China
Thai king becomes country’s first monarch to visit China
King Maha Vajiralongkorn of Thailand has arrived in China on Wednesday, the first ever visit by a reigning Thai monarch.
The visit is at the invitation of Chinese President Xi Jinping to celebrate the 50th anniversary of both countries establishing diplomatic ties for the first time in 1975. China is believed to have been pushing for this visit for some years.
The Thai government said in a statement that the trip “underlines the deep-rooted friendship and mutual understanding shared between Thailand and China at all levels”.
In Beijing, the king and his wife Queen Suthida will visit local landmarks like the Lingguang Buddhist Temple and the Beijing Aerospace City.
President Xi and his wife will also host a state banquet for the Thai royals.
This is the first major state visit by King Vajiralongkorn since he came to the throne nine years ago – in April he also made a trip to Bhutan. By contrast the most high-profile overseas trips made by his father King Bhumibol were to the United States in the 1960s, when Thailand was feted as a crucial Cold War partner, and a vital base for US military operations in Indochina.
Thailand is still officially a military ally of the US, but relations with China have grown steadily closer in recent years, while those with Washington have been frayed by US criticism of human rights in Thailand, by President Trump’s tariffs, and a perception that the US is no longer as committed as it once was to its Asian friends.
China is Thailand’s biggest trading partner, and increasingly a rival to the US as a source of military equipment.
Many Thais can trace their ancestry to migrants who came from China, and the Chinese government often highlights what it calls their “brotherly” or “family” relations.
The importance of those ties to Thailand was underlined earlier this year when the Thai authorities deported 40 Uyghur asylum-seekers back to China, in defiance of a warning not to do so by the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
Then in August an exhibition at Bangkok’s main arts centre featuring Uyghur and Tibetan artists was censored following complaints by Chinese diplomats.
The Thai government was spurred by Chinese pressure into taking action against scam compounds operating along its border with Myanmar, and objections by China are presumed to have been one of the factors which blocked a proposal to legalise casinos in Thailand.
Despite the lack of a Thai royal visit before this one, the Thai monarchy has played a significant role in sustaining Thai-Chinese relations through the work of the king’s younger sister, Princess Sirindhorn, who has studied Chinese art and language for the past 45 years, and been a frequent visitor to China.
China
Trump in Beijing: A Visit of Powerlessness
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : President Donald Trump’s May 2026 visit to Beijing was expected to reset global geopolitics, calm financial markets, pressure China on Iran, secure trade breakthroughs, and perhaps establish a new strategic understanding between the world’s two largest powers. Instead, the visit exposed something far more consequential: a visible shift in global leverage from Washington to Beijing. What was projected as a high-stakes diplomatic triumph increasingly appeared to many observers as a journey of strategic desperation, where the United States arrived seeking concessions while China calmly projected patience, confidence, and restraint.
The visit came at perhaps the worst possible moment for Washington. The United States entered Beijing politically exhausted, militarily stretched, economically pressured, and diplomatically weakened after months of confrontation surrounding Iran, the Strait of Hormuz crisis, sanctions battles, and growing instability in global energy markets. China understood this reality fully. Beijing knew that America’s military-industrial supremacy, once considered untouchable, had suffered reputational damage after Iran managed to withstand the combined pressure of the United States and Israel without surrendering its strategic posture. The longer the war dragged on, the more global markets, oil routes, and supply chains trembled.
Trump arrived in Beijing hoping to secure Chinese cooperation on several critical fronts. Washington wanted China to pressure Iran into reopening the Strait of Hormuz completely and stabilizing energy shipments. The United States also sought Chinese compliance with sanctions and shipping restrictions targeting vessels accused of supporting Iran. Another major American objective was to reduce Chinese economic engagement with Venezuela, whose oil exports had increasingly escaped U.S. pressure mechanisms. Simultaneously, Washington expected movement on agricultural purchases, aircraft deals, tariff relief, and broader trade normalization.
Yet despite all the ceremonial grandeur, lunches, tours, dinners, and carefully choreographed hospitality, China committed to virtually nothing concrete on the core geopolitical disputes.
The most sensitive issue of all remained Taiwan. Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly warned Trump in direct terms that mishandling Taiwan could push both countries toward confrontation or even open conflict. Trump, unusually cautious throughout the visit, avoided public comments about Taiwan while in Beijing. Only after boarding Air Force One did he hint that he may reconsider arms sales to Taipei after hearing Xi’s objections.
That hesitation alone sent shockwaves through strategic circles. Taiwan represents the center of China’s national reunification doctrine under the “One China” policy. Beijing views Taiwan not as a separate sovereign state, but as a breakaway province destined eventually to return to the mainland—much like Hong Kong returned after decades of British control. China’s leadership believes time is now increasingly on its side. Hong Kong’s reintegration demonstrated Beijing’s long-term strategic patience, and Chinese policymakers appear convinced that Taiwan’s eventual absorption into the broader Chinese system is historically inevitable.
Trump’s reluctance to firmly reaffirm military backing for Taiwan revealed how complicated the balance of power has become. America once projected overwhelming confidence in East Asia. Today, Washington appears increasingly cautious about opening another major confrontation 9,500 miles away while already struggling to manage crises in the Middle East.
Equally important was China’s silence on the Iran war. Trump publicly claimed that Xi agreed a nuclear-armed Iran would be dangerous and even offered help in ending the conflict. Yet Beijing itself avoided confirming any such alignment. China maintained its carefully balanced diplomatic position, emphasizing only that all parties’ concerns should be considered.
That distinction mattered enormously. China has no interest in openly endorsing an American-led strategy that weakened one of Beijing’s critical energy and geopolitical partners. Iran remains central to China’s Belt and Road ambitions, regional connectivity plans, and long-term energy security. Beijing also deeply resented American efforts to interfere with Chinese shipping, oil imports, and maritime operations linked to Iran. The Chinese leadership clearly signaled that while it favors stability, it will not become an enforcement arm of U.S. pressure campaigns.
Meanwhile, the economic dimension of the trip produced more headlines than substance. Trump spoke enthusiastically about potential aircraft purchases, suggesting China could buy between 200 and eventually 750 Boeing planes. There were also discussions involving General Electric engines, agricultural products, investment boards, and reciprocal tariff reductions.
But the markets were not impressed. Global investors had expected major breakthroughs—perhaps a concrete trade accord, sanctions relief, maritime understandings, or joint statements stabilizing geopolitical tensions. Instead, what emerged was vague language, future possibilities, and broad diplomatic formulations without enforceable commitments.
Financial markets reacted negatively because traders recognized the gap between optics and outcomes. The world economy today is deeply fragile. Oil prices remain volatile. Shipping insurance costs are elevated. Supply chains are unstable. Fertilizer markets, aviation industries, and industrial production continue facing enormous uncertainty tied to Middle Eastern instability. Investors were hoping for decisive clarity. What they received instead was strategic ambiguity.
The contrast in diplomatic posture between Trump and Xi was also striking. Trump showered Xi with praise throughout the visit, repeatedly describing him as a “great leader,” a “friend,” and someone with whom America could build a “fantastic future.” Xi, by contrast, remained disciplined and restrained. He offered polite gestures, symbolic hospitality, and carefully measured compliments, but avoided emotional reciprocity.
This imbalance itself became symbolic. To many analysts, it reflected a reversal of psychological positioning between the two powers. America appeared eager for accommodation; China appeared comfortable waiting. Trump openly admired Xi and praised China’s hospitality, while Beijing calmly held its ground on virtually every critical issue—from Taiwan to Iran, sanctions, shipping, and strategic competition.
Even more significantly, China now understands America’s vulnerabilities far better than before. Beijing witnessed how quickly American stockpiles of precision-guided weapons were consumed during the Iran conflict. It saw how difficult and expensive prolonged modern warfare had become. It also saw that despite enormous military expenditures, Washington failed to decisively bend Iran to its will or secure uncontested dominance over the Strait of Hormuz.
This realization changes strategic calculations permanently. For decades, American power rested not only on military capability but on the perception of overwhelming inevitability. That aura has weakened. China now increasingly believes that economic resilience, technological advancement, industrial capacity, and strategic patience can gradually outlast American pressure.
The tariff war itself reinforced this conclusion. Washington expected tariffs to severely damage China’s economy. Instead, many American farmers suffered as China reduced agricultural imports and diversified suppliers. Soybean producers, meat exporters, and farming communities across the United States felt the consequences sharply. Beijing endured the tariffs while maintaining industrial production and export competitiveness.
By the end of the visit, Trump appeared to be requesting renewed Chinese purchases more than dictating terms. The broader geopolitical message of the Beijing summit was therefore unmistakable: the global order is shifting from unipolar dominance toward strategic multipolarity, with China increasingly acting not as a challenger seeking acceptance, but as a confident superpower shaping the rules of engagement.
The visit achieved little in concrete terms. There was no major Taiwan understanding, no Iran breakthrough, no Hormuz settlement, no sanctions resolution, and no transformational trade agreement. Yet paradoxically, the trip may still prove historic—not because of what was signed, but because of what it revealed.
It revealed an America struggling to preserve leverage it once took for granted, and a China increasingly convinced that history is moving in its direction.
China
Trump in Beijing: A Visit of Powerlessness
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : President Donald Trump’s May 2026 visit to Beijing was expected to reset global geopolitics, calm financial markets, pressure China on Iran, secure trade breakthroughs, and perhaps establish a new strategic understanding between the world’s two largest powers. Instead, the visit exposed something far more consequential: a visible shift in global leverage from Washington to Beijing. What was projected as a high-stakes diplomatic triumph increasingly appeared to many observers as a journey of strategic desperation, where the United States arrived seeking concessions while China calmly projected patience, confidence, and restraint.
The visit came at perhaps the worst possible moment for Washington. The United States entered Beijing politically exhausted, militarily stretched, economically pressured, and diplomatically weakened after months of confrontation surrounding Iran, the Strait of Hormuz crisis, sanctions battles, and growing instability in global energy markets. China understood this reality fully. Beijing knew that America’s military-industrial supremacy, once considered untouchable, had suffered reputational damage after Iran managed to withstand the combined pressure of the United States and Israel without surrendering its strategic posture. The longer the war dragged on, the more global markets, oil routes, and supply chains trembled.
Trump arrived in Beijing hoping to secure Chinese cooperation on several critical fronts. Washington wanted China to pressure Iran into reopening the Strait of Hormuz completely and stabilizing energy shipments. The United States also sought Chinese compliance with sanctions and shipping restrictions targeting vessels accused of supporting Iran. Another major American objective was to reduce Chinese economic engagement with Venezuela, whose oil exports had increasingly escaped U.S. pressure mechanisms. Simultaneously, Washington expected movement on agricultural purchases, aircraft deals, tariff relief, and broader trade normalization.
Yet despite all the ceremonial grandeur, lunches, tours, dinners, and carefully choreographed hospitality, China committed to virtually nothing concrete on the core geopolitical disputes.
The most sensitive issue of all remained Taiwan. Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly warned Trump in direct terms that mishandling Taiwan could push both countries toward confrontation or even open conflict. Trump, unusually cautious throughout the visit, avoided public comments about Taiwan while in Beijing. Only after boarding Air Force One did he hint that he may reconsider arms sales to Taipei after hearing Xi’s objections.
That hesitation alone sent shockwaves through strategic circles. Taiwan represents the center of China’s national reunification doctrine under the “One China” policy. Beijing views Taiwan not as a separate sovereign state, but as a breakaway province destined eventually to return to the mainland—much like Hong Kong returned after decades of British control. China’s leadership believes time is now increasingly on its side. Hong Kong’s reintegration demonstrated Beijing’s long-term strategic patience, and Chinese policymakers appear convinced that Taiwan’s eventual absorption into the broader Chinese system is historically inevitable.
Trump’s reluctance to firmly reaffirm military backing for Taiwan revealed how complicated the balance of power has become. America once projected overwhelming confidence in East Asia. Today, Washington appears increasingly cautious about opening another major confrontation 9,500 miles away while already struggling to manage crises in the Middle East.
Equally important was China’s silence on the Iran war. Trump publicly claimed that Xi agreed a nuclear-armed Iran would be dangerous and even offered help in ending the conflict. Yet Beijing itself avoided confirming any such alignment. China maintained its carefully balanced diplomatic position, emphasizing only that all parties’ concerns should be considered.
That distinction mattered enormously. China has no interest in openly endorsing an American-led strategy that weakened one of Beijing’s critical energy and geopolitical partners. Iran remains central to China’s Belt and Road ambitions, regional connectivity plans, and long-term energy security. Beijing also deeply resented American efforts to interfere with Chinese shipping, oil imports, and maritime operations linked to Iran. The Chinese leadership clearly signaled that while it favors stability, it will not become an enforcement arm of U.S. pressure campaigns.
Meanwhile, the economic dimension of the trip produced more headlines than substance. Trump spoke enthusiastically about potential aircraft purchases, suggesting China could buy between 200 and eventually 750 Boeing planes. There were also discussions involving General Electric engines, agricultural products, investment boards, and reciprocal tariff reductions.
But the markets were not impressed. Global investors had expected major breakthroughs—perhaps a concrete trade accord, sanctions relief, maritime understandings, or joint statements stabilizing geopolitical tensions. Instead, what emerged was vague language, future possibilities, and broad diplomatic formulations without enforceable commitments.
Financial markets reacted negatively because traders recognized the gap between optics and outcomes. The world economy today is deeply fragile. Oil prices remain volatile. Shipping insurance costs are elevated. Supply chains are unstable. Fertilizer markets, aviation industries, and industrial production continue facing enormous uncertainty tied to Middle Eastern instability. Investors were hoping for decisive clarity. What they received instead was strategic ambiguity.
The contrast in diplomatic posture between Trump and Xi was also striking. Trump showered Xi with praise throughout the visit, repeatedly describing him as a “great leader,” a “friend,” and someone with whom America could build a “fantastic future.” Xi, by contrast, remained disciplined and restrained. He offered polite gestures, symbolic hospitality, and carefully measured compliments, but avoided emotional reciprocity.
This imbalance itself became symbolic. To many analysts, it reflected a reversal of psychological positioning between the two powers. America appeared eager for accommodation; China appeared comfortable waiting. Trump openly admired Xi and praised China’s hospitality, while Beijing calmly held its ground on virtually every critical issue—from Taiwan to Iran, sanctions, shipping, and strategic competition.
Even more significantly, China now understands America’s vulnerabilities far better than before. Beijing witnessed how quickly American stockpiles of precision-guided weapons were consumed during the Iran conflict. It saw how difficult and expensive prolonged modern warfare had become. It also saw that despite enormous military expenditures, Washington failed to decisively bend Iran to its will or secure uncontested dominance over the Strait of Hormuz.
This realization changes strategic calculations permanently. For decades, American power rested not only on military capability but on the perception of overwhelming inevitability. That aura has weakened. China now increasingly believes that economic resilience, technological advancement, industrial capacity, and strategic patience can gradually outlast American pressure.
The tariff war itself reinforced this conclusion. Washington expected tariffs to severely damage China’s economy. Instead, many American farmers suffered as China reduced agricultural imports and diversified suppliers. Soybean producers, meat exporters, and farming communities across the United States felt the consequences sharply. Beijing endured the tariffs while maintaining industrial production and export competitiveness.
By the end of the visit, Trump appeared to be requesting renewed Chinese purchases more than dictating terms. The broader geopolitical message of the Beijing summit was therefore unmistakable: the global order is shifting from unipolar dominance toward strategic multipolarity, with China increasingly acting not as a challenger seeking acceptance, but as a confident superpower shaping the rules of engagement.
The visit achieved little in concrete terms. There was no major Taiwan understanding, no Iran breakthrough, no Hormuz settlement, no sanctions resolution, and no transformational trade agreement. Yet paradoxically, the trip may still prove historic—not because of what was signed, but because of what it revealed.
It revealed an America struggling to preserve leverage it once took for granted, and a China increasingly convinced that history is moving in its direction.
China
Trump’s China Visit in a Changing World Order
Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : President Donald Trump’s upcoming visit to Beijing on May 14–15, 2026, may become one of the most consequential diplomatic moments of his presidency—not because it demonstrates American dominance, but because it symbolizes the dramatic transformation of global power relations. Once the uncontested architect of the global order, the United States now approaches China not from a position of overwhelming superiority, but from a position increasingly shaped by economic necessity, military exhaustion, geopolitical isolation, and strategic dependency.
For years, President Trump has repeatedly described Chinese President Xi Jinping as his “friend,” much like he has referred to Russian President Vladimir Putin and other global leaders. Yet international diplomacy has never operated on permanent friendships. Nations pursue interests, not emotions. Beneath the public compliments and ceremonial gestures lies one of the fiercest strategic rivalries in modern history.
From the moment Trump returned to office, virtually every Senate confirmation hearing for his cabinet nominees revolved around one central theme: China as America’s principal adversary. The United States’ grand strategy was unmistakable—contain China’s rise, weaken its economic reach, obstruct the Belt and Road Initiative, challenge its influence over maritime trade routes, and prevent Beijing from replacing Washington as the world’s dominant power.
Yet the geopolitical landscape has evolved in ways few in Washington anticipated.
The prolonged Iran conflict has fundamentally altered perceptions of American power. The United States and Israel entered the confrontation with sweeping objectives: to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions, dismantle its ballistic missile and drone capabilities, weaken its regional influence, and potentially force political capitulation. However, months later, many of those objectives remain unmet. Iran’s political structure survived, its military resilience remained intact, and its regional alliances endured.
This outcome has had profound global consequences. Across policy circles in Washington, questions are now openly being asked about the limits of American military power. Reports in Congress and the Senate increasingly acknowledge the heavy depletion of expensive precision-guided weapons systems, including Patriot missile batteries and THAAD interceptors. Analysts warn that replenishing these arsenals could take years and require enormous industrial expansion.
The war has therefore produced not only military strain but psychological damage to the image of American invincibility.
For China, this changing environment creates strategic opportunity.
Beijing enters the Trump-Xi summit with growing confidence. Over the past decade, China has systematically insulated itself from external shocks. It built enormous strategic oil reserves, accelerated renewable energy deployment, diversified supply chains, expanded naval and space capabilities, and reduced dependence on vulnerable Western-controlled systems.
Today, China dominates the global rare earth minerals industry—critical for electronics, batteries, aerospace systems, missiles, electric vehicles, and advanced defense manufacturing. The United States remains deeply dependent on Chinese rare earth processing and magnet production, especially as Washington attempts to replenish military stockpiles consumed during the Iran war. Even senior American officials acknowledge that building an alternative ecosystem could take many years.
This dependency significantly weakens Washington’s leverage.
The irony is striking. While the United States once sought to economically isolate China, it now desperately requires Chinese cooperation to stabilize critical industrial and military supply chains.
The upcoming Beijing talks are expected to focus heavily on trade stabilization, rare earth exports, shipping security, artificial intelligence, Taiwan, and Iran. According to multiple reports, Washington also seeks to establish a new “Board of Trade” mechanism to formalize economic coordination between the world’s two largest economies. The United States hopes China will increase purchases of American soybeans, aircraft, agriculture, energy products, and industrial goods. But beneath these economic discussions lies a deeper geopolitical reality: the United States increasingly needs China to help stabilize the international system.
The Iran war has disrupted shipping lanes, endangered energy flows, rattled financial markets, and exposed vulnerabilities across the global economy. Washington is now reportedly urging Beijing to pressure Tehran into reopening and stabilizing the Strait of Hormuz, through which a substantial share of the world’s oil and LNG passes. Yet China’s position on Iran differs sharply from Washington’s.
China has consistently resisted unilateral U.S. sanctions and remains one of Iran’s largest energy customers. Beijing views Iran not merely as an oil supplier but as a strategic node in Eurasian connectivity. At the same time, China has carefully balanced relations with Gulf Arab states, Russia, and Western economies. Unlike the United States, Beijing has largely avoided direct military entanglement while expanding economic influence across continents. This strategic patience has enhanced China’s global image.
At the same time, America’s relations with traditional allies have visibly deteriorated. Trump’s repeated demands regarding NATO burden-sharing, controversial rhetoric toward Europe, pressure over Greenland, and transactional diplomacy have frustrated many longstanding allies. European leaders who once aligned instinctively with Washington increasingly pursue independent relations with Beijing.
In recent years, multiple European delegations have traveled to China seeking investment, trade partnerships, and economic stability. This trend reflects not only Europe’s commercial interests but also a broader perception that China now represents predictability and long-term planning, while the United States increasingly appears driven by short-term political calculations. The symbolic implications are enormous.
For decades, American alliances formed the foundation of U.S. global supremacy. If allies gradually hedge toward China economically and diplomatically, the strategic balance of the international system changes fundamentally.
The Taiwan issue further complicates the summit. For years, Taiwan relied heavily on implicit American military backing. However, after the Iran conflict exposed strains on U.S. military readiness and weapons inventories, questions naturally emerge regarding Washington’s ability to sustain simultaneous large-scale confrontations in multiple theaters.
China understands this reality. Beijing is unlikely to aggressively force the Taiwan issue during Trump’s visit, but it recognizes that America’s credibility has been weakened. Trump himself previously suggested Taiwan should pay more for U.S. protection, reinforcing perceptions that American commitments may be transactional rather than absolute.
At the same time, China’s military modernization continues at remarkable speed. Beijing has expanded naval capabilities, advanced space programs, strengthened missile systems, and invested heavily in artificial intelligence and cyber warfare. China’s technological and industrial rise is now occurring on a scale unprecedented in modern history.
The contrast with America’s current challenges is increasingly visible. Economically, China continues diversifying energy sources and reducing fossil fuel dependency through renewable infrastructure. Militarily, it avoids prolonged foreign wars while preserving industrial capacity. Diplomatically, it expands partnerships without demanding ideological alignment. Strategically, it plays a long game.
This does not mean the United States has collapsed or China has “won” globally. America still possesses immense military power, technological innovation, financial influence, and alliance networks. However, the perception of unstoppable American supremacy has undeniably weakened.
Trump’s Beijing trip therefore represents more than a diplomatic visit. It symbolizes a historic transition toward a more multipolar world order.
The United States enters these talks seeking trade relief, industrial cooperation, shipping stability, rare earth access, and geopolitical de-escalation. China enters the talks seeking recognition of its status, protection of its economic interests, stability for continued growth, and gradual expansion of its global influence.
Both sides need each other. But increasingly, it appears they need each other on terms far more equal than at any point in recent decades. That reality alone marks one of the most significant geopolitical transformations of the 21st century.
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