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Pakistan’s Yemen Dilemma

Pakistan’s Yemen Dilemma

Paris (Imran Y. CHOUDHRY) :- Former Press Secretary to the President, Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France, Former MD, SRBC Mr. Qamar Bashir analysis : Pakistan’s military commitment to Saudi Arabia raises a question that cannot be answered simply by identifying where its soldiers are stationed. Modern warfare allows forces to attack through aircraft, missiles, drones and targeting support without sending infantry across a border. The decisive issue is whether Pakistani personnel and capabilities will participate in hostilities against Yemen’s Houthis—and what consequences could follow.
Scott Ritter, renowned American podcaster, military and geopolitical analyst captures the central danger: Saudi Arabia could obtain through collective defence the Pakistani involvement in Yemen that Islamabad previously resisted. An initially limited commitment could expand through casualties, retaliation and demands for reinforcement, leaving Pakistan responsible for a war whose objectives it does not control.
CNN reported on October 7 that Pakistani troops were already stationed in Saudi Arabia. In the interview, Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, director general of Inter-Services Public Relations, declined to disclose their numbers or capabilities. Asked about operations across the Yemeni border, he invoked military confidentiality, explaining that participating countries do not publicly disclose how and where they will employ their forces. His response offered no categorical exclusion of ground operations or offensive action inside Yemen, even as he described Pakistani involvement as defensive.
That distinction matters. Operational secrecy may protect military personnel, but it also leaves the public without clear answers about the mission’s boundaries. The description “defensive” cannot establish those boundaries by itself. Governments routinely invoke defence to justify attacks beyond their territory; the relevant questions concern what forces actually do, whom they target and under whose authority.
Pakistani forces operating from Saudi territory could potentially support or conduct attacks inside Yemen without deploying infantry there. Air operations and targeting assistance could carry substantial consequences. If Pakistani personnel participate in attacks against Houthi positions, Ansarullah could regard Pakistan as belligerent. Tehran could interpret the same activity as participation in a campaign against Iranian regional interests.
The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye on August 7, 2026, reportedly treats an attack against one member as an attack against all three. Its deterrent promise is substantial, but so is the danger of importing one member’s confrontation into the security calculations of the others.
An October 5 statement published by Türkiye’s Foreign Ministry committed the partners to implement collective defence arrangements and rapidly deploy agreed military forces and capabilities to Saudi Arabia, subject to national legislation. Türkiye therefore shares the deployment commitment. However, the evidence reviewed does not establish a Turkish ground combat commitment against the Houthis or an equal distribution of operational risks.
For Islamabad, the unanswered questions are fundamental. Who authorizes Pakistani involvement in cross-border attacks? Can Pakistan refuse a particular operation? Who finances a prolonged deployment, and what conditions permit withdrawal? Confidential operational details need not be published to explain the political mandate governing the use of force.
Pakistan brings potential strengths to the alliance: experienced personnel, established military institutions and longstanding cooperation with Riyadh. Saudi infrastructure and financing could support a substantial deployment. Islamabad’s relationships with both Riyadh and Tehran might also create diplomatic opportunities, provided military involvement does not undermine its credibility as an intermediary.
Yet those strengths do not resolve the weaknesses of an extended campaign. Destroying particular weapons or positions is different from ending an adversary’s ability and determination to fight. Dispersed forces, local networks and adaptation can frustrate superior firepower. Tactical gains could therefore coexist with an expanding mission and an elusive political settlement.
Ritter’s warning is strongest when understood in these terms. Predicting inevitable Pakistani defeat is less useful than asking what victory would require. Protecting defined facilities offers measurable objectives. Permanently eliminating the Houthi threat could entail commitments far beyond what Pakistan initially intended—and costs that additional military capability cannot necessarily overcome.
Saudi financial assistance complicates Islamabad’s freedom of choice. The State Bank of Pakistan confirmed that a $3 billion Saudi deposit maturing in December 2025 was extended for another year. Such support gives Pakistan a substantial interest in maintaining Saudi confidence.
Saudi’s financial influence does not require an explicit threat. A government facing external financing pressures may find it difficult to reject security requests from an important creditor. The danger is that short-term economic reassurance encourages military obligations carrying much greater long-term costs.
Iran introduces a further risk. Pakistani attacks against an Iranian-supported movement could damage relations with a neighbouring country and generate security pressures closer to home. The Houthis also possess their own Yemeni objectives, and attacking them is not automatically equivalent to attacking Iran. Political escalation, however, can advance through perceptions and retaliation before governments agree on legal distinctions.
International law offers no reliable assurance that this confrontation would remain contained. Legal obligations persist, but their enforcement is uneven, and states may invoke self-defence while pursuing military objectives beyond their borders. Pakistan therefore cannot assume that legal distinctions between defending Saudi territory and attacking Houthi positions would restrain retaliation. If Tehran perceives Pakistani operations as threatening its interests, the danger would turn on strategic calculations, perceived threats and the risk of escalation—not simply on competing interpretations of the UN Charter. Shared religion and geographical proximity would offer no dependable protection against that outcome.
Pakistan’s domestic divisions make a widening conflict especially consequential. The supporters of imprisoned former prime minister Imran Khan began marching from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa toward Islamabad on October 4, demanding his release, hospital treatment and family access. An overseas campaign would impose additional demands on resources and political legitimacy amid an already polarized environment.
Parliament’s April 2015 resolution remains relevant. It supported neutrality in Yemen alongside solidarity against threats to Saudi territorial integrity and the holy sites, while urging diplomacy through the United Nations and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. That distinction deserves renewed parliamentary examination before military commitments overtake political debate.
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye should pursue an emergency OIC initiative linked to UN diplomacy, involving Iran and meaningful Yemeni participation. Reciprocal de-escalation, civilian protection and humanitarian access should take priority. Their collective influence should also sustain action for Palestinian rights rather than dissipate through another prolonged regional confrontation.
The Makkah Pact’s credibility will depend on whether it improves security. Secrecy about military methods cannot replace clarity about political objectives. Before Pakistan’s commitment deepens, its leaders must explain what they are defending, how far that obligation extends and how they intend to prevent it from becoming an open-ended war.

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