Akhtar Hussain Sandhu

Historian & Columnist

Chicago (USA)

The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) government’s non-cooperation with the federal government’s policies and its opposition to military operations against terrorists led to the imposition of Governor’s Rule on 12 October 2026. Political hoopla has been a defining feature of Pakistan’s political history. The PTI’s dissenting and, moreover, defiant politics led its leadership and activists towards violence. However, the subsequent situation, in which security agencies reportedly identified deep links between KP-PTI leaders and the Taliban and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), convinced the federal government to impose Governor’s Rule. There are allegations that the KP government had a covert understanding with Afghanistan regarding cooperation. Although no one has presented evidence of such an understanding, the PTI’s non-cooperation with Pakistan Army operations, its silence on the deaths of law enforcement personnel, and its apathetic attitude towards equipping the KP police with the required modern weapons and other equipment reflect the provincial government’s detachment from federal policies. These factors have also reinforced the claims made by state institutions. Pakistan is a democratic country, but undemocratic policies and attitudes have devastated the dream of establishing a welfare state. The federal government has spent huge amounts of public money on maintaining a luxurious lifestyle for those in power, while the public has continued to endure severe hardships. Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir has expressed his desire to make Pakistan a hard state in which the rule of law empowers the state. However, this aspiration has yet to be realized because politicians remain reluctant to enforce the rule of law. The rule of law begins with genuine democracy, which is possible only through an empowered local government system. Yet, such a system is largely absent across Pakistan. It does not suit politicians and the civil bureaucracy because it transfers resources and decision-making powers to local governments for development work. Neither politicians nor the civil bureaucracy appears willing to share these resources and powers. Federal and provincial governments may formulate democratic policies, but their undemocratic attitudes towards implementation prevent those policies from producing the desired results. Governments are dominated by elite families that enjoy protection from accountability for illegal and corrupt activities. Such practices include shielding individuals from criminal proceedings, protecting the occupation of government land and plots, and benefiting from corruption, commissions from contractors, NGOs, fraudulent TA/DA claims, and bogus medical bills. This pathetic situation neither restores peace in society nor produces honest and competent leadership. Such a pathetic situation neither restores peace in society nor produces honest and competent leadership. After imposing Governor’s rule in KPK, what is to be done with the PTI followers and leaders? I opine that discarding the traditional policy of dividing the political party into factions is more harmful than declaring one party as a traitor and anti-Pakistan. It would have been better to create a parallel PTI faction instead of the Istehkam-i-Pakistan Party, etc. because the PTI workers must have been provided political shelter somewhere, but right now the establishment has left them in the doldrums, which can be more dangerous. This is what we warned about: it would be very easy for terrorist or violent groups to form governments in the proposed new provinces with small areas. Nobody can prevent violent groups such as TLP, TTP, BLA, etc. from clinching governments in the new provinces with small areas. Now, the federal government owes the entire responsibility to root out terrorism from KPK and to ensure the prosperity of the people. People expect positive results from this political strategy. To sum, if we genuinely want to transform Pakistan into a welfare state in which the rule of law is firmly enforced and crime and punishment are proportionate and consistently applied, ‘we’ must redefine the role of institutions. Who are ‘We’ is yet to be disclosed, although the Constitution ought to be the ‘we.’ Everyone, from politicians to those who exercise a strong grip on the system, must demonstrate the will to put Pakistan on the path to becoming a democratic country. The existing political system can transform Pakistan into a welfare state as long as elite capture (Gutterafia) continues to prevail and the powerful remain above the law.

Dragon Boat Associations Established in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
PSHAWAR/LAHORE: Dragon boat associations have been established in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, marking a step towards organising and promoting the sport across Pakistan.
Prominent political and social figure Ameer Bahadur Khan Hoti will serve as president of the Punjab Dragon Boat Association (PDBA), while a notification has been issued confirming the election of former bureaucrat Javed Marwat as president of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Dragon Boat Association (KPDBA). At a meeting in Lahore, prominent sports journalist Muhammad Yousuf was elected secretary general of the Punjab association. Uzma Zaidi will serve as senior vice president and Naveed Akhtar Malik as treasurer.
At a separate meeting in Peshawar, Javed Marwat, who previously held several senior administrative positions in the province, was unanimously elected president of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa association, while renowned sports organiser Naeem Gul was elected secretary general. Shamim Akhtar Jadoon will serve as senior vice president, Junaid Khan vice president and Bilal Aslam as treasurer. Newly elected Punjab association president Ameer Bahadur Khan Hoti said Pakistan’s first dragon boat festival and competitions on the Kabul River had opened new avenues for the sport’s development. He said the enthusiasm shown by participants and the sport’s promising prospects had highlighted the need to establish a Pakistan Dragon Boat Federation to coordinate training, organise competitions and support athletes. Dragon boat associations would be established in all four provinces and the federal capital, Islamabad, before the formal announcement of the national federation, he added.
Newly elected Khyber Pakhtunkhwa association president Javed Marwat said efforts would focus on introducing the sport at the provincial level and providing athletes with opportunities to compete nationally and demonstrate their abilities. Teams would also be sent to represent Pakistan in international competitions. He said the sport would help strengthen people-to-people exchanges and further promote Pakistan-China friendship. Marwat expressed confidence that dragon boat racing would soon gain popularity throughout Pakistan.

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Pakistan’s military commitment to Saudi Arabia raises a question that cannot be answered simply by identifying where its soldiers are stationed. Modern warfare allows forces to attack through aircraft, missiles, drones and targeting support without sending infantry across a border. The decisive issue is whether Pakistani personnel and capabilities will participate in hostilities against Yemen’s Houthis—and what consequences could follow.
Scott Ritter, renowned American podcaster, military and geopolitical analyst captures the central danger: Saudi Arabia could obtain through collective defence the Pakistani involvement in Yemen that Islamabad previously resisted. An initially limited commitment could expand through casualties, retaliation and demands for reinforcement, leaving Pakistan responsible for a war whose objectives it does not control.
CNN reported on October 7 that Pakistani troops were already stationed in Saudi Arabia. In the interview, Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, director general of Inter-Services Public Relations, declined to disclose their numbers or capabilities. Asked about operations across the Yemeni border, he invoked military confidentiality, explaining that participating countries do not publicly disclose how and where they will employ their forces. His response offered no categorical exclusion of ground operations or offensive action inside Yemen, even as he described Pakistani involvement as defensive.
That distinction matters. Operational secrecy may protect military personnel, but it also leaves the public without clear answers about the mission’s boundaries. The description “defensive” cannot establish those boundaries by itself. Governments routinely invoke defence to justify attacks beyond their territory; the relevant questions concern what forces actually do, whom they target and under whose authority.
Pakistani forces operating from Saudi territory could potentially support or conduct attacks inside Yemen without deploying infantry there. Air operations and targeting assistance could carry substantial consequences. If Pakistani personnel participate in attacks against Houthi positions, Ansarullah could regard Pakistan as belligerent. Tehran could interpret the same activity as participation in a campaign against Iranian regional interests.
The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye on August 7, 2026, reportedly treats an attack against one member as an attack against all three. Its deterrent promise is substantial, but so is the danger of importing one member’s confrontation into the security calculations of the others.
An October 5 statement published by Türkiye’s Foreign Ministry committed the partners to implement collective defence arrangements and rapidly deploy agreed military forces and capabilities to Saudi Arabia, subject to national legislation. Türkiye therefore shares the deployment commitment. However, the evidence reviewed does not establish a Turkish ground combat commitment against the Houthis or an equal distribution of operational risks.
For Islamabad, the unanswered questions are fundamental. Who authorizes Pakistani involvement in cross-border attacks? Can Pakistan refuse a particular operation? Who finances a prolonged deployment, and what conditions permit withdrawal? Confidential operational details need not be published to explain the political mandate governing the use of force.
Pakistan brings potential strengths to the alliance: experienced personnel, established military institutions and longstanding cooperation with Riyadh. Saudi infrastructure and financing could support a substantial deployment. Islamabad’s relationships with both Riyadh and Tehran might also create diplomatic opportunities, provided military involvement does not undermine its credibility as an intermediary.
Yet those strengths do not resolve the weaknesses of an extended campaign. Destroying particular weapons or positions is different from ending an adversary’s ability and determination to fight. Dispersed forces, local networks and adaptation can frustrate superior firepower. Tactical gains could therefore coexist with an expanding mission and an elusive political settlement.
Ritter’s warning is strongest when understood in these terms. Predicting inevitable Pakistani defeat is less useful than asking what victory would require. Protecting defined facilities offers measurable objectives. Permanently eliminating the Houthi threat could entail commitments far beyond what Pakistan initially intended—and costs that additional military capability cannot necessarily overcome.
Saudi financial assistance complicates Islamabad’s freedom of choice. The State Bank of Pakistan confirmed that a $3 billion Saudi deposit maturing in December 2025 was extended for another year. Such support gives Pakistan a substantial interest in maintaining Saudi confidence.
Saudi’s financial influence does not require an explicit threat. A government facing external financing pressures may find it difficult to reject security requests from an important creditor. The danger is that short-term economic reassurance encourages military obligations carrying much greater long-term costs.
Iran introduces a further risk. Pakistani attacks against an Iranian-supported movement could damage relations with a neighbouring country and generate security pressures closer to home. The Houthis also possess their own Yemeni objectives, and attacking them is not automatically equivalent to attacking Iran. Political escalation, however, can advance through perceptions and retaliation before governments agree on legal distinctions.
International law offers no reliable assurance that this confrontation would remain contained. Legal obligations persist, but their enforcement is uneven, and states may invoke self-defence while pursuing military objectives beyond their borders. Pakistan therefore cannot assume that legal distinctions between defending Saudi territory and attacking Houthi positions would restrain retaliation. If Tehran perceives Pakistani operations as threatening its interests, the danger would turn on strategic calculations, perceived threats and the risk of escalation—not simply on competing interpretations of the UN Charter. Shared religion and geographical proximity would offer no dependable protection against that outcome.
Pakistan’s domestic divisions make a widening conflict especially consequential. The supporters of imprisoned former prime minister Imran Khan began marching from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa toward Islamabad on October 4, demanding his release, hospital treatment and family access. An overseas campaign would impose additional demands on resources and political legitimacy amid an already polarized environment.
Parliament’s April 2015 resolution remains relevant. It supported neutrality in Yemen alongside solidarity against threats to Saudi territorial integrity and the holy sites, while urging diplomacy through the United Nations and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. That distinction deserves renewed parliamentary examination before military commitments overtake political debate.
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye should pursue an emergency OIC initiative linked to UN diplomacy, involving Iran and meaningful Yemeni participation. Reciprocal de-escalation, civilian protection and humanitarian access should take priority. Their collective influence should also sustain action for Palestinian rights rather than dissipate through another prolonged regional confrontation.
The Makkah Pact’s credibility will depend on whether it improves security. Secrecy about military methods cannot replace clarity about political objectives. Before Pakistan’s commitment deepens, its leaders must explain what they are defending, how far that obligation extends and how they intend to prevent it from becoming an open-ended war.