has divisions, districts, tehsils, local administrations, commissioners, deputy commissioners and numerous departments intended to deliver services.
New districts have repeatedly been created. Yet governance has not improved because the central problem is not simply the size of the provinces. It is the collapse of accountability, political legitimacy, institutional independence and democratic authority.
Creating additional provinces would also impose enormous financial costs. Each new province would require a governor, chief minister, cabinet, provincial assembly, secretariat, departments, residences, security arrangements, vehicles, staff and administrative infrastructure. Billions would be spent on buildings and bureaucracies rather than schools, hospitals, clean water, employment, agriculture and local development.
More provinces may also create more political offices to distribute, more budgets to control and more opportunities for institutional manipulation. Instead of empowering the people, such a structure could strengthen centralized control by fragmenting political authority and making regional governments more dependent upon the establishment.
The proposal therefore risks becoming another narcissistic illusion: a belief that by redrawing the map, the system will automatically improve.
But a dysfunctional political order cannot be repaired through geography alone. If the same culture of interference, manipulation, censorship and administrative domination continues, ten provinces will fail just as four provinces have failed.
Pakistan does not primarily need new provincial boundaries. It needs a new democratic understanding.
The solution is to allow the Constitution, parliament, judiciary, media, civil service and elected governments to function independently.
The people must be allowed to choose the representatives they genuinely trust, support and love—leaders whom they believe can rescue the country from its present political, economic and administrative quagmire.
Elections must be held fairly, transparently and without interference. Political parties must be allowed to compete on equal terms. Popular leaders must not be removed through manipulation, coercion or manufactured political engineering. Governments must rise and fall through the ballot box, not through decisions made behind closed doors.
The army must return fully to its constitutional responsibility of defending the country. It should remain respected, professional and powerful within its legitimate domain, but it should not determine who governs, who enters parliament, who becomes prime minister, which political party survives or which civilian officer receives promotion.
Pakistan’s people are not incapable of choosing their leaders. They have repeatedly demonstrated political awareness, courage and commitment. What they require is not guardianship but freedom. They must be trusted to make their own decisions and, when necessary, correct those decisions through future elections.
Breaking the provinces will not heal Pakistan. Breaking the cycle of interference will.
The country can move toward progress and prosperity only when authority flows from the people, when institutions remain within constitutional limits and when elected representatives are allowed to govern without fear or external control.
Pakistan’s map does not need to be repeatedly redrawn. Its democratic contract needs to be restored. The real reset is not administrative fragmentation. The real reset is free elections, civilian supremacy, constitutional governance, press freedom and the unconditional right of the people to choose their own future.
KHYBER Pakhtunkhwa is on edge again, and not just for the deteriorating security and volatility in the south, which has been bad for quite some time now.
It is the provincial government’s avowed single-point agenda to secure its party’s chairman’s freedom from Adiala jail, or at the very least, get him some relief like shifting him to a private hospital in Islamabad.
But days before ‘D-Day’, i.e. Sept 27, one cannot help but be struck by an overwhelming sense of déjà vu: this is November 2024 all over again, albeit with some changes to the cast.
Ali Amin Gandapur, the chief minister at the time, who led the long march to D-Chowk, lost the job during his second year in office, allowing a young and relatively inexperienced Sohail Afridi to take up the mantle.
One year into his term, the 37-year-old CM Afridi is now playing his biggest political gambit since his foray into politics as a student activist of the PTI’s student wing.
There is another change to the cast. Bushra Bibi, the former first lady who led the bloody Nov 24 D-Chowk March, is now serving a jail term in Adiala jail.
And so, the task of securing Imran Khan’s release has passed on to another woman — his sister, Aleema Khan. She too, though, has now been taken into custody.
With the planned political onslaught on the federal capital just two days away, the clock is ticking, and worryingly, no one knows where and how this will end.
No one has a clue. Not even those who have planned for this day for months. And neither do the ones who have scrambled to throw in all possible measures to defend and protect Islamabad from yet another onslaught from KP. The stakes are high and everyone with an insight knows it.
The comparisons between the two guards are natural; Ali Amin was an old hack. He knew what he was getting into and would war-game it. But even he couldn’t forestall a mob that crossed over into the so-called Red Zone, precipitating violence in a way that was not foreseen.
But Afridi is a relatively new campaigner, carrying the relentless pressure of the party’s D-Chowk fiasco. It seems he doesn’t know the full breadth of what he is getting into. These are uncharted waters for him and he doesn’t have the comfort of many wise counsels.
Even the party’s own decision-making system is so diffused that no one is willing to publicly take responsibility for any fallout of the impending march; everyone is looking towards each other.
Mehmood Khan Achakzai and Raja Nasir Abbas, the PTI’s current political mentors, are there to lend their support. But any decision, they have made clear, has to come from the PTI itself.
Up until now, no one person knows what the whole plan is. With a crackdown on its leaders and lawmakers underway and authorities in Islamabad putting up several layers of security around the federal capital amid ominous warnings of nasty things to come, the PTI leadership can be under no illusions; this time around would be a different and dangerous gambit.
There are logistical and financial issues as well. A party which had no dearth of resources finds itself struggling to raise money to mobilise its workers and pay for logistics.
Adding to their woes is the unwillingness of private transporters to ferry party supporters, after having suffered huge losses to their vehicles in the Nov 2024 fiasco.
So, what could be the game plan once party workers and supporters are eventually mobilised despite all the difficulties and misgivings?
Stop at Swabi, just short of KP’s boundary with the Punjab on the M1 Motorway, and block the many entry points into Punjab?
Stage a sit-in; but for how long? Will it be sustainable? Not just logistically but also politically, given the problems that the blockades would cause to the people, and the food and fuel shortages that these would give rise to?
Or, will the PTI surge ahead, removing all the hurdles and battling police and Rangers to find an opening to enter Islamabad and bring the federal government to its knees, forcing it to accept their demands?
If that is the case, then who will lead the charge? Who will take responsibility in the event of something going terribly wrong? It doesn’t take long for a seemingly well-organised rally to turn into a mob; after all, even Ali Amin had not foreseen what would happen when his party workers entered the Red Zone. The risks are too high and everyone knows it — most of all the minders in Islamabad. PTI leaders now say, they are showing signs of panic by barricading their territory, placing containers and digging up roads to make them impassable.
For the federal authorities, the risk of mob violence is too real to ignore. The events of Nov 2024 are still fresh in their memory and they can’t afford another violent confrontation so close to the Red Zone.
Allowing the PTI to stage a sit-in anywhere near Islamabad is a big no-no for them; it was tried and tested, and it failed.
The choices are limited. The PTI cannot afford a repeat of what happened in November 2024. Such an eventuality, they know, will hurt them gravely and might even cost them their government in KP.
It is a suspense thriller, that’s for sure. No one knows, neither in Peshawar, nor in Islamabad, how events will unfold in the days to come.
Most worryingly, though, no one is talking to anyone, and no one knows who will initiate negotiations to end this deadlock. For some strange reason, in the words of a senior PTI lawmaker, they are looking to divine intervention to toss up some middle ground, or face-saving.
Published in Dawn, September 25th, 2026
For decades, India has refused to recognise a Pakistan-China boundary in a disputed part of the Himalayas that Delhi claims as its own.
But last week, Pakistan and China formalised a boundary in a remote part of the mountainous region, drawing a sharp response from Delhi.
The two countries signed the Pakistan-China Boundary Joint Commission, an agreement which Pakistan described as a “significant milestone” that would deepen cooperation on border management, trade and connectivity between India’s regional rivals.
Delhi rejected the move as having no legal basis, saying it did not recognise any Pakistan-China boundary located in territory it claims as Indian.
The announcement comes at a particularly sensitive moment.
India and China are seeking to stabilise their relationship after years of military tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the disputed line separating their forces along much of their Himalayan frontier. At the same time, Beijing and Islamabad are deepening cooperation along a neighbouring stretch of the frontier that India also claims.
“There is no boundary between Pakistan and China. We reject the so-called Joint Commission, which is without any legal basis,” Indian foreign ministry spokesman Randhir Jaiswal said.
The commission concerns the Pakistan-China frontier, including the Shaksgam Valley, a roughly 5,180 sq km tract that Pakistan ceded to China in 1963 but which India claims as part of its territory in Ladakh.
India says the territory was part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and was illegally occupied by Pakistan before being ceded to China. The Indian government has never recognised the agreement and considers it illegal and invalid.
This history explains the particular sensitivity of Wednesday’s announcement.
“Pakistan has no locus standi to enter into arrangements concerning Indian territory under its illegal and forcible occupation,” the Indian foreign ministry said.
Pakistan says Jammu and Kashmir remains a disputed territory, and argues that India therefore has no standing to challenge its 1963 boundary agreement with China. It regards the agreement as valid.
Jabin T Jacob, professor at the Department of International Relations and Governance Studies at Delhi’s Shiv Nadar University, said the new development represented the revival of an old mechanism rather than an entirely new arrangement.
“A joint boundary commission is provided for in the 1963 Sino-Pak Agreement, the only issue at hand is the timing of its operationalisation,” he told the BBC.
He said there could be several reasons for the timing, including China’s broader effort to demarcate its boundaries and a desire to institutionalise exchanges and movement along a frontier at a time when Pakistan’s other borders have experienced conflict and instability.
Jacob said India should be “worried” by the development. More importantly, he said, the move appeared to disregard a provision in the 1963 treaty itself.
Article 6 of the agreement provided for its renegotiation once the Kashmir dispute was settled with whichever country ultimately controlled the territory, Jacob said.
For India, Jacob said, the problem is compounded by the international information environment.
“China’s relative dominance of the international media and information landscape – [with] CGTN, CRI, presence on social media – relative to India allows it to put forward its narrative and maps globally while India is limited to fulminations that other world capitals are likely to ignore,” he said.
That concern is distinct from the practical management of the frontier itself. Pakistan and China already have extensive infrastructure and connectivity links across the region, including the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Karakoram Highway.
Husain Haqqani, former Pakistani ambassador to the US and now a senior fellow at Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy and Hudson Institute, said the new commission was both practical and political.
“It is a combination of both,” Haqqani told the BBC. “It is a mechanism to enhance border and boundary cooperation, prevent illegal crossings and protect the strategic infrastructure tied to CPEC.”
He said it also served as a signal to India that Beijing continued to view Kashmir through the Pakistani prism.
“China has never accepted India’s position on Kashmir and China views Gilgit-Baltistan from the Pakistani, not Indian prism,” Haqqani said, referring to the region in Pakistan-administered Kashmir that borders China and which India claims as part of its territory.
Haqqani said Islamabad’s position had evolved in response to developments in Indian-administered Kashmir.
“Pakistan still maintains that the final status of Jammu and Kashmir is yet to be decided,” he said. “But since India has made internal changes – for example, the abrogation of Article 370 – in its part of Kashmir, Pakistan sees no issue with simply institutionalising what has been de facto with China since 1963.”
For Beijing, the arrangement also fits into a broader pattern of using its relationships with neighbouring states to manage and signal its position towards India.
Haqqani said reassurance to Pakistan on Kashmir was of both strategic and geopolitical value to Beijing.
“On the strategic front it further deepens ties with Pakistan and on the geo-strategic front it reinforces for India its fear of a two-front threat from China and Pakistan, which pleases Pakistan and benefits China.”
The timing of the statement, say experts, is also significant.
“China always plans its decisions months, if not years, in advance so the decision to operationalise a joint boundary commission must have been made some time back,” says Haqqani.
“The release of this information was timed for after President Xi Jinping’s recent Brics summit trip to send Pakistan a message of reassurance in the strategic partnership, and India a reminder that multilateral engagement does not translate into any change in China’s vision for South Asia.”
But Jacob cautioned against interpreting every aspect of the development as a direct military move against India.
“There aren’t any immediate or apparent implications for the LAC as of now,” he said.
That suggests that the significance of last week’s announcement may lie less in an immediate change to the disputed Himalayan frontier than in the gradual institutionalisation of arrangements that India has consistently rejected.
India’s position, Jaiswal said, remained “clear and consistent”: any attempt to legitimise what Delhi considers Pakistan’s illegal occupation of Indian territory is unacceptable and has no bearing on India’s sovereignty.
But Haqqani believes the dispute goes beyond the legalities of borders.
“The key disagreement between India and China about the border and boundary is geo-strategic, not cartographic,” he said. “So there is a limit to what border negotiations and border management mechanisms can achieve.”
Pakistan, he added, remained “China’s secondary deterrent against India” – and Beijing’s engagement with Islamabad would continue to send that message to Delhi.
Taken From BBC News
KARACHI: Sindh Chief Minister Syed Murad Ali Shah on Wednesday reviewed the progress against poliovirus, noting that Sindh had reduced its polio burden from 23 cases in 2024 and nine in 2025 to just one case so far in 2026. However, environmental surveillance showed that the virus is still present in a few high-risk areas.
Chairing a meeting of the Provincial Task Force (PTF) on Polio Eradication, the CM reaffirmed the government’s commitment to eliminating the disease and directed authorities to intensify vaccination, surveillance and community engagement efforts ahead of the September 21-27 Sub-National Immunisation Days (SNIDs) campaign.
“The progress achieved by Sindh is encouraging and reflects the hard work of our health workers, district administrations and partner organisations, but our mission will only be completed when every child is protected, and the virus is eliminated from every district,” said Murad Ali Shah.
“No child should remain unvaccinated due to negligence, weak supervision or lack of follow-up.”
Reviews preparations for week-long campaign beginning on 21st
The meeting, held at CM House, was attended by Health Minister Dr Azra Fazal Pechuho, chief secretary Asif Hyder Shah, Mayor of Karachi Murtaza Wahab, IG Police Sindh Javed Alam Odho, commissioner of Karachi Hassan Naqvi, provincial secretaries, provincial coordinator of Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) Shaharyar Gul, Sindh government partners, and deputy commissioners. From other districts, commissioners, DIGs, deputy commissioners and SSPs participated via video link.
Briefing the meeting, Health Minister Dr Azra Fazal Pechuho said Pakistan’s wild poliovirus (WPV1) cases have declined sharply from 74 in 2024 to 31 in 2025 and only three so far in 2026. Sindh has recorded a single case this year, reported from Sujawal on February 10, compared to nine cases last year and 23 in 2024.
In-charge of EOC Shaharyar Gul informed the chief minister that environmental surveillance data shows a significant reduction in virus circulation across the province. The number of positive environmental surveillance sites has fallen from a peak of 29 in March 2025 to only five in August 2026. Outside Karachi, all 14 surveillance sites are currently negative, while six of Karachi’s 15 sites remain positive, indicating that transmission is increasingly confined to limited pockets of the city.
The meeting participants were told that the absence of confirmed polio cases in Karachi during the 2025 high-transmission season, despite some positive environmental samples, reflects stronger population immunity achieved through routine immunisation and repeated vaccination campaigns.
Chief secretary Asif Hyder Shah said that sustained immunisation efforts have helped prevent clinical cases even where environmental surveillance continues to detect virus circulation.
Expressing satisfaction over the declining trend, the chief minister directed all commissioners, deputy commissioners and district health authorities to adopt a zero-tolerance approach towards missed children, refusals and operational gaps.
Reviewing surveillance findings, he ordered intensified vaccination and monitoring efforts in Karachi and other identified high-risk areas, full implementation of the Karachi Action Plan 2.0, stronger coordination among district administrations and health authorities, closer monitoring of migrant and mobile populations and improved routine immunisation coverage in underserved communities.
EOC coordinator Shaharyar Gul reported that nearly three million oral polio vaccine (OPV) doses and 2.89 million booster doses were administered in Karachi, while campaigns in other divisions delivered approximately 2.7 million OPV doses and 2.58 million booster doses. Expanded-age vaccination strategies helped reach older children through schools and community-based interventions.
The chief minister appreciated the efforts of frontline workers, teachers, community mobilisers and health staff working in remote and hard-to-reach areas, describing them as the backbone of the eradication programme.
The task force was informed that after the July 2026 SNIDs campaign, a special 10-day follow-up drive was launched to vaccinate children who had initially been missed. Of 146,149 missed children, more than 23,500 were subsequently vaccinated through targeted efforts focused on refusals and unavailable children.
Mr Shah directed district administrations to further reduce refusal rates through stronger community engagement and public awareness campaigns, emphasising that building trust with parents remains critical to the success of the programme.
The meeting reviewed preparations for the September 21-27 SNIDs campaign, during which nearly 10 million children under five will be vaccinated across Sindh. The campaign will cover 23 full districts and selected union councils in seven partial districts, with more than 80,000 frontline workers participating.
Officials said over 26,000 police personnel have been assigned security duties. The chief minister reiterated the provincial government’s financial support for the campaign and noted that incentives for frontline workers had been increased by 28 per cent.
He directed all districts to complete remaining preparedness measures, including vaccine supply, logistics, workforce deployment and supervision arrangements, before the campaign begins.
The chief minister also reviewed campaign quality indicators and was informed that Sindh has continued to maintain strong performance standards while pursuing key reforms in routine immunisation, surveillance, staffing and community engagement.
Published in Dawn, September 17th, 2026
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